1-800-DOCTORS, INC. v. MM&JF, LLC

1:21-cv-17559Njd26 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
1-800-DOCTORS, INC.,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant,
v.
MM & JF INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant/Counterclaim
Plaintiff/Third-Party
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM M. LAUFER, ESQ. et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.
Case No. 21–cv–17559–ESK–SAK
OPINION
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER concerns which party has priority over certain collateral.
Because the facts, through the parties’ written agreements and filings to secure
their interests, favor defendant’s security interest over the collateral, summary
judgment will be granted in defendant’s favor.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Underlying Agreements
On April 20, 2011, William T. Grant, Meridian Health Management, Inc.
(Meridian), and other new lenders (together with Grant and Meridian, “2011
Lenders”) entered into an amended and restated intercreditor agreement
(Intercreditor Agreement). 	((ECF No. 123 (Mov. Br.) p.10 (citing ECF No. 111–
1 	(SOMF) 	¶ 1).) 	Third-party 	defendant 	William 	M. 	Laufer, 	Esq. 	is 	the
collateral agent for the 2011 Lenders. 	(SOMF ¶ 2.)
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On April 19, 2016, plaintiff 1-800-DOCTORS, Inc. (1-800-DOCTORS) and
defendant MM & JF Investments, LLC (MM & JF) entered into several
agreements. 	(Id. ¶¶ 3–5.) 	First, they entered into a securities purchase
agreement (Purchase Agreement). 	(Id. ¶ 3; see Declaration of Vincent Puma
(Puma Dec.), Ex. B, ECF No. 111–5.) 	Second, they entered into a 10% senior
secured convertible promissory note with an original principal amount of $4
million with 1-800-DOCTORS as debtor and MM & JF as creditor (Senior Note).
(SOMF ¶ 4; see Puma Dec., Ex. C, ECF No. 111–6.) 	Third, they entered into a
10% 	subordinated 	secured 	convertible 	promissory 	note 	with 	an 	original
principal amount of $2 million with 1-800-DOCTORS as debtor and MM &JF
as creditor (Junior Note) (together with the Senior Note, “Secured Notes”).
(SOMF ¶ 5; see Puma Dec., Ex. D, ECF No. 111–7.) 	The Secured Notes require
1-800-DOCTORS to pay 10% interest per year on the initial principal balances,
payable upon the maturity date in April 2020. 	(SOMF ¶¶ 7, 10.) 	Each
Secured Note also requires 1-800-DOCTORS to pay default interest of 18% per
year following any “event of default” as defined in each Secured Note. 	(Id.
¶¶ 8, 11.) 	Failure to pay the principal and interest due by the maturity date
qualifies as an “event of default.” 	(Id. ¶¶ 9, 12.) 	Upon an “event of default,”
the default sum, including the outstanding principal, any accrued and unpaid
interest, and default interest, shall become immediately due and payable.
(Id.)
1-800-DOCTORS 	has 	made 	no 	payments 	toward 	either 	principal 	or
interest on either Secured Note. 	(Id. ¶ 13.) 	As a result of the default, 1-800-
DOCTORS owes MM & JF over $13 million on the Senior Note and nearly $7
million on the Junior Note, including principal, regular interest, and default
interest on each. 	(Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.)
Also on April 19, 2016, 1-800-DOCTORS and MM & JF entered into a
security agreement in favor of MM & JF (Security Agreement). 	(Id. ¶ 19; see
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Puma Dec. Ex. E, ECF No. 111–8.) 	The Security Agreement contains a broad
definition of “collateral.” 	(SOMF ¶ 20.) 	It also provides that 1-800-DOCTORS
granted a security interest in it collateral to MM & JF’s collateral agent. 	(Id.
¶ 21.) 	Here, MM & JF acted as its own collateral agent, so the security interest
falls to MM & JF itself. 	(Id. ¶ 22.) 	The Security Agreement provides that
any security interests created may be perfected by filing Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) statements. 	(Id. ¶ 23.) 	As part of the Security Agreement, 1-800
DOCTORS and 83% of the 2011 Lenders executed a modification agreement.
(Id. ¶¶ 32, 33; see Puma Dec. Ex. I, ECF No. 111–12.)
Also on April 19, 2016, MM & JF entered into a subordination agreement
with 	1-800-DOCTORS, 	Grant, 	and 	Meridian 	(Subordination 	Agreement).
