ZEIDERS et al v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC.

2:24-cv-11197Njd8 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
STACY ZEIDERS, CALVIN WESTLUND,
MARIA LYDIA MARTINEZ, JAE
YOUNG CHOI, AMANDA DeLONG,
BRIAN CRAMER, and SCOTT
WORTHINGTON, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA,
INC., a New Jersey Corporation, d/b/a
VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC.,
and VOLKSWAGEN AG, a German
Corporation,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:24-cv-11197 (BRM) (JSA)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.’s (“VW America”)
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Stacy Zeiders, Calvin Westlund, Maria Lydia Martienz, Jae Young
Choi, Amanda DeLong, Brian Cramer, and Scott Worthington’s Consolidated Class Action
Complaint (“CAC”) (ECF No. 20) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 29). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition (ECF No. 31), and VW America filed a
reply (ECF No. 39). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Having reviewed
and considered the parties’ submissions filed in connection with the motion and having declined
to hold oral argument in accordance with Rule 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good
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cause shown, VW America’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
I. BACKGROUND
For the purpose of this motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the CAC as true
and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court also considers any “document integral to or explicitly
relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d
Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Digit. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)).
A. Factual Background
This action arises out of an alleged defect in certain 2022 and 2023 Volkswagen Tiguan
vehicles purchased or leased after November 2021 (“Class Vehicles”). (ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 12, 25, 36,
50, 61, 72–73, 82–83.) Plaintiffs bring this putative class action individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated against VW America and Volkswagen AG (“VWAG”) (collectively,
“Defendants”).1 (See generally id.)
Plaintiffs allege the Defendants defectively installed the piston ring assembly in the Class
Vehicles’ engines. (See id. ¶ 163.) The Class Vehicles employ “four reciprocating pistons to
convert pressure into a rotation motion.” (Id. ¶ 109.) A four-step sequence is utilized to generate
the rotating motion. (Id.) Relevant to this matter, “engine oil is used to lubricate the piston and
cylinder wall as the piston moves up and down through the four-stroke sequence.” (Id. ¶ 110.)
1 VWAG is a German corporation with its principal place of business in Germany. (ECF No. 20
¶¶ 96-98.) VW America is a New Jersey corporation with its corporate headquarters located in
Virginia. (Id. ¶ 94.) VW America and is a wholly owned subsidiary of VWAG. (Id. ¶ 95.) On
September 8, 2025, the parties filed a joint stipulation to extend the time for VWAG to respond to
the CAC to October 17, 2025 (id. 27), which this Court subsequently granted (ECF No. 28). At
this time, VWAG “has not been served with process and, accordingly, is not a party to this motion.”
(ECF No. 29 at 1 n.1.)
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Each reciprocating piston utilizes three compression rings, which if properly tensioned, “prevent[s]
engine oil from entering the combustion chamber.” (Id. ¶ 111.) Absent properly tensioned
compression rings, engine oil would enter the combustion chamber, which would result in
decreased engine performance, damaged internal parts, and reduced engine oil. (Id. ¶ 115.)
Engine oil lubrication “reduce[s] wear on moving parts throughout the engine, improve[s]
sealing, and cool[s] the engine by carrying heat away from the moving parts.” (Id. ¶ 110.) In
contrast, a lack of lubrication would result in “premature wear of internal parts, inadequate
performance, and/or catastrophic engine failure.” (Id.) A “smart oil monitor” gauges the amount
of remaining engine oil and will illuminate a warning light on the dashboard if the engine oil in
the vehicle needs to be refilled. (Id. ¶ 108.) The Class Vehicles’ maintenance schedule advises the
engine oil should be refilled either “every 10,000 miles or every year, whichever occurs first.” (Id.)
Between November 2021 and November 2022, Plaintiffs purchased their respective Class
Vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 25, 36, 50, 61, 72–73, 82–83.) Prior to purchase, Plaintiffs researched the
vehicle on the Volkswagen website, reviewed the available Volkswagen marketing and
promotional materials at the dealership, reviewed the Monroney sticker on the vehicle, “and spoke
with V[olkswagen] sales representatives.” (Id. ¶¶ 13, 26, 51, 62, 84; but see id. ¶ 37 (stating
Martinez did not speak with a VW sales representative prior to purchase); id. ¶ 74 (stating Cramer
only reviewed the Monroney sticker prior to purchase).) The Class Vehicles included a New
Vehicle Limited Warranty. (See ECF No. 29-3.) The New Vehicle Limited Warranty “covers any
repair to correct a defect in manufacturer’s material or workmanship.” (See id. at 11.)
Following purchase, Plaintiffs were frequently required to refill the engine oil due to the
defectively installed piston ring assembly (the “Oil Consumption Defect”). (ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 14–
20, 27–31, 42–47, 52–56, 63–70, 75–76, 85–89.) As a result of the Oil Consumption Defect,
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Plaintiffs have developed concerns regarding the reliability and safety of the Class Vehicles (Id.
¶¶ 22, 32, 48, 58, 68; but see id. ¶¶ 71–93 (failing to allege either Cramer or Worthington share
such concerns)) and have suffered damages, “including, but not limited to, out-of-pocket losses
associated with the Oil Consumption Defect, diminished value of [the] [Class] [V]ehicle, and other
consequential damages” (Id. ¶¶ 23, 34, 49, 59, 69, 79, 92). Plaintiffs allege Defendants knew of
and concealed the Oil Consumption Defect. (Id. ¶¶ 133, 243.)
B. Procedural History
On December 16, 2024, Zeiders and Westlund filed a class action complaint against VW
America. (ECF No. 1.) Both Martinez and Worthington subsequently filed their own class action
complaints under separate docket numbers. (See ECF No. 11-1 at 4.) On February 4, 2025, Zeiders,
Westlund, Martinez, and Worthington filed a motion to consolidate the three actions (ECF No.
11), which the Court granted on February 11, 2025 (ECF No. 13).
On March 13, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the CAC against Defendants on behalf of all individuals
who purchased or leased a Class Vehicle in the nation (the “Nationwide Class”) and in the states
of Delaware (the “Delaware Subclass”), Pennsylvania (the “Pennsylvania Subclass”), Georgia (the
“Georgia Subclass”), Maryland (the “Maryland Subclass”), New York (the “New York Subclass”),
Illinois (the “Illinois Subclass”), and Minnesota (the “Minnesota Subclass”) (collectively, the
“Statewide Subclasses”). (See generally ECF No. 20.)
The CAC alleges five causes of action on behalf of the Nationwide Class or, in the
alternative, the Statewide Subclasses: breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Ninth Cause
of Action) (id. ¶¶ 226–32); breach of express warranty (Tenth Cause of Action) (id. ¶¶ 233–41);
fraudulent concealment (Eleventh Cause of Action) (id. ¶¶ 242–59); negligent misrepresentation
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(Twelfth Cause of Action) (id. ¶¶ 260–65); and unjust enrichment (Thirteenth Cause of Action)
(id. ¶¶ 266–71).
The CAC also alleges eight causes of action on behalf of the Statewide Subclasses,
respectively violation of: the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act (Count Eight), Del. Code Ann. tit. 6,
§ 2511, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 223–25); the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count One), 73 Pa.
