JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS IRELAND LIMITED v. LUPIN INC. et al

2:21-cv-14271Njd30 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS IRELAND
LIMITED,
Plaintiff,
v.
LUPIN INC., LUPIN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
Defendants.
JESSICA S. ALLEN, U.S.M.J.
Civil Action No. 21-14271 (SRC) (JSA)
(CONSOLIDATED)
OPINION
(REDACTED)__
This is a consolidated Hatch-Waxman patent case. Plaintiff, Jazz Pharmaceuticals
Ireland Limited, asserts that Defendants Lupin Inc., Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Teva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 's proposed ANDA products infringe forty-eight ( 48) claims across twelve
(12) patents covering Plaintiffs branded drug Xywav®, which is an FDA-approved treatment for
cataplexy and/or excessive daytime sleepiness associated with narcolepsy.
Plaintiffs initial Complaint was filed on July 28, 2021, followed by five related
Complaints, which have been consolidated for all purposes into this action. (See ECF Nos. 47,
81, 116, 195). Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to strike three (3) paragraphs in
the opening expert report served by Plaintiffs infringement expert, Dr. Richard K. Bogan.
Defendants contend the report presents a new, previously undisclosed theory of infringement.
(See ECF Nos. 242, 248). Plaintiff opposes the motion. (ECF No. 245). No oral argument was
heard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons set forth below, and for good cause shown,
Defendants' motion is DENIED.
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I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 1
A. Relevant Procedural History
Several Scheduling Orders have been entered in this consolidated action. (See ECF Nos.
34, 74, 81,116, 143,195,201,217,239). Plaintiff served Infringement Contentions on Lupin on
June 19, 2023, and on Teva on December 29, 2023. (See ECF No. 243 at 2; see also ECF Nos.
81,116). Following the close of fact discovery,the parties timely served their opening expert
reports on April 21,2025. (See ECF No. 217).2
On May l, 2025,the Undersigned held a Case Management Conference,wherein
Defendants informed the Court that they had issues with the substance of Plaintiffs opening
expert reports. (See Transcript of Case Management Conference, dated May 1, 2025 ("Tr."),
10:20-14:4; ECF No. 235). The Undersigned directed the parties to informally address the issue
and then submit a status letter on or before May 9,2025. (See id.)
In their May 9th submission,the parties advised that they had narrowed their disputes
over expert reports and sought additional time to further meet-and-confer. (ECF No. 234).
Ultimately,the parties were not able to resolve their disputes. As such,the Court instructed the
parties file any motions to strike opening expert reports by June 20,2025,and held the balance
of expert discovery in abeyance pending the outcome of the motions. (See ECF No. 239).
On June 20, 2025,Defendants filed the present motion to strike, contending Dr. Bogan's
Report contains a new theory of infringement related to the "reduced food effect" limitation in
Claim I of U.S. Patent No. 11,426,373 (''the '373 patent"). (ECF No. 242-43).
1 The Court assumes the parties are familiar with the extensive history of this case. Only the background relevant to
the present motion is set forth herein.
2 By letter dated April 24, 2025, Plaintiff advised the Court that "it had identified new theories, prior art, and prior
art combinations in Defendants' opening expert reports that were not previously disclosed in their invalidity
contentions." (ECF No. 229). This is the subject of Plaintiffs motion to strike portions of these reports, (ECF No.
240), which is being addressed in a separate opinion and order.
2
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B. Current Dispute
The Bogan Report exceeds three hundred (300) paragraphs and renders opinions bearing
on several patents at issue in the case. (See Declaration of Liza M. Walsh, Esq., ("Walsh Deel.")
Ex. C (Bogan Report to Teva) & Ex. D (Bogan Report to Lupin); ECF No. 243-1 ). 3 Yet, the
parties' agree that their current dispute is limited to a single limitation, in a single claim, in a
single patent (the '373 patent), and three paragraphs in Dr. Bogan's Report-i.e., paragraphs
332, 333, and 334 (at times, "the disputed paragraphs"). For context, each is addressed below.
C. Relevant Patent At Issue
Plaintiff contends the '373 patent claims discoveries made during clinical testing of
Xywav®. (ECF No. 245 at 2-3). According to Plaintiff, during the development ofXywav®, its
scientists expected that Xywav® would be bioequivalent to a different oxybate product already
on the market, a l 00% sodium oxybate product called Xyrem®, but unexpectedly found
something different. (Id.) In short, Xyrem® was best taken on an empty stomach, because if
Xyrern® was taken with food, there was increased absorption time (Tmax) and decreased
effectiveness (Cmax). (Id.) Unlike Xyrem®, Plaintiffs scientists allegedly found that Xywav®
does not exhibit significantly delayed or decreased absorption rates in the presence of food-in
other words, Xwyav® showed a reduced food effect as compared to Xyrem®. (Id.) According
to Plaintiff, the claims of the '373 patent relate to methods of treating patients based on that
discovery. (Id.)
