ORTIZ v. SUZUKI MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. et al

2:25-cv-11949Njd12 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JESUS M. ORTIZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUZUKI MOTOR OF AMERICA INC.;
SUZUKI MOTOR USA, LLC;
SUZUKI MOTOR OF AMERICA;
SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION;
NISSIN KOGYO COMPANY, LTD;
ABSOLUTE CYCLES;
ABSOLUTE CYCLE EXPERIENCE, INC.;
ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE, LLC;
ABC MANUFACTURERS/
DISTRIBUTORS, fictitious Defendant(s);
DEF MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
COMPANY(IES), fictitious Defendant(s);
and
JOHN/JANE DOE(S), 1-25, fictitious
Defendant(s),
Defendants.
Case No. 2:25-cv-11949 (BRM) (JRA)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI , DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is a motion by Plaintiff Jesus M. Ortiz (“Ortiz”) to remand this action
to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County (“Superior Court of New
Jersey”), which includes a request for attorneys’ fees and costs. (ECF No. 11.) Defendants
Suzuki Motor of America, Inc. (“Suzuki Inc.”) and Suzuki Motor USA, LLC (“Suzuki LLC”)
(collectively, “Suzuki Defendants”) opposed the motion. (ECF No 21.) Ortiz filed a Reply.
(ECF No. 22.) Having reviewed and considered the parties’ submissions filed in connection
with the Motion and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause having been shown, Ortiz’s
Motion to Remand is GRANTED, and his request for attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
This case arises out of personal injuries allegedly suffered by Ortiz on May 12, 2023,
when the braking system of his motorcycle failed while he was driving it, causing him to be
thrown from the motorcycle and trapping him under a sanitation truck. (Compl. (ECF No. 4-2)
at 16–17.)1
On May 12, 2025, Ortiz filed his Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey. (Id.
at 16–43.) Ortiz asserts the following claims against the Suzuki Defendants: (1) negligent
design and manufacture (id. at 16–17, 20–21, 24–25, 28–29, 32–33), (2) breach of express and
implied warranties that “the products manufactured, distributed and sold by” the Suzuki
Defendants would be “fit for its intended purpose” (id. at 18–20, 22–24, 25–27, 29–31, 33–35),
and (3) strict products liability (id. at 20, 24, 27–28, 31–32, 35).2 Ortiz also asserts a negligence
claim against Defendant Absolute Cycles,3 alleging Ortiz’s tire brake failure was a result of
1 The Court cites to page numbers in the Complaint rather than paragraph numbers because the
paragraph numbering restarts under each count.
2 Ortiz also brings these three claims against a set of fictitious defendants, namely ABC
Manufacturers/Distributors, as well as Suzuki Motor Corporation (“Suzuki Corp.”) and
Astemo, Ltd. (incorrectly named as Nissin Kogyo Company, Ltd.) (“Astemo”). (ECF No. 4-2
at 28–32.)
3 Absolute Cycle was improperly plead as “Absolute Cycles.” (Am. Notice of Removal (ECF
No. 4) ¶ 13.) As such, for purposes of this Opinion, the Court refers to Defendant Absolute
Cycles as “Absolute Cycle.” Ortiz alleges Absolute Cycle is a motorcycle repair business and
a corporation located in Rahway, New Jersey. (ECF No. 4-2 at 36; ECF No. 11 at 13, 17; ECF
No. 22 at 4.) He also alleges that Defendant Absolute Cycle Experience, Inc. (“Absolute Cycle
Experience”) is a “corporation engaged in providing motor vehicle repair services.” (ECF No.
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“negligent [repair] services.”4 (Id. at 35–37.)
On June 18, 2025, the Suzuki Defendants removed Ortiz’s Complaint to this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (ECF No. 1.) On June 25, 2025, this Court ordered Suzuki
Defendants to file an amended notice of removal sufficiently setting forth the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. (ECF No. 2.) The Suzuki Defendants filed an amended removal notice on June 25,
2025 specifying the citizenship of each member of each limited liability company defendant
(“Amended Notice of Removal”) and a corporate disclosure statement.5 (ECF No. 4; ECF No.
