1:23-cv-13436•REYNARD v. ADVANTAGE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
MARGARET REYNARD, HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 23-13436 (KMW-EAP)
Vv.
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ADVANTAGE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH }
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SERVICES,
OPINION
Defendant.
Joshua S. Boyette, Esq. Christopher Michael Curci, Esq.
Swartz Swidler LLC Ross G. Currie, Esq.
9 Tanner St., Suite 101 Ward Law, LLC
Haddonfield, NJ 08033 1617 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 500
Counsel for Plaintiff Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Defendant
WILLIAMS, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendant Advantage Behavioral Health
Services’ (“Defendant”) Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Action (Dkt. No.
5); Plaintiff Margaret Reynard’s (“Plaintiff”) Opposition thereto and Cross-Motion for Leave to
Amend the Complaint (Dkt. Nos. 8, 9); and Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. No. 13). The Court, having
considered the parties’ submissions without oral argument pursuant to L.Civ.R. 78.1(b), DENTES
Defendant’s Motion to Compel and DENIES Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Leave to Amend.
I. BACKGROUND!
This matter arises out of an employment dispute wherein Plaintiff alleges Defendant
unlawfully terminated her employment due to Plaintiff's age and/or in retaliation for her
' For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true and draws all
inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir.
2008).
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
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complaints of age discrimination and guid pro quo sexual harassment. Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that she began her employment with Defendant as a Billing Specialist in or around March
2021. (Compl., § 11, Dkt. No. 1.) Approximately one year into her employment, Plaintiff
complained of age discrimination and third-party quid pro quo sexual harassment, i.e., sexual
favoritism. Ud., J 24.) Defendant terminated Plaintiff about two weeks later. (U/d., J 34.) On or
around December 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge alleging sex and age discrimination and
discriminatory retaliation. (EEOC Charge, Dkt. No. 8-4.)?
On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging Defendant improperly
discriminated against her on the basis of her age and in retaliation for her complaints of age
discrimination and quid pro quo sexual harassment. In her Complaint, Plaintiff brings five causes
of action: 1) age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; 2) retaliation in violation of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et
seq.; 3) age discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (““NJLAD”),
N.J.S.A. §§ 10:5-1., et seq.; 4) retaliation in violation of the NJLAD; 5) gender discrimination in
violation of the NJLAD. (Compl., {J 41-74.)
On or around October 25, 2023, Defendant demanded arbitration, providing Plaintiff with
a copy of an arbitration agreement that Defendant contended applied to this matter. (Dkt. No. 5-
5.) Thereafter, Defendant filed its motion to compel arbitration and dismiss or stay the action. (Dkt.
No. 5.) Defendant asserts that arbitration is appropriate because, inter alia, Plaintiff executed a
valid, enforceable arbitration agreement, which covers the claims asserted in Plaintiffs Complaint
? Notably, “the ADEA does not require that the EEOC issue a right-to-sue letter before a suit is filed in federal court.
Lavelle v. PSE&G Gas & Elec., No. 22-5735, 2023 WL 4947371, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2023). However, “[iJn the
event that the EEOC [does] issue[ ] a right-to-sue letter, an ADEA claimant must file [his] federal suit within ninety
days after receipt of the letter.’ Covington v. URS Corp., No. 11-04516, 2013 WL 2181282, at *2 (D.N.J. May 20,
2013) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)). Here, Plaintiffs Complaint does not indicate the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter.
2
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and proposed Amended Complaint (“PAC,” Dkt. No. 8-2). (See Def.’s MTD Br. at 7.) Defendant
attached to its motion a copy of the purported arbitration agreement, along with a receipt containing
Plaintiff's electronic signature “acknowledg[ing] receipt of the Arbitration Agreement found
below.” (Dkt. No. 5-4 at 5.) The agreement, in turn, states that “[b]oth parties acknowledge that
they . . . understand and agree that by signing this Agreement, both parties knowingly and
voluntarily waive their right to trial by court or jury for Covered Disputes as defined above.” (Id.
at 4 (emphasis added).) Notably, the signature lines beneath that clause are not signed by either
Party. Id.)
