SCHNEIDER, FAMILY TRUST et al v. PNC BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

1:23-cv-03146Njd23 févr. 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HARRY & IRENE SCHNEIDER
DISTRIBUTION TRUST, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PNC BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.
Case No. 23–cv–03146–ESK–SAK
OPINION
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
Co-plaintiff and counsel Elias Schneider (Elias) filed this action seeking to
recoup years of payments made from the account of a Trust—for which he
serves as co-trustee—to his personal home equity line of credit. 	Elias conceded
that he authorized these payments, but—as trustee—had elected not to sue
himself. 	After being disqualified as counsel and twice warned that he faced
sanctions if he continued, Elias pressed on to summary judgment undeterred.
The bill has now come due. 	Because the Court has already determined that
defendant PNC Bank, N.A. is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs and the Court
finds that those fees and costs, as supported by PNC’s exhibits, are reasonable
as reduced, PNC’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs (ECF No. 107 (PNC
Mot.)) will be granted with minor adjustments.
I. 	FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Elias filed the instant action in New Jersey Superior Court – Middlesex
County in April 2023. 	As amended, Elias—a barred attorney—brought claims
on behalf of himself, his wife Cynthia M. Schneider (Cynthia), his brother David
S. Schneider (David), and two trusts referred to collectively as the Harry &
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Irene Schneider Distribution Trust. 	(ECF No. 8 (Third Am. Compl.).)1 	The
crux of plaintiffs’ claims was that PNC deducted from the Trust’s checking
account payments necessary to satisfy Elias and Cynthia’s home equity line of
credit. 	(Id. pp. 9, 10.) 	Elias and David are co-trustees of the Trust and David
is the beneficiary. 	(Id. pp. 8, 9.)
The actions relevant to the instant motion pick up on February 20, 2024.
Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Arpert (Ret.) disqualified Elias as counsel based
on “a clear and unmistakable ‘concurrent conflict of interest’” that existed by
virtue of the fact that Trust funds were used to pay Elias and Cynthia’s personal
obligations. 	(ECF No. 48 pp. 5, 6.) 	Further, because PNC maintained that
Elias 	expressly 	authorized 	the 	withdrawals, 	Elias 	would 	have 	been 	an
important witness at trial, according to Judge Arpert. 	(Id.) 	While Judge
Arpert provided plaintiffs 30 days to retain counsel (id. p. 6), Elias stated that
he would continue representing himself and Cynthia and did not believe that
an amended complaint would be necessary (ECF No. 50).
After this case was reassigned to me (ECF No. 51), I dismissed the Trust
because Elias had been disqualified and the Trust’s claims could not be pursued
pro se. 	(ECF No. 67). 	I further, consistent with the disqualification order,
terminated Elias’s appearance on behalf of David. 	(Id. p. 4.) 	In response to
Elias’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 69), I held a hearing on July 15,
2024 (ECF No. 88 (July 15, 2024 Hr’g Tr.)). 	During that hearing, I offered
Elias my perspective on the case and advised that I would consider sanctions if
PNC’s forthcoming motion for summary judgment was granted and I concluded
that Elias had no reasonable basis to assert his claims. 	(Id. pp. 19:4–21:23.) 	I
encouraged Elias to confer with PNC’s counsel or participate in mediation and
offered 	to 	postpone 	summary 	judgment 	motion 	practice 	in 	order 	to
1 The third amended complaint explains that the two trusts operate under the
Harry & Irene Schneider Distribution Trust name. 	(Third Am. Compl. p. 2.) 	The
Court adopts this convention and refers to the Trust as a single entity.
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accommodate 	such 	efforts. 	(Id. 	pp. 21:24–22:7.) 	The 	parties 	followed 	on
August 6, 2024 with a briefing schedule for summary judgment motion practice.
(ECF No. 78.)
