STAFFORD v. FISERV SOLUTIONS LLC et al

2:24-cv-10009Njd28 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED 	STATES 	DISTRICT 	COURT
DISTRICT 	OF NEW JERSEY
CIARA 	STAFFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
FISERV 	SOLUTIONS 	LLC 	and 	CLOVER
NETWORKS, 	INC.,
Defendants.
*
No. 	24-cv-10009 	(MEF) (JRA)
OPINION and ORDER
* 	*
For 	the 	purposes 	of 	this 	brief 	Opinion 	and 	Order, 	the 	Court
largely 	assumes 	familiarity 	with 	the 	procedural 	history 	and
allegations 	of 	this 	case.
* 	* 	*
The 	Plaintiff 	sued 	her 	former 	employer 1 	for, 	among 	other 	things,
retaliating 	against 	her 	after 	she 	complained 	about 	sexual
harassment. 	See 	Plaintiff's 	First 	Amended 	Complaint
1 	It 	is 	not 	clear 	which 	entity 	or 	entities 	formally 	employed 	the
Plaintiff. 	Compare 	Plaintiff's 	Brief 	in 	Opposition 	to
Defendants' 	Motion 	to 	Partially 	Dismiss 	Plaintiff's 	Amended
Complaint 	Pursuant 	to 	Rule 	12 (b) (6) 	(ECF 	47) 	at 	1 	n. l 	with
Defendants' 	Memorandum 	of 	Law 	in 	Support 	of 	Their 	Motion 	to
Partially 	Dismiss 	Plaintiff's 	Amended 	Complaint 	with 	Prejudice
(ECF 	43-1) 	at 	5 	n.3. 	This 	does 	not 	matter 	for 	now. 	The 	Court
refers 	to 	the 	former 	employer 	as 	"the 	Company" 	and 	does 	not
differentiate 	between 	the 	two 	entities 	named 	as 	Defendants 	here,
Fiserv 	Solutions 	LLC 	and 	Clover 	Networks, 	Inc. 	Which 	entity
formally 	employes 	the 	Plaintiff 	can 	be 	nailed 	down 	later, 	as
necessary.
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("Complaint") 	(ECF 	38) 	<JI<_![ 136-140. 	This 	allegedly 	violated 	the
New 	Jersey 	Law 	Against 	Discrimination. 	See 	id. 	<JI 138.
After 	a 	prior 	decision 	from 	the 	Court, 	see 	Stafford 	v. 	Fiserv
Sols. 	LLC, 	2025 	WL 	1920940 	(D.N.J. 	July 	11, 	2025), 	the 	complaint
was 	amended, 	and 	the 	Company 	now moves 	to 	dismiss 	the
Plaintiff's 	retaliation 	claim under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil
Procedure 	12(b) (6). 	See 	Defendants' 	Memorandum 	of 	Law 	in
Support 	of 	Their 	Motion 	to 	Partially 	Dismiss 	Plaintiff's 	Amended
Complaint 	with 	Prejudice 	("Company's 	Brief") 	(ECF 	43-1) 	at 	1.
The 	motion 	is 	granted 	in 	part 	and 	denied 	in 	part.
* 	* 	*
The 	relevant 	allegations 	for 	now 	are 	as 	follows. 2
The 	Plaintiff 	reported 	that 	she 	was 	being 	sexually 	harassed 	by 	a
coworker 	("Coworker") . 	See 	Complaint 	<JI 9 6.
The 	Company 	investigated, 	see 	id. 	<JI 98, 	"substantiate[d] 	most"
of 	what 	had 	been 	reported, 	id. 	<JI 	99, 	and 	looked 	to 	separate 	the
Plaintiff 	from 	the 	Coworker. 	To 	accomplish 	this, 	the
Plaintiff's 	workspace 	was 	physically moved. 	See 	id. 	<_j[<_j[ 99, 	102. 3
But 	then 	the 	Plaintiff 	found 	her 	Coworker 	"sitting 	in 	[the
Plaintiff's] 	new 	cubicle 	in 	an 	attempt 	to 	intimidate 	her." 	Id.
<JI 104.
The 	Plaintiff 	told 	her 	supervisor 	what 	had 	happened, 	see 	id. 	<_j[<_j[
30, 	108-09, 	and 	he 	said 	he 	would 	"report 	the 	situation 	to 	[HR]."
