ROE et al v. PENNS GROVE-CARNEY'S POINT REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT et al

1:24-cv-10827Njd10 févr. 2026

Texte intégral

[ECF No. 49]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
SARA ROE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PENNS GROVE-CARNEY’S POINT
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 24-10827 (CPO/EAP)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel,
ECF No. 49, filed by pro se Defendant Jackie Doe. 	No opposition has been filed. 	The Court
exercises its discretion to decide Defendant Jackie Doe’s Motion without oral argument. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 78; L. Civ. R. 78.1. 	For the following reasons, Defendant Jackie Doe’s Motion is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2024, Plaintiffs Sara Roe and Roland Roe, individually and on behalf of
their minor children C.R., M.R., G.R., and A.R., initiated this action. 	ECF No. 1 (Compl.) 	On
February 6, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, naming as defendants Penns
Grove-Carney’s Point Regional School District, Penns Grove-Carney’s Point Board of Education,
Zenaida Cobian, Abner Mendoza, Anwar Golden, Jason Brice, Eva DiMauro, Allison Venello,
Danielle Barbato, Lisa Niezgoda, Edward Doe, Liam Doe, and Jackie Doe.1 ECF No. 65 (Am.
Compl.). Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges, in part, that Defendants Liam Doe and Edward
1 	The Amended Complaint also names additional fictitious parties, including John Does 1-
10, who are the unidentified parents or guardians of Edward Doe.
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Doe lured minor Plaintiff Christine Roe into an empty high school classroom and forced her to
perform oral sex while they recorded the event. 	Id. ¶¶ 45-48. 	The video was then disseminated
over the internet. Id. ¶ 49. The Amended Complaint asserts, among other things, that Jackie Doe,
who is Liam Doe’s mother, paid for and arranged for the equipment used to record the event, and
that Jackie Doe owed a duty to supervise her son. Id. ¶¶ 53, 106.
Plaintiffs further allege that students in school began to harass all members of the Roe
family, leading to anxiety, stress, embarrassment, and humiliation. Id. ¶¶ 50, 58, 60-61. The Roes
sought assistance from school staff, but these Defendants allegedly failed to take action to protect
the family, which worsened the situation. Id. ¶ 62. In addition, according to Plaintiffs, Edward and
Liam Doe continued to harass the Roe family through social media, physical abuse, and verbal
harassment. Id. ¶ 66. The School District allegedly refused to provide the children with
accommodations, while retaliating against Michael Roe by subjecting him to unwarranted
discipline. Id. ¶¶ 71-73. Plaintiffs claim that all of this conduct “led to severe emotional distress”
of Plaintiffs, which required counseling. Id. ¶ 74.
On October 30, 2025, Defendant Jackie Doe, who is currently proceeding pro se in this
matter, moved for the appointment of pro bono counsel, see ECF No. 49 (“Def. Doe’s Mot.”). In
connection with that Motion, Ms. Doe also applied for in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a), as a precondition to the appointment of counsel, ECF No. 50. The Court issued a Report
and Recommendation on December 5, 2025, recommending that Ms. Doe be granted in forma
pauperis status. 	ECF No. 60. 	On January 5, 2026, the District Judge adopted that Report and
Recommendation, ECF No. 63, rendering Ms. Doe’s pro bono counsel motion ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
Indigent civil litigants possess neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to appointed
counsel. See Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, Congress has
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granted district courts statutory authority to “request” appointed counsel for indigent civil litigants.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (providing that “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any
person unable to afford counsel”). 	The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
interpreted § 1915 as affording district courts “broad discretion” to determine whether appointment
of counsel in a civil case would be appropriate. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993).
The decision to appoint counsel may be made at any point in the litigation and may be raised by a
district court sua sponte. Id. at 156.
In Tabron, the Third Circuit developed a list of criteria to aid the district courts in weighing
the appointment of counsel for indigent civil litigants. Id. at 155-58. As a threshold matter, a district
court must assess whether the claimant’s case has some arguable merit in fact and law. Tabron, 6
F.3d at 155; see also Parham, 126 F.3d at 457. If a claimant overcomes this threshold hurdle, the
district court should consider a number of additional factors in assessing a claimant's request for
counsel, including: (1) the party’s ability to present his or her own case; (2) the difficulty of the
particular legal issues; (3) the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability
of the party to pursue investigation; (4) the party’s capacity to retain counsel on his or her own
behalf; (5) the extent to which a case is likely to turn on credibility determinations, and; (6) whether
the case will require testimony from expert witnesses. 	Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57. 	“[T]his list of
factors is not exhaustive, but instead should serve as a guidepost for the district courts.” Parham,
126 F.3d at 458 (citing Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155). In addition, the Third Circuit cautioned that “courts
should exercise care in appointing counsel because volunteer lawyer time is a precious commodity
and should not be wasted on frivolous cases.” 	Id. (citing Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157); see also
Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002) (same).