Stat. Ann. § 201-1, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 174–85); the Georgia Fair Business Practice Act (Count Three),
Ga. Code Ann., § 10-1-393, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 192–98); the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Count
Two), Md. Code Com. Law § 13-101, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 186–91); the New York Deceptive Trade
Practices Act & False Advertising (Count Five), N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349; § 350 (id. ¶¶ 211–
14); the Illinois Consumer Fraud & Deceptive Business Practices Act (Count Six), 815 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. § 505/1, et seq., and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count Seven),
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 510/1, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 215–22); and the Minnesota Prevention of
Consumer Fraud Act (Count Four), Minn. Stat. § 325F.68-70 (id. ¶¶ 199–10) (collectively, the
“Consumer Fraud Act Claims”).
On May 23, 2025, pursuant to the Court’s Judicial Preferences, VW America submitted a
pre-motion letter requesting leave to file a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiffs filed a
response on May 29, 2025. (ECF No. 27.) On June 3, 2025, the Court entered a text order granting
VW America leave to file a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 28.)
On June 17, 2025, VW America filed the Motion to Dismiss the CAC pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiffs filed their Opposition on August 1, 2025 (ECF No.
31; see also ECF No. 24 (permitting Plaintiffs to file their opposition within forty-five days of the
filing of the motion to dismiss)); and VW America filed its Reply on September 16, 2025 (ECF
No. 39; see also ECF No. 35 (permitting VW to file its reply on or prior to September 16, 2025)).
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
“When a motion under Rule 12 is based on more than one ground, the court should consider
the 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot.” Dickerson v. Bank of Am., N.A., Civ.
A. No. 12-3922, 2013 WL 1163483, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013) (quoting In re Corestates Tr.
Fee Litig., 837 F. Supp. 104, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1993)). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)
challenging the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction asserts the Court lacks “authority or competence
to hear and decide the case before it.” Northlight Harbor, LLC v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 2d
517, 520 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5B Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1350 (3d ed. 2004)). It requires a plaintiff to bear the burden of pleading that
jurisdiction is appropriate. Id. at 521; see also Wright v. N.J./Dep’t of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 3d 490,
495 (D.N.J. 2015) (“It is well-settled that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject
matter jurisdiction . . . to defeat a motion under 12(b)(1).”). In considering dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, a district court’s focus is not on whether the factual allegations entitle
a plaintiff to relief, but rather on whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim and grant
relief. See Maertin v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 434, 445 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing
New Hope Books, Inc. v. Farmer, 82 F. Supp. 2d 321, 324 (D.N.J. 2000)). The court is tasked with
determining “whether [it is] dealing with a facial or factual attack to jurisdiction.” United States
ex rel. Atkinson v. PA. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2007).
“A facial attack . . . is an argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is
insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court because, for example, it does not
present a question of federal law, or because there is no indication of a diversity of citizenship
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among the parties, or because some other jurisdictional defect is present.” Const. Party of Pa. v.
Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). The standard of review for a facial attack is the same
as one “under Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., construing the alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party.”
Id. (citing In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012)).
A factual attack, however, “concerns not an alleged pleading deficiency, but rather the
actual failure of [a plaintiff’s] claims to comport with . . . jurisdictional prerequisites.” United
States ex rel. FLFMC, LLC, 855 F. Supp. 2d 300, 304 (D.N.J. 2012) (quoting United States ex rel.
Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 514). Unlike a facial attack, no presumption of truthfulness attaches to a
plaintiff’s allegations. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632
(3d Cir. 2017) (citing Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016)).
The Third Circuit has “repeatedly cautioned against allowing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to be turned into an attack on the merits.” Davis, 824
F.3d at 348. “[D]ismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely because the legal theory
alleged is probably false, but only because the right claimed is ‘so insubstantial, implausible,
foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to
involve a federal controversy.’” Id. at 350 (alteration in original) (quoting Kulick v. Pocono Downs
Racing Ass’n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Here, Defendant asserts a facial 12(b)(1) challenge given it does not raise arguments
concerning any of the underlying facts but rather focuses exclusively on deficiencies in the
pleadings. See Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); Mortensen v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).
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B. Rule 12(b)(6)
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court is “required to
accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged
in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party].” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228. “[A] complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). However, “a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555 (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the
factual allegations in the complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This
“plausibility standard” requires the complaint to allege “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement.’” Id. at 678
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations” are not required, but “more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” must be pled; it must include
“factual enhancement” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the elements of a cause
of action. Id. (citations omitted). In assessing plausibility, the court may not consider any “[f]actual
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claims and assertions raised by a defendant.” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 345 (3d Cir.
2022).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—’that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Indeed,
after Iqbal, conclusory or “bare-bones” allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss:
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To prevent dismissal, all civil
complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible,
allowing “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570). The Supreme Court’s ruling in Iqbal
emphasizes that a plaintiff must show that the allegations of his or her complaints are plausible.
See id. at 670.
While, generally, the court may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the
complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held that “a court
may consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss
[to one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56].” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184
F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, courts may consider any “document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426 (quoting
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1220). However, “[w]hen the truth of facts in an ‘integral’ document are contested
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by the well-pleaded facts of a complaint, the facts in the complaint must prevail.” Princeton Univ.,
30 F.4th at 342.
C. Rule 9(b)
Fraud-based claims are subject to a heightened pleading standard, requiring a plaintiff to
“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). For
a fraud-based claim, a court may grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 9(b) if the plaintiff
fails to plead with the required particularity. See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200–02
(3d Cir. 2007). The level of particularity required is such that a defendant is provided with
sufficient details to be put on notice of the “precise misconduct with which [it is] charged.” Id. at
200 (citation omitted). At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to allege the “essential factual
background that would accompany the first paragraph of any newspaper story—that is, the ‘who,
what, when, where and how’ of the events at issue.” In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
438 F.3d 256, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
III. DECISION
VW America moves to dismiss the CAC for lack of standing pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)
(see generally ECF No. 29 at 36–39) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 12(b)(6) (see
generally id. at 10–35). The Court addresses each in turn.
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
VW America argues the Court should dismiss the nationwide claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1). (See generally id. at 36–39.) Specifically, VW America claims Plaintiffs do not have
“Article III standing to assert claims on behalf of unnamed putative class members who reside or
purchased their [Class Vehicles] in states in which the Plaintiffs themselves have suffered no
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injury.”2 (Id. at 38–39.) VW America does not allege Plaintiffs do not have Article III standing to
assert claims on behalf of same in the states in which the Plaintiffs were collectively injured or
reside—Delaware, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, Illinois, and Minnesota.3 (See
generally id. at 36–39.) In response, Plaintiffs contend “[t]his argument is premature and, as
numerous courts have found, is more appropriate to address when Plaintiffs file their motion for
class certification.” (ECF No. 31 at 39.)
As recognized by Plaintiffs (id. at 40), however, there is a split among the district courts
within the Third Circuit as to whether the standing of named class representatives to assert claims
on behalf of unnamed plaintiffs arising under the laws of states where the named plaintiff neither
resides nor alleges to have suffered any injury should be reviewed under Article III standing
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or under class standing pursuant to Rule 23. Hardy v. Volkswagen Grp.
of Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 24-8251, 2025 WL 1409820, at *6–7 (D.N.J. May 14, 2025). At this time,
2 VW America also argues Plaintiffs lack Article III standing: (1) to request injunctive relief as the
CAC fails to establish Plaintiffs are “likely to suffer a future injury” (ECF No. 29 at 36-37); and
(2) to compel Defendants to issue a recall as such relief is preempted by the Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30101, et seq. (id. at 37–38). First, the CAC sufficiently alleges a threat
of future injury (see ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 23, 34, 48, 59, 69, 79, 92, 155) and, therefore, dismissal of the
injunctive relief claims on this basis is not warranted at this juncture. Second, the Court recognizes
there is a split among the district courts within the Third Circuit as to the preemptive effect of the
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act on state law remedies. Compare Hickman v. Subaru of Am.,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 21-2100, 2022 WL 11021043, at *12 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2022), and Rieger v.
Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 21-10546, 2023 WL 3271116, at *8 (D.N.J. May 4,
2023); with Diaz v. FCA US LLC, 693 F. Supp. 3d 425, 445–46 (D. Del. 2023). As neither the
Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has held the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempts state
law remedies, this Court declines to do so.
3 As VW America does not allege Plaintiffs do not have Article III standing to assert claims on
behalf of unnamed putative class members who reside or purchased their Class Vehicles in the
states of Delaware, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, the Court need not conduct a
review the three elements of Article III standing to establish same. See Sittol v. AvalonBay
Communities, Inc., Civ. A. No. 25-2124, 2025 WL 3041823, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2025)
(reviewing the elements of (1) injury in fact; (2) traceability; and (3) redressability).
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“[t]here is a fairly even split of authority among the cases that have previously been confronted
with this issue, and there is no binding Third Circuit precedent directly on point.” Id. (quoting
Snowdy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Civ. A. No. 23-1681, 2024 WL 1366446, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr.
1, 2024); compare, e.g., Ponzio v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 447 F. Supp. 3d 194, 223 (D.N.J.
2020) (holding “[p]laintiffs’ lack standing to assert claims on behalf of unnamed plaintiffs in
jurisdictions where [the] [p]laintiffs have suffered no alleged injury”), with In re Allergan Biocell
Textured Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 537 F. Supp. 3d 679, 753–54 (D.N.J. 2021) (holding
“prior to the class certification stage, it is premature to examine the named plaintiffs’ standing to
pursue claims on behalf of absent class members of the nationwide class” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Although some courts have held a plaintiff may have standing to assert claims as a
proposed named class representative on behalf of unnamed plaintiffs arising under the laws of
states where the plaintiff neither resides nor alleges to have suffered any injury, which should be
reviewed under Rule 23, this Court has declined to hold same. Tijerina v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am.,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 21-18755, 2023 WL 6890996, at *8 n.3 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2023). As repeatedly
affirmed by the Third Circuit, “[a] plaintiff must ‘demonstrate [Article III] standing for each claim
he seeks to press.’” Long v. SEPTA, 903 F.3d 312, 323 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Neale v. Volvo
Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 359 (2015)). The Court may not “exercise jurisdiction over
one claim simply because it arose ‘from the same nucleus of operative fact’ as another claim.”
Neale, 794 F.3d at 359 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)).
Therefore, “if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite
of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any
other member of the class.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); see also Lewis v. Casey,
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518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (“[N]amed plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that
they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members
of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Long, 903 F.3d at 325 (“[A]ny harm to unnamed class members cannot
constitute injury in fact.”). These well-established standing requirements do not change merely
because the action involves a purported national class action. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs.,
846 F.3d at 634; see also Mielo v. Steak’n Shake Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467, 480 (3d Cir.
2018) (explaining “the standing inquiry must be limited to a consideration of the class
representatives themselves, after which [the court] may employ Rule 23 to ensure that classes are
properly certified” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the CAC alleges claims only under the laws of seven states—Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Maryland, New York, Illinois, and Minnesota. (See generally ECF No. 20
at ¶¶ 174–271.) Importantly, Plaintiffs do not claim they have Article III standing to assert claims
under the laws of any other state outside these seven. (See id.) Therefore, as Plaintiffs do not have
Article III standing to assert a claim under the laws of any other state, the Court does not have the
authority to review same. Schaller v. U.S. Social Security Admin., 844 F. App’x 566, 570 (3d Cir.
2021); In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 246.
Based on the foregoing, VW America’s Motion to Dismiss the nationwide claims for lack
of Article III standing is GRANTED IN PART to the extent such claims are premised on state-
law claims brought on behalf of putative “Nationwide Class” members who purchased a Class
Vehicle outside of the seven states represented by Plaintiffs—Delaware, Pennsylvania, Georgia,
New York, Maryland, Illinois, and Minnesota.
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B. Rule 12(b)(6)
VW America argues the Court should dismiss the CAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See
generally ECF No. 29 at 10–35.) Specifically, VW America claims Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently
plead the following claims: breach of express warranty (id. at 10–12); breach of implied warranty
of merchantability (id. at 12–15); fraudulent concealment (id. at 15–30); negligent
misrepresentation (id. at 15–17, 31–34); statutory fraud (id. at 18–30); unjust enrichment (id. at
35–36); and for injunctive relief (id. at 34–35).4
This litigation involves seven named Plaintiffs asserting claims under the laws of seven
different states—Delaware, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, Illinois, and Minnesota.
VW America does not dispute that the state law under which each named Plaintiff brings their
claim is the governing law to be applied. (See generally id.) Therefore, a choice of law analysis is
unnecessary, and the Court will apply the law under which each named Plaintiff brings their claim.
See UBI Telecom Inc. v. KDDI Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 13-1643, 2014 WL 2965705, at *9 (D.N.J.
June 30, 2014) (“When the parties agree upon which state’s law applies . . . the Court need not
conduct [a] choice-of-law inquiry.”); Cole v. NIBCO, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13-07871, 2015 WL
2414740, at *5 (D.N.J. May 20, 2015) (“[T]he Court will follow the lead of the parties and will
not engage in a choice of law analysis.”).
4 VW America also argues the CAC should be dismissed as the pleading asserts Plaintiffs’ claims
collectively against both VW America and VWAG. (ECF No. 29 at 9–10.) The CAC, however,
sets forth the role of both VW America and VWAG and distinguishes each defendant by their
respective function. (ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 94–102.) Under the circumstances of this case, the Court does
not find the use of the term “Defendants” creates any confusion or leaves any doubt as to the nature
of the allegations. Accordingly, the CAC sufficiently puts VW America and VWAG on notice,
and dismissal on this basis is not warranted. Accord Tijerina v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., Civ.
A. No. 21-18755, 2023 WL 6890996, at *14 n.10 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2023); see also In re Volkswagen
Timing Chain Prod. Liab. Litig., Civ. A. No. 16-2765, 2017 WL 1902160, at *9–10 (D.N.J. May
8, 2017) (denying similar request to dismiss based on “lumping”).
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1. Express Warranty Claim
VW America asks the Court to dismiss the Tenth Cause of Action—breach of express
warranty—for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See generally ECF No. 29 at 10–
12.) Specifically, VW America argues the breach of express warranty claim should be dismissed
as the New Vehicle Limited Warranty covers only repairs “to correct a defect in manufacturer’s
material or workmanship” (Id. at 10; accord ECF No. 29-3 at 11), which does not include “design
defects” (see generally id. at 10–12).5 In response, Plaintiffs argue the CAC does not allege a
defect in design but rather a defect in workmanship. (ECF No. 31 at 11–14 (citing, in part, Coba
v. Ford Motor Co., 932 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting a defect in workmanship “is a
deficiency in the execution of a product’s assembly or construction,” whereas a defect in design
“is a flaw inherent in the product’s intended operation and construction”)).)
To plead a breach of express warranty claim, a plaintiff is required to allege the following
elements: (a) an express warranty existed; (b) the defendant breached said warranty; and (c) the
breach of said warranty proximally caused the plaintiff injury or damage. See Godreau-Rivera v.
Coloplast Corp., 598 F. Supp. 3d 196, 219 (D. Del. 2022); Mueller v. Sunbean Prods. Inc., 535 F.