(SOMF ¶ 25; see Puma Dec., Ex. G, ECF No. 111–10.) 	The Subordination
Agreement establishes that MM & JF’s Junior Note takes priority over all other
notes and secured interests held by Meridian and Grant “regardless of the order
or time of attachment, or the order, time[,] or manner of perfection.” 	(SOMF
¶ 27.) 	The Subordination Agreement further makes the 2011 Lenders and
MM& JF responsible for perfecting and maintaining perfection of any lien on 1-
800-DOCTORS’ 	collateral. 	(Id. 	¶ 28.) 	Pursuant 	to 	the 	Subordination
Agreement, Grant and Meridian may not challenge MM & JF’s security interest
and priority on 1-800-DOCTORS collateral.1 	(Id. ¶29.)
B. 	Financing Statements.
On April 25, 2011, the 2011 Lenders filed a UCC financing statement with
the 	Delaware 	Department 	of 	State 	to 	secure 	their 	interest 	under 	the
1 MM & JF argues that Laufer cannot challenge MM & JF’s lien or priority
based on this waiver because Laufer represents Meridian and Grant. 	(Mov. Br.
pp. 16–17.) 	Laufer counters that he does not represent Grant or Meridian. 	(ECF No.
118–1 ¶ 30.) 	I need not reach this issue because MM & JF is entitled to summary
judgment 	on 	its 	counterclaims 	against 	1-800-DOCTORS 	regardless 	of 	Laufer’s
opposition.
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Intercreditor Agreement (2011 Financing Statement). 	(Id. ¶ 34; see Puma Dec.
Ex. F, ECF No. 111–9.) 	The 2011 Financing Statement expired on April 25,
2016. 	(SOMF ¶ 35.)
On April 28, 2016, after entering into the Security Agreement, MM & JF
filed a UCC financing statement with the Delaware Department of State to
secure its lien on 1-800-DOCTORS’ collateral (2016 Financing Statement).
(Id. ¶ 36; see Puma Dec., Ex. J, ECF No. 111–13.) 	Consequently, as of April 28,
2016, only MM & JF had a perfected UCC financing statement as to a security
interest on 1-800-DOCTORS’ collateral because the 2011 Financing Statement
had expired on April 25, 2016. 	(SOMF ¶ 38.) 	On April 9, 2021, the 2016
Financing Statement was extended for another five years. 	(Id. ¶ 37.)
It was not until April 14, 2021 (i.e. five days after MM & JF’s filing of its
2016 Financing Statement), that the 2011 Lenders filed a new financing
statement. 	(Id. ¶ 39.)
C. 	Settlement Agreement, 2023 Modification
Agreement, and Consent to Foreclosure
As a part of this case, on March 22, 2023, 1-800-DOCTORS and MM & JF
entered into a settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement) and modification
agreement (2023 Modification Agreement). 	(Id. ¶ 42; see Puma Dec. Ex. K,
ECF No. 111–14.) 	Pursuant to the 2023 Modification Agreement, the 2011
Lenders who signed the 2023 Modification Agreement agreed to share in a pari
passu secured position with MM & JF with respect to the Senior Note. 2
(SOMF 	¶ 45.) 	The 	Settlement 	Agreement 	requires 	1-800-DOCTORS 	to
repurchase the Secured Notes within 210 days, after which MM & JF would be
2 Although MM & JF’s statement of material facts and moving brief only refer
to the “Note” in the context of the 2023 Modification Agreement, (see Mov. Br. p. 19),
it is clear from context and from the 2023 Modification Agreement itself that “Note”
refers to the Senior Note. 	(See ECF No. 111–14 pp. 2, 9 (Settlement Agreement and
2023 Modification Agreement defining the Senior Note as the “Note”).)
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entitled to foreclose on 1-800-DOCTOR’s collateral pursuant to the Security
Agreement. 	(Id. ¶¶ 43, 44.) 	As a part of the Settlement Agreement, 1-800-
DOCTORS also executed a consent to foreclosure, which was filed with the court
on December 6, 2023 (ECF No. 57–1) and entered by the court on April 4, 2024
(ECF No. 82 (Consent to Foreclosure)). 	(Id. ¶ 48; see also ECF No. 81 (Consent
Order).)
1-800-DOCTORS 	did 	not 	purchase 	the 	Secured 	Notes, 	Purchase
Agreement, 	and 	Security 	Agreement 	within 	210 	days 	of 	the 	Settlement
Agreement, and MM & JF proceeded with the foreclosure of the collateral.