5.) Ortiz then filed this Motion to Remand to the Superior Court of New Jersey on July 16,
2025, arguing a lack of diversity of jurisdiction based on the Suzuki Defendants’ inability to
4-2 at 36.) Ortiz claims his “tire brake failure was a result of [Absolute Cycle Experience’s]
negligent services.” (Id.) According to the Suzuki Defendants, Absolute Cycle Experience “was
not served in the State Court Action.” (ECF No. 4 ¶ 15.) Additionally, Ortiz alleges Defendant
Absolute Performance, LLC, (“Absolute Performance”) “was a corporation engaged in
providing motor vehicle repair services” and brings a negligence cause of action against it for
“[im]properly servic[ing] [his] vehicle.” (ECF No. 4-2 at 37, 39.) But according to the Amended
Notice of Removal, Absolute Performance, “[w]hen it was in operation, . . . was a New Jersey
limited liability company with only two members residing in New Jersey and New York,
respectively,” “which was not served in the State Court Action, ceased operations in 2008, and
is not transacting business in New Jersey.” (ECF No. 4 ¶ 16; see also ECF No. 4-6 at 2–3.)
Between Absolute Cycle, Absolute Cycle Experience, and Absolute Performance (together,
“Absolute Defendants”), only Absolute Cycle has appeared before the Court in this matter.
4 Ortiz also brings a negligence claim against fictitious defendants Def Maintenance and Repair
Company(ies) and John/Jane Doe(s).
5 While Ortiz has labeled Absolute Performance both a limited liability company and a
corporation (ECF No. 4-2 at 37), the Suzuki Defendants’ Amended Notice of Removal makes
clear that at all relevant times, meaning at the time of the alleged wrongdoing and through the
pendency of this matter, Absolute Performance was not a limited liability company given the
termination of its limited liability company status. (ECF No. 4-6 at 2–3.)
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prove fraudulent joinder. (ECF No. 11.) On August 4, 2025, the Suzuki Defendants filed an
Opposition (ECF No. 21), and Ortiz filed his Reply on August 11, 2025 (ECF No. 22).
II. 	L EGAL S TANDARDS
A notice of removal of a civil action must be filed by a defendant within thirty (30) days
of receiving the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Upon the removal of an action, a plaintiff
may challenge such removal by moving to remand the case back to state court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447. Grounds for remand include: “(1) lack of district court subject matter jurisdiction or (2)
a defect in the removal procedure.” PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993).
A motion for remand on the basis of a procedural defect in the removal must be filed within
thirty (30) days of the notice of removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), whereas “a motion to remand
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time before final judgment,”
Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1212–13 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c)).
“The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that at all stages of the
litigation the case is properly before the federal court.” Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc.,
357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004). Federal courts rigorously enforce the congressional intent to
restrict federal diversity jurisdiction, and therefore removal statutes are “strictly construed
against removal” and “doubts must be resolved in favor of remand.” Id. at 396–403.
Additionally, when a case is removed, “all defendants who have been properly joined and
served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
III. 	DECISION
The Suzuki Defendants allege that the Absolute Cycle Defendants were fraudulently
joined. (ECF No. 4 ¶ at 4–6.) According to the Suzuki Defendants, because “Absolute Cycle
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did not perform any work on [Ortiz’s] motorcycle, no viable claim of negligence can be asserted
against it under New Jersey law[;]” consequently, “it is not a properly joined defendant.” (Id.
¶ 14.) Put differently, given the supposed fraudulent joinder of Absolute Cycle, the Suzuki
Defendants believe Absolute Cycle’s citizenship should not be considered in the diversity
analysis, and therefore insist there is complete diversity between the parties. (Id. ¶ 7.) In his
motion to remand, Ortiz invokes the forum defendant rule and contends this matter belongs in
state court because “the presence of a properly joined and served forum defendant,” i.e.,
Defendant Absolute Cycle, a “New Jersey business entity[,] . . . bars removal under [28 U.S.C.]
§ 1441 (b)(2).” (ECF No. 11 at 14.)
