FARINA et al v. OMARI

2:24-cv-11098Njd12 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MELINDA FARINA and
BEAUTY BROKERS – MELINDA
FARINA INCORPORATED,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DANA ABED OMARI,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 24-11098 (SDW) (AME)
WHEREAS OPINION
January 12, 2026
WIGENTON, District Judge.
THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon Plaintiffs Melinda Farina and
Beauty Brokers – Melinda Farina Incorporated’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Sanctions
(D.E. 28) against Defendant Dana Abed Omari (“Defendant”) and her counsel, Daniella Gordon,
Esq., and Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (D.E. 27) against Plaintiffs; and
WHEREAS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 11(b) requires parties to certify that
(1) their pleadings are not presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to delay the
litigation; (2) the claims are warranted by existing law; and (3) the factual allegations are supported
by evidence.1 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). 	Rule 11(c) authorizes federal courts to impose sanctions
against the parties for violations of the Rule. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). 	Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
1 On July 17, 2025, Plaintiffs submitted a letter indicating they would no longer rely on Rule 11(c)(3) and
only rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and this Court’s inherent power to impose sanctions in their Motion for
Sanctions. See D.E. 29.
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(“Section 1927”), courts may sanction any attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies
legal proceedings, thereby increasing the cost of the proceedings with bad faith or intentional
misconduct. LaSalle Nat. Bank v. First Connecticut Holding Grp., LLC., 287 F.3d 279, 288 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175,
188 (3d Cir. 2002)). A district court has the inherent discretion to “fashion an appropriate sanction
for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45
(1991); and
WHEREAS a motion for sanctions is premature when there are pending dispositive
motions or when the motion is aimed at the merits of the dispute before the underlying issues have
been resolved by the court. See Braun v. Schwartz, No. 12-6224, 2013 WL 4008820, at *4 (D.N.J.
Aug. 5, 2013) (denying the defendant’s motion for sanctions where his motion to dismiss was
pending); O’Brien v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., No. 17-13327, 2024 WL 3949319, at *8 (D.N.J.
Aug. 26, 2024) (citing Tiger Supplies Inc. v. MAV Assocs. LLC, No. 20-15566, 2022 WL 195858,
at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2022)); and
WHEREAS here, both Plaintiffs and Defendant have moved for sanctions against each
other. At the time of the motions, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint was still pending. (See generally D.E. 21, 27, 28.) Pursuant to this Court’s Order and
Opinion issued on September 29, 2025, Plaintiff was granted leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint and did so on October 29, 2025. (See generally D.E. 37, 38, 39.) Because the Second
Amended Complaint currently has pending dispositive motions and both Motions for Sanctions
present arguments about the merits of the dispute that have yet to be addressed by this Court, both
Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s Motions for Sanctions are premature; therefore
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Both Motions for Sanctions are DENIED, and this Court will preserve Defendant’s right
to reassert its motion at a later time, if appropriate. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
Orig: 	Clerk
cc: 	Parties
André M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J.
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