(SOMF ¶ 52.)
D. 	Procedural History
1-800-DOCTORS initiated this case on September 24, 2021 (ECF No. 1).
On November 2, 2021, 1-800 DOCTORS filed the operative amended complaint,
seeking declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief regarding MM & JF’s
secured position over 1-800-DOCTORS’ collateral. 	(ECF No. 3.) 	On April 22,
2024, MM & JF filed a second amended counterclaim and third-party complaint
seeking to foreclose on its security interest in 1-800-DOCTORS’ collateral (First
Cause of Action) and seeking a declaration from the court that the Secured
Notes are secured by a first lien on 1-800-DOCTORS’ assets (Second Cause of
Action) 	(ECF No. 85.)
MM & JF filed a motion for summary judgment (Motion) against 1-800-
DOCTORS and Laufer. 	(ECF No. 111.) 	MM & JF included a statement of
material facts (SOMF) and brief in support of the Motion (Mov. Br.).3 	Laufer
3 Although MM & JF attempted to revise its brief to include an appropriate
statement of material facts in the brief (see ECF Nos. 123, 124), no such statement
appears in the amended brief. 	Accordingly, for clarity, I cite the facts as stated in the
original Motion filing (see ECF No. 111–1) and to the argument as stated in the moving
brief (ECF No. 123).
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filed opposition to the Motion (ECF No. 118 (Opp’n Br.)), to which MM & JF
replied (ECF No. 125 (Reply)).4
II. 	STANDARD
A. 	Motions for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule (Rule) of Civil Procedure 56(a) dictates that a “court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	A factual dispute is “genuine” when the “evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”
and is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 	The movant
“bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of
material fact.” 	Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d
Cir. 1996). 	The party may satisfy its burden by “produc[ing] evidence showing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” or “by ‘showing’—that is,
pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case.” 	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325 (1986). 	If the movant makes this showing, the nonmovant must “do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” 	Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). 	Instead, the nonmovant must “point to concrete evidence in the record
that supports each and every essential element of his case.” 	Orsatti v. N.J.
State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
4 I note that the only opposition to the motion comes from Laufer. 	Plaintiff did
not file an opposition to the Motion because 1-800-DOCTORS waived all challenges to
MM & JF’s security interest under the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Consent
to Foreclosure. 	(SOMF ¶¶ 44, 49.)
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Local Civil Rule 56.1 requires movants to “furnish a statement which sets
forth material facts as to which there does not exist a genuine issue.” 	L. Civ.
R. 56.1(a). 	The rule further requires that the party opposing summary
judgment file a responsive statement of material facts responding to each
paragraph of the movement’s statement, asserting agreement or disagreement,
“and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in dispute and citing to the
affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with the motion.” 	Id.
Any statement that is not clearly and substantively denied with an appropriate
citation to the record is deemed admitted pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1.
See Coastal Jersey Holdings, LLC v. Giordano, 22–02024, 2023 WL 7545301, at
*5 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2023); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (stating that—upon a
party’s failure to properly address an assertion of fact—a court may provide an
opportunity to address that fact, consider the fact undisputed, grant summary
judgment if the movant is entitled to it, or issue any other appropriate order).
The court’s role is not to weigh the evidence and decide the truth, but to
determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. 	Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 	In
making that decision, “[a]ll facts and inferences are construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party,” and credibility determinations are for the
fact finder. 	Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998); Big
Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	There is no genuine dispute of material
fact.
This case centers on the terms of financing contracts negotiated by
sophisticated commercial actors and the remedies available to creditors seeking
to enforce those remedies following debtor’s default. 	Because the agreements
contain merger clauses confirming that the written agreements represent the
entirety of the agreement between the parties, little can be done by Laufer to
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create a genuine dispute of material fact.5 	(See, e.g., ECF No. 111–8 p. 11 ¶ 8(i)
(Security Agreement merger clause stating that the “Transaction Documents”
(which includes the Security Agreement, Purchase Agreement, Secured Note,
and Subordination Agreement) contain the entire agreement).). 	In short, the
documents say what they say, and I must apply the law to the parties’ rights
under the agreements. 	Moreover, 1-800-DOCTORS—the only other party to
the Security Agreement—has waived its right to challenge the relief sought in
the Motion. 	(SOMF ¶ 44.) 	Because Laufer does not present any factual
dispute that might affect the outcome of this lawsuit or could lead a reasonable
jury to return a verdict for Laufer, summary judgment is appropriate. 	Laufer’s
response (ECF No. 118–1) to MM & JF’s Statement of Material Facts does
nothing to help his cause. 	It denies either in whole or in part, four allegations
in MM & JF’s statement of undisputed material facts. 	In fact, Laufer responds
to nearly every allegation by saying that he “neither admit[s] nor den[ies]” a
particular fact, based on lack of knowledge or because a “document speaks for
itself.” 	(ECF No. 118–1). 	As Laufer has not clearly and substantively denied
these facts, with citations to the record, I am required to deem them admitted.