Supp. 3d 351, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2021); McDonald v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 603 S.E.2d 456, 459–
61 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); John C. Grimberg Co., Inc. v. Nudura Corp., 775 F. Supp. 3d 946, 960
(D. Md. 2025); Reed v. Pfizer, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 571, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Bayer HealthCare
5 In support of its argument, VW America notes although the CAC does not allege the Class
Vehicles contain a design defect, the initial Complaint expressly did. (ECF No. 29-1 at 11 (citing
ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.) The Court, however, does not consider the allegations contained in the initial
Complaint as an amended complaint “supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”
West Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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LLC v. Aeropres Corp., 767 F. Supp. 3d 810, 817–18 (N.D. Ill. 2025); Knotts v. Nissan N. Am.,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1320 (D. Minn. 2018).
Here, the CAC alleges an express warranty exists—i.e., the New Vehicle Limited
Warranty. (ECF No. 20 ¶ 234.) The New Vehicle Limited Warranty is limited to “repair[s] to
correct a defect in manufacturer’s material or workmanship” (ECF No. 29-3 at 11); neither party
contests this limitation (see generally ECF No. 29; ECF No. 31). The CAC does not allege the
Class Vehicles’ piston ring assemblies are defective as designed, but rather alleges the assemblies
are defective as a result of workmanship, i.e., incorrect installation. (See, e.g., ECF No. 20 ¶ 111
(stating the piston ring assembly “when correctly sized and installed, and when properly tensioned,
prevent[s] engine oil from entering the combustion chamber”), id. ¶ 116 (stating the “piston ring
assembly in the Class Vehicles contain . . . insufficient piston ring tension, causing . . . . engine oil
[to] not separate[] from the [c]ombustion [c]ycle as intended”), id. ¶ 163 (stating this “defect is
based on poor manufacturing”).) Therefore, accepting these allegations as true and drawing all
inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228, the breach of
express warranty claim is based on a workmanship defect and not a design defect. Therefore, the
CAC sufficiently states a claim of breach of express warranty under the respective state laws.
Based on the foregoing, VW America’s Motion to Dismiss the Tenth Cause of Action for
failure to state a breach of express warranty claim is DENIED.
2. Implied Warranty Claim of Merchantability
VW America asks the Court to dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action—breach of implied
warranty of merchantability—for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See generally
ECF No. 29 at 12–15.) Specifically, VW America claims the breach of express warranty claim
should be dismissed as the CAC does not allege the Class Vehicles are not “merchantable”—that
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they “stopped functioning” or “could not be driven safely.” (Id.) VW America notes Plaintiffs
continued to operate their respective vehicles despite the alleged defect and appropriately received
indications to add additional oil. (Id. at 13–14.) Furthermore, VW America argues the New York
Subclass and the Illinois Subclass’s Breach of Implied Warranty claims should be dismissed
because Choi and DeLong did not purchase their respective vehicles from VW America directly
and, therefore, lack privity to assert same. (Id. at 15.)
In response, Plaintiffs argue the respective vehicles do not pass without objection in the
trade, are not fit for their ordinary purpose, and the New York Subclass’s claim is not barred based
on Choi’s lack of privity. (ECF No. 31 at 14–18.) Plaintiffs do not oppose VW America’s argument
the Illinois Subclass’s breach of implied warranty claim should be dismissed as DeLong lacks
privity to assert same. (Id. at 17 n.10.)
All seven states have adopted Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) § 2-314 (Implied
Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade). U.C.C. § 2-314 (Unif. L. Comm’n 2022). Indeed, the
express language of each state’s law adopting U.C.C. § 2-314 is effectively uniform to both U.C.C.
§ 2-314 and one another. Compare U.C.C. § 2-314, with Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2-314, 13 Pa.
Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2314, Ga. Code Ann. § 11-2-314, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-314,
N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 2-314, 810 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-314, and Minn. Stat. Ann. § 336.2-314.
However, the caselaw interpretating each state’s law by its respective courts varies. Therefore,
while the seven states are relatively uniform in defining whether an implied warranty of
merchantability exists, see U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (stating “a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind”); id. § 2-314(2)(a), (c) (stating a good is “merchantable” if it would “pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description” and is “fit for the ordinary purpose[] for
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which such [a] good[] [is] used”), the states differ in the essential elements to be alleged to
sufficiently plead a breach of same.
All seven states, however, generally require the following elements: (1) the defendant sold
the good; (2) the good was not merchantable—i.e., would not pass without objection under the
contract description or was not fit for the ordinary purpose of which such a good is used—at the
time of sale; (3) the plaintiff notified the defendant-seller the good was not merchantable within a
reasonable time after discovering same; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the
non-merchantable good. See Reybold Grp., Inc. v. Chemprobe Techs., Inc., 721 A.2d 1267, 1269
(Del. 1998); Bieda v. CNH Indus. Am. LLC, 518 F. Supp. 3d 863, 868 (W.D. Pa. 2021); Whitaker
v. Excel Indus., 512 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2021); Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916
A.2d 257, 286 (Md. 2007); Fiuzzi v. Paragon Sporting Goods Co. LLC, 212 A.D.3d 431, 433
(N.Y. App. Div. 2023); Maldonado v. Creative Woodworking Concepts, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 662, 666
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Driscoll v. Standard Hardware, Inc., 785 N.W.2d 805, 816 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010).
New York, however, also requires an additional element of privity of contract between the
defendant and the plaintiff. See Catalano v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 167 F. Supp. 3d 540, 556
(S.D.N.Y. 2016). Alternatively, a plaintiff may plead an implied warranty of merchantability claim
under New York law by alleging a product is a “thing of danger”—i.e., “when used for the purpose
for which it is made it is likely to be a source of danger to several or many people if not properly
designed and fashioned.” Shaaya v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am. LLC, Civ. A. No. 20-5679, 2022
WL 2341599, at *11 (D.N.J. June 29, 2022) (quoting Amato v. Subaru of Am., Inc., Civ. A. No.
18-16118, 2019 WL 6607148, at *13 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2019)).
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Here, the CAC alleges: (1) Defendants sold the Class Vehicles (ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 100, 227);
(2) the Class Vehicles were not merchantable at the time of sale (id. ¶ 229); (3) Plaintiffs notified
Defendants the Class Vehicles were not merchantable within a reasonable time of discovery same
(id. ¶¶ 12–93); and (4) Plaintiffs have suffered damages as a result of the non-merchantable Class
Vehicles (id. ¶¶ 12–93). Therefore, accepting these allegations as true, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at
228, the CAC sufficiently states a claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim
under Delaware, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Minnesota, and the Motion to Dismiss is
DENIED as to Cramer, Martinez, Zeiders, Westlund, and Worthington’s respective implied
warranty of merchantability claims.
The CAC fails to allege, however, the required element of privity of contract under New
York law. (See ECF No. 20 ¶ 50.) Nevertheless, the CAC does allege Choi has concerns as to
whether his Class Vehicle may be operated safely due to the Oil Consumption Defect (id. ¶ 58),
which may cause “unexpected” and “catastrophic” “engine failure while the Class Vehicle[] [is]
in operation” (id. ¶¶ 3, 110). Courts in this district have recognized allegations of potential
“premature” and “catastrophic” engine failure to be sufficient to demonstrate a vehicle is a “thing
of danger” at this stage of the litigation. See, e.g., Amato, 2019 WL 6607148, at *13. Therefore,
accepting these allegations as true and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to Choi,
see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228, the CAC sufficiently alleges the Class Vehicle is a “thing of danger,”
Shaaya, 2022 WL 2341599, at *11. Accordingly, the CAC sufficiently states a claim of breach of
implied warranty of merchantability under New York law, and the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED
as to Choi’s implied warranty of merchantability claim.