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that the arbitration agreement is invalid because Plaintiff
did not sign it, there was no meeting of the minds regarding its terms, and Plaintiff did not
knowingly waive her right to seek relief in court. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 12-16.) In support of her
opposition, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit stating that she received a packed of information from
Defendant when she commenced her employment but does not recall seeing or reviewing an
arbitration agreement as part of that packet. (Affidavit of Margaret Reynard (“Reynard Aff.’”),
qf 1-2, Dkt. No. 8-5.) Plaintiff attests that she did not intend to enter into an arbitration agreement
with Defendant and did not know that by beginning employment with Defendant she waived her
right to litigate any employment disputes before a jury. (/d. at J 4.) Plaintiff also states that she
would not have signed an agreement limiting her ability to recover attorneys’ fees for employment-
based civil rights claims because it would limit her ability to afford counsel. Ud. at ¥ 5.) According
to Plaintiff, at no point during her employment or prior to October 25, 2022, did Defendant inform
her that it believed she was party to an arbitration agreement. (Id. at J 6.)
With her opposition, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for leave to amend her Complaint to add
allegations concerning quid pro quo sexual harassment and favoritism pursuant to NJLAD. (Dkt.
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No. 8.) Plaintiff alleges that even if the arbitration agreement were valid and covered all the claims
in her original Complaint, it would not cover her claims of unlawful sexual favoritism alleged in
her PAC. (PI.’s Opp. Br. at 1, 6-8.) In its reply, Defendant argues that granting leave to amend
would be futile because all of Plaintiffs claims in her PAC would nonetheless be subject to the
arbitration agreement or dismissal for failure to state a claim. (Def.’s Reply Br. at 1-3.)
Il. LEGAL STANDARD?
a. Motion to Compel
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) reflects the strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration and “places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.” Bacon v.
Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 959 F.3d 590, 599 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). Pursuant to the FAA, courts “compel arbitration of claims
covered by a written, enforceable arbitration agreement.” Jd. (citing FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4). Yet
. despite the strong presumption of arbitrability, “[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of contract” and is
thus governed by state law. Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 441, 444 (3d Cir.
1999) (“If a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the courts have no authority to mandate that he do
so.”). Accordingly, when deciding whether to compel arbitration under the FAA, the Court must
determine “(1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties and, if so,
(2) whether the merits-based dispute in question falls within the scope of that valid agreement.”
Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In conducting this
inquiry, the Court applies state law principles of contract formation. Torres v. Rushmore Serv. Ctr.,
LLC, No. 18-9236, 2018 WL 5669175, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2018).
3 The Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
4
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The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that an arbitration agreement is enforceable when
its terms affirmatively state—or unambiguously convey to a consumer in a way that he or she
would understand—that there is a distinction between agreeing to resolve a dispute in arbitration
and in a judicial forum.” Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 315 (2014). The
Third Circuit has similarly held that “[b]efore a party to a lawsuit can be ordered to arbitrate . . .
there should be an express, unequivocal agreement to that effect.” Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey &
Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2009).
Under New Jersey law, “[a]n agreement to arbitrate, like any other contract, must be the
product of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law.” Levy v. AT&T
Servs., Inc., No. 21-11758, 2022 WL 844440, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2022) (quoting James v. Glob.
TelLink Corp., 852 F.3d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 2017)). “Therefore, ‘if parties agree on essential terms
and manifest an intention to be bound by those terms, they have created an enforceable contract.’”
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Compass Grp. USA, No. 14-02545, 2015 WL 1006389, at *3 (D.N.J.
Mar. 6, 2015)). “To manifest assent, ‘an offeree must provide unqualified acceptance, which can
be express or implied by conduct.’” Jd. (quoting Glob. TelLink Corp., 852 F.3d at 265).
More generally, to prove the existence of a valid contract under New Jersey law, a party
must show: 1) a “meeting of the minds”; 2) “offer and acceptance”; 3) consideration; and
4) certainty in the terms of the agreement. Big M. Inc. v. Dryden Advisory Group, No. 08-3567,
2009 WL 1905106, at *13 (D.N.J. June 30, 2009) (citing N.J. Jury Instr. Civ. 4.10 C); see also
Comprehensive Neurosurgical, P.C. v. Valley Hosp., 257 N.J. 33, 65 (2024) (noting that a contract
requires mutual assent and consideration, and that the parties agree on all essential terms).
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b. Motion for Leave to Amend
Whether to permit an amendment to a complaint is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a),
which provides that leave to amend should be readily granted where justice requires. “In the
absence of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, leave to amend
should be freely given.” In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 400
(3d Cir. 2007). “Leave to amend may be denied, however, if amendment would be futile.” Alvin
v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (Gd Cir. 2000). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint
would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.” Id.