See Coastal Jersey Holdings, LLC, 2023 WL 7545301, at *5.
B. 	First Cause of Action – Foreclosure
1. 	Party Arguments
MM & JF argues that 1-800-DOCTORS’ default on the Secured Notes and
Consent to Foreclosure entitle MM & JF to foreclose on 1-800-DOCTORS’
assets. 	(Mov. Br. pp. 26–31). 	Although Laufer admits that the “[Secured]
Notes, which became due and payable in April 2021, were not paid, causing a
default,” (Opp’n Br. p. 5) Laufer counters that the Senior Note was unsecured
5 Laufer does not help his argument by failing to include his own numbered
statement of material facts and instead relying on declarations that themselves barely
cite to any record evidence. 	(Opp’n Br. p. 7; see ECF No. 118–2, 118–3, 118–8.)
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(id. pp. 5, 9–12) and that failure of a condition precedent invalidates MM & JF’s
security 	interest 	in 	the 	Junior 	Note 	(id., 	pp. 13–16). 	I 	find 	that 	the
uncontroverted terms of the agreements permit MM & JF to foreclose on 1-800-
DOCTORS’ collateral.
2. 	Analysis
New Jersey law applies. 	(ECF No. 116.) 	New Jersey has adopted the
UCC. 	See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:1–101, et seq. (NJUCC). 	The NJUCC defines
“negotiable instrument” as:
[A]n unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money,
with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or
order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first
comes into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the
payment of money, … .
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:3–104a. 	A negotiable instrument is a “note” if it is a
promise. 	Id. § 3–104e. 	Negotiable instruments become due on the day after
the due date specified in the contract, and they become overdue after the
accelerated due date. 	See id. § 12A:3–304(b)(2), (3).
An enforceable security interest attaches against the debtor and third
parties if value is given, the debtor has rights to the collateral, and an authentic
security agreement exists that describes the collateral. 	See id. § 12A:9–203(a),
(b). 	When a debtor defaults on a secured note, the secured party has the right
to enforce its security interest, including by foreclosing on the collateral. 	Id.
§ 12A:9–601(a)(1).
Here, the Secured Notes meet the definition of “negotiable instruments.”
They serve as 1-800-DOCTORS’ promise to repay the $6 million principal from
MM & JF, plus 10% annual interest, within four years. 	(SOMF ¶¶ 4, 5, 7, 10.)
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1-800-DOCTORS has not kept its promise to pay, (id. ¶¶ 13, 48, 52), and MM &
JF may enforce its security interest from the Secured Notes by foreclosing on 1-
800-DOCTORS’ collateral. 	N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:9–601(a)(1).
Moreover, 1-800-DOCTORS has admitted its default and consented to MM
& JF’s foreclosure. 	(See generally Consent to Foreclosure, ECF No. 82.) 	And
the court may enforce the Consent to Foreclosure, for which the court also
entered a consent order (ECF No. 81). 	See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 317–18 & n. 9 (3d Cir. 1990) (stipulation “so ordered” by
district court was “the functional equivalent, and has the same effect as, a
consent order or consent decree,” and was “subject to continued judicial
policing” 	(citation 	omitted); 	Shell’s 	Disposal 	& 	Recycling, 	Inc. 	v. 	City 	of
Lancaster, 504 F. App’x 194, 198 (3d Cir. Nov. 16, 2012) (district court retains
jurisdiction over agreement embodied in court order based on “its inherent
authority to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its
decrees”) (citation omitted). 	Accordingly, the Motion will be GRANTED as to
the First Cause of Action.
C. 	Second 	Cause 	of 	Action 	– 	Declaratory
Judgment
1. 	Party Arguments
MM & JF argues that it has a first priority security interest over the
collateral. 	(Mov. Br. pp. 31–34.) 	Laufer counters that the Junior Note was
subordinate to the 2011 Investors’ first security interest. 	(Opp’n Br. pp. 17,
18.). 	MM & JF has the winning argument.