D. The Disputed Claim & Plaintifrs Infringement Contentions
Claim I of the '373 patent (with the "reduced food effect" limitation in bold) reads, in
3 The Bogan Reports served on Teva and Lupin "are substantially identical, differing only in that they cite Teva- and
Lupin specific documents, respectively." (ECF No. 243 at 3 n.l). For brevity and efficiency, the Court refers to both
reports collectively as "Dr. Bogan's Report" or the "Bogan Report."
3
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relevant part:
1. A method of reducing food effect due to administration of gamma
hydroxybutyrate (GHB) in a patient having cataplexy in narcolepsy or
excessive daytime sleepiness in narcolepsy, comprising: ... wherein the
pharmaceutical composition of GHB has reduced food effect as measured
by Cmax compared to an equal dose of immediate release liquid solution of
Na.GHB, ....
(ECF No. 243 at 1-2) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff's Infringement Contentions address this limitation with the following
description and citation to documents:
The claimed pharmaceutical composition, when administered as instructed by
[Defendants'] accompanying labeling (within four hours after eating), will, in at
least some patients, have a reduced food effect as measured by Cmax compared to
an equal dose of immediate release liquid solution ofNaGHB. See, e.g.,
TEVA_xwAV_00000027-103; TEVA_xwAV_ 00004932-4997;
TEVA_XWAV_00000265-300; TEVA_XWAV_00005054-5089; JPIL0040913-
l 454; and JPIL0066557-7166.
(Wash Deel., Ex. A at 612).4
E. Dr. Bogan's Report
The disputed paragraphs in Dr. Bogan's Report addressing Claim l read:
332. Example 2 of the '373 patent describes pharmacokinetic testing
where a mixture of sodium, potassium, calcium, and magnesium oxybates
called "Formulation O" was compared to Xyrem. See Ex. 10, '373 patent
at 35:1-39:3. The mixed salt formulations tested in the pharmacokinetic
studies were a single dose "equivalent to 4.5 g sodium oxybate." Ex. I 0,
'373 patent at 35:14-15. In particular, the '373 patent states: Formulation
"O" was tested for bioequivalence relative to Xyrem® (Formulation "X",
commercial sodium oxybate solution of the same molar concentration and
comparable pH as "O") and in the fasted as well as fed state. The study
was compliant with the FDA guidance for food effect studies ("Guidance
for Industry: Food-Effect bioavailability and Fed Bioequivalence Studies",
FDA December 2002), incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
(Ex. IO, '373 patent at 36:10-19.) The results of the bioequivalence studies
are presented in Table 4 and Table 7 of the '373 patent, reproduced below:
4 Plaintiffs Infringement Contentions are the same for both Defendants, other than the citation to each Defendants'
respective documents. For the sake of simplicity, the Court recites only Plaintiffs contentions served on Teva.
4
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li\BLE 4
Conditions nrul Rc�nllll jn Stum· IJ.o Ill U!Wllt 2411 ml. l.iqnici \'olnmc
l\wtlbct \ol Cmax Cm11.1; :\LiC AUC % cgui\'tilcnt
Trc.-um�nt of P�icnts IIIIL) (mii,'L) r.1tio (111g•h.il) r;ttio �:t K (';1 Mi!
o. fa.�lt'II 34 24(1 !02J 76�. 218.7	&9% 	8 23 4!1 21
O, lcd 36 240 77.7 5S�o 216.0 81% 8 23 48 JI
X. li�tt�I 32 240 134.6 lff•�o 268.1 IC.t% IOO (J 0 ,,
X. fed )6 240 84.9 6.l�o m.o 117% 100 0 (I (I
(Ex. 10, '373 patent at 36:25-37.)