The Suzuki Defendants do not contest that, if properly joined and served, Absolute
Cycle’s presence would create a lack of complete diversity. (ECF No. 4; ECF No. 21.) Instead,
they maintain they may remove the action to federal court because they can establish that
Absolute Cycle was fraudulently joined solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 21 at
14 (citing In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2006)).).
Ortiz challenges Suzuki Defendants’ assertion of fraudulent joinder and argues the
forum defendant rule bars removal.6 (ECF No. 11 at 14.) Additionally, Ortiz seeks attorneys’
fees because he contends the Suzuki Defendants have no factual or legal basis to argue
fraudulent joinder. (Id. at 18.) The Court will first address Ortiz’s assertion that removal is
6 Because the joinder of Absolute Cycle was not fraudulent, see infra Section III.A, the Court
need not decide whether the forum defendant rule thwarts removal because the joinder of
Absolute Cycle—a New Jersey corporation—destroyed complete diversity and deprived this
Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372,
375–76 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)).
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substantively improper.
A. 	Fraudulent Joinder
Citing Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., Ortiz argues that, absent a “definitive undisputed
fact,” factual disagreements between the parties cannot sustain removal to federal court based
on fraudulent joinder. (ECF No. 11 at 17 (citing 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990)).) More
specifically, Ortiz contends a “factual dispute between the Complaint and a certification[7]
[raising an allegation of fraudulent joinder] is . . . insufficient to sustain removal.” (Id.)
The Suzuki Defendants disagree, essentially arguing they have established fraudulent
joinder because there is no reasonable basis in fact supporting the only claim against the non-
diverse defendant, Absolute Cycle, i.e., a negligence claim. (ECF No. 21 at 15–19.) According
to the Suzuki Defendants, because “Absolute [Cycle] never performed any service at all for
[Ortiz] or his [m]otorcycle,” Ortiz does not have a viable negligence claim against Absolute
Cycle given the absence of a “legal duty beyond the services promised in the parties’ underlying
transaction.”8 (ECF No. 21 at 16.) Additionally, the Suzuki Defendants contend Ortiz cannot
7 As best the Court can tell, the certification Ortiz refers to is the supplemental declaration of
Steven Andriopoulos (“Andriopoulos”) (ECF No. 4-4 at 2–3), owner of Absolute cycle (ECF
No. 21-1 at 1).
8 On its face, the Suzuki Defendants’ argument appears to be that Ortiz’s claim against Absolute
Cycle is without any reasonable basis in fact or colorable legal ground. But the Court reads
Suzuki’s first argument (ECF No. 21 at 15–19) as addressing the “objective criteria that there
be some reasonable basis in fact,” because any argument contesting “some colorable legal
ground supporting” Ortiz’s negligence claim against Absolute Cycle is necessarily premised on
Ortiz’s assertion that Absolute Cycle did not in fact perform work on Ortiz’s motorcycle. Abels
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 32 (3d Cir. 1985). In other words, the Suzuki
Defendants’ first argument, insofar as it seeks to challenge the legal sufficiency of Ortiz’s
negligence claim against Absolute Cycle, would necessarily fail if the Court rejected their
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defeat removal based on fraudulent joinder because he has offered only “generic pleadings,”
which do not draw a “connection between any service purportedly performed on the
[m]otorcycle to the alleged defects he claims existed in the [m]otorcycle.” (ECF No. 21 at 19–
22.) In reply, Ortiz largely argues the Suzuki Defendants have asked the Court to engage in a
merits inquiry, which would be an inappropriate conflating of the threshold jurisdictional issue.9
(ECF No. 22 at 7.)
Here, the parties do not contest the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and
costs, exceeds $75,000, nor do they contest that the Complaint on its face does not demonstrate
complete diversity between Plaintiffs and Defendants. And, as the Court reads Suzuki
Defendants’ Opposition, Suzuki Defendants apparently concede that New Jersey common law
provides Ortiz with a negligence cause of action if all the facts alleged in the Complaint are
true. (ECF No. 21 at 15–16.) In other words, the “fighting issue is whether there is a reasonable
basis in fact” for Ortiz’s claim against Absolute Cycle. Mattress Warehousing, Inc. v. Power
Mktg. Direct, Inc., No. 08-CV-141, 2009 WL 395162, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 17, 2009). In their
legal arguments, the parties largely dispute whether the Court may “‘pierce the pleadings’ and
factual argument. (ECF No. 21 at 15 (citing Pfenninger v. Hunterdon Cent., 770 A.2d 1126,
1132 (N.J. 2001) (explaining when a duty of care arises)).)
