HAIR ZONE, INC. v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al

2:25-cv-14960Njd25 févr. 2026

Texte intégral

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CLOSED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HAIR ZONE INC. D/B/A SENSATIONNEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY;
HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY; THE CHARTER OAK FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY; and TRAVELERS
PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF
AMERICA,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 25-14960 (SRC)
OPINION
CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on various motions brought by the parties in this case.
First, Defendants Travelers Property Casualty Company of America and The Charter Oak Fire
Insurance Company (“Travelers”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Hair Zone Inc. D/B/A
Sensationnel’s (“Plaintiff” or “Hair Zone”) Complaint (Dkt. No. 28, the “Travelers Motion”)
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Second, Defendants Hartford Fire Insurance
Company and Hartford Casualty Insurance Company (“Hartford”), after filing an Answer to the
Complaint, (Dkt. No. 25), filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Dkt. No. 41, the “Hartford Motion”). Third, in addition to opposing
the defendants’ motions, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. No.
54, “Plaintiff’s Motion”). 	All motions have been opposed and fully briefed. 	(Dkt. Nos. 54-56,
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62). 	For the following reasons, the Travelers Motion is GRANTED, the Hartford Motion is
GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a corporation that sells synthetic braiding hair, weaves, hair extensions, and
wigs (“Hair Products”). 	(See Dkt. No. 1, the “Complaint,” ¶ 4). 	In exchange for Plaintiff’s
payment of monthly premiums, Travelers and Hartford have both promised, at various relevant
times, to provide insurance coverage for Plaintiff consistent with the terms of their insurance
agreements. (See Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 20, 32) (the “Travelers Policies” and the “Hartford Policies”).
Under the Travelers Policies, Travelers promises to pay “those sums that [Plaintiff]
becomes legally obligated to pay as damage because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’”
(Id. ¶ 24). 	Additionally, Travelers has a “duty to defend [Plaintiff] against any ‘suit’” seeking
those damages. 	(Id. ¶ 26). 	The term bodily injury is defined by the Travelers Policies as
“[p]hysical harm including sickness or disease sustained by a person” or “[m]ental anguish, injury
or illness, or emotional distress, resulting at any time from such physical harm, sickness or
disease.” (Id. ¶ 28). The term “property damage” means “[p]hysical injury to tangible property,
including all resulting loss of use of that property” or “[l]oss of use of tangible property that is not
physically injured.” 	(Id. ¶ 27). 	Additionally, the Travelers Policies exclude coverage for
“[p]roperty damage to ‘your product’ arising out of it or any part of it.” (Travelers Motion, Ex. 1
at 118, “Your Product Exclusion”). “Your product” is defined as “[a]ny goods or products, other
than real property, manufactured, sold, handled, distributed or disposed of by [Plaintiff].” (Id. at
134).1
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the insurance agreements between Plaintiff and Travelers
even though they are attached to Travelers’s Motion and not to Plaintiff’s complaint because
they are integral to the complaint as this case is fundamentally a dispute about coverage under
the agreements. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d
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The Hartford Policies likewise cover sums Plaintiff becomes obligated to pay as damages
because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” and has a right and duty to defend against suits
seeking such damages. 	(Complaint ¶¶ 36-38). 	The Hartford Policies define “bodily injury” as
“physical: a. Injury; b. Sickness; or c. Disease sustained by a person and, if arising out of the above,
mental anguish or death at any time.” (Id. ¶ 40). The policies define “property damage” as “a.
Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property.”; or “b.
Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured.” (Id. ¶ 41). The Hartford Policies
also maintain the same Your Product Exclusion as the Travelers Policies. (Hartford Motion, Ex.
1 at 88, 104).
In March 2025, a class action complaint was filed against Plaintiff by Unique Little in the
Superior Court of California. (Complaint Ex. A, the “Little Complaint”). In May 2025, Plaintiff
received a letter from counsel on behalf of a woman named Jamaica Love threatening to file a
separate class action lawsuit. (Complaint Ex. B, the “Love Letter”). The Little Complaint alleges
that Plaintiff engaged in “fraudulent, deceptive and/or unsafe business practices” in connection
with its sale of Hair Products containing dangerously high levels of various carcinogens, lead, and
volatile organic compounds.” (Little Complaint ¶ 1). The Little Complaint alleges generally that
the Hair Products sold by Plaintiff contained toxins that, in some cases, are unsafe for human
exposure in any amount. (See, e.g., Id. ¶ 39). The Little Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff
failed to disclose this information to consumers before selling its Hair Products. (See, e.g., Id. ¶
9) (“Defendant is therefore liable to Plaintiff and Class Members for selling, manufacturing, or
distributing the Hair Products without disclosing that the products contain the chemicals described
Cir. 1993) (holding that “a court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a
defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the
document.”). For the same reason, the Court takes judicial notice of the Hartford Policies in
considering the competing motions for judgment on the pleadings.