TABLE7
Rt.�,.111.s of S111dv JZP:?5�-1111. n • .U j?.UJcmts
\'(ll ('m:ix Cm.'lX .-\UC' :\l!(' 0
/4 c-gniY!llcnt
Tr..-:1.1111cnl uni.I (m�/1.) r:ilio M�•h'I.) rati<l N:l K Cs Mg
o. r.ut .....J 60 	IJJ.(I 	77% 238 !J5% � 23 48 21
O. fasted :?4V 9::!.7 74°-"o 233 9V0·o g .:?3 48 21
o. f.-J 60 63.0 S:2�t 20� l(t,<?iJ 1:$ ... �	_., 48 21
X_ filltcd 60 1205 100°,;, 251 11111°,,, IUO u ll u
X. f�1cd :!4(.J l:?S.9 lW% 258 101)'% 11)1) I) u (.I
X. fed (ii) (,8.6 :'i7� .. 206 lt�'o I llll fl 0 (I
(Ex. 10, '373 patent at 37:56-38:9.)
The '373 patent states that "[t]he results indicate that formulation 'O' has
a reduced food effect compared to Xyrem®." (Ex. 10, '373 patent at
38: I 6- 18.) As can be seen in Table 4 and Table 7, the difference for Cmax
between the fed and fasted conditions for Formulation O is smaller than
the difference for Cmax between the fed and fasted conditions for Xyrem.
This shows, in my opinion, that Formulation O has a reduced food effect
compared to Xyrem based on a smaller difference in Cmax between fed and
fasted states for a single dose of sodium, potassium, calcium, and
magnesium oxybates compared to an equal dose ofXyrem which is an
immediate release liquid solution of sodium oxybate.
333. I understand from my review of the deposition transcript of one of
the inventors of the '373 patent, Clark Allphin, that "Formulation O"
referred to in Example 2 of the '373 patent is the same salt mixture as
Xywav. Specifically, Mr. Allphin identified "Mixture H" from U.S. Patent
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No. 8,591,922 ("the '922 patent") as containing the salt mixture for
Xywav. (Ex. 39, Allphin Tr. at 41 :24-42:6 ("Q. ·Can you take a look in the
['922] patent, and let me know where the Xywav formulation is disclosed?
A. The Xywav salt mixture is mixture H.").) Mixture H from the '922
patent contains, expressed as % molar equivalents, 8% Na.GHB, 23%
K.GHB, 21% Mg.(GHB)2, and 48% Ca.(GHB)2. (Ex. 45, '922 patent at
29:30-45.) The '373 patent describes Formulation Oas containing "as
(equivalent %) 8% sodium, 23% potassium, 48% calcium, and 21%
magnesium oxybate." (Ex. 10, '373 patent at 35:50-36: 1.) Therefore, the
salt mixture in Formulation Oof the '373 patent is the same as the salt
mixture in Xywav.
334. The package inserts for �s ANDA Product and Xywav -
state that their products contain-Na.GHB,-K.GHB
Mg.(GHB)2, and�a.(GHB)2 per each mil1imeter (mL) of oral
solution. (See, e.g., Ex. 28, at LUPIN-XYWAV_0042988; Ex. 12 at
JPILOI 79621.) Therefore, Lupin's ANDA Product and Xywav
in my opinion,
Lupin's ANDA Product would also have a reduced food effect compared
to Xyrem based on a smaller difference in Cmax between fed and fasted
states for a single dose of sodium, potassium, calcium, and magnesium
oxybates compared to an equal dose of Xyrem. Consequently, in my
opinion, Lupin's ANDA Product meets this claim element.
(Walsh Deel., Ex. C (Bogan Report to Lupin) at ,i,r 332-334) (bold emphasis added).
F. The Parties' Arguments
Defendants contend that the disputed paragraphs present a new "ten-step infringement
theory" for the "reduced food effect limitation" in Claim I of the '373 patent that was absent
from Plaintiffs Infringement Contentions. (See ECF No. 243 at 3). According to Defendants,
Plaintiffs Infringement Contentions "consisted of conclusory alJegations and cited documents
without explaining how the accused products allegedly satisfied each claim limitation," and
"constituted nothing more than a bare assertion of infringement." (Id. at 2). Thus, Defendants
contend, the new ten-step theory contained in the disputed paragraphs amounts to "a
fundamentally new approach [relying on] undisclosed documents, [inventor] testimony, and
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technical rationales ... that bore no resemblance to anything in [Plaintiffs] infringement
contentions." (Id. at 3). Defendants purport to extract from the disputed paragraphs ten
analytical steps and argue that each step was not previously disclosed, given the alleged
"boilerplate" nature of Plaintiffs Infringement Contentions. (Id. at 3-5; see also ECF No. 248 at
2-7). According to Defendants, the Local Patent Rules and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(c)(l) govern Plaintiffs failure to previously disclose this new infringement theory, which
must be excluded as untimely and prejudicial based on the Third Circuit's- multi-factor test for
analyzing a request to exclude evidence set forth in Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home
Ownership Ass 'n, 559 F .2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977) (at times, "Pennypack "). (ECF No. 243 at 6-8;
ECF No. 248 at 11-12).