WI. DISCUSSION
a. The EFAA Does Not Apply to Plaintiff’s Claims
The parties dispute whether the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-02 applies to Plaintiff's claims. The Court
finds it does not.
As declared by Congress, the ERAA amended the FAA to provide:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of
the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute
or sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or
in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute
arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid
or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal,
Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the
sexual harassment dispute.*
9 U.S.C. § 402(a).
“ Notably, if a lawsuit relates to a sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute, the EFAA renders unenforceable an
arbitration agreement “with respect to” that entire “case.” McDermott v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc., No. A-0921-24, 2025
WL 3730563, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 26, 2025) (citing Johnson v. Everyrealm, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 3d
535 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Thle] text [of 9 U.S.C. § 402(a)] is clear, unambiguous, and decisive as to the issue here. It
keys the scope of the invalidation of the arbitration clause to the entire ‘case’ relating to the sexual harassment
dispute.”’)).
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The EFAA defines “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to
constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(4).
The EFAA was enacted on March 3, 2022, and thus only applies to claims that accrued on or after
that date. See Pub. L. No. 117-90, § 3, 136 Stat. 26, 28 (2022); Johnson, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
To determine whether a plaintiff has “alleg[ed] conduct constituting a sexual harassment
dispute” pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 402(a), courts apply “the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard to
evaluate whether a plaintiff has sufficiently plead a claim under the law allegedly violated. Michael
v. Bravo Brio Restaurants LLC, No. 23-3691, 2024 WL 2923591, at *4 (D.N.J. June 10, 2024);
see Cornelius v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., 133 F.4th 240 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 193 (2025).
There are two recognized theories of sexual harassment under Title VII: “quid pro quo harassment”
and a “hostile work environment.”? Michael, 2024 WL 2923591, at *5 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB vy. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). “To establish a hostile work environment claim under
Title VI, a plaintiff must show: ‘(1) intentional discrimination because of their sex; (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the
plaintiff; [and] (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same
sex in that position.’” Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d
Cir. 2009) (quoting Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2001)). Similarly, to make
out a hostile work environment claim under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must prove “the complained-
of conduct (1) would not have occurred but for the employee’s [protected status]; and it was (2)
> The Third Circuit has not yet determined whether a hostile work environment claim can be made under the ADEA.
See, e.g., Howell v. Millersville Univ. of Pa., 749 F. App’x 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2018); Culler v. Sec’y of U.S. Veterans
Affs., 507 F. App’x 246, 249 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012). Even if such a claim existed, it is not clear that it would constitute a
“sexual harassment dispute” for purposes of 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). Thus, “[iJn analyzing the ADEA hostile work
environment claim, the Court pulls from the caselaw developed in the context of Title VII hostile work environment
claims. This is because “Title VII and the [ADEA] are comparable in many contexts,’ and the Third Circuit has relied
on cases from one statute when analyzing the other.” Adams v. City of Newark, 747 F. Supp. 3d 721, 732 (D.N.J.
2024) (quoting Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006)).
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severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable [person] believe that (4) the conditions of
employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive.” Adams v. City of
Newark, 747 F. Supp. 3d 721, 732 (D.N.J. 2024) (quoting Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419, 430
(2008)).
To prove a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment under NJLAD, “[q]uid pro quo sexual
harassment occurs when an employer attempts to make an employee’s submission to sexual
demands a condition of his or her employment” and “involves an implicit or explicit threat that if
the employee does not accede to the sexual demands, he or she will lose his or her job, receive
unfavorable performance reviews, be passed over for promotions, or suffer other adverse
employment consequences.” Logan v. Millstone Manor LLC, No. 20-14433, 2022 WL 1720172,
at *7 (D.N.J. May 27, 2022) (quoting Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 601 (1993)); see
also Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding to state a
claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment, a plaintiff must allege that “his or her response to
unwelcome advances was subsequently used as a basis for a decision about compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges or employment.”) (cleaned up).
Here, neither Plaintiff's Complaint nor PAC allege that Plaintiff was subject to any form
of discrimination because of her gender. (See generally Compl.; PAC.) With respect to NJLAD,
Plaintiff has not alleged that, but for her age or gender, Defendant would not have engaged in its
alleged favoritism toward other employees. See id.; see also Adams, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 732
(quoting Cutler, 196 N.J. at 430). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for sexual harassment
based on a hostile work environment. See Michael, 2024 WL 2923591, at *5. Nor does Plaintiff
allege that she received any sexual demands. See Farrell, 206 F.3d at 281-82. Rather, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant favored younger employees who were allegedly engaged in relations with
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other employees (which are not alleged to be unwelcome or non-consensual). (See Compl.; PAC.)