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herein.”). 	The Little Complaint brings seven claims against Plaintiff: (1) Breach of Implied
Warranty of Merchantability under a California state statute, (2) Violation of the California
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, (3) Violation of California Unfair Competition Law, (4) Violation
of California False Advertising Law, (5) Fraud, (6) Unjust Enrichment/Quasi-Contract, and (7)
Negligent Misrepresentation. 	(Id. ¶¶ 32-46). 	Each of these claims fundamentally seeks relief
predicated on harm caused to the class of individuals who purchased Plaintiff’s Hair Products
without knowing about their allegedly dangerous ingredients. 	As alleged, if the purchasers had
known the truth about the Hair Products they would have either not purchased the Hair Products
or paid substantially less for them. The Love Letter essentially re-iterates the arguments already
brought in the Little Complaint.2
Plaintiff notified Hartford and Travelers of these actions. Hartford responded by sending
Plaintiff letters on May 28, 2025 and July 3, 2025 disclaiming coverage of both the Little
Complaint and the Love Letter under the Hartford Policies and it has not provided insurance
coverage related to these actions. (See Complaint ¶ 6). Travelers had not responded to Plaintiff’s
notice of the underlying actions by the time Plaintiff had filed its complaint in this case. (See Id.
¶ 8). 	Plaintiff filed this suit on August 27, 2025 seeking declaratory judgment declaring that
Travelers and Hartford are obligated to defend and indemnify it in the underlying actions, and
seeking damages from Hartford because of its failure to defend and indemnify Plaintiff.
2 Further, because Plaintiff appears to concede, and this Court agrees, that the Love Letter has
not yet ripened into a “suit” within the meaning of the Travelers or Hartford Policies, the
insurers’ duty to defend against the Love Letter is, as a threshold matter, not triggered.
(Plaintiff’s Mot. at 5, n. 2). Accordingly, the Court focuses its opinion here on the Little
Complaint and largely disregards the Love Letter.
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II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “sufficient
factual allegations, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may “consider
only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.”
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). A motion for judgment on the pleadings
“is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Revell v. Port Auth.
of New York, New Jersey, 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Glob. Naps, Inc. v. Bell Atl.-
New Jersey, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (D.N.J. 2003) (“The difference between Rules 12(b)(6)
and 12(c) is purely procedural as 12(c) requests for dismissal are governed by the same standards
as 12(b)(6) motions.”).
B. Analysis
Though there are multiple competing motions in this case, there is a single core question:
Does the Little Complaint fall within the coverage promised to Plaintiff by Travelers and Hartford?
Specifically, the Court must determine whether the Little Complaint qualifies as a suit seeking
damages “because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’” as contemplated by the Hartford and
Travelers Policies. If the answer is yes, and no exclusion applies, then the defendants have a duty
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to defend Plaintiff against the Little Complaint. If the answer is no, then the defendants do not
have such a duty and the complaint will be dismissed.3 Because, the Court finds that the Little
Complaint does not state claims seeking “damage because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property
damage,’” the Little Complaint does not fall within the coverage promised to Plaintiff, and the
Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed.
The duty to defend requires an insurer to provide “the insured with a defense against all
actions covered by the insurance policy.” Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Assoc., LLC, 23 A.3d
338, 346 (N.J. 2011). This duty arises when an underlying complaint “states a claim constituting
a risk insured against” by the relevant policies. 	Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d
1255, 1259 (N.J. 1992) (citation omitted). “If the pleadings set forth facts which bring the injury
within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is then obligated to defend . . . .” SL Industries v.
American Motorists, 591 A.2d 677, 680 (App.Div.1991) (citation omitted). 	In determining
whether the duty to defend has been triggered, “court[s] typically look[] to the allegations of the
complaint to decide whether the third party's action against the insured states a claim covered by
the policy. 	So long as one count or claim is covered under the policy, the duty to defend is
triggered. Am. Legacy Found., RP v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 623 F.3d 135,
139 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 	So, the Court must look to the Little Complaint and
determine whether it “states a claim covered by” the Travelers or Hartford Policies, because if
even “one count or claim is covered under the policy, the duty to defend is triggered.” Id.
First, Plaintiff argues it is entitled to defense because the Little Complaint asserts damages
“because of ‘bodily injury.’” The thrust of Plaintiff’s argument is that because the Little Complaint
3 Plaintiff states in its papers, “the duty to indemnify is premature at this stage.” (Plaintiff’s Mot.
at 10 n. 6). The Court agrees and the focus of this opinion is exclusively whether the Little
Complaint triggers the duty to defend.
