ABOUELMAKAREM v. MUSTAFA et al

2:23-cv-22209Njd28 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NADER ABOUELMAKAREM,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAHMOUD MUSTAFA and SADIYA
MUSTAFA,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 23-22209
OPINION
January 28, 2026
SEMPER, District Judge.
The 	current 	matter 	comes 	before 	the 	court 	on 	Plaintiff 	Nader Abouelmakarem’s
(“Plaintiff”) motion for summary judgment against Defendant Sadiya Mustafa (“Defendant” or
“Sadiya”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 	(ECF 50-1, “Mot.”) 	Defendant
submitted an opposition to the motion (ECF 51, “Def. Opp.”), and Plaintiff replied. 	(ECF 52,
“Reply.”) The Court has decided this motion upon the parties’ submissions, without oral argument,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated below,
Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
This matter arises from the alleged fraudulent transfer of property in Hudson County, New
Jersey from Defendant Mahmoud Mustafa (“Mahmoud”) to his wife, co-Defendant Sadiya
Mustafa. 	This Court previously entered default judgment against Mahmoud for Plaintiff’s sole
1 The Court relies on the facts contained in the Complaint (ECF 1), Defendant Sadiya Mustafa’s
Answer (ECF 14), the Court’s previous Opinion in this case (ECF 53), Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment and the statement of facts contained within (ECF 50).
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claim of fraudulent conveyance in violation of the New Jersey Uniform Voidable Transactions Act
(“UVTA” formerly the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 25:2-20 et seq. (ECF
53, “Op.” at 10.) For purposes of judicial economy, the Court does not retrace the full factual and
procedural history and incorporates the preceding opinion herein.
This matter relates to a civil judgment that Plaintiff secured against Mahmoud and his
brother on August 17, 2023 in the Southern District of New York (the “SDNY Action”).2 (ECF 1,
“Compl.” ¶ 1.) Plaintiff worked as a cashier for three years in a New York City gift shop that was
owned and operated by Mahmoud. (Id.; ECF 50-3, SDNY Complaint, “Ex. A” ¶ 6.) Following a
three-day trial, a federal jury in Manhattan found that Mahmoud had failed to pay Plaintiff
minimum wage and overtime pay. 	(Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16.) The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Plaintiff in the amount of $245,593.78 in monetary damages and attorneys’ fees, collectively.
(ECF 50-4, “Ex. B”.) No amount of money has been paid by any defendant in the SDNY Action
to satisfy that judgment. (Id. ¶ 22, 23.)
Two weeks after Plaintiff commenced the SDNY Action,3 Mahmoud transferred ownership
of his home located at 1611 86th Street in North Bergen, New Jersey (the “Property”) to his wife
Sadiya for consideration of $1.00. (Id. ¶ 17; ECF 50-6, 2021 Deed, “Ex. D”.) Mahmoud purchased
the Property on November 9, 2000 (see ECF 50-5, 2000 Deed, “Ex. C”) and was the sole owner
of the Property for twenty-one years, until he transferred his ownership interest to his wife.
(Compl. ¶ 13.) On August 27, 2021, Mahmoud satisfied the mortgage on the Property. (Id. ¶ 14.)
2 See Abouelmakarem v. MDNMA Inc. et. al., No. 21-10625, 2023 WL 4561765 (S.D.N.Y. July
17, 2023).
3 Plaintiff filed his complaint in the SDNY Action on December 13, 2021, which sought over
$300,000 in damages. (See Ex. A; Mot. at 2.) The deed transferring ownership of the Property is
dated December 27, 2021. (ECF 50-6.)
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Defendant Sadiya appeared through counsel and filed an Answer to the Complaint on
February 13, 2024. (ECF 14, “Ans.”) On October 30, 2024, Magistrate Judge Jose R. Almonte
permitted Sadiya’s counsel to withdraw as her attorney. (ECF 31.) Sadiya is now proceeding pro
se.4 On March 28, 2025, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his singular cause of action
against Sadiya. 	(See Mot.) 	On April 10, 2025, Sadiya filed a handwritten letter opposing
Plaintiff’s motion. (See Opp.) Plaintiff submitted a reply brief on April 15, 2025. (See Reply.)