Here, without engaging in an extensive analysis of the Amended Complaint’s substantive
merit or Ms. Doe’s Answer to the original Complaint, the Court will assume—solely for the purpose
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of this Motion—that Ms. Doe has satisfied her threshold burden of presenting a defense with some
merit in fact and law. Plaintiff brings various causes of action against Ms. Doe in connection with
her and her son’s role in the events giving rise to this suit. See generally Compl. In her Answer to
the original Complaint, Ms. Doe denies all allegations of wrongdoing against her and her son and
asserts that at the time of the incident, she was at work and entrusted the care of her child to the
school’s supervision. ECF No. 40 (Def. Jackie Doe’s Answer). Taken as true, Ms. Doe’s Answer
could potentially provide a complete defense to the claims against her. Accordingly, the Court turns
to the question of whether appointment of counsel is warranted under the Tabron factors.
The first Tabron factor requires an evaluation of whether the litigant is capable of presenting
his or her own case. Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 501. This factor will weigh against the appointment
of counsel where the litigant is capable of pursuing his or her own action. See Gordon v. Gonzalez,
232 F. App’x 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2007). This capability should be measured through an analysis of
the litigant’s literacy, education, ability to understand English, prior work experience, and prior
litigation experience. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156. This factor constitutes “[p]erhaps the most significant
of Tabron’s post-threshold factors.” Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 501.
A review of the record indicates that Ms. Doe is a single mother with no legal experience.
Def. Doe’s Mot. at 3. More importantly, as the Court has observed during status conferences, Ms.
Doe speaks primarily Spanish, with limited comprehension of the English language. 	Ms. Doe’s
inability to comprehend and express herself in English suggests that she will be significantly
hampered in her ability to pursue her defense. 	Thus, this factor weighs in favor of appointing
counsel. See Hernandez v. Montoya, No. 16-4592, 2018 WL 4676042, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2018)
(noting that the plaintiff’s assertion that he does not speak English weighs in favor of appointment
of counsel) (citing Valdez v. Flax, No. 17-3848, 2018 WL 276906, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2018); Perez
v. Hauck, No. 07-5685, 2008 WL 797054, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2008)).
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The second factor concerns the complexity of the legal issues presented in the case. Courts
should lean toward appointment of counsel when the legal issues are complex. Tabron, 6 F.3d at
156 (“[W]here the law is not clear, it will often best serve the ends of justice to have both sides of a
difficult legal issue presented by those trained in legal analysis.” (quotation omitted)). 	Here, the
claims against Ms. Doe and her son involve a cause of action under the Violence Against Women
Act Reauthorization Act (“VAWA”) of 2022, 15 U.S.C. § 6851, Am. Compl. at Count Two; a claim
for sexual abuse/battery, id. at Count Three; a claim of extreme and outrageous harassment and
conduct, id. at Count Four; a claim that Defendants School District, Board of Education, and the
School District employees owed a duty to protect students, knew or should have known of the risk
that Edward Doe and/or Liam Doe would sexually abuse Plaintiff C.R. if left unsupervised, failed
to take reasonable or minimal steps to prevent that abuse, acted with gross negligence or willful
disregard for student safety, and failed to implement or follow policies designed to prevent such
harm, id. at Count Five; and a claim that Ms. Doe, as Liam Doe’s parent, and Edward Doe’s parent(s)
failed to supervise their children and provided them with equipment to create child pornography, id.
at Count Six. “There is scarce caselaw interpreting the recently enacted VAWA provision at issue,
15 U.S.C. § 6851. 	Analyzing a new statute will require determining congressional intent, which
primarily entails interpreting a statute’s plain language but also, potentially, the statute’s purpose
and legislative history.” Tille v. Kaplan, No. 25-14903, 2025 WL 2779183, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 30,
2025) (citing Nichols v. Knight, No. 22-5808, 2023 WL 8751265, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2023)).
“Navigating a new statute can be challenging even for an experienced lawyer, let alone a self-
represented litigant.” 	Id. 	Given the novel issues of law present, the Court finds that the second
Tabron factor weighs in favor of the appointment of counsel.
