LADIKA v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY

2:24-cv-10892Njd23 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED 	STATES 	DISTRICT 	COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ANDRE 	LADIKA 	and LUISA ERESBINDA
LADIKA,
Appellants,
v.
STATE 	OF NEW 	JERSEY 	et 	al.,
Appellees.
* 	*
No. 	24-cv-10892 	(MEF)
OPINION and ORDER
*
For 	the 	purposes 	of 	this 	brief 	Opinion 	and 	Order, 	the 	Court
largely 	assumes 	familiarity 	with 	the 	allegations 	and procedural
history 	of 	this 	case.
* 	* 	*
The 	case 	in 	a 	nutshell:
A couple 1 	defaulted 	on 	their 	home 	loan, 	and 	a 	foreclosure
judgment 2 	was 	entered 	against 	them by 	a 	New 	Jersey 	state 	court.
The 	couple 	then 	sued 	three 	governmental 	entities 3 	in 	federal
bankruptcy 	court 	--- 	claiming 	that 	the 	foreclosure 	judgment 	was
unlawful. 	4
1 	Andre 	Ladika 	and 	Luisa 	Ladika.
2 	See 	Final 	Judgment 	in 	Foreclosure, 	The 	Bank 	of 	N.Y. 	Mellon 	v.
Ladika, 	No. 	F 	004642-13 	(N.J. 	Super. 	Ct. 	Ch. 	Div. 	Feb 	6, 	2023).
3 	The 	entities: 	the 	State 	of 	New 	Jersey, 	the 	New 	Jersey
Judiciary, 	and 	the 	Superior 	Court 	of 	New 	Jersey.
4 	See 	Complaint 	at 	10, 	Ladika 	v. 	Superior 	Court 	of 	New 	Jersey,
No. 	24-01142 	(Bankr. 	D.N.J. 	Mar. 	11, 	2024) 	(ECF 	1).
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The 	bankruptcy 	judge 	dismissed 	the 	case, 5 and 	this 	appeal
followed.
From here, 	the 	two 	people 	who 	sued 	are 	called 	"the 	Appellants."
The 	Court's 	bottom-line 	conclusion: 	this 	case 	must 	be 	dismissed.
There 	is 	no 	jurisdiction 	here.
* 	* 	*
Start 	with 	some 	legal 	background.
The 	jurisdiction 	of 	the 	lower 	federal 	courts 	is 	set 	by 	the
United 	States 	Congress. 	See 	Patchak 	v. 	Zinke, 	583 	U.S. 	244, 	252
(2018); 	Sheldon 	v. 	Sill, 	49 	U.S. 	(8 	How.) 	441, 	442 	(1850).
And 	Congress 	has 	given 	jurisdiction 	to 	review 	state-court
judgments 	to 	the 	United 	States 	Supreme 	Court. 	See 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1257.
This 	grant 	of 	jurisdiction 	implies 	that 	other 	federal 	courts
(including 	federal 	district 	courts) 	generally 	have 	no 	role 	to
play 	in 	reviewing 	state 	court 	judgments. 6
To 	effectuate 	this 	implicit 	limit, 	the 	so-called 	Rooker-Feldman
doctrine 	has 	been 	developed.
The 	doctrine 	"precludes 	a 	United 	States 	district 	court 	from
exercising 	. 	. 	jurisdiction" 	over 	a 	given 	case, 	Exxon Mobil
Corp. 	v. 	Saudi 	Basic 	Indus. 	Corp., 	544 	U.S. 	280, 	291 	(2005), 	and
it 	applies 	where 	"(l) 	the 	federal 	plaintiff 	lost 	in 	state 	court;
(2) 	the 	plaintiff 	complains 	of 	injuries 	caused by 	[a] 	state-
court 	judgment[]; 	(3) 	th[e] 	judgment[] 	w[as] 	rendered before 	the
federal 	suit 	was 	filed; 	and 	(4) 	the 	plaintiff 	is 	inviting 	the
district 	court 	to 	review 	and 	reject 	the 	state 	judgment[]."
