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2:24-cv-11139Njd9 janv. 2026

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1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SHMUEL G.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:24-cv-11139 (BRM)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI , DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is Plaintiff Shmuel G.’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the final decision of the
Commissioner (“Commissioner”)1 of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his
application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act
(the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–83, and for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II
of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 402–34. (ECF Nos. 1, 14.) The Commissioner filed an Opposition. (ECF
No. 16.) Plaintiff filed a Reply. (ECF No. 17.) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Having reviewed and considered the submissions filed in
connection with this appeal and having declined to hold oral argument in accordance with Local
Civil Rule 78.1(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause shown, the Commissioner’s
decision is AFFIRMED.
1 Frank Bisignano became the new Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
on May 7, 2025. Therefore, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Commissioner
Bisignano is substituted as Defendant (at the time of Plaintiff’s appeal, Carolyn Colvin was the
Acting Commissioner of the SSA). See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in
accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying
the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
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I. 	B ACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
This matter arises out of the Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s applications
for DIB and SSI, dated February 14, 2024. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff filed a Title II application
for a period of disability and DIB, and a Title XVI application for SSI on August 1, 2022, and June
23, 2022, respectively. (Transcript of Proceedings (“Tr.”) (ECF No. 10) at 17.) Plaintiff alleged
disability commencing August 18, 2020, in both applications. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleged
his ability to work was limited by the following conditions: “sleep apnea,” “memory impairment,”
“ADHD,” “generalized anxiety,” “degenerative joint disease bilateral ankles,” “adjustment
disorder,” “PTSD,” “major depression,” and “cognitive deficits.” (Id. at 272.)
Plaintiff’s 	claims 	were 	denied 	on 	September 	13, 	2022, 	and 	denied 	again 	at 	the
reconsideration stage on April 5, 2023. (Id. at 17, 107, 112, 119, 123.) On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 17, 126–27.) On January
24, 2024, Plaintiff, as well as an impartial vocational expert, testified at a telephonic hearing before
ALJ Trina Moore. (Id. at 17, 40–75.) On February 14, 2024, ALJ Moore issued a decision
concluding Plaintiff “has not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act
from August 18, 2020, through the date of [the] decision.” (Id. at 18.) The ALJ’s decision became
final when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review ALJ Moore’s decision on
October 15, 2024. (Id. at 1–6.) Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed his
appeal with this Court, seeking review of ALJ Moore’s decision.
B. Administrative History
Plaintiff was forty years old at the time of the alleged onset date and forty-four years old
at the time of ALJ Moore’s decision. (Tr. at 29.) He has at least a high school education. (Id.) ALJ
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Moore determined Plaintiff met the Act’s insured status requirements between the alleged onset
date—August 18, 2020—and the date he was last insured—September 30, 2022. (Id. at 18, 20.)
ALJ Moore considered the entire record in reaching her decision and employed the five-step
process established by the SSA to evaluate whether the Plaintiff was eligible for social security
and disability benefits. (Id. at 18–30.)
At step one, ALJ Moore determined Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset date of August 18, 2020. (Id. at 20.) At step two, ALJ Moore concluded
Plaintiff had the following “severe” and “medically determinable impairments”: “obesity,
degenerative joint disease in the bilateral ankles, amnesia, depressive disorder and anxiety
disorder.” (Id. at 20.) Moreover, the ALJ found such impairments “significantly limited
[Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic work activities.” (Id.) At step three, ALJ Moore determined
Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).” (Id. at 20–22.)
The ALJ further found Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: The claimant can never climb
ladders, ropes, scaffolds or crawling. The claimant must avoid
constant operation of foot controls bilaterally. The claimant must
avoid all exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and
moving mechanical parts. The claimant retains the ability to carry
out 	simple 	routine 	tasks 	on 	a 	continuous 	basis 	with 	simple
instructions and simple work-related decisions. The claimant is
limited to no assembly line or production rate pace work and no
work in tandem. The claimant is limited to occasional interaction
with co-workers and supervisors but no constant interaction with the
public in a customer service setting. The claimant is able to tolerate
occasional changes in the work setting and work processes.
