DENIS v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC

2:25-cv-13553Njd13 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VICTOR DENIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC d/b/a MR.
COOPER,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:25-cv-13553 (BRM) (MAH)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is pro se Plaintiff Victor Denis’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Default
Judgment as to Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper (“Nationstar”) pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b) (ECF No. 5) and Nationstar’s Cross-Motion1 to
Dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 1) for Insufficient Service of Process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5)
(ECF No. 6). Plaintiff filed an Opposition in response to Nationstar’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 7.) The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2 Having reviewed and considered
the submissions filed in connection with the motions and having declined to hold oral argument in
accordance with Rule 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause shown, Plaintiff’s
1 Although Nationstar does not specifically identify their motion as a “cross-motion,” the motion
includes an opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment. (See ECF No. 6 at 8.) Therefore,
the Court will treat the motion as a cross-motion rather than a distinct and separate motion pursuant
to Local Civil Rule 7.1(h).
2 The cause of action arises under federal law—i.e., the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1681, et seq. (See generally ECF No. 1.)
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Motion for Default Judgment is DENIED and Nationstar’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Plaintiff will have sixty days to properly serve Nationstar.
I. BACKGROUND
For the purpose of this motion, the Court attempts to glean the factual allegations through
liberal construction of the Complaint and accepts those allegations as true drawing all inferences
in the light most favorable to the pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
228 (3d Cir. 2008); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 926 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Cooke
v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., Civ. A. No. 22-05375, 2024 WL 1142214, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 15,
2024) (“When considering a motion to dismiss the complaint of a pro se litigant, courts must bear
in mind that such pleadings are held to less stringent standards than more formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.”); Huff v. Atl. Cnty. Just. Facility, Civ. A. No. 20-9761, 2021 WL 307303, at *2
(D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2021) (“Court personnel reviewing pro se pleadings are charged with the
responsibility of deciphering why the submission was filed, what the litigant is seeking, and what
claims she may be making.” (quoting Higgs v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339–40 (3d
Cir. 2011))); but see Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (“P]ro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim. And they still must
serve process on the correct defendants. At the end of the day, they cannot flout procedural rules—
they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” (internal citations omitted)).
The Court also considers any “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In
re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Digit.
Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)).
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A. Factual Background
On February 28, 2019, Plaintiff entered into a mortgage loan with non-party Movement
Mortgage, LLC relating to the real property located at 14 Brian Road, Edison, New Jersey. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 7; ECF No. 6-5.) On August 21, 2019, Movement Mortgage assigned the mortgage to
Nationstar. (ECF No. 6-7.)
Between 2023 and 2024, Nationstar reported to credit reporting agencies that Plaintiff was
thirty days late on six mortgage payments. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 8–9; see, e.g., ECF No. 7 at 7.)
Specifically, Nationstar reported Plaintiff was thirty days late in May 2023, June 2023, October
2023, January 2024, March 2024, and May 2024. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 8–9.) As a result, Nationstar
“increased Plaintiff’s escrow balance and attempted to inflate Plaintiff’s required monthly
payment” (id. ¶ 11); and non-party PNC Bank declined Plaintiff’s refinancing application (id.
¶ 15.)
Plaintiff, however, alleges he timely paid each of these six mortgage payments. (Id. ¶ 10;
see e.g., ECF No. 7 at 8–9.) Although Plaintiff subsequently filed a formal complaint with the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and “disputes with one or more consumer
reporting agencies,” Plaintiff claims Nationstar has failed to conduct a reasonable investigation or
to correct the error. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13–14.)
B. Procedural History
On July 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Nationstar alleging a single cause
of action—violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff subsequently mailed a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Nationstar “by certified
mail, return receipt requested” (ECF No. 7 at 2; accord ECF No. 5-1), which identified Plaintiff
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as the server on the return receipt. (See ECF No. 5-1.) On August 8, 2025, the Summons and
Complaint was delivered, which was signed for by an individual named “Kobow.”3 (Id. at 2.)
On September 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed both a Request for Entry of Default4 (ECF No. 4)
and a Motion for Default Judgment5 (ECF No. 5). In response, Nationstar filed a Cross-Motion to
Dismiss for insufficient service of process on September 26, 2025. (ECF No. 6.) On September
29, 2025, the Clerk’s Office denied the Request for Default as the request was submitted without
the referenced proof of service and could not be granted absent same. (Clerk’s Entry dated Sept.