I held a hearing on the parties’ summary judgment motions on September
16, 2024. 	(ECF No. 101.) 	During the hearing, I raised the issue of standing
with Elias and expressed my concern with his prosecution of the Trust’s claims
as co-trustee or otherwise in light of the clear conflict present. 	(Id. pp. 5:25–
8:16.) 	I indicated that I was prepared to rule on the motions but believed that
mediation would be helpful and encouraged Elias to listen to what the mediator
might say. 	(Id. pp. 12:5–16, 14:20–15:3.) 	I repeated that if I determined that
the case was frivolous and Elias was without standing, I would consider
sanctions. 	(Id. p. 12:9–12.) 	PNC wrote to the Court on January 10, 2025
stating that mediation was unsuccessful. 	(ECF No. 103.)2 	I reinstated the
parties’ motions for summary judgment. 	(ECF No. 104.)
I granted PNC’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied Elias’s
motion as moot in a May 28, 2025 opinion and order. 	(ECF No. 105 (May 28,
2025 Op.); ECF No. 106.) 	Consistent with my advisements, I concluded that
Elias could not prosecute claims as trustee due to his disqualification and that
he failed to establish Article III standing for his individual claim premised on
tarnished 	familial 	relationship. 	(May 	28, 	2025 	Op. 	pp. 10–15.) 3 	Of
importance here, I granted PNC’s request for attorney’s fees and costs on the
2 Elias represents that, following mediation, he offered to voluntarily dismiss this
case and reimburse PNC its costs. 	(ECF No. 110 (Elias Opp’n Br.) p. 23.) 	While an
offer to that general effect was erroneously filed on the docket (ECF No. 102), Elias
opted not to take definitive steps—such as, for instance, filing a notice of voluntary
dismissal for the Court’s consideration—in the four months between the unsuccessful
mediation and the Court’s summary judgment decision.
3 Separately, Cynthia’s per quod claim was dismissed as derivative of Elias’s
claims and David’s claims were dismissed for failure to prosecute. 	(May 28, 2025 Op.
pp. 15 n. 7, 15–19.)
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alternative 	basis 	of 	my 	inherent 	power 	to 	sanction. 	(Id. 	pp. 19–21.) 	I
concluded that Elias was, or should have been, aware of the inherent conflict of
his representation of the Trust from the outset and any doubt should have been
resolved upon Judge Arpert’s disqualification order. 	(Id. p. 20.) 	The interests
of justice therefore required imposition of sanctions in the form of PNC’s
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs from the date of the disqualification order
to the present. 	(Id. p. 21.)
The pending motion followed in which PNC seeks $54,950 in attorney’s
fees and $1,774.66 in costs. 	(PNC Mot.) 	Elias filed an opposition (Elias Opp’n
Br.) to which PNC replied (ECF No. 111 (PNC Reply Br.)).
II. 	STANDARD AND PARTY ARGUMENTS
A. 	Attorney’s Fees
Courts possess the inherent authority to impose sanctions on those who
abuse the judicial process. 	See Arneault v. O’Toole, 718 F. App’x 148, 153 (3d
Cir. 2017). 	This authority includes the assessment of attorney’s fees when a
party has been found to have acted in bad faith. 	Chang v. Able C&C Co. Ltd.,
778 F. Supp. 3d 654, 674 (D.N.J. 2025); see also In re Mondelli, 558 F. App’x
260, 264 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Because the Bankruptcy Court properly determined
that Mondelli acted in bad faith, it similarly acted within its discretion in
sanctioning him for the costs Silverman and the Chapter 13 Standing Trustee
have incurred in responding to this petition.”). 	Courts’ authority to sanction
is further untethered to any specific rule or statute. 	See Rorrer v. Cleveland
Steel Container, 564 F. App’x 642, 644–45 (3d Cir. 2014) (discussing a court’s
power to sanction beyond the authority provided by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(f)).
District 	courts 	exercise 	considerable 	discretion 	in 	awarding 	and
calculating attorney’s fees. 	See Dungee v. Davison Design & Dev. Inc., 674 F.