On June 30, 2025 this Court entered default judgment against Mahmoud, finding that Plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged the elements of a fraudulent transfer under the UVTA. (Op. at 10.) The Court
reserved on awarding damages until after the Court ruled on the instant motion for summary
judgment. (Id.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted
if the movant shows that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact [and] the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204
(3d Cir. 2000); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding a
motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing Peters v. Del. River Port Auth. of Pa. & N.J., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact
remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “[W]ith respect to an issue on
which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . the burden on the moving party may be
4 Sadiya moved this Court to appoint her pro bono counsel (ECF 39, 42), and on February 20,
2025, this Court denied her application to proceed in forma pauperis, a prerequisite to receive pro
bono counsel, finding that she did not sufficiently demonstrate indigent status. (ECF 45.)
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discharged by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the non-moving party “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A fact is only “material” for
purposes of a summary judgment motion if a dispute over that fact “might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” 	Id. 	Unsupported allegations, subjective beliefs, or argument alone, however, cannot
forestall 	summary 	judgment. 	See Lujan 	v. 	Nat’l 	Wildlife 	Fed’n, 	497 	U.S. 	871, 	888
(1988) (nonmoving party may not successfully oppose summary judgment motion by simply
replacing “conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an
affidavit.”). Thus, if the nonmoving party fails “to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. . . . there can be ‘no genuine issue of material fact,’ since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23). Moreover, the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asks this Court to enter summary judgment on his fraudulent transfer claim against
Sadiya. (Mot. at 4-7.) Plaintiff maintains that he “has been in yearslong litigation to vindicate his
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rights against Mahmoud” and that both Defendants here “engaged in an effort to cheat [] Plaintiff,
a creditor of Mahmoud, by transferring the Property to Sadiya for one dollar, thereby placing the
Property out of Plaintiff’s reach as he seeks to execute” his civil judgment. 	(Id. at 7.) 	Sadiya
argues that the Property “was promised to me and my children over 10 years ago” and that “as
soon as [the mortgage] was paid off, we began the process of switching the deed for my children’s
security.” (Opp. at 3.) 	The Court will also address the affirmative defense offered in Sadiya’s
Answer that the Property was transferred to her pursuant to Defendants’ divorce settlement. (See
Ans. ¶ 14.)
Actual and constructive fraudulent transfers may be avoided pursuant to New Jersey’s
UVTA, see N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 25:2–20 et seq. The purpose of the UVTA is to prevent a debtor
from placing property beyond a creditor’s reach. 	In re Tzanides, 574 B.R. 489, 512-13 (D.N.J.
2017). 	“Underlying the Act is the notion that a debtor cannot deliberately cheat a creditor by
removing his property from the jaws of execution.” Gilchinsky v. Nat’l Westminster Bank N.J.,
159 N.J. 463, 475 (1999). The UVTA provides that a transfer is voidable if the transfer was made
either “[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor” (actual fraud) or
“[w]ithout receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and
the debtor…[i]ntended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor
would incur, debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as they become due” (constructive fraud).
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 25:2-25(a)(1), (a)(2).
“In order to determine whether an actual intent to hinder or defraud existed, courts look to
see whether ‘badges of fraud’ are present.” Leonard v. Bayuk, No. 23-21314, 2025 WL 1419813,
at *6 (D.N.J. May 16, 2025). Relevant badges of fraud that may apply to the present matter include
whether “before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor was sued or
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threatened with suit;” “the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets;” “the debtor retained
possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;” “the value of the consideration
received by the debtor was not reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the
amount of the obligation incurred;” and “the transfer occurred shortly before or after a substantial
debt was incurred[.]” Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707, 747 (D.N.J. 2013)
(quoting Meiselman v. Hamilton Farm Golf Club LLC, No. 11-0653, 2011 WL 3859846, at *8
(D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2011)); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-26 (listing “badges of fraud” factors to
determine intent).