Great 	W. 	Mining 	& Min. 	Co. 	v. 	Fox 	Rothschild 	LLP, 	615 	F.3d 	159,
166 	(3d 	Cir. 	2010) 	(cleaned up).
Here, 	each 	of 	these 	four 	boxes 	is 	checked.
5 	See 	Decision 	and 	Order 	Re: 	Defendants' 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	(ECF
1-3) 	at 	2.
6 	One 	key 	exception 	to 	this: 	habeas 	corpus. 	In 	habeas 	cases,
the 	governing 	statute, 	see 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2254(a), 	gives 	federal
district 	courts 	power 	to 	review 	state-court 	judgments 	under
which 	a 	person 	is 	in 	custody.
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First, 	the 	Appellants 	are 	"federal 	plaintiff[s]" 	who 	"lost 	in
state 	court." 	Id. 	at 	166.
"[F]ederal 	plaintiff[s]" 	because 	they 	kicked 	off 	this 	federal
lawsuit. 	See 	Complaint 	at 	10, 	Ladika 	v. 	Superior 	Court 	of 	New
Jersey, 	No. 	24-01142 	(Bankr. 	D.N.J. 	Mar. 	11, 	2024) 	(ECF 	1).
Who 	"lost" 	because 	a 	foreclosure 	judgment 	was 	entered 	against
them. 	See 	Final 	Judgment 	in 	Foreclosure, 	The 	Bank 	of 	N.Y.
Mellon 	v. 	Ladika, 	No. 	F 	004642-13 	(N.J. 	Super. 	Ct. 	Ch. 	Div. 	Feb
6, 	2023). 	"[I]n 	state 	court" 	because 	that 	is 	where 	the
foreclosure 	judgment 	was 	entered. 	See 	id.
Second, 	the 	Appellants 	"complain 	of 	injuries 	caused by 	[a]
state-court 	judgment[]." 	Great 	W. 	Mining 	& Min. 	Co., 	615 	F.3d
at 	166 	(cleaned up).
The 	"injur[y]" 	that 	is 	"complain[ed] 	of" 	here 	is 	the 	possible
sale 	of 	their 	house. 7 	See 	Complaint 	at 	12-13. 	Such 	a 	sale 	would
be 	facilitated 	by 	the 	state-court 	foreclose 	judgment 	--- 	because
it 	cuts 	off 	the 	interest 	the 	Appellants 	had 	in 	the 	house.
Third, 	the 	state 	court 	judgment 	(issued 	in 	2023) 	came 	before
this 	federal 	lawsuit 	(initiated 	in 	2024) . 8
Fourth, 	the 	Appellants 	"invit[e] 	the 	district 	court 	to 	review
and 	reject 	the 	state 	judgment[]." 	Great 	W. 	Mining 	& Min. 	Co.,
615 	F.3d 	at 	166 	(cleaned 	up).
In 	particular, 	they 	ask 	for 	a 	determination 	that 	the 	state-court
foreclosure 	judgment 	was 	"void," 	Complaint 	at 	15 	--- 	apparently9
because 	it 	was 	entered 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Appellants' 	due
process 	and 	equal 	protection 	rights. 	See 	Complaint 	at 	12-14. 10
7 	The 	house 	has 	apparently 	not 	yet 	been 	sold 	pursuant 	to 	the
foreclosure 	judgment. 	See 	Notice 	of Motion 	for 	Relief 	From the
Automatic 	Stay 	and 	Co-Debtor 	Stay 	at 	2, 	In 	re 	Ladika, 	No. 	23-
18387 	(Bankr. 	D.N.J. 	Jan. 	15, 	2026) 	(ECF 	63).
8 	For 	the 	supporting 	sources, 	see 	footnotes 	2 	and 	4.
9 	"Apparently" 	because 	the 	Appellants' 	prose 	federal 	complaint
is 	hard 	to 	follow. 	(The 	Court 	has 	read 	it 	"liberally," 	as 	it
must. 	See, 	e.g., 	Dluhos 	v. 	Strasberg, 	321 	F.3d 	365, 	369 	(3d
Cir. 	2003).)