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(Id. at 22–28.) Accordingly, at step four, ALJ Moore concluded Plaintiff is “unable to perform any
past relevant work,” including work as a “Fundraiser II” and “Food Delivery Driver.” (Id. at 28–
29.) Finally, at step five, ALJ Moore found Plaintiff “is capable of making a successful adjustment
to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy,” including work as a
dishwasher, stocker, and cleaner. (Id. at 29–30.)
II. 	S TANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court “shall have power
to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir.
2001). The Commissioner’s decisions regarding questions of fact are deemed conclusive by a
reviewing court if supported by “substantial evidence” in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Knepp
v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). In other words, a district court must affirm an ALJ’s
decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted); Newhouse v.
Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence “is more than
a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this understanding of the
substantial evidence standard in Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019). To determine
whether an ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, a court must review the evidence
in its totality. Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1984). “Courts are not permitted to re-
weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
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667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a court may not set an ALJ’s “decision aside if it
is supported by substantial evidence, even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry
differently.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
III. 	T HE FIVE -S TEP S EQUENTIAL E VALUATION PROCESS
Under the Act, the SSA is authorized to pay SSI and DIB to “disabled” persons. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(a). A person is “disabled” if “he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A person is unable to engage in substantial
gainful activity
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations promulgated under the Act establish a five-step process for determining
whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of SSI and DIB. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant has shown he or she is not currently engaged in “substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140
(1987). If a claimant is presently engaged in any form of substantial gainful activity, he or she is
automatically denied disability benefits. Id. Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has
demonstrated a “severe impairment” or “combination of impairments” that significantly limits his
or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c);
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see Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140–41. Basic work activities are defined as “the abilities and aptitudes
necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). These activities include:
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,
pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
(3) 	Understanding, 	carrying 	out, 	and 	remembering 	simple
instructions;
(4) Use of judgment;
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual
work situations; and
(6) 	Dealing 	with 	changes 	in 	a 	routine 	work 	setting.
Id. A claimant who does not have a severe impairment is not considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(c); see Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).
Third, if a claimant’s impairment(s) is found to be severe, the ALJ then determines whether
the impairment(s) meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (the “Impairment List”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates
his or her impairment(s) is equal in severity to, or meets, one of the impairments on the Impairment
List, the claimant has satisfied his or her burden of proof and is automatically entitled to benefits.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. If the claimant’s specific
impairment is not listed, the ALJ will consider the most similar listed impairment to decide whether
the claimant’s impairment is medically equivalent. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526. If there is more than
one impairment, then the ALJ must consider whether the combination of impairments equals any
listed impairment. Id. An impairment or combination of impairments is basically equivalent to a
listed impairment if there are medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most
similar. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d Cir. 1992).
If the claimant is not conclusively disabled under the criteria set forth in the Impairment
List, step three is not satisfied, and the claimant must prove at step four whether he or she retains
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the RFC to perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), (f); Bowen, 482 U.S.
at 141. Step four involves three sub-steps:
(1) the ALJ must make specific findings of fact as to the claimant’s
[RFC]; (2) the ALJ must make findings of the physical and mental
demands of the claimant’s past relevant work; and (3) the ALJ must
compare the [RFC] to the past relevant work to determine whether
claimant has the level of capability needed to perform the past
relevant work.
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). When
determining RFC, an ALJ’s consideration of medical opinion evidence is subject to the framework
articulated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (for claims filed before March 27, 2017) or 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c (for claims filed after March 27, 2017).
Claimants are not disabled if their RFC allows them to perform their past relevant work.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). However, if the claimant’s RFC prevents him or her from
doing so, or if the claimant has no past relevant work, an ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step
of the process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(g). The final step requires the ALJ to “show there are
other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform,
consistent with [his or] her medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and
[RFC].” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In doing so, “[t]he ALJ must
analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining whether she is
capable of performing work and is not disabled.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.
An ALJ typically seeks the assistance of a vocational expert at this final step. Plummer, 186 F.3d
at 428.
The claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four. Sykes v. Apfel, 228
F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2000). Neither side bears the burden of proof for step three “[b]ecause step
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three involves a conclusive presumption based on the listings.” Id. at 263 n.2; see Bowen, 482 U.S.
at 146 n.5. An ALJ bears the burden of proof for step five. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 263.
