1:24-cv-07250•BOLOTINA et al v. CHERRY HILL PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION et al
BOLOTINA et al v. CHERRY HILL PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION et al
1:24-cv-07250Njd9 janv. 2026
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[ECE No, 35]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
INNA BOLOTINA et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil No. 24-7250 (KM W/SAK)
CHERRY HILL PUBLIC SCHOOLS
BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants’ compliance
with the parties’ settlement agreement and for attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this motion
[ECF No, 35]. The Court considered Plaintiffs’ Motion and supporting documents [ECF Nos. 35,
36, 37], Defendants’ Opposition [ECF No. 39], and Plaintiffs’ Reply [ECF No. 40]. For the
reasons to be discussed, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs’ motion be DENIED. This
Report and Recommendation is issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 636(b)(1).. The Court makes the
following findings in support of this Recommendation.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this action against Cherry Hill Public Schools Board of Education, Cherry
Hill High School East, Dr. Kwame Morton, Dr. Dennis Perry, and Aaron Edwards (“Defendants”),
alleging violations of then-minor L.B.’s rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.
See Compl. [ECF No. 1].
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
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On March 17, 2025, April 21, 2025, and May 5, 2025, the parties apprised the Court of
ongoing negotiations culminating in a settlement agreement. [ECF Nos. 31, 32, 33]. All parties
signed this agreement on May 21, 2025. See Defs.’ Opp. at 2 [ECF No. 39]. On June 16, 2025,
Plaintiffs filed the present motion to compel Defendants’ compHance with the settlement
agreement. Pls.’ Mot. [ECF No. 35].
The core of the parties’ dispute is whether Defendants complied with paragraph five of the
settlement agreement. See Ex. A {5 [ECF No. 36-1]. This paragraph requires that during the 2025
Holocaust Remembrance Day commemoration, Defendants “include a statement issued by the
District (also posted on its website), which includes the following: ....” Ex. A 5 [ECF No. 36-
1] (proceeding to list the required elements of the agreed-upon statement), The parties do not
dispute that the contents of the statement issued by Defendants comply with the settlement
agreement. See id. JJ 5(a)-S(c). The dispute instead revolves around whether Defendants both
“issue[d]” and “also posted” a statement. See generally Pls.’ Br. [ECF No. 37]. The settlement
agreement goes to great lengths to describe the precise details of the statement’s contents but does
not provide additional context as to how Defendants are to “issue” the statement, See id, J 5.
Plaintiffs purport that Defendants did not “issue” the statement because the Cherry Hill
Public Schools Board of Education (“the Board”) only posted the statement on the Board’s
website. Schreiber Decl. § 10 [ECF No. 36]. Plaintiffs suggest that to “issue” a statement and
“also post” on the website is to disseminate the statement through two distinct methods: one, by
posting on the website, and another, by any additional public-facing means of Defendants’
choosing. See Schreiber Decl. ff] 10-12 [ECF No. 36] (pointing out that Defendants have not
emailed the statement, included the statement in a press release, or placed an advertisement
including the statement in a local paper), see also Pls.’ Br. at 4d—-6 [ECB No. 37] (asserting that the
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settlement agreement does not require the Board to “issue” the statement specifically by email,
and that Defendants may issue the statement by sending a letter to the community, issuing a press
release, or placing an advertisement in the local paper). Plaintiffs argue that the “plain and
unambiguous language of the Settlement” support their understanding that twe methods of
a7 Ge
dissemination are required because the parties included the additional term “also,” “making clear
that posting the statement on [the Board’s] website alone was not sufficient.” Pls.’ Br, at 8 [ECF
No, 37]. To interpret the term “also” as not requiring a second public-facing method of
disseminating the statement, argue Plaintiffs, ignores this term and otherwise renders it
meaningless. /d.; see also Pls,’ Rep. Br. at 3 [ECF No. 40] (“The parties would not have included
in the settlement agreement the Defendants’ obligation to ‘issue’ the statement and ‘also post’ the
statement on the district's website if simply posting would be enough.”).
Defendants counter that the Board fully complied with paragraph five of the settlement
agreement by publicly posting a statement generated by the Board on its website. Defs.’ Opp, at 7
LECF No. 39]. Defendants assert that the Board “complied with the settlement agreement when it
generated, ie., ‘issued,’ a specific, agreed-upon statement as required by the terms of the
agreement, and made it accessible to the District’s local community — and the world — when it
publicly posted a copy of the statement on the Board’s website.” Id. (emphasis added). According
to Defendants, Plaintiffs are attempting to look beyond the plain-meaning of the terms of the
settlement agreement by imputing additional import to the words “issue” and “also post[].” In so
doing, Defendants construe Plaintiffs’ motion as an attempt to rewrite the settlement post hoc to
grant Plaintiffs better terms than those agreed to by the parties. /d. at 8.