9 Ortiz also disputes the Suzuki Defendants’ supposed assertion that he “had to not only serve
the complaint . . . but also to file proof of service for the rule [against ‘snap removal’] to apply,”
but Ortiz does not cite any part of Suzuki Defendants’ submissions nor is the Court aware of
any such argument raised by Suzuki Defendants. (ECF No. 22 at 5.) Regardless, Ortiz is correct
that Absolute Cycle was properly joined and served before removal. (ECF No. 11-2 at 1 (listing
date of service as May 16, 2025); ECF No. 1 at 7 (listing notice of removal filing date as June
18, 2025); ECF No. 4 at 8 (listing amended notice of removal filing date as June 25, 2025).)
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receive evidence on the issue of fraudulent joinder or [whether] the court [is] confined to the
‘four corners’” of Ortiz’s Complaint. Id.
Suzuki Defendants correctly argue district courts in the Third Circuit may indeed look
beyond the pleadings to identify indicia of fraudulent joinder. Abels, 770 F.2d at 33; see also
In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining courts may “look beyond the
pleadings in a fraudulent joinder inquiry when faced with a statute of limitations defense to
claims against non-diverse defendants”). As the Briscoe Court noted,
[a] limited look beyond the pleadings, as described above, runs
no risk of usurping jurisdiction over cases that properly belong in
state court. To hold otherwise would run the risk that we condone
the practice of asserting baseless, stale claims against non-diverse
defendants for the sole purpose of thwarting a defendant’s right
to remove a case that falls within the original jurisdiction of a
federal court.
448 F.3d at 220.
Courts in this circuit are split on whether to consider affidavits or declarations: some
do,10 others have declined to credit apparently self-serving affidavits,11 and others consider
affidavits that have not been tested through full discovery or prior litigation as evidence of
fraudulent joiner “only if that affidavit ‘presents undisputed facts that establish with complete
certainty that the non-diverse defendant has no liability.’”12 The Court adopts the latter—the
10 See, e.g., Curtiss Wright Corp. v. CNA Fin. Corp., Civ. A. No. 11-04416, 2012 WL 1046536,
at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2012).
11 See, e.g., Gaynor v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., No. 13-3607, 2013 WL 4079652, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 13, 2013) (declining to credit hotel manager’s affidavit asserting he was not involved
in inspection, repair, or maintenance of sidewalk that allegedly cause plaintiff’s injury).
12 See, e.g., Wooten v. Boppy Co., LLC, Civ. A. No. 22-4341, 2023 WL 11826191, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 14, 2023) (alteration in Wooten) (quoting Gaynor, 2013 WL 4079652, at *5).
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“workable rule” articulated in Wooten, 2023 WL 11826191, at *3, as it recognizes the Third
Circuit’s admonition to look “beyond the face of the complaint for indicia of fraudulent
joinder,” In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 218 (quoting Abels, 770 F.2d at 29), without delving “from
the threshold jurisdictional issue into a decision on the merits.” Id. at 218 (quoting Boyer, 913
F.2d at 112 (citation omitted)).
While the Suzuki Defendants provided Andriopoulos’s sworn statement regarding
Absolute Cycle’s non-involvement in servicing Ortiz’s motorcycle, the issue of whether
Absolute Cycle performed any service at all for Ortiz or his motorcycle is plainly in dispute.
(Compare ECF No. 4-2 at 35–37, with ECF No. 21 at 16 and ECF No. 4-4 at 2–3.) In other
words, although Andriopolous’s sworn statement contradicts the allegations in Ortiz’s
Complaint, specifically the allegation that “Ortiz’s tire brake failure was . . . a result of negligent
services provided by . . . Absolute Cycle[],” given the Court’s obligation to accept the factual
allegations in Ortiz’s Complaint as true, Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851–52
(3d Cir.1992), the Court cannot consider the facts asserted in Andriopoulos’s affidavit to be
undisputed for purposes of assessing fraudulent joinder. Notwithstanding Andriopoulos’s
sworn statement, Ortiz has asserted at least “some reasonable basis in fact . . . supporting a
[negligence] claim against” Absolute Cycle. In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 219.