On appeal, the harmless error doctrine requires a plaintiff to show, as to the first four steps:
(1) an error occurred; and (2) but for that error, they might have proven their disability. Holloman
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016). In other words, when reviewing an
appeal based on the first four steps, a court considers whether the plaintiff articulated a basis for a
decision in their favor, based on the existing record. If the plaintiff cannot, it is unlikely they will
meet their burden of showing an error was harmful. See, e.g., Lippincott v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
982 F. Supp. 2d 358, 380–81 (D.N.J. 2013) (finding ALJ’s error was harmless); Powers v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 19–21970, 2021 WL 1207793, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2021) (finding the
plaintiff had not demonstrated she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s decision and had not shown an
error occurred amounting to harm).
The court’s review of legal issues within this appeal is plenary. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). However, factual findings are reviewed “only to
determine whether the administrative record 	contains substantial evidence supporting the
findings.” Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262. As noted above, substantial evidence is “less than a
preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501,
503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence also “means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). When substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s factual
findings, this Court must abide by those determinations. See id. (citing Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at
431); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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IV. 	DECISION
Plaintiff raises two primary arguments on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues ALJ Moore’s
decision does not adequately evaluate the evidence in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. (ECF No. 14 at
9–12.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not “articulate the persuasiveness of all medical
opinions” by “fail[ing] to adequately evaluate the medical source evidence of Marta Billan-Mild
LPC, NCC.” (Id. at 9.) Second, Plaintiff claims ALJ Moore violated her duty to develop the record
by misstating, misinterpreting, and mischaracterizing Plaintiff’s testimony. (Id. at 12–14.)
The Commissioner argues “none of [the] evidence [from Billan-Mild] constitutes medical
opinion evidence as that term is defined by the regulations,” and because “Billan-Mild did not
offer any opinion on Plaintiff’s work-related functional abilities, the ALJ did not err by addressing
her findings as other medical evidence.” (ECF No. 16 at 6.) Additionally, the Commissioner asserts
“[t]he ALJ adequately developed the record in this case, and did not mischaracterize or
misinterpret Plaintiff’s hearing testimony.” (Id. at 10.) Instead, the Commissioner argues “after
considering all of the evidence, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s statements about the
intensity and persistence of his symptoms were not consistent with the rest of the medical record.”
(Id. at 10–14.)
A. Evaluation of Evidence from Billan-Mild
A claimant may support a disability benefits claim with multiple, distinct types of evidence.
“Under the Commissioner’s regulations, all evidence received is ‘evaluate[d] . . . according to the
rules pertaining to the relevant category of evidence.” Angela S. v. O’Malley, Civ. A. No. 23-
22441, 2024 WL 4563910, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2024) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)).
“Medical opinion evidence must be evaluated under the factors articulated in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c.” Id. However, “[i]n cases where the evidence submitted by a medical source does
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not qualify as a medical opinion, the ALJ is not required to apply the specific evaluation framework
for medical opinions articulated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c or to specifically weigh the non-medical
opinion evidence’s persuasiveness, or ‘weight.’” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c). A “medical
opinion” is “a statement from a medical source about what you can still do despite your
impairment(s) and whether you have one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions in
the following abilities”:
(i) Your ability to perform physical demands of work activities, such
as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or
other 	physical 	functions 	(including 	manipulative 	or 	postural
functions, such as reaching, handling, stooping, or crouching);
(ii) Your ability to perform mental demands of work activities, such
as 	understanding; 	remembering; 	maintaining 	concentration,
persistence, 	or 	pace; 	carrying 	out 	instructions; 	or 	responding
appropriately to supervision, co-workers, or work pressures in a
work setting;
(iii) Your ability to perform other demands of work, such as seeing,
hearing, or using other senses; and
(iv) Your ability to adapt to environmental conditions, such as
temperature extremes or fumes.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2).
In addition to medical opinion evidence, “two additional categories of evidence from
medical sources” exist. Angela S., 2024 WL 4563910, at *4. The first is “objective medical
evidence, defined as ‘signs, laboratory findings, or both.’” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502(f),
404.1513(a)(1)). The second is “[o]ther medical evidence,” which is “evidence from a medical
source that is not objective medical evidence or a medical opinion, including judgments about the
nature and severity of [one’s] impairments, . . . medical history, clinical findings, diagnosis,
treatment prescribed with response, or prognosis.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(3).