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Il. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court maintains jurisdiction to hear this dispute. There has been
no dismissal order in this case. See Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Off. of Child. & Youth, 752 F.3d 316, 322
(3d Cir. 2014) (holding that, when a suit has not been dismissed, ongoing matters remain for the
district court to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement agreements
between parties); see also Ricker vy, Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., No. 21-467, 2025 WL 823250,
at *2 nl (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2025) (summarizing Third Circuit law and noting that, once a
dismissal order has been filed, a court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction to hear disputes
arising from the enforcement of the parties’ settlement agreement), Thus, the Court may proceed
in addressing Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
In federal court, the construction and enforcement of a settlement agreement—a type of
contract—are governed by state law. Jacob’s Limousine Transp., Inc. v. City of Newark, 688 F,
App’x 150, 151 Gd Cir. 2017). Under New Jersey law, a court must “interpret the parties’ contract
according to its plain language” while construing the contract “as a whole in a fair and common
sense manner.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 255 Gd Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted), When such plain language is clear, unambiguous, and without room for
interpretation, a court will enforce its terms as written. Karl’s Sales and Sery., Inc. v. Giinbel Bros.,
Inc., 249 NJ, Super, 487, 96-97 (App. Div. 1991). A court “must also endeavor to avoid ignoring
certain words or reading the contract in such a way as to make any words ‘meaningless.’” Travelers
Indem, Co., 594 F.3d at 255 (citing Cumberland Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co.,
358 N.J. Super, 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003)). While a court must endeavor to avoid ignoring words,
a court must also “not re-write a contract or grant a better deal than that for which the parties
expressly bargained.” Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 436 N.J.. Super. 594, 602 (App. Div. 2014),
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rev'd on other grounds, 225 N.J. 469 (2016); see also Grow Co, v. Chokshi, 403 N.J. Super. 443,
464 (App. Div. 2008) (reflecting the policy and general contract principles applicabie to
ascertaining the meaning of settlement agreements, noting that courts “do not rewrite contracts in
order to provide a better bargain than contained in [the parties’ ] writing”).
Here, the parties do not dispute that the settlement agreement at issue is binding, See Pls,’
Br. at 2-4 [ECF No, 37] (summarizing the circumstances of the executed written settlement
agreement); see also Defs.’ Opp. at 2 [ECF No. 39] (same). At issue is the settlement term
requiring Defendants to “include a statement isswed by the District (also posted on its website) . .
..” Ex. AG 5 [ECF No. 36-1] (emphasis added). Precisely, the parties dispute the scope of the
actions required by Defendants to comply with this term. The Court finds that the term of the
settlement does not clearly and unambiguously indicate in plain language that Defendants must
disseminate the statement using two distinct methods. See Karl’s Sales and Serv., 249 N.J. Super,
at 96-97.
Examining the settlement agreement as a whole, the Court finds that Defendants’ actions
pursuant to the settlement agreement reflect a fair, common sense understanding of the term
“issue” under the term’s plain meaning. The Cambridge English Dictionary defines “issue (verb)”
as “to produce or provide something official.” Issue, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/issue (last visited January 9, 2026).
Applying this definition, the Board produced a public-facing statement and came to a collective
agreement on the draft statement. In other words, the Board “issued” the statement, The Board
also published the agreement on the Board’s website in an area accessible to the entire online
community. In other words, the Board “also posted” the statement on its website. It is undisputed
that the contents of the statement comply with the recommendations of paragraph five of the
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settlement agreement. The Court finds that these actions are not inconsistent with a fair reading
of the settlement agreement and that Defendants have not failed to comply with the terms of the
agreement.
“Courts do not ordinarily grant attorneys’ fees unless specifically authorized by statute or
party agreement, or where there is bad faith,” United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Marago, No, 22-1913,
2024 WL 6078930, at *2 (D.N.J. May 13, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-
1913, 2025 WL 3173858 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2025). Some courts have concluded that a party’s
failure to abide by the terms of a settlement agreement constitutes bad faith. Jd. (citing In re Elonex
Phase Il Power Mgmt. Litig., No. 01-082, 2003 WL 21460391, at *3 (D. Del. June 23, 2003)).
The Court notes that the instant settlement agreement does not appear to contemplate a fee shifting
alrangement in the event either side moves to enforce the agreement. See generally Ex. A [ECF
No. 36-1]; see, e.g., Sfx Installation, Inc. v. Pimentel, No, 21-11326, 2023 WL 4995395, at *2
(D.NJ. May 16, 2023), Further, in light of the Court’s finding that Defendants have not violated
the settlement agreement, the Court does not find that Defendants acted in “bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” V. Patel & Sons, Inc. v. Shree Shiv Shakti Food, Ine., No. 6-
1978, 2007 WL 913880, at *2 (D.NJ. Mar. 22, 2007) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc,, 501
U.S, 32, 45-46 (1991)). Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and
costs associated with Plaintiffs’ present motion.
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Tl, CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, it is this 9th day of January, 2026 respectfully
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants’ compliance with the settlement
agreement be DENIED. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 72 and L. Civ. R. 72,1(c)}(2), the parties shall
have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order in which to file any objections with the Court;
and it further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate the pending motion to compel and
activate this Report and Recommendation for the District Court’s review.
s/ Sharon A. King
SHARON A, KING
United States Magistrate Judge
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