Plaintiff counters that Dr.Bogan's Report does not contain any new theory of
infringement. (ECF No. 245 at I, 2-4). Plaintiff contends that the disputed paragraphs rely on
the same data and documents cited in its Infringement Contentions and that the inventor
testimony relied upon is directly related to the previously disclosed evidence. (Id. at 1, 6-8).
Plaintiff denies that there is a "ten-step" theory of infringement presented, but rather, contends
that the disputed paragraphs are consistent with its Infringement Contentions. (Id. at 8-9).
Plaintiff further argues that Defendants' motion is, at its core, a fundamentally misguided and
untimely attack on the adequacy of Plaintiff's Infringement Contentions, lodged nearly two years
after they were first served. (Id. at 11). Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that, by waiting to raise
alleged deficiencies in Plaintiffs Infringement Contentions, Defendants have waived any
deficiency argument, and thus, by extension, that anything in Dr. Bogan's Report is new. (Id. at
11-12). Putting that aside, Plaintiff contends that Defendants have, in fact, been aware of the
supposedly new theory of infringement since the beginning of the case, as they conducted
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discovery on the issue. (Id at 10-11). Finally, while Plaintiff disputes that Rule 37(c)(l) and the
Pennypack factors apply, it contends, in all events, there is no prejudice that would warrant
striking the disputed paragraphs in Dr. Bogan's Report. (Id. at 15).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"The Local Patent Rules exist to further the goal of full, timely discovery and provide all
parties with adequate notice and information with which to litigate their case." Amgen Inc. v.
Kashiv Biosciences LLC, 2019 WL 5445974, at *I (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2019).5 The Patent Rules
"are designed to require the parties to crystallize their theories of the case early in the litigation
and to adhere to those theories once they have been disclosed." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Pursuant to Local Patent Rule 3.1, a patent holder must serve an alleged infringer a
"Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions" within 14 days of the initial
scheduling conference. Id. The infringement contentions must contain, among other things: "(I)
each claim of each patent in suit that is allegedly infringed; (2) identification of defendant's
"Accused Instrumentality"; (3) a chart identifying where each limitation of each asserted claim is
found in each "Accused Instrumentality"; (4) whether the alleged infringement is literal or under
the doctrine of equivalents; (5) the priority date to which each asserted claim allegedly is
entitled; and (6) the basis for any willful infringement claims." Elan Pharma Intern. Ltd v.
Lupin Ltd., 2010 WL 1372316, at *3 (D.N.J. March 31, 2010); see also Voxpath RS LLC v. LG
Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., 2012 WL 5818143, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2012).
"[A]II courts agree that the degree of specificity under Local Rule 3.1 must be sufficient
to provide reasonable notice to the defendant why the plaintiff believes it has a 'reasonable
5 The Local Patent Rules "were adopted verbatim from the Northern District of California and are identical to those
adopted in Eastern District of Texas. Accordingly, courts in this District look to these 'sister-courts' for guidance
with respect to issues not commonly addressed in this District." Curia IP Holdings, LLC v. Salix Pharm., Ltd., 2025
WL I 627251, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 18, 2025).
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chance of proving infringement."' Shared Memory Graphics LLC v. Apple, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d
1022, 1025 ( N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d
981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). However, "(p]arties ... need not 'prove up' their theories by
providing evidence beyond the material they have at the time they make their contentions."
Apple v. Samsung Electronics, Co., 2013 WL 3246094, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013); see also
AntiCancer, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 769 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (a patentee's infringement
contentions "do not need to include proof or direct evidence of infringement"). "Infringement
contentions serve two purposes: they act as substitutes for interrogatories and as a method of
disclosure for the parties' theories of their case, thereby shaping discovery and trial issues."
Curia, 2025 WL 1627251, at *6 ( D.N.J. Feb. 18, 2025) (citing Indus.Tech. Rsch. Inst. v. LG
Elecs., 2015 WL 12819052, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar.30, 2015)). These requirements "serve an
important function-to narrow and focus the issues and theories that must be pursued during the
litigation." Curia, 2025 WL 1627251, at *6 (citing Golden v. United States, 156 Fed. Cl. 623,
632 (Fed. Cl. 2021), affd, 2022 WL 4103287 (Fed. Cir. 2022)).