29, 2025.) On October 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Nationstar’s Cross-Motion to
Dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) At this time, Plaintiff has not submitted the referenced proof of service.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 55(a)
Rule 55(a) requires the Clerk’s Office to enter default against a party whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought when the party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure
is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Wahab v. New Jersey Dep’t of Env’t Prot., Civ. A. No. 12-
6613, 2017 WL 4790387, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2017). Moreover, “entry of default by the Clerk
under Rule 55(a) constitutes a general prerequisite for a subsequent default judgment under Rule
55(b).” Husain v. Casino Control Com’n, 265 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2008).
3 The given name of the individual who signed the mailpiece is partly obscured and generally
illegible. (See ECF No. 5-1 at 2.)
4 The Request for Default alleges a proof of service was filed with this Court on September 16,
2025. (See ECF No. 4 at 1, ¶ 2.) A review of the electronic case file does not support same.
However, a proof of service was filed in support of the Motion for Default Judgment on September
19, 2025. (See generally ECF No. 5-1.)
5 The Motion for Default Judgment alleges an entry of default was entered against Nationstar on
September 15, 2[0]25. (See ECF No. 5 at 1, ¶ 4.) A review of the electronic case file does not
support same.
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B. Rule 55(b)
Once the Clerk makes an entry of default, Rule 55(b) “authorizes courts to enter a default
judgment against a properly served defendant who fails to file a timely responsive pleading.” La.
Counseling & Family Servs., Inc. v. Makrygialos, LLC, 543 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364 (D.N.J. 2008)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)). The district court, rather than the Clerk, must enter the judgment
where the amount is not a sum certain or cannot be made certain by computation. Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(b).
The Third Circuit generally disfavors default judgment. Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536
F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2008). While entry of a default judgment is within the district court’s
discretion, cases should “be disposed of on the merits whenever practicable.” Hritz v. Woma Corp.,
732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242,
244 (3d Cir. 1951)).
Prior to entering a default judgment, the Court is required to: “(1) determine it has
jurisdiction both over the subject matter and parties; (2) determine whether Defendants have been
properly served; (3) analyze the Complaint to determine whether it sufficiently pleads a cause of
action; and (4) determine whether the plaintiff has proved damages.” Moroccanoil, Inc. v. JMG
Freight Grp. LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-5608, 2015 WL 6673839, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2015). In
addition, the Court must make explicit factual findings as to: “(1) whether the party subject to
default has a meritorious defense, (2) the prejudice suffered by the party seeking default, and (3)
the culpability of the party subject to default.” Doug Brady, Inc. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide
Funds, 250 F.R.D. 171, 177 (D.N.J. 2008); see also Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164
(3d Cir. 2000) (“[These] [t]hree factors control whether a default judgment should be granted[.]”).
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Generally, courts treat all pleadings and allegations of a plaintiff as true on a motion for
default judgment. See Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbine, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990). However,
the Court is not required to accept a plaintiff’s conclusions of law and, therefore, “it remains for
the [C]ourt to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action”
against defendants. Directv, Inc. v. Asher, Civ. A. No. 03-1969, 2006 WL 680533, at *1 (D.N.J.
Mar. 14, 2006) (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2688, at 58–59 (3d ed. 1998)).
C. Rule 12(b)(5)
“Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural
requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Cap. Int’l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
Rule 12(b)(5) allows a party to file a motion to dismiss based on insufficient service of
process. Moses v. Amazon.com.dedc LLC, Civ. A. No. 16-8675, 2019 WL 7293590, at *2 (D.N.J.
Dec. 30, 2019). “When a party moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), the party making the service
has the burden of demonstrating its validity.” Disantis v. Allied Constr., LLC, Civ. A. No. 17-
11379, 2018 WL 3647210, at *3 (D.N.J. 2018) (quoting Laffey v. Plousis, Civ. A. No. 05-2796,
2008 WL 305289, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2008), aff’d, 364 F. App’x 791 (3d Cir. 2010)). Any
dismissals under this Rule must be without prejudice. White v. Vydia, Inc., Music Distribs. Cos.,
Civ. A. No. 22-02716, 2023 WL 3675957, at *2 (D.N.J. May 26, 2023).
Pursuant to Rule 4, “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is
filed, the court . . . must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that
service be made within a specified time.” Moses, 2019 WL 7293590, at *2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(m)). A “summons—or a copy of a summons that is addressed to multiple defendants—must
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be issued for each defendant to be served.” See Serfess v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., LLC, Civ.