App’x 153, 156 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that the awarding of attorney’s fees
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and the amount of an award are within a district court’s discretion while the
standards used to calculate the award are subject to plenary review). 	A
district court abuses its discretion if it fails to apply the correct legal standard
or bases an award on clearly erroneous findings of fact. 	Id.
The lodestar is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by a
reasonable number of hours expended, resulting in a presumptively reasonable
fee. 	Simring v. Rutgers, 634 F. App’x 853, 857 (3d Cir. 2015). 	Courts utilize
a burden-shifting framework in calculating the lodestar. 	Dee v. Borough of
Dunmore, 548 F. App’x 58, 60 (3d Cir. 2013). 	The movant is first responsible
for producing evidence supporting the rate charged and hours expended, after
which the opponent may object to either or both figures. 	Id. 	The court may
then exercise its discretion in adjusting the hours and rates asserted based on
arguments raised by the opponent. 	Id.
B. 	Party Arguments
PNC submits that the Court has already concluded that sanctions are
warranted based on Elias’s conduct and that conclusion is now the law of the
case. 	(PNC Mot. pp. 2, 3; PNC Reply Br. pp. 4, 5.) 	The fees sought are the
product of Elias’s baseless claims and willful, bad faith tactics in prolonging the
case. 	(PNC Mot. p. 5; PNC Reply Br. pp. 7, 8.) 	PNC asserts that the fees
sought 	are 	premised 	on 	reasonable, 	below-market 	hourly 	rates 	and
contemporaneously recorded hours. 	(PNC Mot. pp. 5, 6; PNC Reply Br. p. 9.)
Elias’s challenges to the propriety of sanctions are untimely and arguments as
to the fee amount are without merit, according to PNC. 	(PNC Reply Br. pp. 3,
4, 9–11.)
Elias spends significant space in his opposition rehashing the complexity
of the underlying case and his related confusion. 	(Elias Opp’n Br. pp. 4–8, 23–
28.) 	He states that he has never before been sanctioned, has no interest in
further pursuing this case, and—given his age and health—is unlikely to repeat
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his sanctionable actions. 	(Id. pp. 2, 3, 34.) 	Focusing more on the fee request
itself, Elias contends that the American Rule requires parties to cover their own
legal fees and PNC has failed to rebut that presumption by (1) citing a statutory
basis and (2) prevailing (3) on the merits. 	(Id. pp. 2, 12–17.) 	Many of the fees
sought are for communications among attorneys or with the client, according to
Elias, and PNC did not spend significant time on the merits of—as opposed to
technical issues with—plaintiffs’ claims. 	(Id. pp. 8–12, 29–32.)
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Elias’s Claims of Confusion
Brief reference to Elias’s efforts to revisit my summary judgment decision
and the related confusion he has experienced is necessary given the significant
portion of Elias’s opposition brief dedicated to these points. 	Out of respect to
the Court and the parties, I will not prolong this case—now in its final stage
after significant time unnecessarily expended—by rebutting each of Elias’s
arguments. 	Suffice it to say, Elias’s arguments are untimely.
Following my two in-person warnings to Elias about the possibility of
sanctions, PNC requested attorney’s fees and costs—either through its right to
indemnification or, alternatively, the Court’s power to sanction—in its moving
brief. 	(ECF No. 80–1 (PNC Summ. J. Br.) pp. 24–29.) 	Elias did not respond
to this request in either his cross-motion (ECF No. 92) or his opposition to PNC’s
motion (ECF No. 94). 	I noted this lack of response in the summary judgment
decision. 	(May 28, 2025 Op. p. 19.) 	I then stated that I would not reach the
issue of indemnification because my decision rested on representative and
standing issues and, instead, concluded that fees and costs would be awarded
through the Court’s inherent power to sanction. 	(Id. pp. 19–21.)