Id. 	<JI 110.
Over 	the 	following 	days, 	the 	Plaintiff 	learned 	that 	her 	Coworker
had 	been 	telling 	their 	colleagues 	that 	"he 	did 	not 	understand
why 	[the 	Plaintiff] 	had 	reported 	him 	for 	sexual 	harassment 	when
2 	Because 	this 	is 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	the 	Court 	treats 	all 	the
allegations 	as 	true. 	See 	McTernan 	v. 	City 	of 	York, 	564 	F.3d
636, 	646 	(3d 	Cir. 	2009) 	Whether 	they 	are 	in 	fact 	true 	is 	a
question 	for 	later.
3 	It 	appears 	that 	the 	Company's 	workers 	sat 	together 	in 	a 	room
with 	an 	"open" 	floor 	plan. 	See 	Complaint 	<JI 20. 	And 	note: 	the
Company 	let 	the 	Plaintiff 	choose 	whether 	she 	or 	her 	Coworker
should be 	moved. 	See 	id. 	<JI 99. 	The 	Plaintiff 	opted 	to 	have 	her
seat 	moved. 	See 	id.
2
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she 	was 	actually 	the 	one 	constantly 	telling 	him 	that 	she 	wanted
to 	have 	sex 	with 	him[.]" 	Id. 	I 	116.
The 	Plaintiff 	reported 	this 	to 	a 	Company HR 	official. 	See 	id.
ii 	120-22. 	The 	Company 	again 	investigated, 	see 	id. 	I 	123,
determined 	that 	the 	referenced 	statements 	had 	been made, 	see 	id.
at 	I 	124, 	and 	"told 	[the 	Coworker] 	that 	this 	type 	of 	behavior
was 	not 	acceptable." 	Id.
The 	Plaintiff 	continued working 	at 	the 	Company 	for 	around 	ten
more 	months 	and 	then 	resigned. 	See 	id. 	I 	126.
* 	* 	*
In 	light 	of 	the 	above, 	the 	Plaintiff 	sued 	the 	Company. 	She
claims 	the 	Company 	is 	liable 	under 	the 	New 	Jersey Law Against
Discrimination 	for 	the 	Coworker's 	alleged 	retaliatory
harassment, 	for 	three 	distinct 	reasons. 	See 	Plaintiff's 	Brief
in 	Opposition 	to 	Defendants' 	Motion 	to 	Partially 	Dismiss
Plaintiff's 	Amended 	Complaint 	Pursuant 	to 	Rule 	12(b) (6)
("Plaintiff's 	Brief") 	(ECF 	47) 	at 	9-12, 	15-16.
Take 	these 	up 	just 	below.
* 	* 	*
First, 	the 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	to 	hold 	the 	Company 	liable 	for 	the
Coworker's 	"sitting 	in 	her 	new 	cubicle 	in 	an 	attempt 	to
intimidate 	her," 	Complaint 	I 	104, 	after 	the 	Company 	decided 	to
separate 	the 	Plaintiff 	and 	the 	Coworker. 	See 	Plaintiff's 	Brief
at 	11-12.
The 	background 	law 	here:
To 	state 	a 	New 	Jersey Law Against 	Discrimination 	retaliation
claim, 	a 	plaintiff must 	plausibly 	allege 	three 	things. 	First,
that 	she 	"engaged 	in 	a 	protected 	activity 	known 	to 	the
employer." 	Battaglia 	v. 	United 	Parcel 	Serv., 	Inc., 	214 	N.J.
518, 	547 	(2013) 	(cleaned 	up). 	Second, 	that 	she 	"was 	subjected
to 	an 	adverse 	employment 	[action]." 	Id. 	(cleaned 	up). 	And
third, 	that 	"there 	is 	a 	causal 	link 	between 	the 	protected
activity 	and 	the 	adverse 	employment 	action." 	Id.
In 	cases 	like 	this 	one, 	where 	a 	plaintiff 	seeks 	to 	hold 	an
employer 	liable 	for 	retaliatory 	harassment 	by 	a 	coworker, 	a
fourth 	thing must 	be 	plausibly 	alleged, 	too.
Namely, 	that 	the 	employer 	"knew 	or 	should 	have 	known 	about 	the
coworker 	harassment, 	but 	failed 	to 	take 	prompt 	and 	adequate
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remedial 	action 	to 	stop 	the 	abuse." 	Moore 	v. 	City 	of
Philadelphia, 	461 	F.3d 	331, 	349 	(3d 	Cir. 	2006) 	(cleaned 	up) 	4
Come 	back now 	to 	this 	case.