10 	The 	Appellants 	also 	seem to 	suggest 	that 	the 	state 	court 	did
not 	have 	jurisdiction. 	See 	Complaint 	at 	23. 	This 	is 	said 	to 	be
another 	reason why 	the 	foreclosure 	judgment 	is 	void.
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What 	this 	adds 	up 	to: 	the 	relevant 	four-part 	test 	is 	satisfied
and 	the 	Court 	therefore 	does 	not 	have 	jurisdiction 	over 	this
case. 	The 	Appellants 	are, 	in 	essence, 	asking 	a 	federal 	district
court 	to 	undo 	a 	state-court 	foreclosure 	judgment. 	The 	Rooker-
Feldman 	doctrine 	forbids 	that, 	and 	courts 	across 	the 	Nation 	have
consistently 	come 	to 	this 	same 	conclusion. 	See, 	e.g., 	Eisenhart
v. 	Eagle 	Cnty. 	Sheriff's 	Off., 	2024 	WL 	3594357, 	at 	*1, 	*3 	(10th
Cir. 	July 	31, 	2024) 	(holding 	that 	Rooker-Feldman 	barred 	due
process 	and 	equal 	protection 	challenges 	to 	state-court
foreclosure 	judgment); 	Thomas 	v. 	Vergara, 	2025 	WL 	3458594, 	at
*1, 	*3-4 	(M.D. 	Fla. 	Dec. 	2, 	2025) 	(same); 	Laverpool 	v. 	Taylor
Bean 	& Whitaker 	Reo 	LLC, 	229 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	5, 	12-13, 	18 	(D.D.C.
2017) 	(same); 	Mather 	v. 	Territorial 	Sav. 	Bank, 	2014 	WL 	6471372,
at 	*3 	(D. 	Haw. 	Nov. 	17, 	2014) 	(similar); 	Taggart 	v. 	Trauger,
2025 	WL 	3280944, 	at 	*2, 	*4 	(E.D. 	Pa. 	Nov. 	24, 	2025) 	(similar).
* 	* 	*
Against 	the 	idea 	that 	there 	is 	no 	jurisdiction 	here, 	the
Appellants 	press 	three 	main 	counterarguments.
These 	do 	not 	work.
* 	* 	*
The 	first 	counterargument 	is 	that 	Rooker-Feldman 	does 	not 	apply
to 	bankruptcy 	claims. 	See 	Motion 	to 	Strike 	(ECF 	19) 	at 	4-5.
But 	this 	cannot 	be 	squared with 	the 	Third 	Circuit's 	decision 	in
In 	re 	Knapper, 	407 	F.3d 	573 	(3d 	Cir. 	2005).
There, 	two 	state-court 	foreclosure 	judgments 	were 	entered
against 	a 	woman, 	and 	the 	relevant 	properties 	were 	then 	sold.
See 	id. 	at 	575-76. 	The 	woman 	filed 	for 	bankruptcy 	and 	brought
an 	adversary proceeding 	against 	the 	property buyer 	--- 	"seeking
to 	have 	the 	two 	pre-petition 	. 	. 	sales 	vacated." 	Id. 	at 	576-
77.
The 	court 	of 	appeals 	instructed 	the 	district 	court 	to 	dismiss
the 	complaint 	under 	the 	Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine. 	See 	id. 	at
582, 	584. 	It 	noted 	that 	its 	"analysis 	[was] 	not 	altered 	by 	the
fact 	that 	[the 	woman's] 	federal 	claim 	[was] 	cloaked 	in 	the 	guise
of 	an 	adversary 	proceeding 	in 	bankruptcy 	court." 	Id. 	at 	581
(citations 	omitted). 	The 	reason 	why: 	even 	in 	that 	context,
"Rooker-Feldman 	still 	applies." 	Id.