“[E]valuations submitted into evidence by a physician or other licensed healthcare worker
. . . are not necessarily ‘medical opinions’ unless they meet [the above] requirements.” Angela S.,
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2024 WL 4563910, at *3. Here, the record contains two letters from Billan-Mild dated December
17, 2021, and January 21, 2024 (Tr. at 560, 645–46) as well as Billan-Mild’s progress notes
documenting Plaintiff’s psychotherapy sessions from May 24, 2021, to October 21, 2021 (Tr. 621–
44). The Court agrees with the Commissioner; this evidence is more appropriately classified as
“other medical evidence” under the regulations’ definitions. Billan-Mild does not offer, in this
evidence, an opinion meeting the particular requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). Rather,
the letters and progress notes include “judgments about the nature and severity of [Plaintiff’s]
impairments, [Plaintiff’s] medical history, clinical findings, diagnosis, treatment prescribed with
response, or prognosis.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(3). Therefore, ALJ Moore was required to
consider this evidence but not under the evaluation framework for medical opinions. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Kijakazi, Civ. A. No. 22-170-E, 2023 WL 6050097, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. Sept. 15,
2023) (“This other [medical] evidence is to be considered, of course, but not evaluated in the same
way as opinion evidence.”).
The Court finds ALJ Moore sufficiently considered the evidence from Billan-Mild in her
discussion of Plaintiff’s RFC. Indeed, ALJ Moore explicitly recognized and discussed the progress
notes and both letters. (Tr. at 25 (noting the record indicates Plaintiff “was engaged in
psychotherapy from late May 2021 through late October 2021,” and discussing the December 2021
letter in detail), 26–27 (discussing the January 2024 letter in detail).) ALJ Moore’s RFC
determination was based on “the entire record,” including Billan-Mild’s letters and progress notes.
(Id. at 22, 25, 26–28.) Therefore, the Court finds ALJ Moore adequately evaluated the evidence in
assessing Plaintiff’s RFC.2
2 In his Reply brief, Plaintiff argues “[a]ssuming arguendo that the Court deemed the findings and
opinions of Marta Billan-Mild, LPC to be ‘other medical evidence,’” the ALJ “ignore[d] the
recommendation prescription for [P]laintiff to have a twelve-hour a day home health aide.” (ECF
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B. The ALJ’s Duty to Develop the Record
“Although 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	described 	SSA 	administrative 	proceedings 	as
‘adjudicative,’ they are not classically so because they are ‘non-adversarial,’ and at times
‘inquisitorial.’” Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-2009, 2022 WL 1635628, at *2 (3d Cir.
May 24, 2022) (footnotes omitted). As such, the ALJ has “a duty to develop a full and fair
record[,]” and “must secure relevant information regarding a claimant’s entitlement to social
security benefits.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995).
A review of the record makes clear the ALJ did not violate her duty to develop a full and
fair record. Indeed, the ALJ asked Plaintiff’s attorney if the record was complete, and Plaintiff’s
attorney responded in the affirmative. (Tr. at 45.) Moreover, at the start of the hearing, ALJ Moore
stated, “[i]t is extremely important that there is no background noise that affects our ability to
obtain a good recording. . . . [I]f we don’t obtain a good recording, we will have to do the hearing
again.” (Tr. at 43–44.) ALJ Moore also allowed Plaintiff to move to a different room to reduce
No. 17 at 2.) The Court disagrees. ALJ Moore specifically acknowledged said recommendation
multiple times in her decision. (Tr. at 23–24 (“It is noted that although the claimant was prescribed
a home health aide to assist with his activities of daily living, the claimant testified that he did not
continue with the home health aide’s assistance due to other help provided.”), id. at 25 (“[Billan-
Mild] stated that it would be beneficial for [Plaintiff’s] symptoms and overall safety to have a
home health aide for 12 hours daily to assist him with various tasks he has difficulty completing
on his own.”), id. at 26 (“It was noted that the claimant no longer has a home health aide as he felt
anxious.”), id. at 27 (“Billan-Mild noted that due to the claimant’s symptoms and impairments, a
home health aide was recommended to [Plaintiff] due to his anxiety-related symptoms, he felt
vastly uncomfortable and nervous in his home during the presence of the home health aide . . . .