The 	Plaintiff 	argues, 	as 	noted, 	that 	the 	Company 	is 	liable 	in
part 	because 	the 	Coworker 	sat 	in 	her 	seat 	after 	the 	Company
separated 	them 	--- 	in 	alleged 	retaliation 	for 	her 	(the
Plaintiff) 	reporting 	his 	(the 	Coworker's) 	prior 	conduct 	to
Company 	officials. 	See 	Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	9-12.
As 	to 	this, 	the 	Company's 	only 	substantial 	argument 5 	relates 	to
the 	fourth 	part 	of 	the 	four-part 	test 	--- 	whether 	it 	"knew 	or
should 	have 	known 	about 	the 	coworker 	harassment, 	but 	failed 	to
take 	prompt 	and 	adequate 	remedial 	action 	to 	stop 	the 	abuse."
Moore, 	461 	F.3d 	at 	349 	(cleaned 	up).
But 	the 	Company's 	argument 	does 	not 	work.
"[A]n 	employee's 	knowledge 	of 	sexual 	harassment 	will 	be 	imputed
to 	the 	employer 	where 	[a 	report 	is 	made 	to 	an] 	employee 	[who] 	is
specifically 	employed 	to 	deal 	with 	sexual 	harassment." 	Huston
v. 	Procter 	& Gamble 	Paper 	Prods. 	Corp., 	568 	F.3d 	100, 	107 	(3d
Cir. 	2009).
Here, 	the 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	she 	told 	her 	supervisor 	about
the 	seat 	incident. 	See 	Complaint 	ii 	30, 	107. 	He 	then 	told 	her
he 	"would 	report 	the 	situation 	to 	[H]uman 	[R]esources." 	Id. 	i
110.
4 	Moore 	was 	a 	Title 	VII 	case. 	See 	461 	F.3d 	at 	349. 	But 	the 	New
Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	relied 	on 	federal 	Title 	VII 	caselaw 	to
construe 	the 	antiretaliation 	provision 	of 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Law
Against 	Discrimination. 	See 	Roa 	v. 	Roa, 	200 	N.J. 	555, 	573-75
(2010); 	see 	also 	Lehmann 	v. 	Toys 	R Us, 	Inc., 	132 	N.J. 	587, 	600
(1993).
5 	See 	Company's 	Brief 	at 	10-13; 	Defendants' 	Reply 	Brief 	in
Further 	Support 	of 	Their 	Motion 	to 	Partially 	Dismiss 	Plaintiff's
Amended 	Complaint 	with 	Prejudice 	("Company's 	Reply") 	(ECF 	4 8) 	at
9-10. 	At 	various 	places, 	and 	as 	to 	the 	Plaintiff's 	various
legal 	theories, 	the 	Company 	glancingly makes 	other 	arguments,
too 	--- 	for 	example, 	as 	to 	whether 	certain 	conduct 	can 	rise 	to
the 	level 	of 	an 	adverse 	employment 	action. 	See 	Company's 	Reply
at 	3-5. 	But 	these 	arguments 	are 	not 	meaningfully 	enough
developed, 	and 	the 	Company 	cannot 	carry 	its 	burden 	based 	on
them.
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That 	is 	more 	than 	enough 	to 	establish 	the 	Company 	"knew 	or
should 	have 	known." 	Moore, 	461 	F.3d 	at 	349 	(cleaned 	up).
As 	a 	general 	matter, 	an 	employee 	"specifically 	employed 	to 	deal
with 	sexual 	harassment" 	will 	"[t]ypically 	. 	be 	part 	of 	the
employer's 	human 	resources 	. 	. 	group." 	Huston, 	5 68 	F. 3d 	at
107.
And 	that 	checks 	out 	in 	this 	case. 	Why 	would 	the 	supervisor 	say
he 	was 	passing 	the 	report 	to 	HR, 	see 	Complaint 	1 	110, 	if
addressing 	sexual 	harassment 	was 	not 	that 	department's
responsibility? 	And 	beyond 	that, 	the 	complaint 	alleges 	that
the 	Company 	looked 	to 	HR 	to 	conduct 	sexual 	harassment-related
investigations 	and 	to 	assist 	with 	imposing 	sexual 	harassment-
related 	discipline. 	See 	id. 	11 	89-94, 	96-99, 	110, 	123-24.