Additionally, the Court is unpersuaded by the Suzuki Defendants’ argument concerning
Ortiz’s claimed “conclusory” allegations. (See ECF No. 21 at 19–22.) While Suzuki Defendants
include two pages worth of string cites, the nine cases from outside the Third Circuit are
inapposite. (Id. at 20–21.) Moreover, while Suzuki Defendants are correct that conclusory
allegations are insufficient to oppose a claim of fraudulent joinder, Reeser v. NGK Metals Corp.,
247 F. Supp. 2d 626, 630 (E.D. Pa. 2003), Suzuki Defendants’ reliance on Reeser, In re Diet
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Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., and In re Briscoe are
misplaced and unpersuasive.
The court in Reeser simply stated that plaintiff’s claims of civil conspiracy and
fraudulent concealment or non-disclosure against the non-diverse defendant was not colorable
because it “merely consist[ed] of conclusory allegations which are clearly insufficient.” 247 F.
Supp. 2d at 630. In reading Reeser, the Court cannot discern what allegations were conclusory.
The same can be said about In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine)
Prods. Liab. Litig., which merely states the “complaints . . . are devoid of specific allegations
against the pharmacies 	[and] filled instead 	with general statements 	levied against all
defendants.” 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 424 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
Suzuki Defendants’ articulation of the discussion in In re Briscoe is also misplaced. The
Third Circuit, summarizing its Abels decision, noted it had held “the plaintiffs’ complaint
identified the [unnamed] defendants with specificity and raised express claims against them,
[which led the court to] f[i]nd the allegations sufficient to defeat diversity jurisdiction.” In re
Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 218–19. Here, Ortiz has identified Absolute Cycle as a “corporation
engaged in providing motor vehicle repair services” and has alleged Absolute Cycle “failed to
properly service [his] vehicle,” and this “result[ed]” in his “tire brake failure,” which “caused
[him] to sustain serious, permanent[,] and disabling injuries.” (ECF No. 4-2 at 36.) For purposes
of this Motion to Remand, the Court finds Ortiz’s allegations were not conclusory statements.
See Batoff, 977 F.2d at 851 (“[R]emoval statutes ‘are to be strictly construed against removal
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.’” (quoting Steel Valley Author. v. Union
Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987))).
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Because Ortiz has a “reasonable basis in fact” and “colorable ground supporting” his
negligence claim against Absolute Cycle, the non-diverse defendant, and because he has
articulated allegations with sufficient specificity, removal of this action is barred by the for lack
of complete diversity. Accordingly, Ortiz’s Motion for Remand is GRANTED.
B. 	Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
This Court may, when remanding a case, “require payment of just costs and any actual
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
“Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where
the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely,
when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Cap.
Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). The Court has discretion in determining “whether unusual
circumstances warrant a departure from the rule in a given case.” Id.
The Court declines to award Ortiz attorneys’ fees and costs. While the Court agrees that
joinder of Absolute Cycle frustrated complete diversity, the Court does not find the Suzuki
Defendants’ “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal” by asserting
fraudulent joinder. Id. As the Court discussed, some courts in the Third Circuit may have
considered Andriopoulos’s sworn statement and ultimately found Absolute Cycle did not
complete work on Ortiz’s motorcycle and permitted the removal of this action to federal court.
See Curtiss Wright Corp., 2012 WL 1046536, at *2. Although this Court finds Ortiz did not
fraudulently join Absolute Cycle, see supra Section III.A, the Suzuki Defendants had an
objectively reasonable basis for removal under the fraudulent joinder doctrine. Accordingly,
Ortiz’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Ortiz’s Motion for Remand is GRANTED and his
request for attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED. An appropriate order will follow.
Date: January 12, 2026 	/s/ Brian R. Martinotti___________
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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