Elias claims now that he did not address PNC’s request for attorney’s fees
because he thought it premature. 	(Elias Opp’n Br. p. 24.) 	This appears to
have been a strategic misstep. 	Because I have already determined that the
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interests of justice require the imposition of PNC’s reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs as a sanction, I decline Elias’s invitation to revisit the summary
judgment decision or excuse Elias’s conduct during this case due to purported
confusion. 	Elias’s related argument that “[c]ourts should provide counsel an
opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions” (id. p. 28) is rejected for
these same reasons.
B. 	Challenges to Fees as a Sanction
Moving closer to the substance of the instant motion is Elias’s repeated
position that PNC fails to meet several threshold requirements for overcoming
the American Rule and obtaining fees. 	These include the need for (1) statutory
authorization, (2) prevailing party status, and (3) that the prevailing party
prevailed on the merits of the case. 	(Elias Opp’n Br. pp. 5, 6, 12–18.)
Elias is correct that the American Rule presumes that each litigant—
successful or unsuccessful—will pay their own attorney’s fees absent a statute
or contract to the contrary. 	Med. Assocs. of Erie v. Zaycosky, 77 F.4th 159, 162
(3d Cir. 2023). 	Sanctions are an exception to this general rule when a party is
willfully 	disobedient 	toward 	a 	court 	order 	or 	“has 	‘acted 	in 	bad 	faith,
vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.’” 	Cellco P’ship v. Data Find
Sols., Inc., Case No. 06–00326, 2007 WL 1521075, at *3 (D.N.J. May 22, 2007)
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991)). 	The Court
expressly so found in its summary judgment decision. 	(May 28, 2025 Op.
p. 21.)
Elias provides minimal support for his positions and the authorities he
cites all seem to deal with fee requests that had a statutory or contractual
predicate. 	Local Civil Rule 46(e) does not reference a statutory requirement
for attorney’s fees as Elias argues (Elias Opp’n Br. pp. 12, 13) in no small part
because there is no Local Civil Rule 46(e). 	Again, the Court’s inherent power
to sanction exists separate and apart from any rule or statute. 	See Rorrer, 564
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F. App’x at 644–45. 	Elias’s threshold challenges to PNC’s motion are therefore
rejected 	and 	the 	Court 	moves 	to 	the 	lodestar 	analysis 	and 	related
considerations.
C. 	The Lodestar
To repeat, the lodestar is calculated by multiplying a reasonable number
of hours worked by a reasonable hourly rate. 	Simring, 634 F. App’x at 857.
The relevant rate is generally the prevailing rate in the forum of the litigation
unless the special expertise of counsel from a distant district was required or
local 	counsel 	were 	unwilling 	to 	take 	the 	case. 	Interfaith 	Cmty. 	Org. 	v.
Honeywell Int’l., Inc., 726 F.3d 403, 413 (3d Cir. 2013). 	The relevant rate for
this Vicinage is that of the “Philadelphia/New Jersey legal market.” 	Sciore v.
Phung, Case No. 19–13775, 2022 WL 17446505, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2022).
Courts have been guided by Community Legal Services of Philadelphia’s (CLS)
fee schedule in determining the reasonable rate within the Vicinage. 	Id.
I do not interpret Elias’s challenges to the requested fees to be premised
on the asserted rates and I independently find them reasonable.
PNC requests an hourly rate of $450 per hour for attorney Daniel J. Tobin
and $400 per hour for attorney William P. Reiley. 	(ECF No. 107–1 (PNC Mot.
Exs.) pp. 3, 4.) 	Tobin is a partner with 35 years of experience. 	(Id. p. 4.) 	His
requested fee is well below the $735 to $850 range provided for attorneys with
25 or more years of experience in the CLS fee schedule. 	Attorney Fees, Cmty.