A. No. 13-406, 2015 WL 501972, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b)).
Additionally, “[a] summons must be served with a copy of the complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).
As noted above, a court generally does not have jurisdiction over a defendant if there has
been insufficient process or service of process. Salaam v. Merlin, Civ. A. No. 08-1248, 2009 WL
2230925, at *3 (D.N.J. July 22, 2009) (holding “service of process was insufficient for jurisdiction
over the party to attach”); Sunoco v. Mid-Atl. Region Retailer Compliance Ctr., Civ. A. No. 10-
4941, 2012 WL 2870871, at *2 (D.N.J. July 12, 2012) (“Properly serving a summons that does not
comply with Rule 4 for lack of signature or seal fails to confer personal jurisdiction, and a properly
issued summons containing signature and seal fails to confer personal jurisdiction if service is not
in compliance with the Rules.”); Omni Cap. Int’l Ltd., 484 U.S. at 104. “A pro se plaintiff’s
ignorance of the requirements of [R]ule 4[ ] do[es] not constitute good cause for failure to comply.”
Sykes v. Blockbuster Inc./Viacom, Civ. A. No. 04-6260, 2006 WL 286785, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 3,
2006), aff’d sub nom., Sykes v. Blockbuster Video, 205 F. App’x 961 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Carlton
v. Bullet, Civ. A. No. 85-3546, 1989 WL 125365, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 1989)).
III. DECISION
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment
Plaintiff requests the Court to enter default judgment as “[m]ore than 35 days have elapsed
since service, and [Nationstar] ha[s] failed to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the
Complaint.”6 (ECF No. 5 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff claims default judgment is appropriate as he “requested
6 Plaintiff’s claim Nationstar was required to respond within 35 days appears to be based on the
New Jerey Rules of Court, which require a defendant to respond within 35 days after service. See
N.J. Ct. R. 4:6-1. Pursuant to Rule 12(a(1)(A)(i), a defendant has 21 days after service to respond
to a complaint.
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and obtained an Entry of Default against [Nationstar].” (Id. ¶ 4.) In response, Nationstar argues
entry of default judgment in inappropriate as the motion “included neither an affidavit of service
nor proof that Nationstar waived service.” (ECF No. 6-1 at 6.)
Pursuant to Rule 55, “[o]btaining a default judgment is a two-step process.” Ming Wu v.
Putra, Civ. A. No. 19-18807, 2021 WL 1997375, at *1 (D.N.J. May 19, 2021). First, if a defendant
fails to file an answer or a motion to defend within the time prescribed under the Rules, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i), a plaintiff may request the clerk to enter default under Rule 55(a). In
support of same, a plaintiff is required to submit an affidavit with proofs demonstrating “the
defendant has been served with the summons and complaint in accordance with the rules governing
such service.” See Reardon v. Hillman, Civ. A. No. 18-1296, 2018 WL 1665700, at *4 (D.N.J.
Apr. 6, 2018), aff’d, 735 F. App’x 45 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Bey v. Bruey, Civ. A. No. 09-1092,
2009 WL 961411, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2009)). “The clerk’s function [in deciding whether to enter
default] is not perfunctory. Before entering a default, the clerk must examine the affidavits filed
and find that they meet the requirements of Rule 55(a).” Bey, 2009 WL 961411, at *4 (alteration
in original) (quoting Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682 at p. 19). Therefore, neither the
Clerk’s Office nor the Court should enter default absent proof there has been a sufficient service
of process. See, e.g., Anderson v. Mercer County Sheriff’s Dept., Civ. A. No. 11-7620, 2013 WL
5703615 at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2013) (“The entry of default ‘when there has been no proper service
of the complaint is a fortiori void, and should be set aside.’” (quoting Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg
Oil Co., 756 F. 2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985)).
If either the Clerk’s Office or the Court enters default, then the plaintiff may move to obtain
default judgment under Rule 55(b). In other words, an entry of default is a required pre-requisite
to obtain a default judgment under Rule 55. Husain, 265 F. App’x at 133 (“Prior to obtaining a
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default judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2), there must be an entry of default as
provided by Rule 55(a).”); accord Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. CMS Logistics, Inc., Civ. A. No. 24-
5793, 2025 WL 1043432, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2025).