The third factor focuses on the degree and/or difficulty of any expected factual investigation
the case may require, and the ability of the movant to conduct such an investigation. Tabron, 6 F.3d
at 156. 	Claims that are likely to “require extensive discovery and compliance with complex
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discovery rules” may warrant the appointment of counsel. 	Id. 	Here, given the multitude of
Defendants involved, together with the sensitive allegations lodged by Plaintiffs, the Court
anticipates that this case will involve fairly onerous factual discovery. As such, the third Tabron
factor weighs in favor of the appointment of counsel.
The fourth factor focuses on the likelihood that a case will turn on credibility determinations.
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156. Because most cases turn on credibility determinations, this factor will only
weigh in favor of the appointment of counsel where the trial is expected to be “solely a swearing
contest.” 	Parham, 126 F.3d at 460. 	Thus, in considering this factor, a court must evaluate the
degree to which “witness credibility is a key issue.” Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156 (citation omitted). Here,
this case has significant potential to turn on credibility determinations, particularly pitting Ms. Doe’s
son’s version of the relevant events against that of Plaintiff Christine Roe. 	Indeed, Ms. Doe’s
Answer expressly “den[ies] all allegations of negligence or wrongdoing” against her and her son.
Jackie Doe Answer ¶ 2. 	The Court finds that the fourth Tabron factor weighs in favor of
appointment of counsel.
The fifth factor considers the extent to which expert testimony may be required. Tabron, 6
F.3d at 156. Where a case will likely require such testimony, the appointment of counsel may be
warranted. Id. 	In particular, where claims of mental and emotional distress are involved, a plaintiff
“may potentially rely on expert testimony to demonstrate damages.” Bellazzin v. L’Oreal USA, No.
24-6278, 2024 WL 3409446, at *3 (D.N.J. July 14, 2024); see also Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 498
(holding that “expert testimony is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be
apparent to a layperson.” (quotation omitted)).
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged emotional distress and post-traumatic stress disorder resulting
from the events at issue. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 39, 47, 49-50, 55, 63. Additionally, during status
conferences, Plaintiffs’ counsel has expressed the potential to rely on experts, which in turn would
require Ms. Doe to obtain rebuttal expert testimony. Because the precise role of experts remains
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unknown at this juncture, the Court finds that the fifth Tabron factor weighs only slightly in favor
of the appointment of counsel.
The final Tabron factor considers whether the litigant is financially capable of retaining his
or her own counsel. Parham, 126 F.3d at 461. Ms. Doe alleges that although she recently started
working, she is a single mother with two sons—aged seventeen and twelve—for whom she is
financially responsible, and that most of her income is used to pay for her home mortgage, car loan,
and basic living expenses. Def. Doe’s Mot. at 3; ECF No. 60 (R&R) at 3. Ms. Doe also receives
SNAP benefits. Id. This Court has already granted Ms. Doe in forma pauperis status, noting that
even the combination of her income and SNAP benefits results in her operating in the negative.
ECF No. 60 (R&R) at 2-3; ECF No. 63 (Order Approving R&R). Given these circumstances, and
Ms. Doe’s obvious inability to pay for a private attorney, the last Tabron factor favors appointment
of counsel.
CONCLUSION
Because five of the six Tabron factors weigh heavily in favor of pro bono counsel and one
of the six leans slightly in favor, the Court finds that Ms. Doe has sufficiently established a need for
the appointment of counsel. 	Given the complexity of this case, together with Ms. Doe’s lack of
English proficiency and financial inability to secure counsel, the overall progress of this case will
benefit from the appearance of trained legal counsel on Ms. Doe’s behalf. Accordingly, for all the
foregoing reasons,
IT IS this 10th day of February 2026,
ORDERED that Defendant Jackie Doe’s Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel, ECF No.
49, is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall select an attorney for appointment from the
Civil Pro Bono Panel, in accordance with procedures set forth in Appendix H, Local Rules for the
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United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. However, while the Court has granted
Ms. Doe’s Motion and is directing that an attorney be selected, the Court cautions Ms. Doe that
there is no guarantee that an attorney will be willing to accept Ms. Doe’s case; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office shall forward a copy of this Order to Defendant Jackie
Doe’s address via regular mail and shall enter a notation on the docket indicating the date upon
which this Order was mailed.
s/Elizabeth A. Pascal
ELIZABETH A. PASCAL
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Hon. Christine P. O’Hearn, U.S.D.J.
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