If a party develops new theories of infringement after serving its contentions, Local
Patent Rule 3.7 allows for amendment of contentions, but "only by order of the Court upon a
timely application and showing of good cause." L. Pat. R. 3.7; see also 02 Micro Int 'l Ltd. v.
Monolithic Pwr. Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Cout1s have repeatedly
avowed that Rule 3.7 is the proper vehicle to seek to add new theories in patent cases, and that
parties should not embed new theories within expert reports. See, e.g., Celgene, 2021 WL
3701700, at *2 ("Given the purpose behind the patent local rules' disclosure requirements, 'a
party may not use an expert report to introduce new infringement theories, new infringing
instrumentalities, new invalidity theories, or new prior art references not disclosed in the parties'
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infringement contentions or invalidity contentions."') (quoting Verinata Health, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 2014 WL 4100638, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014))); Merck Sharp & Dohme
Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2014 WL 997532, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2014), afj'd, 2014 WL 1494592
(D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2014). However, this District's Patent Rules are notably silent on the remedy
for noncompliance. See Taro Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Novitum Pharma, LLC, 2020 WL 1673045,
at *10 n.4 (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2020) ("While it is apparent that Defendant has violated [the Local
Patent Rules], the Local Patent Rules are silent on the remedy to be applied.").
Plaintiff submits that the appropriate standard is governed by Local Patent Rule 3.7,
which requires a party to move to amend and establish good cause. According to Plaintiff,
nothing in the Bogan Report is new, and therefore, there is no basis for it to have filed a motion
to amend or establish good cause. Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that, if an expert's report
contains new theories, the proper remedy is to strike those portions of the report for violating the
Local Patent Rules. (See ECF No. 245 at 15).
In comparison, Defendants submit the proper standard is governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(c)(l) and a balancing of the Pennypack factors identified by the Third
Circuit6 to determine whether exclusion of a new theory is proper. (See ECF No. 243 at 6). The
Pennypack factors are: (1) "the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the
excluded witnesses would have testified" or the excluded evidence would have been offered; (2)
"the ability of that party to cure the prejudice"; (3) the extent to which allowing such witnesses
or evidence would "disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the
court"; (4) any "bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court's order"; and (5) the
6 Although this is a patent case, the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to evidentiary rulings not unique to
patent law. See, e.g., Insite Vision Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 783 F.3d 853, 864-65 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying Third
Circuit law).
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importance of the excluded evidence. Id. at 904-05.
Reconciling these competing standards is not the threshold issue. Rather, this Court first
must consider "whether the expert has permissibly specified the application of a disclosed theory
or impermissibly substituted a new theory altogether." Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2. Only
if this Court finds that the Bogan Report contains a newly disclosed theory does this Court need
to determine the proper legal standard for exclusion. Of course, what is "new" in a patent
expert's report can be a nuanced evaluation, and several courts have noted the following general,
overarching approach to the issue now before the Court:
The threshold question in deciding whether to strike an expert
report or, in this case, select portions of an expert report, is
whether the expert has permissibly specified the application of a
disclosed theory or impermissibly substituted a new theory
altogether. When the line between permissible application of a
disclosed theory and impermissible substitution of a new theory
blurs, the district court revert[s] to a simple question: will striking
the report result in not just a trial, but an overall litigation, that is
more fair, or less?
Sonos, Inc. v. Google, LLC, 2023 WL 2918751, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2023) (internal
quotes and cites omitted); see also Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2 (Hochberg, J.
(Ret.), stating, "[t]he Special Discovery Master will apply the overarching question, 'will
striking the report [portion or reference] result in not just a trial, but an overall litigation,
that is more fair, or less?"') (quoting Verina/a, 2014 WL 4100638, at *3).
ill. ANALYSIS
The parties' arguments break down into two parts: (1) the timeliness of Defendants'
motion to strike, and (2) whether Dr. Bogan's Report, in fact, presents a new theory of
infringement, and if so, whether the new theory should be excluded. Each is taken in turn.
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A. Timeliness
Ordinarily, on a motion to strike such as this, the dispositive question is whether the
contentions disclosed what is in dispute in the expert's report. See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat
Sys. Inc., 2015 WL 3640694, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2015) ("The dispositive inquiry in a
motion to strike is thus whether the allegedly undisclosed "theory" is in fact a new theory ....")
(citing Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2011 WL 4479305, at *3 (N.D. Cal.Sept. 26, 2011)).
However, Plaintiff raises the threshold issue of timeliness, which the Court turns to first.