Here, Plaintiff filed simultaneously his Request for Entry of Default and Motion for Default
Judgment on September 19, 2025. (ECF Nos. 4, 5.) Therefore, the Motion for Default Judgment
was filed prior to the entry of default in conflict with the two-step process for same under Rule 55.
See Husain, 265 F. App’x at 133 (requiring an entry of default to be entered as a prerequisite to
filing a motion for default judgment). More importantly, the Request for Entry of Default was filed
without proof of service and denied. (See generally ECF No. 4.) The Clerk’s Office subsequently
denied the request and advised Plaintiff that default could not be entered absent proof of service.
(Clerk’s Entry dated Sept. 29, 2025.) At this time, Plaintiff has failed to supplement the Request
for Entry of Default. Accordingly, the entry of default judgment is inappropriate at this time as the
Request for Entry of Default was denied and Plaintiff has failed to supplement his request with the
required proof of service. See also infra Section III.B (finding Plaintiff cannot demonstrate
sufficient service of process at this time).
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is DENIED.
B. Nationstar’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss
Nationstar requests the Court to dismiss the Complaint for insufficient service of process
under Rule 12(b)(5). (See generally ECF No. 6 at 3–6.) Specifically, Nationstar claims Plaintiff’s
attempted service of process by mailing a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Nationstar by
certified mail is procedurally improper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (id. at 4); the
New Jersey Rules of Court (id. at 4–5); and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (id. at 5–6). In
response, Plaintiff argues “service was properly affected in compliance with [Rule] 4(e)(1) and
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Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 103 and 106(a)(2).” (ECF No. 7 at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims
he “served Nationstar by certified mail, return receipt requested, directed to its registered agent for
services of process in Texas. The return receipt was signed, and the proof of service was filed with
the Court.” (Id. at 1.)
As discussed, a court generally does not have jurisdiction over a defendant if there has been
an insufficient service of process. Omni Cap. Int’l Ltd., 484 U.S. at 104. The appropriate method
to properly effect service of process, however, differs depending on the circumstances. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(e), (f), (g) (serving an individual); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h) (serving a corporation,
partnership, or association); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i), (j) (serving a government entity). The party
making the service bears the burden of demonstrating its sufficiency. Disantis, 2018 WL 3647210,
at *3 (quoting Laffey, 2008 WL 305289, at *3).
Nationstar is an LLC. (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.) Pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1)(B), a plaintiff may
effect service of process upon an LLC by having an individual, “who is at least [eighteen] years
old and not a party [to the action],” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (emphasis added), personally deliver a
copy of the summons and complaint “to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process,” Fed R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B).
Alternatively, a plaintiff may effect service by “following state law for serving a summons in an
action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or
where service is made.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), (h)(1)(A).
Here, the record establishes Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendants by mailing a copy of
the Summons and Complaint to Nationstar by certified mail, which identified Plaintiff as the server
on the return receipt. (ECF No. 7 at 2; accord ECF No. 5-1.) On August 8, 2025, the Summons
and Complaint were delivered to and signed for by “Kobow.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 2.) This attempted
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service of process, however, is procedurally improper under the first possible method of service as
Plaintiff “was identified as the server on the return receipt submitted to the District Court,” Touray
v. Middlesex Cnty., 139 F. App’x 428, 430 (3d Cir. 2005); accord Cutchins v. Home Depot Corp.,
Civ. A. No. 23-353, 2024 WL 5146885, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2024); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(c)(2) (requiring service of process to be effected by an individual who is “not a party” to the
action); “service by mail, alone, is insufficient to effectuate service in accordance with Rule 4(h).”
Mite v. Bray, Civ. A. No. 22-6665, 2024 WL 1376052, at *2–4 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2024) (citing
Mettle v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 279 F. Supp. 2d. 598, 602 (D.N.J. 2003)); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(h)(1)(B) (requiring personal service); and the record does not indicate “Kobow” was “an
officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by [Nationstar] . . . to receive
service of process,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B); Grand Entm’t Grp. v. Star Media Sales, 988 F.2d
476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he party asserting the validity of service bears the burden of proof on
that issue.”).
Similarly, this attempted service of process is procedurally improper under the second
possible method, i.e., under the state laws of either New Jersey—the state where this Court is
located—or Texas—where the attempted service was made.