Legal 	Servs. 	of 	Phila., 	https://clsphila.org/about-community-legal-
services/attorney-fees/ (last visited February 13, 2026). 	Reiley is an attorney
with 12 years of experience. 	(PNC Mot. Exs. p. 3.) 	His requested fee is below
the $420 to $525 range for attorneys with 11 to 15 years of experience per the
CLS fee schedule. 	Attorney Fees, supra.
Moving to reasonable hours, PNC seeks fees for 131 total hours, 80 for
Reiley and 51 for Tobin. 	(PNC Mot. Exs. p. 5.) 	Courts first determine the
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number of reasonable hours expended by looking to the number of hours
actually 	spent. 	Simring, 	634 	F. 	App’x 	at 	857. 	Hours 	not 	reasonably
expended—those that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary—
may be excluded. 	Id. 	PNC has provided a detailed accounting of the hours
expended with the date, attorney, time spent to the tenth of an hour, rate, total
fee, and brief description for each entry. 	The bulk of these entries include
drafting filings and correspondences, reviewing Elias’s submissions and court
orders, 	and 	collaborating 	and 	communicating 	with 	the 	client 	and 	fellow
attorneys. 	(PNC Mot. Exs. pp. 14–27.) 	The Court does not identify any
excessive, duplicative, or otherwise unnecessary entries in its review of PNC’s
invoice summary.
Elias makes two general attacks on the hours sought. 	First, he identifies
$13,215 for a duplicative court appearance and entries that he characterizes as
mere communications between attorneys. 	To the extent that Elias challenges
these hours because the invoice summary includes redactions, billing records
need only be detailed enough for the Court to determine whether the time
expended was reasonable for the work performed. 	See Rastelli Partners, LLC
v. Baker, Case Nos. 23–02967 & 23–03126, 2024 WL 960485, at *11 (D.N.J.
Mar. 6, 2024). 	While redactions may obscure the exact topics researched or
discussed in a communication, the Court is satisfied that the time expended
itself was reasonable for these general activities.
Elias specifically challenges a $1,080 entry, Reiley’s fee for the September
16, 2024 motion hearing for which Tobin also charged for preparation and
attendance. 	(PNC Mot. Exs. p. 25; Elias Opp’n Br. p. 11.) 	This hearing was
held after my first warning to Elias and suggestion that he confer with PNC’s
counsel or a mediator. 	(July 15, 2024 Hr’g Tr. pp. 21:18–22:7.) 	It is common
in 	the 	Court’s 	experience 	for 	multiple 	attorneys 	to 	attend 	a 	hearing,
particularly one in which arguments are to be exchanged for dispositive motion
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practice. 	See Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 598, 604 (D.N.J.
1998) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that fees for three attorneys to attend
a mediation, settlement conferences, and motion hearings were excessive); see
also Qorvo, Inc. v. Akoustis Techs., Inc., Case 21–01417, 2024 WL 5165155, at
*6 (D. Del. Sept. 9, 2024) (finding that the plaintiff did not overstaff depositions
by assigning two attorneys). 	This time will not be reduced.
Elias’s additional specific challenges relating to “internal communications
among attorneys” are not even all mere communications. 	For instance, one
flagged entry is for “[a]ttention to editing and drafting of memo in support of
summary judgment to address comments from Counsel.” 	(PNC Mot. Exs.
p. 22.) 	Elias also challenges correspondences that contributed to PNC’s motion
for summary judgment, such as in the preparation of PNC’s certification and
statement 	of 	material 	facts. 	(Id. 	p. 23.) 	Insofar 	as 	the 	challenged 	time
consists of correspondences to PNC and conversations among attorneys, the
Court finds that these instances were brief, often just a few minutes at a time.
While Elias may intend to use “internal communications among attorneys”
derisively, the practice of law is inherently communicative. 	See Holzhauer v.
Hayt, Hayt & Landau, LLC, Case No. 11–02336, 2012 WL 3286059, at *8
(D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2012) (declining to strike intra-office communications from the
lodestar calculation).