Shortly after Plaintiff filed his lawsuit in the SDNY Action, Mahmoud transferred the
Property to his wife, Sadiya, for consideration of one dollar.5 (Ex. D.) The Hudson County Board
of Taxation assessed the value of the Property in 2025 at $533,600.00. (See ECF 50-13, “Ex. K”)
It is therefore not in dispute that Mahmoud transferred the Property to Sadiya without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer. See Chestnut St. Consol., LLC v. Dawara,
619 F. Supp. 3d 489, 511 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (finding Defendants liable under Pennsylvania’s UVTA
for transferring properties valued between $73,800 and $528,700 for one dollar). 	It is also not
disputed that at the time of the transfer, Plaintiff was a creditor of Defendant, because he had filed
the lawsuit in the SDNY Action.6 	The uncontested facts therefore demonstrate that Mahmoud
made a constructively fraudulent transfer “without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
5 The deed transferring ownership of the Property lists consideration in the amount of $1.00,
contains Defendant’s own signature, and identifies the Property by the address listed in the
Complaint. 	(Ex. D.) Mahmoud also testified that he transferred the Property in consideration for
one dollar in his deposition taken in the SDNY Action. (See ECF 50-12, “Ex. J”, 22:22-27:4.)
6 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-21 (defining “creditor” as “a person who has a claim” and “claim” as
“a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”)
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exchange” and that he intended to incur, or “believed or reasonably should have believed” that he
would incur debts beyond his ability to pay, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-25(a)(2).
The Court has already found that the following badges of fraud exist here: (1) before the
transfer Defendant was sued by Plaintiff in the SDNY Action; (2) Defendant retained possession or
control of the Property after the transfer;7 and (3) the value of the consideration received by the
Defendant was not reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred. (Op. at 8-9) (citing
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-26 and Leonard, 2025 WL 1419813, at *6 (finding voidable transfer in
almost identical circumstances where badges of fraud established intent, including consideration
of $1.00 for the property)). 	“While a finding of one badge of fraud may cast suspicion on the
transferor’s intent, a finding of several badges in one transaction generally provides conclusive
evidence of an actual intent to defraud.” 	Jurista, 492 B.R. at 747. 	These badges of fraud
sufficiently demonstrate that Mahmoud made that transfer with actual intent to hinder his creditors,
satisfying the statutory requirement for actual fraud. 	See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-25(a)(1). 	The
conveyance of the Property to Sadiya was a transparent effort by Mahmoud to avoid his obligations
to Plaintiff. 	The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has established an actual and constructive
fraudulent transfer under the UVTA.
Defendant Sadiya’s sole defense is that the transfer of the Property to her was part of her
divorce settlement with Mahmoud. (Ans. ¶¶ 15-17.) Sadiya filed for divorce on September 26,
2023. (ECF 50-14, “Ex. L”.) Mahmoud transferred the Property to her on December 27, 2021,
nearly two years before their divorce proceedings began. 	(See Ex. D.) 	The Court agrees with
Plaintiff that this renders “any assertions that the divorce proceeding is related to the Fraudulent
7 In correspondence with this Court dated November 29, 2023, two years after the transfer,
Mahmoud listed his mailing address as the Property’s address. (See ECF 33-9, “Ex. G”.)
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Transfer factually impossible.” 	(Mot. at 10.) 	Defendant Sadiya’s argument is therefore
unavailing.8 	Defendant has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute as to any
material fact, and Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his fraudulent
conveyance claim.
IV. 	DAMAGES
In his motion, Plaintiff asks this Court to grant “the relief requested in the Complaint and/or
set forth in the annexed proposed order.” (Mot. at 14.) The UVTA provides remedies for violations
of the statute in the form of injunctive relief, including but not limited to: “Avoidance of the
transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim;” “attachment or other
provisional remedy against the asset transferred” and, subject to principles of equity, an “injunction
against further disposition by the debtor or transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other
property” or “[a]ppointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or other property
of the transferee[.]” 	N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-29. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks all forms of relief
prescribed by the statute, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs of this action. (Compl. at 6.)
The Court requires further briefing from the parties to determine the damages award in this
case. Plaintiff is directed to file a brief of no more than ten pages within thirty days of the date of
this opinion. Defendant will have fourteen days to respond.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF 50) is
GRANTED. The parties shall brief the Court on damages as outlined in the accompanying Order.
8 Similarly unavailing is Sadiya’s argument that the Property “was promised to me and my children
over 10 years ago” and that “as soon as [the mortgage] was paid off, we began the process of
switching the deed for my children’s security.” (Opp. at 3.) Defendant has not proffered a credible
reason that her husband transferred the Property from his name to hers, instead of, for example,
adding her name to the deed.
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/s/ Jamel K. Semper 	.
H ON. JAMEL K. S EMPER
United States District Judge
Orig: 	Clerk
cc: 	Jose R. Almonte, U.S.M.J.
Parties
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