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1. New Jersey7
Pursuant to New Jersey Rule of Court 4:4-4(a)(6), a plaintiff may effect service of process
upon an LLC by having an individual, “not having a direct interest in the [action],” N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-
3(a), personally deliver a copy of the summons and complaint to “any officer, director, trustee or
managing or general agent, or any person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service
of process on behalf of the corporation, or on a person at the registered office of the corporation in
charge thereof” N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(6). Accord Mite, 2024 WL 1376052, at *3. However, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has permitted service of process “on corporate representatives other than
those enumerated in the previsions of New Jersey Rule of Court 4:4-4(a)[(6)].” Moore v.
Diversified, Inc., Civ. No. 20-11017, 2021 WL 11586107, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2021), report
and recommendation adopted, Civ. A. No. 20-11017, 2021 WL 11586108 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2021)
(citing O’Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 127 (1975)).
Applying a two-pronged test to determine the sufficiency of service on a corporate
representative, “courts have approved service on New Jersey corporations via a number of
representatives, including a part-time receptionist, an office manager, a Director of Human
Resources, an assistant . . . manager, and the receptionist of a managing agent.” Id. (internal
citations omitted). Although New Jersey Rule of Court 4:4-4(a)(6) provides for alternative
7 Plaintiff does not argue service was properly affected in compliance with the New Jersey Rules
of Court. (See generally ECF No. 7.) The Court, however, will review whether the attempted
service of process was sufficient under New Jersey law as this issue inherently impacts the exercise
of personal jurisdiction and, as such, the Court is permitted to review the issue sua sponte. See,
e.g., Peters v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Civ. A. No. 04-6057, 2006 WL 278916, at *2
(D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2006) (“[I]f the defendants have not waived a defense based upon personal
jurisdiction, the Court may sua sponte consider whether it lacks jurisdiction over the defendants
due to insufficient service of process.”).
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methods to effect service of process, these methods are only available if the plaintiff can establish
“service cannot be made on any of th[e]se persons.” N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(6).
Here, Plaintiff was identified as the server on the return receipt. (ECF No. 7 at 2; accord
ECF No. 5-1.) Therefore, the attempted service of process is procedurally improper under the New
Jersey Rules of Court. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-3(a) (requiring service of process by an individual “not
having a direct interest in the [action]”).
2. Texas
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106, a plaintiff may effect service of process
upon an LLC by having an individual, “who is [not] a party to or interested in the outcome of a[n]
[action],” Tex. R. Civ. P. 103, personally deliver a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent
of the corporation, Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(1); see also Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 5.255 (“For
the purpose of service of process, notice, or demand . . . each manager of a manager-managed
domestic or foreign [LLC] and each member of a member-managed domestic or foreign [LLC] is
an agent of that [LLC].”). Accord Mite, 2024 WL 1376052, at *3–4. Alternatively, the clerk of the
court may effect service of process by “mailing to the defendant by registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested, a copy of the citation and of the petition,” Tex. R. Civ. P. 103, 106(a)(2);
see, e.g., Perkins v. S&R Gold & Silver Exch., LLC, Civ. A. No. 21-1437, 2022 WL 658563, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2022) (“Service by registered or certified mail by an attorney, rather than the
clerk, is insufficient to satisfy Rule 103 and 106.”). Although Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b)
provides for alternative methods to effect service of process, these methods are only available if
the plaintiff can demonstrate “service ha[d] been attempted under [Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
106](a)(1) or (a)(2) . . . but ha[d] not been successful.”
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Here, Plaintiff was identified as the server on the return receipt. (ECF No. 7 at 2; accord
ECF No. 5-1.) Therefore, the attempted service of process is procedurally improper under the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 103 (requiring service of process by an
individual “who is [not] a party to or interested in the outcome of a[n] [action]”).
Accordingly, the record establishes Plaintiff’s attempted service of process by mailing a
copy of the Summons and Complaint to Nationstar by certified mail is procedurally improper
under Rule 4(h). The Court has discretion either to dismiss the action without prejudice or to order
Plaintiff to effect service of process within a certain time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The Court
finds good cause to extend the time for service and to order Plaintiff to effect service of process
within sixty days.
Based on the foregoing, Nationstar’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss for insufficient service of
process is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 5) is
DENIED and Nationstar’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is DENIED. Plaintiff will have
sixty days to properly serve Nationstar. An appropriate order follows.
Date: January 13, 2026 /s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:25-cv-13553-BRM-MAH Document 10 Filed 01/13/26 Page 14 of 14 PageID:
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