Knapper makes 	clear 	that 	the 	Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine 	covers
adversary bankruptcy proceedings, 	like 	the 	one 	brought 	here 	by
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the 	Appellants. 	See 	also 	In 	re 	Madera, 	586 	F.3d 	228, 	232 	(3d
Cir. 	2009) 	("We 	have 	held 	that 	. 	[Rooker-Feldman] 	applies
equally to 	federal 	bankruptcy 	courts.") 	11
* 	* 	*
The 	Appellants' 	second 	counterargument: 	a 	statute 	(Title 	11,
United 	States 	Code, 	Section 	105) 	allows 	for 	"collateral 	attacks
[in 	bankruptcy 	court] 	on 	the 	validity 	of 	foreclosure
[judgments]." 	Reply Memorandum of 	Law 	(ECF 	23) 	at 	3.
This 	is 	not 	persuasive.
Section 	105(a) 	empowers 	federal 	bankruptcy 	courts 	to 	"issue 	any
order, 	process, 	or 	judgment 	that 	is 	necessary 	or 	appropriate 	to
carry 	out 	the 	provisions 	of" 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code. 	11 	U.S.C. 	§
105 (a).
But 	this 	statute 	does 	not 	purport 	to 	give 	bankruptcy 	courts
power 	to 	hear 	cases 	they 	could 	not 	otherwise 	take 	up. 	See
Harrington 	v. 	Purdue 	Pharma 	L.P., 	603 	U.S. 	204, 	216 	n.2 	(2024)
(Section 	105(a) 	"serves 	only 	to 	carry 	out 	authorities 	expressly
conferred 	elsewhere 	in 	the 	code")
411 	F.3d 	452, 	455 	(3d 	Cir. 	2005)
(cleaned up); 	In 	re 	Joubert,
(Section 	105(a) 	"does 	not
create 	substantive 	rights 	that 	would 	otherwise 	be 	unavailable
under 	the 	Bankruptcy Code") 	(cleaned 	up).
* 	* 	*
The 	Appellants' 	third 	and 	final 	counterargument: 	another 	statute
(Title 	11, 	United 	States 	Code, 	Section 	525) 	allows 	bankruptcy
courts 	to 	hear 	challenges 	to 	state-court 	foreclosure 	judgments.
See 	Reply Memorandum of 	Law 	at 	3.
But 	whatever 	else 	might 	be 	said 	about 	Section 	525, 	no 	part 	of
the 	statute 	fits 	this 	case.
Section 	525(a) 	prohibits 	"governmental 	unit[s]" 	from 	engaging 	in
certain 	types 	of 	bankruptcy-related 	discrimination 	when 	they
make 	employment 	decisions 	or 	decisions 	regarding 	permits,
11 	Accord, 	e.g., 	In 	re 	Mehl, 	660 	B.R. 	353, 	359-364 	(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 	2024); 	In 	re 	Soriano, 	587 	B.R. 	371, 	386-87 	(Bankr. 	W.D.
Okla. 	2018); 	In 	re 	Washington, 	469 	B.R. 	587, 	594-95 	(Bankr. 	W.D.
Pa. 	2012); 	In 	re 	Letennier, 	2024 	WL 	1596883, 	at 	*6-7 	(Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 	Apr. 	11, 	2024).
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franchises, 	and 	the 	like. 	See 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	525(a). 	But 	none 	of
that 	is 	on 	the 	table 	here.
Section 	525(b) 	forbids 	certain 	bankruptcy-related discrimination
by 	private 	employers. 	See 	id. 	§ 	525(b). 	But 	that 	is 	not 	in
play. 	This 	case 	was 	brought 	against 	governmental 	entities, 	not
private 	employers.
And 	the 	last 	part 	of 	Section 	525, 	Section 	525(c), 	relates 	to
bankruptcy-related 	discrimination 	in 	student 	loan 	programs. 	See
id. 	§ 	525(c). 	That 	is 	not 	relevant 	here, 	either.
* 	* 	*
The 	bankruptcy 	court's 	decision 	dismissing 	the 	adversary
complaint 	is 	affirmed. 12
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	23rd 	day 	of 	January, 	rORDERED.
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
12 	Given 	this, 	the 	motion 	to 	strike 	at 	ECF 	19 	is 	denied 	as 	moot.
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