Based on the foregoing, VW America’s Motion to Dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action for
failure to state a breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim is GRANTED as to DeLong.
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3. Common Law Claims
VW America asks the Court to dismiss the Eleventh Cause of Action—fraudulent
concealment—and the Twelfth Cause of Action—negligent misrepresentation—for failure to state
a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See generally ECF No. 29 at 18–34.) Specifically, VW America
claims the common law claims should be dismissed as the claims are barred under the economic
loss doctrine of each state. (Id. at 30–31.) Alternatively, VW America claims the CAC fails to
establish VW America had pre-sale knowledge of the Oil Consumption Defect in the Class
Vehicles (id. at 18–23); VW America had a duty to disclose the Oil Consumption Defect to
Plaintiffs (id. at 26–33); and Plaintiffs relied on an affirmative representation (id. at 23–26), as
required to sufficiently plead a fraudulent concealment or negligent misrepresentation claim.
In response, Plaintiffs argue the common law claims are not barred under the economic
loss doctrine and are sufficiently pled. (ECF No. 31 at 32–35.) Plaintiffs do not oppose VW
America’s argument the negligent misrepresentation claim should be dismissed as to Westlund
based on a lack of duty under Maryland law. (Id. at 35 n.39.)
a. Economic Loss Doctrine
All seven states have adopted the economic loss doctrine, also known as the economic loss
rule, which “prohibits plaintiffs from recovering in tort economic losses to which their entitlement
only flows from a contract.” Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Bergen Brunswig Drug Co., 226 F. Supp.
2d 557, 562 (D.N.J. 2002) (quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 6 F.3d 604,
618 (3d Cir.1995)). “[T]he economic loss doctrine ‘defines the boundary between the overlapping
theories of tort law and contract law by barring the recovery of purely economic loss in tort.’”
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 244 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Dean
v. Barrett Homes, Inc., 968 A.2d 192, 202 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)). The states, however,
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have recognized exceptions to the economic loss doctrine, which typically involve a defendant’s
allegedly tortious act or omission that arises from but is independent to the contract. See Bracco
Diagnostics, 226 F.Supp.2d at 564 (quoting Emerson Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 95-6455, 2000 WL 49361, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2000)).
Relevant to this matter, Delaware, Georgia, and Maryland have recognized both a well-
pled fraudulent omission claim and negligent misrepresentation claim as exceptions to their
respective economic loss doctrines. See Livery Coach Sols., L.L.C. v. Music Express/E., Inc., 245
F. Supp. 3d 639, 646 (D. Del. 2017); Murray v. ILG Techs., LLC, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1244
(S.D. Ga. 2019); Dwoskin v. Bank of Am., N.A., 850 F. Supp. 2d 557, 569 (D. Md. 2012). In
contrast, New York, Illinois, and Minnesota have declined to recognize a well-pled negligent
misrepresentation claim as an exception, Harris v. Pfizer Inc., 586 F. Supp. 3d 231, 243 (S.D.N.Y.
2022) (applying the economic loss doctrine to negligent misrepresentation claims absent
allegations of personal injury); Rouse v. H.B. Fuller Co., 694 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1160 (D. Minn.
2023) (applying the economic loss doctrine to “common law misrepresentation claims”) (citing
Minn. Stat. § 604.101 (2016)); but see Hecktman v. Pac. Indem. Co., 59 N.E.3d 868, 873–74 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2016) (recognizing a well-pled negligent misrepresentation claim as an exception to the
economic loss doctrine in the limited circumstances in which the defendant is “in the business of
supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions”); and Pennsylvania
has declined to recognize either fraudulent concealment or negligent misrepresentation as an
exception “if the misrepresentation relates to the quality of the good sold.” Martin v. Ford Motor
Co., 765 F. Supp. 2d 673, 684 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
Based on the foregoing, VW America’s Motion to Dismiss the Eleventh Cause of Action
pursuant to the economic loss doctrine is GRANTED as to Zeider and VW America’s Motion to
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Dismiss the Twelfth Cause of Action pursuant to the economic loss doctrine is GRANTED as to
Choi, Worthington, and Zeider.
b. Fraudulent Concealment & Negligent Misrepresentation
Although the states differ in the essential elements to be alleged to sufficiently plead a
fraudulent concealment claim, Delaware, Georgia, New York, Maryland, Illinois, and Minnesota
effectively require a plaintiff to assert the following elements: (1) knowledge, i.e., the defendant
had knowledge of a material fact; (2) duty, i.e., the defendant had a duty to disclose to the plaintiff
said material fact; (3) intent, i.e., the defendant concealed or omitted said material fact with the
intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) causation, i.e., had the defendant
disclosed the omitted material fact, the plaintiff would not have acted or refrained from acting; and
(5) damages, i.e., as a result of the defendant’s omittance, the plaintiff was damaged. See
TransDigm Inc. v. Alcoa Glob. Fasteners, Inc., C.A. No. 7135, 2013 WL 2326881, at *6 (Del. Ch.
May 29, 2013); Bolling v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Civ. A. No. 23-671, 2024 WL 3972987, at
*14 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2024); Lacey v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Civ. A. No. 24-2770, 2025
WL 2597118, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 5, 2025); Diaz v. FCA US LLC, Civ. A. No. 21-906, 2022 WL
4016744, at *26 (D. Del. Sept. 2, 2022); Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 596 F. Supp. 3d 1050,
1057–58 (N.D. Ill. 2022); Peterson v. Clark Lake Homes, Inc., No. A22-398, 2022 WL 16910578,
at *4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2022). Under both Delaware and Georgia law, the only difference
between a fraudulent concealment claim and a negligent misrepresentation claim is “whether the
defendant knowingly or negligently made the misrepresentations.” Am. Casual Dining, L.P. v.
Moe’s Sw. Grill, L.L.C., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2006); see also Rohm & Haas Elec.
Materials, LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., Civ. A. No. 06-297, 2009 WL 1033651, at *7 (D. Del.
Apr. 16, 2009) (“[N]egligent misrepresentation only differs from fraud in that a party’s knowledge
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of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth need not be proven.”). Therefore, if a plaintiff
sufficiently pleads a fraudulent concealment claim under Delaware or Georgia law, then the
plaintiff sufficiently pleads a negligent misrepresentation claim.
Although a plaintiff is typically required to plead a claim of fraud with particularity under
Rule 9(b), the courts have relaxed this requirement in claims based on an omission of material fact.
See Tijerina, 2023 WL 6890996, at *26; see also Craftmatic Secs. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d
628, 645 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Courts must be sensitive to the fact that application of Rule 9(b) prior to
discovery may permit sophisticated defrauders to successfully conceal the details of their fraud.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, to sufficiently assert the elements of knowledge
and intent in support of a fraudulent concealment claim, a plaintiff is merely required to allege
“what [the] defendant is alleged to have known and when.” BK Trucking Co. v. Paccar, Inc., Civ.
A. No. 15-2282, 2016 WL 3566723, at *8 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016) (quoting In re AZEK Building
Prods., Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litig., 82 F. Supp. 3d 608, 623 (D.N.J. 2015)); accord
Tijerina, 2023 WL 6890996, at *26.