2. 	Analysis
Under the NJUCC, security interest priority is determined by the order in
which the interest is perfected, such as by the filing of a financing statement.
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:9–322(a)(1) (“Conflicting perfected security interests
… rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection.”) 	However,
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financing statements are only effective for five years, and failure to file a
continuation of a filing statement prior to the end of the five-year period results
in a lapse. 	Id. § 12A:9–515(a), (c). 	Upon lapse, the security interest loses
perfection, and the secured creditor loses its priority. 	Id. § 12A:9–515(c).
Here, it is evident that MM & JF has the first priority over the collateral.
The 2011 Lenders filed the 2011 Financing Statement on April 25, 2011.
(SOMF ¶ 34.) 	That statement lapsed on April 25, 2016. 	(Id. ¶ 35.) 	And three
days later, MM &JF filed its financing statement on the same collateral. 	(Id.
¶ 36.) 	From then on, MM & JF had priority over the 2011 Lenders for 1-800-
DOCTORS’ collateral. 	See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:9–515(c).
Laufer has presented nothing more than conjecture and speculation to
refute MM & JF’s claim. 	He argues that a “WHEREAS” clause in the Security
Agreement somehow created a condition precedent requiring a Subordination
Agreement in favor of the 2011 Lenders that was never completed. 	(See Opp’n
Br. pp. 13–16.). 	Laufer ignores the actual Subordination Agreement (ECF No.
111–10), which explicitly makes the 2011 Lenders’ security interest subordinate
to MM & JF’s interest through the Junior Note. 	(Subordination Agreement
pp. 3–4, § 1(a).) 	Both the 2011 Lenders and MM & JF had the ability to perfect
and maintain their security interests. 	(SOMF ¶ 28.) 	MM & JF perfected its
security interest while the 2011 Lenders let their security interest lapse. 	(Id.
¶¶ 35–39.) 	Accordingly, I find, as a matter of law, that the uncontroverted
documents grant to MM & JF a first priority security over 1-800-DOCTORS’
collateral, shared pari passu with the 2011 Lenders who signed the 2023
Modification Agreement.
Accordingly, the Motion will be GRANTED as to the Second Cause of
Action.
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D. 	Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing
In his opposition, Laufer asserts that MM & JF breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 	(Opp’n Br. pp. 19–21.) 	MM & JF
argues that Laufer cannot raise this issue for the first time at the summary
judgment stage, and even if he could, the argument fails on the merits. 	(Reply
Br. pp. 14–19.)
Assuming, without deciding, that Laufer can raise this argument for the
first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment, Laufer’s
argument is without merit.6 	Laufer claims that MM & JF’s representative,
Mario Monello, acted in bad faith because he should have known about and told
1-800-DOCTORS and Laufer that the 2011 Financing Statement would lapse.
(Opp’n 	Br. 	p. 19.) 	The 	opposition 	brief 	relies 	on 	passive 	assertions 	and
conjecture rather than legal authority and record evidence to support the claim.
(See, e.g., id. p. 20 (“It is submitted on behalf of Laufer that [Monello’s inaction]
constitutes bad faith.”).) 	Further, Laufer admits that “[t]he Subordination
Agreement leaves responsibility for perfecting and maintaining perfection of
any lien on the collateral to the 2011 Lenders and [MM & JF].” 	(SOMF ¶28;
see ECF No. 118–1 ¶28 (Laufer neither admitting nor denying this fact).)
Because Monello had no responsibility under the Subordination Agreement to
maintain perfection of the 2011 Financing Statement, Laufer’s claim fails and
cannot defeat summary judgment. 	See Kare Distrib., Inc. v. Jam Labels &
Cards 	LLC, 	09–00969, 	2012 	WL 	266386, 	at 	*7 	(D.N.J. 	Jan. 	30, 	2012)
(recognizing that a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
6 I consider this issue because MM & JF had an opportunity to address it in its
reply brief. 	See Ragland v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 717 F. App’x 175, 179 n. 4 (3d
Cir. 2017) (no prejudice in district court’s consideration of a new claim raised for the
first time in response to summary judgment motion, where both parties briefed the
issue).
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fair dealing fails “when the conduct at issue is governed by the terms of an
express contract”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, MM & JF’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 111) will be GRANTED. 	An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.
/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 26, 2026
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