All of these communications took place after Elias was disqualified and
many occurred after the Court’s first warning that it would consider sanctions.
Elias not only prolonged this litigation after it was no longer advisable to do so,
he continued to make motions and other filings—many of them unsuccessful if
not ultimately withdrawn—that he should have understood would result in
time expended for review, collaboration with counsel, client updates, and
responsive filings that are common in the practice of law. 	Elias may now look
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at PNC’s invoice summary as a pages-long receipt. 	But if the bill appears
steep, Elias must take responsibility for running up the tab.
Second, and more generally, Elias claims that a review of the invoice
summary does not show any significant time spent on the merits of individual
asserted claims, but rather technical issues such as standing. 	(Elias Opp’n Br.
pp. 29–32.) 	To 	the 	extent 	that 	this 	argument 	is 	separate 	from 	Elias’s
prerequisite argument above, it is difficult to determine how Elias arrived at
his assertion. 	The invoice summary does not parse out time spent on merits
arguments 	versus 	standing 	or 	procedural 	arguments. 	PNC’s 	counsel
confirmed during the July 15, 2024 status conference that its theory of the case
was that PNC could not be liable for payments authorized by Elias. 	(July 15,
2024 Hr’g Tr. p. 19:4–12.) 	PNC’s brief supporting summary judgment asserted
arguments including lack of standing, equitable estoppel, laches, and the
undisputed fact that Elias and Cynthia authorized the payments to the home
equity line of credit. 	(PNC Summ. J. Br. pp. 13–24.) 	Upon concluding that
Elias was prohibited from proceeding pro se as trustee and failed to establish
standing for his individual claim, the Court had no reason to delve further into
PNC’s arguments. 	(See May 28, 2025 Op. pp. 10–15.)
The defendants in Eckert v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local
Union 776 Profit Sharing Plan contended that hours expended on a claim
plaintiffs 	succeeded 	on 	through 	procedural 	grounds 	ought 	to 	have 	been
excluded from the fee award. 	Case No. 15–01920, 2018 WL 4404657, at *8
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2018). 	The court declined to do so, concluding that the
plaintiffs achieved substantial relief and fully litigated their claims without
regard to how the Court would choose to rule. 	Id.
Similar here, the majority of PNC’s arguments centered on the notion that
Elias was responsible for harm alleged and—unwilling to allow himself to be
sued—decided to come after PNC for allowing him transfer the funds. 	PNC
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achieved the outcome desired: dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. 	The Court will
not hold against PNC its own decision to analyze no further than Elias’s
inability to press Trust-related claims and lack of standing to assert others.
Fees will not be reduced simply because the Court did not need to look to the
merits to dispose of the case.
Finally, in addition to the $54,950 in requested fees, PNC seeks $1,774.66
in costs. 	Many of these costs consist of transcript purchases, delivery service,
and moderate travel. 	(PNC Mot. Exs. p. 27.) 	The Court finds these costs to
be reasonable with the exception of PNC’s $855 mediation fee and Tobin’s
$275.01 pro hac vice admission. 	Though the admission fee was not paid until
January 30, 2025 (id.), Tobin applied for admission on November 20, 2023 (ECF
No. 29) and was granted admission on January 2, 2024 (ECF No. 35), both
before Elias was disqualified. 	Further, the Court appointed the mediator in
this case pursuant to Local Civil Rule 301.1. 	(ECF No. 100.) 	Under Local
Civil Rule 301.1, “compensation shall be borne equally by the parties.” 	L. Civ.
R. 301.1(c). 	The Court will therefore deduct $1,130.01 from PNC’s requested
costs.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that PNC has supported its
request for fees and costs and Elias has failed to adequately rebut their
presumptive reasonableness. 	PNC’s motion at ECF No. 107 will therefore be
GRANTED as adjusted and $54,950 in attorney’s fees and $644.65 in costs will
be awarded. 	An appropriate order and judgment accompanies this opinion.
/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: February 23, 2026
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