VW America argues the CAC fails to sufficiently allege the elements of knowledge, duty,
and causation. (See generally ECF No. 29 at 18–26, 29–30.) VW America does not argue the CAC
fails to sufficiently allege the elements of intent or damages. (See generally id.)
i. Knowledge
First, VW America argues the CAC fails to sufficiently assert the element of knowledge.
(See generally id. at 18–23.) Specifically, VW America claims the CAC fails to establish VW
America had pre-sale knowledge of the Oil Consumption Defect in the Class Vehicles. (See id. at
18–23.) In response, Plaintiffs argue the CAC sufficiently asserts the element of knowledge based
on allegations of “[p]re-release testing, dealership data, and consumer complaints.” (ECF No. 31
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at 19–25; accord ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 130–33, 152–53 (alleging VW America tested the Class Vehicles
prior to sale, including but not limited to exhaust emission durability testing); id. ¶¶ 144–46, 150
(alleging VW America collected field reports, customer complaints, and warranty data regarding
excess oil consumption); id. ¶¶ 134–43 (alleging VW America issued technical service bulletins
regarding excess oil consumption); id. ¶¶ 147–49 (alleging VW America reviewed customer
complaints on social media websites regarding excess oil consumption).) Furthermore, Plaintiffs
note “[t]he Court has rejected similar lack-of-knowledge arguments . . . in other oil consumption
cases.” (ECF No. 31 at 19 (citing Rieger, 2023 WL 3271116, at *2).)
The CAC adequately alleges facts supporting an inference VW America had pre-sale
knowledge of the Oil Consumption Defect at this stage. Excluding Zeider, Martinez and Cramer
were allegedly the first plaintiffs to purchase their respective Class Vehicles, which were
purchased in November 2021. (ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 36, 71.) The CAC alleges VW America has
periodically issued a technical service bulletin regarding complaints of oil consumption higher
than the VW America standard since December 2008. (Id. ¶ 136; accord ECF No. 20-1.) Plaintiffs
allege these bulletins are periodically issued “to include new models that are released each year.”
(ECF No. 20 ¶ 136; see, e.g., ECF No. 20-1 (issued “[t]o include 2025 model year applicability”).)
The CAC references a technical service bulletin issued on June 22, 2021, which was issued
to include all 2022 Volkswagen models. (ECF No. 20 ¶ 136 n.12.) The Class Vehicles purchased
by Westlund, Choi, DeLong, Cramer, and Worthington were 2022 Volkswagen Tiguans. (Id. ¶¶
25, 50, 61, 72–73, 82–83.) Because the technical service bulletin, which included the 2022
Volkswagen Tiguan, was issued prior to Plaintiffs respective purchases of same in and following
November 2021, this allegation alone is sufficient to support an inference VW America had pre-
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sale knowledge of the Oil Consumption Defect in the 2022 Volkswagen Tiguan at this stage of the
litigation.
In contrast, the CAC does not allege a technical service bulletin was issued to include any
2023 Volkswagen model prior to Martinez’s purchase of his 2023 Volkswagen Tiguan in
November 2021. (ECF No. 20 ¶ 36.) The periodically issued technical service bulletins, however,
suggest VW America’s knowledge of a consistent oil consumption defect in all of its models
between 2008 and 2022. (See id. ¶¶ 134–43; accord ECF No. 20-1; see also ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 29,
43–47, 55–56, 63–64, 85 (stating the Oil Consumption Defect was “normal”); id. ¶ 146 (stating
VW America “considers it acceptable for their cars to burn through a quart of oil every 1,000
miles”).) Furthermore, the CAC alleges VW America was required to test the 2023 Volkswagen
Tiguan prior to sale, including but not limited to testing the exhaust emission durability, during
which “the Oil Consumption Defect would have manifested itself.” (Id. ¶¶ 130–33, 152–53.) Based
on these allegations of a consistent oil consumption defect in all VW America models since 2008
and VW America’s required testing of the Class Vehicles prior to sale, the Court may reasonably
infer VW America either knew or should have known of the Oil Consumption Defect in the 2023
VW Tiguan prior to Martinez’s purchase of same. Callen v. Daimler AG, Civ. A. No. 19-1411,
2020 WL 10090879, at *16 (N.D. Ga. June 17, 2020) (upholding “the reasonable inference that
the [d]efendants did, in fact, conduct various tests that could have revealed the existence of the
defect”). Therefore, accepting these allegations as true and drawing all inferences in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228, VW America had pre-sale knowledge of the
Oil Consumption Defect. Accordingly, the CAC sufficiently alleges the element of knowledge at
this stage of the litigation.
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ii. Duty
Next, VW America argues the CAC fails to sufficiently allege the element of duty under
the laws of each state. (See generally ECF No. 29 at 26–30.) Specifically, VW America claims
“the CAC fails to identify any misleading statement by [VW America], partial or otherwise, much
less one that relates to the [Class Vehicles’] pistons or oil consumption.” (Id. at 26 (internal citation
omitted).) In response, Plaintiffs argue the CAC sufficiently asserts the element of duty based on
VW America’s superior knowledge and affirmative statements contained in the maintenance
schedule, “advis[ing] owners to change their oil every 10,000 miles or every year, whichever
comes first.” (ECF No. 31 at 27–28; accord ECF No. 20 ¶ 245.) Plaintiffs do not allege VW
America had a duty to disclose the Oil Consumption Defect based on a confidential or fiduciary
relationship between the parties. (See generally ECF No. 20.) As the element of duty is defined
differently in each state, the Court addresses each in turn.
A. Delaware, Maryland, & Minnesota
Under Delaware, Maryland, and Minnesota law, a party to a transaction has a duty to
disclose information, which if undisclosed, will cause a partial statement of fact to be misleading.
In re Student Fin. Corp., Civ. A. No. 02-11620, 2004 WL 609329, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 23, 2004);
Kwintkiewicz v. Bentley Motors, Inc., Civ. A. No. 10-3212, 2011 WL 1336576, at *2 (D. Md. Apr.
7, 2011); Jane Doe 43C v. Diocese of New Ulm, 787 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
“[S]ilence does not constitute fraud in the absence of a duty to speak.” Jane Doe 43C, 787 N.W.2d
at 687 (quoting Berreman v. W. Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)); accord
Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del. 1983). Also under Delaware law, a
party to a transaction also has a duty to disclose “facts basic to the transaction if he knows that the
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other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them.” In re Student Fin. Corp., 2004 WL
609329, at *5.
The CAC alleges VW America had a duty under Delaware, Maryland, and Minnesota law
to disclose the Oil Consumption Defect based on its prior representations. (ECF No. 20 ¶ 243.)
Specifically, the CAC alleges VW America represented in its maintenance schedule the Class
Vehicles require “an oil change every 10,000 miles or every year, whichever occurs first.” (Id.
¶ 108; accord ECF No. 31 at 14–15, 28, 35.) A maintenance schedule “identif[ies] parts and
components that require routine maintenance and/or replacement as certain points throughout the
lifespan of [a] vehicle.” In re Volkswagen Timing Chain Prod. Liab. Litig., Civ. A. No. 16-2765,
2017 WL 1902160, at *20 (D.N.J. May 8, 2017). Courts in this district have previously held a
maintenance schedule may qualify as a partial statement of fact requiring a defendant to disclose
information, if undisclosed, will cause the maintenance schedule to be misleading. Id.; accord
Opheim v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Civ. A. No. 20-2483, 2021 WL 2621689, at *15 (D.N.J.