Plaintiff cites no authority suggesting that these allegations give rise to a cause of action for quid
pro quo sexual harassment under the ADEA, Title VI, or NJLAD.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the EFAA does not render the parties’ Arbitration
Agreement unenforceable because Plaintiff has not “alleg[ed] conduct constituting a sexual
harassment dispute” pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). Furthermore, the Court finds that leave to
amend Plaintiff's Complaint to add a claim for quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual
harassment would be futile. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Dkt. No. 8) is denied.
b. The Arbitration Agreement
The Third Circuit has established a two-tiered framework for assessing motions to compel
arbitration. Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 2013).
“Where the affirmative defense of arbitrability of claims is apparent on the face of the complaint
(or... documents relied upon in the complaint),” courts apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standard to decide a motion to compel arbitration. Jd. at 773-74 (cleaned up). However,
the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is inappropriate when the complaint does not contain the “requisite
clarity to establish on its face that the parties agreed to arbitrate, or the opposing party has come
forth with reliable evidence that is more than a naked assertion . . . that it did not intend to be bound
by the arbitration agreement, even though on the face of the pleadings it appears that it did.” Jd. at
774 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In that event, “a district court should employ the
standard used in resolving summary judgment motions pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.” Jd. at 771 (cleaned up).
Defendant contends, without elaboration, that “[c]ourts in the Third Circuit traditionally
treat a motion to compel arbitration as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim” pursuant to
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Def.’s Br. at 4, Dkt. No. 5-7.) Defendant does not analyze in its papers
whether the Rule 56 standard should apply. Plaintiff argues that the Rule 56 standard should apply
because Defendant’s purported arbitration agreement is extraneous to the Complaint. (Pl.’s Opp.
Br. at 20-21, Dkt. No. 8-1.) Thus, Plaintiff requests that the Court deny Defendant’s motion at the
pleading stage and permit limited discovery of the issue of arbitrability. (/d.)
Here, the Complaint does not reference, attach, or rely on the arbitration agreement that
Defendant cites. (See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Moreover, Plaintiff has submitted a sworn
affidavit stating she did not sign the arbitration agreement and did not intend to be bound by it.
(Reynard Aff., {{ 2-7.) Furthermore, Plaintiff's affidavit is corroborated by the agreement itself,
which is indeed unsigned. (See Dkt. No. 5-4.) Thus, Plaintiff has come forth with more than a
“naked assertion” that the agreement is unenforceable. See Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776. In such a
scenario, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is not “the proper vehicle through which to analyze the
validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement” because “the question of arbitrability
cannot be resolved without considering the employment contract, which is evidence extraneous to
the pleadings, and thus it would be inappropriate to apply the Rule 12(b)(6) in deciding this
motion.” See Lepore v. Selectquote Ins. Servs., Inc., No. 22-1753, 2022 WL 17093110, at *3
(D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-3390, 2023 WL 8469761 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2023).
As the Third Circuit has explained, a “motion to compel arbitration must be denied pending
further development of the factual record” in such scenarios. See id. The Court finds that here, as
in Guidotti, a “restricted inquiry into factual issues” will be necessary to properly evaluate whether
there was a meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate, and the non-movant “must be given
the opportunity to conduct limited discovery on the narrow issue concerning the validity” of the
arbitration agreement. Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 774; see also Torres, 2018 WL 5669175, at *2
10
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(denying motion to compel arbitration where the agreement, arbitration provision, and class action
waiver were not referenced in the complaint and raised for the first time in the defendant’s motion);
Sauberman v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., L.L.C., No. 17-756, 2017 WL 2312359, at *2 (D.N.J. May 26,
2017) (denying motion to compel arbitration without prejudice and ordering limited discovery
where the complaint did not establish on its face that the parties agreed to arbitrate).
Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion without prejudice and will order the
parties to conduct limited discovery on the issue of arbitrability. Following limited discovery,
Defendant may file a renewed motion to compel arbitration, which the Court will review under the
Rule 56 standard. See Lepore, 2022 WL 17093110, at *3.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Arbitration or Dismiss (Dkt.
No. 5) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Leave to Amend (Dkt. No. 8)
is DENIED. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: February a , 2026 4K
WN
KAREN M. WILLIAMS
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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