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outlines the extensive dangers of and possible harm from exposure to the various toxic chemicals
alleged to be in Plaintiff’s Hair Products, it falls within the “bodily injury” protection of the
relevant policies. 	(See Hair Zone Mot. at 12-15). 	For support, Plaintiff primarily relies on the
decision of another court in this district which found that under New Jersey law, “exposure to
harmful substances, even when that exposure is not immediately accompanied by physical
symptoms, can be ‘bodily injury’ under a CGL policy.” Baughman v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co., 662 F.
Supp. 2d 386, 395 (D.N.J. 2009). The core issue with Plaintiff’s argument is that even if this Court
agrees that mere exposure to harmful substances without the immediate manifestation of
symptoms may constitute “bodily injury,” that conclusion is not, despite Plaintiff’s argument,
dispositive of this case. Understanding how the case at bar is distinguishable from Baughman is
key to understanding why Plaintiff is not entitled to defense here.
In Baughman, the court found that the insured was entitled to defense from its insurer based
on a series of complaints stemming from the presence of mercury in the insured’s daycare facility.
The underlying plaintiffs in Baughman brought claims alleging, among other things, strict liability,
nuisance, and battery, because of exposure to toxins in the insured’s daycare facility. Id. at 390.
Additionally, the underlying plaintiffs in that case sought, as part of their damages request, medical
monitoring which they required after having been exposed to the toxins at issue. Id. at 393. First
the Baughman court determined that medical monitoring constituted “damages” even though in
traditional tort law, medical monitoring might be classified as “equitable relief.” Id. at 395. Then,
the court found that the plaintiffs’ exposure to mercury, which resulted in an increased risk of
illness for the plaintiffs constituted “bodily injury” within the meaning of the parties’ insurance
agreements. Id. Finally, having classified relief sought for medical monitoring as “damages” and
exposure to and increased risk of illness from mercury as “bodily injury,” the court held that “[t]he
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underlying plaintiffs have brought suit to procure, among other things, the costs of medical
monitoring ‘as damages’ for the ‘bodily injury’ they allegedly suffered due to exposure to
dangerous levels of mercury and so the underlying suits fall within the general coverage of the
CGL policy.” Id. at 396.
The facts here are crucially distinct from those in the Baughman case. The Little Complaint
brings claims which allege injury based only on fraud, consumer fraud, breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability and other similar actions. 	At no point does it seek relief based on
harm caused by exposure to the alleged toxins in the Hair Products. Instead, the Little Complaint
seeks relief based on the fact that if the named plaintiff and similarly situated class members had
known about the potentially dangerous substances in the Hair Products, they would not have
purchased the Hair Products or they would have been willing to spend less money on them. For
example, in the first cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the
Little Complaint states "as a direct and proximate cause of [Hair Zone’s] breach . . . Plaintiff and
Class Members have been injured and harmed because they would not have purchased the Hair
Products (or at minimum would have paid much less) if they knew the truth . . ..” (Little Complaint
¶ 109). The other six causes of action sound in the same basic injury to the class members.
In other words, even taking a broad view of the allegations of the Little Complaint, at no
point will the named plaintiff or any class members need to show they in fact used the Hair
Products or were exposed to any dangerous chemicals in order to recover.4 A class member who
4 The fact that a single paragraph of the complaint in its introductory section states that
“claimants purchased and used the Hair Products and were therefore exposed to, or risked being
exposed to, the harmful presence of chemicals linked to cancers and other life-threatening
diseases,” (Little Complaint ¶ 7), does not change the Court’s analysis here. This paragraph in
fact dovetails with the Court’s view that a class member who only risked being exposed to the
chemicals, but was not actually exposed to the toxic chemicals is every bit as included in this
lawsuit as someone who inhaled the chemicals on a regular basis. This buttresses the position
that the Little Complaint does not state a claim for damages based on “bodily injury.”
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purchased the Hair Products but never so much as opened a single bottle is identically situated to
a class member who used the Hair Products on a daily basis.5 	This is in stark contrast to
Baughman, where the underlying plaintiffs brought tort actions such as battery and sought relief
based on the medical monitoring they required from exposure to toxic chemicals. 	Further, it
appears Baughman is essentially the edge case in New Jersey with respect to interpreting the
coverage requirements of a bodily injury provision, and Plaintiff cites no New Jersey case where
an insurer has been held liable for coverage on facts analogous to those in this case.