Knowing 	about 	the 	alleged 	seat 	incident, 	the 	Plaintiff 	contends,
the 	Company 	had 	an 	obligation 	to 	take 	"prompt 	and 	adequate
remedial 	action," 	Moore, 	461 	F.3d 	at 	349, 	but 	did 	not 	do 	so.
The 	complaint 	alleges 	the 	Company 	"did 	absolutely 	nothing 	to
stop 	[the 	coworker's] 	retaliatory 	conduct 	against 	[the
Plaintiff] 	once 	[the 	Company] 	learned 	about 	it 	[on 	the 	day 	of
the 	seat 	incident]." 	Id. 	1 	112.
The 	Company's 	response 	is 	that 	it 	did 	take 	remedial 	action. 	See
Defendants' 	Brief 	at 	13. 	But 	what 	the 	Company 	cites 	for 	that
idea 	is 	that 	Company 	employees 	heard 	out 	the 	Plaintiff 	and
passed 	her 	information 	along 	to 	the 	right 	people 	in 	the
organization 	--- 	not 	that 	they 	acted 	to 	fix 	the 	situation. 	See
id. 	Hearing 	out 	a 	complaint 	and 	taking 	steps 	to 	remedy 	it
these 	are 	different 	things. 	Common 	sense 	makes 	that 	clear, 	and
so 	does 	the 	caselaw. 	See, 	~, 	Christian 	v. 	Umpqua 	Bank, 	984
F.3d 	801, 	812 	(9th 	Cir. 	2014) 	(holding 	a 	reasonable 	jury 	could
conclude 	that 	a 	bank 	did 	not 	take 	"prompt, 	appropriate, 	and
effective 	action" 	after 	learning 	about 	a 	customer's 	harassment
of 	an 	employee 	because 	it 	took 	no 	concrete 	steps 	to 	remedy 	the
issue); 	see 	generally 	Young 	v. 	Temple 	Univ. 	Hosp., 	359 	F. 	App'x
304, 	308 	(3d 	Cir. 	2009) 	("an 	employer's 	remedial 	action 	is
adequate 	if 	it 	is 	reasonably 	calculated 	to 	end 	the 	harassment")
( cleaned 	up) .
* 	* 	*
The 	Plaintiff 	also 	claims 	the 	Company 	is 	liable 	on 	a 	second New
Jersey 	Law Against 	Discrimination 	retaliation 	theory 	--- 	for 	the
Coworker's 	post-seat-incident 	verbal 	statements 	to 	various
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colleagues, 	which, 	the 	Plaintiff 	contends, 	were 	retaliation 	for
her 	reports 	to 	the 	Company 	about 	his 	alleged 	conduct. 	See
Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	15.
But 	an 	employer 	cannot 	be 	liable 	in 	a 	situation 	like 	this 	one
where 	it 	took 	"prompt 	and 	adequate 	remedial 	action." 	Moore, 	461
F.3d 	at 	349 	(cleaned up).
And 	on 	the 	Plaintiff's 	allegations, 	the 	Company 	did 	just 	that.
As 	to 	"prompt[ness]," 	the 	Company's 	HR 	director 	spoke 	to 	the
Plaintiff within 	hours 	of 	receiving 	her 	verbal-comments
complaint, 	see 	Complaint 	CJ[ 119, 	quickly 	kicked 	off 	an
investigation, 	see 	id. 	CJ[ 123, 	and 	wrapped 	it 	up 	in 	just 	over 	a
week. 	See 	id. 	CJ[ 124.
This 	is 	certainly 	fast 	enough. 	See 	Huston, 	568 	F.3d 	at 	110
(holding 	that 	employer 	that 	"launched 	an 	investigation 	on 	the
very 	day 	[the 	plaintiff] 	filed 	her 	complaint" 	had 	"responded
promptly"); 	accord, 	e.g., 	Hemphill 	v. 	City 	of 	Wilmington, 	813 	F.
Supp. 	2d 	581, 	589 	(D. 	Del. 	2011) 	(holding: 	employer 	that
"temporarily 	removed 	[the 	plaintiff] 	from 	the 	allegedly 	hostile
environment 	and 	initiated 	an 	investigation" 	immediately 	upon
receiving 	a 	complaint 	engaged 	in 	"prompt 	. 	. 	remedial
action").
