COMBS v. WORMUTH

2:25-cv-01779Njd2 févr. 2026

Texte intégral

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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 2:25-cv-01779-EP-JRA Document 21 Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 5 PagelD:
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GEORGIA L. COMBS,
Plaintiff,
No. 25cv1779 (EP) (JRA)
V.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
CHRISTINE WORMUTH,
Defendant.
PADIN, District Judge.

This matter has been opened by the Court sua sponte based on (1) the failure of pro se
Plaintiff Georgia L. Combs’s to adequately serve Defendant and (2) the adjudication of an identical
case brought before this Court in Combs v. Gospel, No. 23-6502 (“Original Action’’).

For the reasons explained below, the Court will DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint with
prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Combs was a former member of the United States Department of the Army (the “Army”’).
Original Action, D.E. 1-4 (“Final Agency Denial” or “FAD”) at 2. On January 24, 2019, Combs
received notice that the Army had proposed removing her from federal service due to her absence
without leave (“AWOL”) accumulation, failure to follow proper leave procedures, and
discourteous and unbecoming conduct. Jd. at 3. Alleging discrimination and hostile work
environment, Combs filed an equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) complaint against United
States Department of the Army (the ““Army”’) in connection with her proposed dismissal on April

22, 2019. FAD at 1. On May 14, 2019, the Army removed Combs from its service. FAD at 2.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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The Amy issued its Final Agency Denial dismissing Combs’s EEO claims on November 3, 2022.
Id. at 1.

On August 21, 2023, Combs filed a complaint before this Court bringing an action pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (“Title VII’), the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (the “ADEA”), and the American with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12112-12117 (the “ADA”) in connection with her dismissal from the
the Army. Original Action, D.E. 1 (“Original Complaint’) at 3-5. Plaintiff brought her Original
Complaint against Defendants Amy Gopel, Matthew Hunter, Samuel Morgan, and Thomas F. Hunt
(the “Original Defendants”) and included with her suit, the Army’s Final Agency Decision. FAD.
Combs’s Original Complaint relied on an attachment titled “STATEMENT OF THE CIVIL CASE”
for the facts underlying the claims. See Original Complaint at 6 (citing Original Action, D.E. 1-
3).

The United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey appeared on behalf of the Army,
see Original Action, D.E. 6 at 1, and moved to dismiss, Original Action, D.E. 18-1! (the “Motion”),
in part because Combs’s action was untimely. Motion at 10-12. This Court dismissed Combs’s
Original Complaint on grounds that her action should have been brought against the Secretary of
the Army, rather than against the Original Defendants, because only employers—not individual
employees—could be held liable under the causes of action Combs brought. Original Action, D.E.
28 at 6-7. Amendment, however, would be futile because as this Court explained, the Original
Action was filed several months after Combs alleged even receiving the Final Agency Denial and

was therefore outside the thirty-day filing requirement. Jd. at 5 (quoting Slingland v. Donahoe,

' The Army filed its Notice of Motion at D.E. 18.
2

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542 F. App’x 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2013)). This Court therefore dismissed the Original Complaint
with prejudice. Original Action, D.E. 29.

Combs now brings an action against the Secretary of the Army, Christine Wormuth, relying
again on the same facts described in “STATEMENT OF THE CIVIL CASE.” D.E. 1. The
documents Combs has submitted in this action and in the Original Action are exactly the same.
Compare D.E. 1-1, with Original Action, D.E. 1-3.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Claim preclusion prevents parties from bringing a second suit against “the same adversary
based on the same cause of action as the first suit.” Salerno v. Corzine, 449 F. App’x 118, 122 (3d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Duhaney v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010)). Claim
preclusion applies when there has been: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving;
(2) the same parties or their privies; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of action.”
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir. 2010).

I. ANALYSIS

For the reasons explained below, Combs’s claims are precluded. She may not circumvent
this Court’s prior dismissal with prejudice in the Original Action by simply filing a new action.

A. Combs Received a Final Judgment on the Merits

When a court dismisses a party’s claims, that party has received a final judgment on the
merits. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190 (“[T]he merits of a claim are disposed of when
they are refused enforcement.”). Here, this Court dismissed Combs’s claims with prejudice for
falling well outside the thirty-day filing requirement and explained to Combs that amendment
would be futile. Combs has therefore received a final judgment on the merits in the Original

Action. See Dowdell v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 94 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (D.N.J.

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2000) (holding that a dismissal based on the relevant statute of limitations operates as a final
judgment on the merits); Cahn v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 2d 537, 544-45 (D.N.J. 2003) (same).
B. The Parties Are the Same in this Action as in the Original Action
“Privity ‘is merely a word used to say that the relationship between one who is a party on

999

the record and another is close enough to include that other within the res judicata.” Marran v.

Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 493
(1990)). Because “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a
suit against the entity,” federal employees are in privity with the federal entity to which they belong
when subject to the same claims based upon the same facts. See Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111,
120 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Kelly v. City of Philadelphia, No. 25-1307, 2025 WL 3034961, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2025) (treating municipal employees sued in their official capacity as in privity
with the municipality).

In the Original Action, this Court explained that amendment of the Original Complaint to
name Combs’s employer would be futile because Combs’s action was nevertheless time-barred.
For purposes of claim preclusion, the Original Defendants are in privity with the Secretary of the
Army because the Original Defendants belong to the federal entity Combs seeks to sue by virtue
of naming the Secretary of the Army and because this Court explained that even ifCombs amended
the Original Complaint to name the head of the Army, the action would sti// be time-barred.

C. This Action is Based on the Same Causes of Action as the Original Action

Courts in the Third Circuit take a broad view of what constitutes the “same cause of action”
for purposes of claim preclusion. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 342 (3d Cir. 2016). “Ifthe
‘underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims’ are ‘essentially similar,’ then it is likely

that the claims meet the ‘same cause of action’ element for claim preclusion purposes.” Ritz v.

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Erie Indemnity Co., No. 17-340, 2019 WL 438086, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2019) (quoting Blunt
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 276 (3d Cir. 2014)).

The Court need not take a broad view here. Like in the Original Action, Combs relies on
a document entitled “STATEMENT OF THE CIVIL CASE” to explain the facts underlying her
action. D.E.1 at 1. The “STATEMENT OF THE CIVIL CASE” document Combs relied on in the
Original Action and the “STATEMENT OF THE CIVIL CASE” document Combs relies on now
are identical. Combs’s action here is therefore based on the same causes of action brought in the
Original Action.

Having determined that the Army is entitled to the benefit of this Court’s judgement in the
Original Action, this Court will sua sponte DISMISS Combs’s claims again with prejudice.”
IV. CONCLUSION

Having determined that Combs is barred from reasserting the causes of action she brought
in Combs v. Gospel, No. 23cv6502,

IT IS on this 2" of February 2026, for the forgoing reasons,

ORDERED that Combs’s complaint here, D.E. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice; and it
is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Memorandum Order to
Plaintiff Georgia Combs via regular mail; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case.

Sah Tad

Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.

* As explained in the Original Action, amendment would be futile because Combs’s action is time-
barred.

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