As noted, Plaintiffs Infringement Contentions were served in June and December 2023,
respectively. Defendants' motion focuses heavily on the substance of these Contentions,
contending they are perfunctory, conclusory, and deficient. See, e.g., ECF No. 243 at 2 ("With
respect to "reduced food effect" limitation specifically, [Plaintiffs] contentions constituted
nothing more than a bare assertion of infringement"); id. at 3 ("The Contentions did not provide
any analysis, explanation, or rationale connecting the cited materials to the specific claim
language"). Indeed, Defendants' current motion to strike an expert report could easily be
confused with a motion challenging the specificity of an infringement contention. See id. at 3
("[T]his sidesteps the notice and disclosure requirements that are foundational to the purpose of
infringement contentions" ... [and] "[the] contentions are "tantamount to simply saying,
Defendants' proposed AN DA Products infringe because they infringe."); see also ECF No.248
at I (referring to "barebones contentions "). In other words, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs
Infringement Contentions on this limitation in Claim 1 of the '373 patent did not effectively
provide them with notice of any meaningful theory of infringement.
However, if this deficiency is true, leaving Defendants to "guess which infringement
theories Plaintiff may strategically chose to present at trial," (id. at I), then Defendants were
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aware of this deficiency in June and December 2023, respectively, when Plaintiff served its
Contentions. Yet, the record confirms that Defendants did not raise the purported deficiency
with Plaintiff-or the Court-for more than eighteen (18) months when Plaintiff served Dr.
Bogan's Report in April 2025. Instead, apparently, Defendants accepted the Contentions,
engaged in fulsome fact discovery for over a year, allowed discovery to close, and then raised the
issue in a motion to strike Plaintiffs opening expert report. The Court is troubled by this delay.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants' failure to timely raise this issue amounts to a waiver
of their right to complain about the adequacy of Plaintiffs Contentions and, correspondingly, Dr.
Bogan' s Report. In support of its position, Plaintiff relies on Evolve Biosystems, Inc. v. Abbott
Labs, 2024 WL 4215804 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2024), and Sonos, 2023 WL 2918751. The Court
finds both cases instructive in that they support finding waiver in the face of lengthy inaction
relating to allegedly deficient contentions.
In Sonos, the parties cross-moved to strike allegedly new theories disclosed in expert
reports. Id. at* I, 4-5. As it related to one issue in dispute, the court noted that while the
plaintiff had "some colorable arguments" regarding the deficiency of the defendant's
contentions, plaintiff should have made these arguments when the issue was first raised in
connection with prior motion practice months earlier. Id. at*4. The Sonos court concluded that,
instead, plaintiff "seems to have sat on its hands waiting to strike expert report language ...
strategically chos[ing] not to initiate motion practice on this issue." Id. Based on the delay and
the lack of prejudice involved, the court declined to strike the allegedly new material. Id. at*5.
Likewise, in Evolve, the defendant alleged, among other things, that the plaintiff raised
new theories of infringement in an expert report and sought to strike the new theories based on
the allegation that previously served infringement contentions were deficient. See 2024 WL
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4215804, at *5. The Evolve court found that the defendant had an obligation to raise the issue of
an alleged deficiency in infringement contentions prior to expert reports by way of "a joint status
report and/or [] a motion," and that "[i]t is not clear why defendant chose instead to sit back and
do nothing ...." Id. at *7. Accordingly, the Evolve court found that the defendant had
improperly delayed raising an issue with plaintiffs' infringement contentions, and "[w]hether it
was a conscious litigation strategy or a decision now regretted, parties must live with the
consequences of the strategic decision ...." Id. at *7-8.
Here, Defendants could have and should have raised issues concerning the sufficiency of
Plaintiffs Infringement Contentions with Plaintiff (and if unsuccessful with the Court), months
ago and certainly long before opening expert reports were served. See, e.g., Fenner Invs. Ltd. v.
Hewelett-Packard Co., 2010 WL 786606, at *3 (E.D. Tex.Feb.26, 2010) ("If Defendants were
unclear as to the scope of the contentions, it was their responsibility to work with Plaintiff,
informally or through motion practice, to clarify the issue"). They did not. Crucially,
Defendants do not contend that Plaintiffs Contentions were adequate and disclosed a theory of
infringement, but that Dr. Bogan's Report now contains a new theory. That would be a more
typical motion to strike. Rather, Defendants primarily argue that Plaintiffs Infringement
Contentions have been deficient all along. The time to raise deficiencies in contentions passed
long ago. See Sonos, 2023 WL 29 I 8751, at *4. Moreover, if this Court were to accept
Defendants' position, it would lead to a series of unanswered questions. If Plaintiffs
Contentions were conclusory and bare boned and thus deficient when served, how did
Defendants know Plaintiffs theory of infringement or that Dr. Bogan's Report contained a new
theory? What did Defendants believe Plaintiffs Infringement Contention on this claim meant?