Second, Plaintiff argues for coverage because the Little Complaint seeks damages “because
of ‘property damage.’” Once again, Plaintiff’s reliance on another decision from another court in
this district, Am. All. Ins. Co. v. Jencraft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 485 (D.N.J. 1998), helps illustrate
why, in fact, Plaintiff is not entitled to coverage in this instant case. 	In Jencraft, an insured
manufacturer of window blinds sued its insurer for defense and indemnification. The insured did
so after having been sued by a number of plaintiffs in actions relating to the deterioration of its
lead-stabilized vinyl mini-blinds and the resulting release of hazardous lead dust into the
surrounding environment. Jencraft, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 486. Like here, the underlying lawsuits in
Jencraft, “sounded in fraud, negligence, and breach of warranty.” Id. But the court in that case
was able to, after reviewing the complaints, “infer the specter of a property damage claim.” Id. at
487. While the underlying causes of action in that case were similarly focused on economic harm,
the complaints in Jencraft also alleged product defects which caused actual damage to the
5 The Court notes that it states no opinion or judgment as to the merits of the Little Complaint
and, further, that its underlying merits are irrelevant to the analysis here. See Navigators
Specialty Ins. Co. v. inVentiv Health Clinical, Inc., 826 F. App'x 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2020) (“The
duty to defend is determined by comparing the allegations in the complaint with the language of
the policy ... [and it] arises, irrespective of the claim's actual merit.”) (quotation omitted). The
analysis of the Little Complaint here is strictly focused on whether it, as currently constituted,
comes within the coverage promised by Travelers and Hartford to Plaintiff.
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underlying plaintiffs’ property. 	For example, the Jencraft court, summarizing some of the
underlying complaints, noted,
The complaint in Finley v. Wall–Mart Stores, Inc., expressly states with regard to
damages that “lead dust has spread into Plaintiffs' homes and must be cleaned
according to certain procedures in order to eliminate the hazard.” . . . And the
complaint in Benefield v. Wall–Mart Stores Inc., alleges that “[i]n order to remove
all lead contamination from their respective households, each plaintiff will have to
use special vacuuming equipment, at a cost of $2,000 per household.” . . . That
these homes will require special cleanup procedures to abate the alleged health
hazards indicates “physical injury” to property that could trigger coverage under
the policies.
Jencraft, 21 F.Supp. 2d at 487 (emphasis added). In other words, the Jencraft court hinged
its finding of coverage under the “property damage” provision on the fact that the
underlying complaints alleged that the plaintiffs’ homes were physically injured and would
require expensive and specialized clean-up services to make the homes habitable.
Plaintiff contends that the Little Complaint makes similar allegations and therefore
it would be reasonable for this Court to “infer the specter of a property damage claim.” Id.
(Mot. at 16-18). 	But reviewing the factual allegations of the Little Complaint to which
Plaintiff draws this Court’s attention in fact illustrates how far from the threat of a “property
damage” claim the Little Complaint actually is. Plaintiff cites to paragraphs 38 and 46 of
the Little Complaint which state, respectively, “. . . practical ways of exposure: . . braids
can . . break and accidentally be consumed with food, hand-to-mouth contact such as
touching the braiding hair with your hands . . ” and “when synthetic hair ‘is heated, VOCs
are released into the air.’” (Plaintiff’s Mot. at 17) (Little Complaint ¶¶ 38, 46). Neither of
these allegations come close to the kind of specific allegations of physical injury to
property found in Jencraft. 	There is no allegation that the named plaintiff’s or class
members’ property have been harmed nor that they will need to remediate such harm at
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their own expense. Accordingly, the Little Complaint does not seek damages because of
“property damage.” Instead, Plaintiff can only point to nebulous allegations regarding the
dangerous nature of the Hair Products at issue.
In short, Plaintiff asks this Court to take a wholly speculative view of the Little
Complaint and imagine that, one day, it may morph into a complaint that asserts “bodily
injury” or “property damage” such that Hartford and Travelers should be made to defend
Plaintiff now. This Court refuses to do so. It may be the case that the Little Complaint has
been carefully crafted to assert damages and injury based only upon the purchase of a
defective product which class members would not have bought or paid as much for if they
had known of the defect. And this may have been an intentional decision to avoid class
certification issues that could arise from a claim for personal injury or property damage.
But plaintiffs in an action have the right to determine how to pursue their claim, and
defendants in that action may not recharacterize it in their own image to manufacture
insurance coverage. Plaintiff has attempted to do exactly that.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Plaintiff’s complaint against Hartford and Travelers will be
dismissed in its entirety because it does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Further,
it is apparent based on the nature of the underlying class action that any effort to amend Plaintiff’s
Complaint would be futile, so the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
s/Stanley R. Chesler
STANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
Dated: February 25th, 2026
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