And 	the 	"adequate" 	box 	is 	checked, 	too.
"A remedial 	action 	that 	effectively 	stops 	the 	harassment 	will 	be
deemed 	adequate 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law." 	Knabe 	v. 	Boury 	Corp., 	114
F.3d 	407, 	411 	n.8 	(3d 	Cir. 	1997).
Here, 	the 	verbal-comments 	investigation 	corroborated 	the
Plaintiff's 	allegations. 	Company 	officials 	told 	the 	Coworker
"that 	this 	type 	of 	behavior 	was 	not 	acceptable," 	Complaint 	CJ[ 124
--- 	and 	there 	are 	no 	further 	allegations 	from 	the 	Plaintiff 	as
to 	any workplace 	difficulties 	during 	the 	ten months 	that
followed, 	her 	last 	at 	the 	Company. 	For 	those 	months, 	any
misconduct 	was 	"effectively 	stop[ped]," 	Knabe, 	114 	F.3d 	at 	411
n.8, 	and 	so 	the 	Company 	cannot 	be 	liable. 	See, 	e.g., 	Morrison
v. 	Carpenter 	Tech. 	Corp., 	193 	F. 	App'x 	148, 	153 	(3d 	Cir. 	2006);
Mlinarchik v. 	Brennan, 	2018 	WL 	4922925, 	at 	*6 	(W.D. 	Pa. 	Oct. 	10,
2018); 	Rader 	v. 	Whitehall/Coplay 	Sch. 	Dist., 	2008 	WL 	2468361, 	at
*6 	(E.D. 	Pa. 	June 	18, 	2008).
* 	* 	*
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Third, 	the 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	the 	Company 	retaliated 	against 	her
by 	"allow[ing 	the 	Coworker] 	to 	continue 	working 	with 	[the]
Plaintiff 	even 	after 	[she] 	reported 	his 	sexual 	misconduct
against 	her 	to 	[the 	Company]." 	Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	11-12.
For 	the 	last 	ten 	months 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	worked 	at 	the
Company, 	this 	claim 	fails. 	At 	the 	beginning 	of 	that 	period, 	the
Coworker 	was 	investigated, 	see 	Complaint 	1 	123, 	told 	that 	his
conduct 	was 	out 	of 	bounds. 	See 	id. 	1 	124. 	And 	from 	that 	point
forward, 	there 	was 	no 	further 	alleged misconduct. 	The 	Third
Circuit 	has 	held 	that 	"if 	the 	remedy 	chosen 	by 	the 	employer 	is
adequate, 	an 	aggrieved 	employee 	cannot 	object 	to 	that 	selected
action." 	Knabe, 	114 	F.3d 	at 	414. 	Among 	other 	things, 	she
cannot 	claim that 	an 	allegedly 	harassing 	colleague 	"should 	have
been 	transferred 	. 	. 	or 	fired." 	Id.
But 	for 	earlier 	periods, 	it 	is 	not 	clear 	how 	the 	Company's
response 	can 	be 	described, 	for 	now, 	as 	adequate 	as 	a 	matter 	of
law. 	Remedial 	steps 	were 	taken 	by 	the 	Company 	(moving 	seats,
for 	example) 	but 	issues 	persisted 	(verbal 	comments 	to
colleagues, 	for 	example).
* 	* 	*
In 	Count 	II 	of 	her 	complaint, 	the 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	to 	hold 	the
Company 	liable 	for 	alleged 	retaliatory 	harassment 	by 	the
Coworker, 	and 	the 	Company moves 	to 	dismiss 	that 	count.
The motion 	is 	granted 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	it 	rests 	on 	allegations
for 	the 	period 	from 	September 	20, 	2023 	until 	the 	end 	of 	the
Plaintiff's 	employment 	with 	the 	Company. 	As 	to 	that 	period, 	the
Company 	took 	remedial 	action 	that 	was 	effective 	as 	a 	matter 	of
law. 	And 	for 	that 	period 	it 	was 	under 	no 	obligation 	to 	do 	more
--- 	to 	fire 	the 	Coworker, 	or 	to 	transfer 	him.
Otherwise, 	the 	motion 	at 	ECF 	43 	is 	denied.
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	27th 	day 	of 	January,
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
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