Without understanding Plaintiffs theories of infringement, how did Defendants effectively
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frame and proceed with discovery especially without previously raising this issue? Defendants
do not answer these questions in their motion papers.
This Court cannot condone Defendants' course of action. To do so would be unjust. See
Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2. Accordingly, this Court finds that Defendants' failure to
timely raise this issue without any explanation weighs against striking the disputed paragraphs.
See Sonos, 2023 WL 2918751, at *4-5. However, in all events, as is explained below, even if the
Court were to find Defendants timely raised this issue, the Court still finds that Defendants have
not shown that Dr. Bogan's Report contains a new theory of infringement.
B. Whether The Disputed Paragraphs Contain a New Theory oflnfringement
"Expert infringement reports may not introduce theories not previously set forth in
infringement contentions." Sol IP v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 2020 WL 10045985, at *2 (E.D.Tex.
Apr. 23, 2020) (internal quotations omitted). "The scope of infringement contentions and expert
reports are not, however, coextensive." Id. "For example, infringement contentions need not
disclose specific evidence, nor do they require a plaintiff to prove its infringement case, whereas
expert reports must include a complete statement of the expert's opinions, the basis and reasons
for them, and any data or other information considered when forming them." Id. (quotations
omitted). "The inquiry is 'whether the allegedly undisclosed theory is in fact a new theory or ...
instead the identification of additional evidentiary proof .... '" Id. (quoting Klaus Tech, Inc. v.
Google LLC, 2018 WL 5109383, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept.14, 2018)); Finjan, Inc., 2015 WL
3640694, at *2.
Dr. Bogan's Report opines in paragraphs 332 through 334 "that Xywav® exhibits the
claimed food effect ...and that because [Defendants] each seek FDA approval for a product
those products will therefore also exhibit
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the claimed food effect." (ECF No. 245 at 3; see also ECF No. 243 at 5; ECF No. 248 at 7).
Now compare Dr. Bogan's opinion to Plaintiffs Contentions, which state in relevant part, that
"the claimed pharmaceutical composition, when administered as instructed by Defendants'
labeling will, in at least some patients, have a reduced food effect as measured by Cmax compared
to an equal dose of immediate release liquid solution ofNaGHB." (Walsh Deel., Ex. A at 612).
While not terribly explanative, what Plaintiff's Contention effectively translates to is this:
Xywav® exhibits the claimed food effect, and, as a result,
Defendants' product will have -educed food effect. (See ECF No. 245 at 15-16).
Further, Plaintiffs Contentions are suppo1ted by two sets of documents: the package inserts that
accompany Defendants' products, and clinical study reports for two studies that Plaintiff carried
out during the development of Xywav®. 7 (See ECF No. 245 at 3). According to Plaintiff, these
two sets of documents referenced in their Infringement Contentions show that
ould exhibit the reduced food effect and support the theory in Dr. Bogan's
Report. (Id. at 10).
The question is whether the theory in Dr. Bogan's Report is present in Plaintiff's
Infringement Contentions. The Court concludes that it is, and that there is no new theory of
infringement in Dr. Bogan's Report. Specifically, Plaintiffs Infringement Contentions identify
the Xywav® salt ratio; identify the package inserts that Plaintiff intends to rely on to show that
Defendants' nd reference the clinical data (in the form
of the study reports) that Plaintiff intends to rely on to show that
�ould exhibit the claimed reduced food effect. (See Walsh Deel., Ex. A at 612). This is in
7 "JPIL0040913-1454" is a clinical study report for a study designated "13-010." (See Declaration of Nicholas A.
LoCastro, Esq. ("LoCastro Deel."), Ex. A; ECF No. 245-1)). "JPIL0066557-7116" is a clinical study report for a
study designated "JZP258-10 J ." (See Locastro Deel., Ex. B) (at times, the "study reports").
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substance the same as what appears in Dr. Bogan's Report in the disputed paragraphs.