She further noted that he terminated home health aide services and the claimant currently receives
daily support from members in his community who have volunteered to help assist him with his
functioning and daily tasks.”). Moreover, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s “activities of daily living”
to support her RFC conclusion. (Id. at 27.) She found “[i]n the record including his adult function
report as well as at his hearing, the [Plaintiff] stated that he was able to handle a number of his
activities of daily living independently.” (Id.) Specifically, the ALJ found “[Plaintiff] stated that
he is able to dress himself, handle his personal care, prepare meals, grocery shop[,] . . . care for his
children . . . drive and walk.” (Id.) Therefore, the Court cannot conclude ALJ Moore’s decision
was not supported by substantial evidence.
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background noise. (Id. at 44–45.) Later in the hearing, Plaintiff’s attorney interrupted Plaintiff’s
response to a question from the ALJ, and the ALJ again reminded everyone she cannot hear two
people talking at once. (Id. at 52–53.) The ALJ stated, “I’m trying to be very diligent with
reminding everyone to be mindful that this is being recorded and it’s important that we get a clear
recording.” (Id. at 53.) At one point, when Plaintiff was “getting emotional,” the ALJ asked if
Plaintiff needed a moment because they could not understand what he was saying. (Id. at 55.)
Plaintiff points to one particular statement from the ALJ—“we will move this along quickly
if you just answer the question asked”—to support his argument the ALJ was “curt and short” with
him. (ECF No. 14 at 12.) However, after reviewing the transcript, the Court finds the ALJ was
attempting to keep the Plaintiff focused on a narrow question after the Plaintiff did not answer the
precise question twice in a row. Read in context, ALJ Moore was not unfairly cutting off the
Plaintiff’s answers. Indeed, as the above examples indicate, ALJ Moore actively worked to reduce
simultaneous speaking and to maintain a clear transcript.
Moreover, Plaintiff argues the ALJ, “in a haste,” interpreted Plaintiff’s reference in the
hearing to children potentially making noise upstairs as evidence of Plaintiff caring for his
children, while in reality these were children from a separate apartment. (ECF No. 14 at 12–13.)
However, as the Commissioner points out, ALJ Moore’s conclusion Plaintiff “stated that he is able
to . . . care for children” was grounded in other parts of the record. (ECF No. 16 at 12–13.) In
particular, when asked in his Function Report if he “take[s] care of anyone else such as a
wife/husband, children, grandchildren, parents, friend, other,” Plaintiff checked “yes” and wrote
he shares joint custody and provides guidance and supervision. (Tr. at 292.)
Additionally, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s assertion “the claimant testified that he
did not continue with the home health aid[e]’s assistance due to other help provided,” arguing the
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testimony instead reveals Plaintiff did not continue with the home health aide because “the
presence of strangers in his home made him uncomfortable and anxious.” (ECF No. 14 at 13.) But
when asked at the hearing if he still gets help with his “activities of daily living,” Plaintiff described
how he receives help from a “very close knit” community rather than a home health aide. (Tr. at
62.) He explained he is “comfortable” with the help from his community and “[i]t’s almost like
family.” (Id.) Further, ALJ Moore acknowledged Plaintiff’s anxiety surrounding the home health
aide multiple times in her decision. (Tr. at 26 (“It was noted that the claimant no longer has a home
health aide as he felt anxious.”), 27 (“Billan-Mild noted that due to the claimant’s symptoms and
impairments, a home health aide was recommended to [Plaintiff] due to his anxiety-related
symptoms, he felt vastly uncomfortable and nervous in his home during the presence of the home
health aide.”).) Therefore, the ALJ did in fact consider what Plaintiff argues should have been
considered.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to show ALJ Moore erred
in determining Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. Therefore, the Commissioner’s decision
is AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order follows.
Date: January 9, 2026 	/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:24-cv-11139-BRM Document 18 Filed 01/09/26 Page 14 of 14 PageID:
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