June 25, 2021); Rickman v. BMW of N. Am., Civ. A. No. 18-4363, 2020 WL 3468250, at *14
(D.N.J. June 25, 2020); Albers v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Civ. A. No. 16-881, 2020 WL
1466359, at *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2020). Therefore, accepting these allegations as true and drawing
all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228, VW America
had knowledge of the Oil Consumption Defect prior to Plaintiffs purchase of their respective Class
Vehicles. Accordingly, the CAC sufficiently alleges the element of duty to disclose same based on
the representations made by VW America in the maintenance schedule under Georgia, New York,
and Illinois law.
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B. Georgia, New York, & Illinois
Under Georgia, New York, and Illinois law, a party to a transaction has a duty to disclose
a material fact based on the party’s “superior knowledge of essential facts render[ing]
nondisclosure inherently unfair.” Gormley v. Marist Bros. of Sch., 236 A.D.3d 868, 872 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2025) (first quoting Sanford/Kissena Owners Corp. v. Daral Props., LLC, 84 A.D.3d
1210, 1211 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011), then quoting Barrett v. Freifeld, 64 A.D.3d 736, 738 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2009)); see also Bolling, 2024 WL 3972987, at *16 (imposing a duty to disclose
“intrinsic qualities of the article which the other party by the exercise of ordinary prudence and
caution could not discover.” (quoting McCabe v. Daimler AG, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1368 (N.D.
Ga. 2013))); Monopoli v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Civ. A. No. 21-1353, 2022 WL 409484, at
*10 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2022); Bakhtiari v. Savenok, 2023 IL App (3d) 220480-U, 2023 WL
6621399, ¶ 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024) (imposing a duty to disclose a material fact if “the plaintiff
places trust and confidence in the [party], thereby placing the [party] in a position of influence and
superiority over the plaintiff” (citing Kurti v. Fox Valley Radiologists, Ltd., 464 N.E.2d 1219, 1123
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984)). Superior knowledge triggers a duty to disclose “only in instances where a
party (1) has superior knowledge, (2) that is not available to the other party by reasonable inquiry,
and (3) the first party knows that the second party is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge.”
Naughright v. Weiss, 826 F. Supp. 2d 676, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 582 (2d Cir. 2005)).
Martinez, Choi, and DeLong allege VW America had a duty to disclose the Oil
Consumption Defect as it had superior knowledge of same, which “is an ‘intrinsic quality’ of the
Class Vehicles and, given the internal nature, . . . Plaintiffs could not discover the [d]efect through
‘the exercise of ordinary prudence and caution.” (ECF No. 31 at 31–32 (quoting Bolling, 2024 WL
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3972987, at *16); see also ECF No. 20 ¶ 245 (stating Plaintiffs “could not reasonably have been
expected to learn or discover that their engines have a dangerous safety defect until after they
purchased the Class Vehicles”).) Therefore, accepting these allegations as true and drawing all
inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228, VW America had
prior knowledge of and failed to disclose the Oil Consumption Defect, which is an intrinsic quality
of the Class Vehicles and could not have been reasonably discovered prior to purchase.
Accordingly, the CAC sufficiently alleges the element of duty under Georgia, New York, and
Illinois law, see, e.g., Tijerina, 2023 WL 6890996, at *26 (finding superior knowledge triggers a
duty to disclose under New York law); In re Volkswagen Timing Chain, 2017 WL 1902160, at *20
(finding superior knowledge triggers a duty to disclose under Georgia and Illinois law).
iii. Causation
Finally, VW America argues the CAC fails to sufficiently allege the element of causation.
(See generally ECF No. 29 at 23–26.) Specifically, VW America claims the CAC does not “plead
the specific statements or information from [VW America], viewed by [Plaintiffs] prior to
purchase, which allegedly should have contained the undisclosed information. (Id. at 23–24.) In
response, Plaintiffs argue the CAC sufficiently alleges “they were unaware of the Oil Consumption
Defect at the time of their purchase/lease and, had this material information been disclosed to them,
they would not have bought/leased their vehicle, or would have paid substantially less for them.”
(ECF No. 31 at 25.)
Significantly, “allegations sufficient to show justifiable reliance on an omission differ from
those sufficient to show reliance on a misrepresentation. By the very nature of fraudulent
concealment, plaintiffs cannot be expected to point to the time, place, and precise substance of
what should have been disclosed.” Bolling, 2024 WL 3972987, at *17 (quoting Monopoli, 2022
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WL 409484, at *10). The courts in this district have consistently held the element of causation is
sufficiently pled wherein the plaintiffs “would not have paid as much for the Class Vehicles or
would not have purchased them at all.” Id.; see also Tijerina, 2023 WL 6890996, at *26 (finding
the plaintiffs sufficiently pled reliance on alleged omissions based on allegations the defendant
“failed to disclose the [defect] before the sale of the Class Vehicles when only [the defendant]
knew of the claimed defect”); In re Volkswagen Timing Chain, 2017 WL 1902160, at *24 (finding
the plaintiffs sufficiently pled reliance on alleged omissions based on allegations defendant had
superior knowledge of the defect, actively concealed same from the plaintiffs, and the alleged
omissions “would mislead purchasers, including [the] [p]laintiffs, regarding the useful life of the
vehicle, the anticipated cost of repair, and the overall value and quality of the Class Vehicles”).
The CAC adequately alleges facts supporting causation at this stage of the litigation. The
CAC alleges had Plaintiffs “known about the Oil Consumption Defect at the time of their purchase
or lease transaction, they would not have purchased or leased the Class Vehicles or they would
have paid substantially less for them than they did.” (ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 5, 24, 35, 40, 60, 70, 80, 93.)
Therefore, accepting these allegations as true and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable
to Plaintiffs, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228, Plaintiffs “would not have paid as much for the Class
Vehicles or would not have purchased them at all,” Bolling, 2024 WL 3972987, at *17.
Accordingly, the CAC sufficiently alleges the element of causation at this stage of the litigation.
Based on the foregoing, VW America’s Motion to Dismiss the Eleventh and Twelfth
Causes of Action for failure to state a fraudulent concealment or negligent misrepresentation claim
under Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, and Illinois law is DENIED.
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4. Consumer Fraud Act Claims
VW America asks the Court to dismiss the First through Eighth Causes of Action—the
Consumer Fraud Act Claims—for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See generally
ECF No. 29 at 15–30.) Specifically, VW America grounds its request to dismiss the Consumer
Fraud Act Claims on the same arguments raised in support of its request to dismiss the common-
law fraud claims. (See generally id.)
Each of the states has enacted a consumer protection statute, permit a plaintiff to file a
private cause of action against a defendant for the use of unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent acts or
practices in a consumer transaction. See generally Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2512, 2525(a); 73 Pa.
Stat. Ann. §§ 201-3(a), 9.2(a); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-393, 399(a); Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§
13-303, -408(a); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349(a), (h), 350; 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/2, 10a,
11a; Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 8.31(3)(a), 325F.69. Although these statutes are not identical, each statute
is liberally construed and generally broader than their common-law counterpart. See Williams v.
Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 631 F. Supp. 3d 202, 207 (D. Del. 2022); Gregg v. Ameriprise Fin.,
Inc., 245 A.3d 637, 645–46 (Pa. 2021); McClure v. Toyota Motor Corp., 759 F. Supp. 3d 1333,
1358–60 (N.D. Ga. 2024); Reed v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, Civ. A. No. 13-3265, 2016 WL
3218720, at *7–9 (D. Md. June 10, 2016); New York v. Feldman, 210 F. Supp. 2d 294, 301
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Cuculich v. Thomson Consumer Elecs., Inc., 739 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000); State v. Minnesota Sch. of Bus., Inc., 935 N.W.2d 124, 133 (Minn. 2019).