Nevertheless, Defendants contend Dr. Bogan's Report has a new theory of infringement
because the Report relies on several things not specifically referenced in Plaintiffs Infringement
Contentions, primarily: (I) data from the '373 patent, including reference to "Formulation 0";
(2) deposition testimony from an inventor of the '373 patent, Dr. Clark Allphin, elicited near the
close of fact discovery; and (3) reference to "Mixture H" from the '922 patent and the '922
patent itself. (See ECF No. 243 at 3-5). Plaintiff counters that such information is either
explanatory, permissible expansion of a disclosed theory, or was otherwise referenced or
disclosed in materials that were cited in its Infringement Contentions. (ECF No. 245 at 6-9).
This Court finds that Plaintiff has the better end of this argument.
First, as Plaintiff notes, Plaintiff is not required to prove infringement or provide
commentary or analysis in its contentions, nor is Plaintiff limited to only using evidence in its
expert repo1ts that was originally in its Infringement Contentions. See, e.g., Curia, 2025 WL
1627251, at * 11 ("Plaintiff need not disclose specific evidence to prove its infringement case in
preliminary infringement contentions."). Thus, the Court is not troubled by Dr. Bogan's reliance
on Dr. Allphin's deposition testimony in general. Defendants do not cite authority suggesting
that an expert cannot rely on deposition testimony in rendering his or her opinion, and the
relevant authority suggests otherwise. See, e.g., Sol IP, 2020 WL 10045985, at *2. Furthermore,
as Plaintiff notes, a contrary rule could require amendment of contentions after fact discovery in
every case, a result not contemplated by the Local Patent Rules. Finally, Defendants have not
shown that Dr. Allphin's testimony is being used to alter Plaintiffs theory of infringement.
Rather, as Plaintiff contends, it appears Dr. Allphin's testimony is merely being used to support a
previously disclosed theory.
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Second, Plaintiff explains that the data in Tables 4 and 7 in the '373 patent and
Formulation 0, on which Dr. Bogan relied, is the same data as contained in the clinical studies
cited in Plaintiffs infringement contentions-i.e., Study 13-010 and Study JZP258-101. (See
ECF No. 245 at 4-6). Moreover, as Plaintiff points out, Defendants already took discovery that
touched upon issues in the disputed paragraphs in the Bogan Report when they deposed Dr.
Cuiping Chen, co-inventor of the '373 patent. Specifically, Dr. Chen testified regarding, among
other things, the data and studies referenced in the disputed paragraphs, including Tables 4 and 7
of the '373 patent, as well as conclusions one could draw from the data. (See Locastro Deel., 16
& Ex. E at 70:15-71:6, 75:12-76:5, 76:15-77:9). At bottom, Dr. Bogan is using the same data
disclosed in Plaintiffs Contentions but from a different source, i.e., the '373 patent, as opposed
to the clinical studies themselves. The use of the same data from a separate source for the same
purpose does not turn a previously disclosed theory of infringement into a new one.
Third, as it relates to the '922 patent and Fonnulation H, again, the Bogan Report may be
fairly read to simply repeat Dr. Allphin's deposition testimony regarding Mixture Hand the fact
that Plaintiffs position is that "Mixture H, formulation 0, andXywav® are all the same." (ECF
No. 245 at 7) (emphasis added). Defendants appear to have been aware of Plaintiffs position,
having acknowledged, albeit at other times, that the Patent Examiner had "noted out that
'Composition H' disclosed in the '922 patent 'has the same ratios of salts as instant Formulation
0."' (ECF No. 245 at 7 (citing and quoting ECF No. 241-1, Ex. 8, Appendix 43 at 7-8 (Teva's
Invalidity Contentions))). That puts Dr. Bogan's reference to Fonnulation Hand the '922 patent
within the scope of permissible complimentary proof and does not reflect a new opinion. See Sol
IP, 2020 WL 10045985, at *2.
For all the above reasons, the Court finds that the disputed paragraphs in Dr. Bogan's
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Report do not present a new "ten-step infringement theory" for the "reduced food effect
limitation" in Claim 1 of the '373 patent that was absent from Plaintiffs Infringement
Contentions. Having found that the Bogan Report does not contain a newly disclosed theory,
and thus, there is no basis to strike the disputed paragraphs, this Court need not determine the
proper legal standard for exclusion. See Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2; Finjan, Inc., 2015
WL 3640694, at *2 ("The dispositive inquiry in a motion to strike is thus whether the allegedly
undisclosed 'theory' is in fact a new theory.").
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion to strike, (ECF No. 242), is
DENIED. An appropriate order will be entered.
SO ORDERED.
s/Jessica S. Allen
Hon. Jessica S. Allen
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: January 15, 2026
cc: Hon. Stanley R. Chesler, U.S.D.J.
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