Having determined the CAC sufficiently states a claim under the provisions of the more
narrowly construed common-law fraudulent concealment claim, the Court need not review
whether the CAC sufficiently states a claim under the broader provisions of Delaware, Georgia,
New York, Maryland, Illinois, and Minnesota’s respective consumer protection statutes. As the
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Court was not required to review whether the CAC sufficiently states a claim of fraudulent
concealment under Pennsylvania common-law pursuant to the economic loss doctrine, however,
the Court will review whether the CAC sufficiently states a claim under the provisions of
Pennsylvania’s statutory fraud act—i.e., the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act, 73 Pa. Stat.
Ann. § 201-1, et seq.
a. Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act creates a private right of action for consumers
injured by unfair or deceptive trade practices. 73 Pa. Con. Stat. § 201-9.1. To state a claim under
same, a plaintiff must assert:
(1) they purchased or leased “goods or services primarily for a
personal, family, or household purpose”; (2) they suffered an
“ascertainable loss of money or property”; (3) the loss occurred “as
a result of the use or employment by a vendor of a method, act, or
practice declared unlawful by” the CPL; and (4) the consumer
justifiably relied upon the unfair or deceptive business practice
when making the purchasing decision.
Gregg, 245 A.3d at 646 (citing 73 P.S. §§ 201-8, -9.2(a) § 201-8). “When allegations underlying
a [Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act] claim involve a defendant’s nondisclosure rather than
misrepresentation, the omission is actionable only if there is a duty to disclose.” DeSimone v. U.S.
Claims Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 19-6150, 2020 WL 1164794 at *3, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2020).
In Pennsylvania, absent a fiduciary or confidential relationship, the courts have recognized a
defendant “has a duty to disclose known material and dangerous defects, i.e. those defects which
are likely to cause significant bodily harm.” Zwiercan v. GMC, No. 3235, 2003 WL 1848571, at
*2 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 18, 2003).
Stated another way, to sufficiently plead a statutory fraud claim under the Pennsylvania
Unfair Trade Practices Act, like Choi, Zeider is required to demonstrate the Class Vehicles are a
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“thing of danger.” Compare Shaaya, 2022 WL 2341599, at *11 (defining the term a “thing of
danger” as a product “likely to be a source of danger to several or many people if not properly
designed and fashioned”), with Zwiercan, 2003 WL 1848571, at *2 (defining the term “dangerous
defect” as a defect “likely to cause significant bodily harm”). Having determined the CAC
sufficiently alleges the dangers of a potential “premature” and “catastrophic” engine failure to be
sufficient to demonstrate a vehicle is a “thing of danger” as it relates to Choi’s implied warranty
of merchantability claim under New York law, see supra Section III.B.2, the Court similarly finds
the allegations to be sufficient to demonstrate a vehicle is “dangerous” as it relates to Zeider’s
statutory fraud claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act at this stage of the
litigation. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228. Accordingly, the CAC sufficiently alleges a statutory fraud
claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act.
Based on the foregoing, VW America’s Motion to Dismiss the First through Eighth Causes
of Action is DENIED.
5. Unjust Enrichment Claim
VW America asks the Court to dismiss the Thirteenth Cause of Action—unjust
enrichment—for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See generally ECF No. 29 at
35–36.) Specifically, VW America claims the unjust enrichment claim is barred as a plaintiff is
barred from alleging both a breach of an express warranty claim—i.e., a breach of contract claim—
and an unjust enrichment claim.6 (Id.) In response, Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to plead an
unjust enrichment claim in the alternative. (ECF No. 31 at 36–37.)
6 VW America similarly argues the Court should dismiss the claims for injunctive relief as
Plaintiffs failed to allege they “lack any adequate alternative remedy at law.” (ECF No. 29 at 34-
35.) Under Rule 8(a), “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a demand for the
relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Therefore,
Plaintiffs are entitled to seek their concurrent claims for injunctive or other equitable relief. See
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Although each state defines the elements of unjust enrichment slightly differently, it is
well-established these differences are immaterial as “there is no actual conflict between [the]
different states’ laws.” Sharma v. Gupta, Civ. A. No. 20-3446, 2022 WL 970544, at *5 (D.N.J.
Mar. 31, 2022) (quoting Avram v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., Civ. A. Nos. 11-6973, 12-976, 2013
WL 3654090, at *20 (D.N.J. July 11, 2013)). To sufficiently state a claim for unjust enrichment, a
plaintiff must assert: the defendant received a benefit and the retention of said benefit without
payment would violate “the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.” In re
Insulin Pricing Litig., Civ. A. No. 23-7042, 2025 WL 2573409, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2025)
(quoting MetroPCS v. Devor, 215 F. Supp. 3d 626, 634–35 (N.D. Ill. 2016)). It may be pled in the
alternative even if there appears to be an express agreement between the parties if based on the
allegation the agreement arose from unlawful or improper conduct, such as fraudulent concealment
or negligent misrepresentation. See Humana Inc. v. Merck & Co., Civ. A. No. 23-23023, 2025 WL
2538859, at *21 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2025); see also Talkdesk, Inc. v. DM Trans, LLC, No. N23C-08-
005 MAA CCLD, 2024 WL 2799307, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2024) (holding under
Delaware law an unjust enrichment claim may be pled as an alternative to a breach of contract
claim if “the claim is premised on an allegation that the contract arose from wrongdoing (such as
breach of fiduciary duty or fraud)” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bostic v. Ethicon Inc., Civ.
A. No. 20-6533, 2022 WL 952129, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2022) (holding under Pennsylvania
law an unjust enrichment claim may be pled as an alternative to a breach of contract claim if “based
on unlawful or improper conduct established by an underlying claim, such as fraud” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Shlapak v. Dau, 917 S.E.2d 767, 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 2025) (holding
Flynn-Murphy, 2021 WL 5448716, at *12 (permitting the plaintiffs to seek concurrent claims for
alternative types of relief).
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under Georgia law an unjust enrichment claim may be pled as an alternative to a breach of contract
claim if “the parties dispute the scope of their contractual obligations to each other”); AXE Props.
& Mgmt., LLC v. Merriman, 311 A.3d 376, 389 (Md. 2024) (holding under Maryland law an unjust
enrichment claim may be pled as an alternative to a breach of contract claim if “there is evidence
of fraud or bad faith” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Forework, LLC v. Cull, Civ. A. No. 22-
547, 2023 WL 2931845, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2023) (holding under New York law an unjust
enrichment claim may be pled as an alternative to a breach of contract claim if “there is a dispute
as to the agreement’s validity or enforceability” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lake v.
Unilever U.S., Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 893, 922–24 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (holding under Illinois law an
unjust enrichment claim must be tied to an underlying claim and there is no basis to dismiss an
unjust enrichment claim if the claim is tied to an underlying fraud claim, which survived a motion
to dismiss); Phillips v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., Civ. A. No. 19-2711, 2020 WL 5531588, at *4
(D. Minn. Sept. 15, 2020) (holding under Minnesota law an unjust enrichment claim may be pled
as an alternative to a breach of contract claim if “founded on the failure of consideration, fraud,
mistake, or a circumstance in which it would be morally wrong for one party to enrich itself at the
expense of another” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the CAC sufficiently alleges
an unjust enrichment claim under Delaware, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, Illinois,
and Minnesota law.
Based on the foregoing, VW America’s Motion to Dismiss the Thirteenth Cause of Action
is DENIED.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, VW America’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) is DENIED; and VW America’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. An appropriate order follows.
Date: January 8, 2026 /s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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