Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Deepak Gupta
v. 	Case No. 1:26-cv-207-PB-TSM
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 078
Christopher Brackett,
Superintendent, Strafford County
Department of Corrections, et al.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Deepak Gupta, the petitioner in this habeas corpus case, challenges an
immigration judge’s refusal to release him on bond pending the conclusion of
his removal proceedings. For the reasons described in this Memorandum and
Order, I deny Gupta's request for a new bond hearing because I lack the
power to grant him the relief he seeks.
I. BACKGROUND
Gupta, an Indian national, entered the United States without
inspection in July 2023. Doc. 1 at 4. In February 2026, Gupta allegedly called
911 to “report suspected drug activity” at his place of work. Doc. 14-2 at 5.
When the police arrived, they asked Gupta to produce his immigration
papers, arrested him, and later transferred him to civil immigration custody
at the Strafford County Department of Corrections in Dover, New
Hampshire. Doc. 1 at 4. Gupta was never charged in connection with the drug
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activity the police discovered at his place of work. Doc. 14-2 at 4-5. Since
Gupta’s arrest, he has remained in federal custody. See Doc. 1 at 4.
In March, 2026, Gupta filed a habeas corpus petition in this court
seeking an order compelling the government to provide him with a bond
hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”). Id. I granted his request, and he
received a bond hearing on April 7, 2026. Doc. 8 at 1.
Gupta was represented by counsel at the bond hearing. To support his
request for release on bond, Gupta submitted tax returns, payroll records,
and several affidavits. See Doc. 14-1. Among the affidavits was an unsigned
“Affidavit of Support and Bond Sponsorship” in which the affiant states that
he is “willing and able to post the immigration bond on behalf of Mr. Deepak
Gupta.” Id. at 56. Gupta also submitted letters affirming his moral character
and an affidavit from his employer. Id. at 58-65.
The government did not claim that Gupta was a danger to the
community during the bond hearing. Doc. 14-2 at 4-5. Instead, it argued that
Gupta should be detained because he is a flight risk. Id. To support its
contention, the government emphasized that Gupta entered the United
States for the first time in 2023; he failed to appear in May 2025 for an ICE
check-in; and, although he timely filed for asylum, any relief pursuant to that
application remained “speculative.” Id. at 4. In response, Gupta argued that
his missed check-in does not make him a flight risk because there is no
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evidence he “willfully” failed to appear as required; he had remained in the
community and maintained employment for a significant period of time; he
has a cousin for whom he worked; and he was “willing to comply with any
conditions that the court imposes.” Id. at 5.
After weighing the evidence, the IJ denied Gupta’s request for release
on bond. Id. at 6-7. Although she was not persuaded that Gupta had been
“involved in” the drug activity discovered at his place of work, she determined
that he should be detained because he “has been shown to be a flight risk by
a preponderance of evidence that no amount of bond and no conditions of
release or alternatives to detention can ameliorate.” Id.; Doc. 8-1 at 2.
After the government notified the Court of Gupta’s bond hearing, I
issued an order requiring him to show cause why his petition should not be
dismissed. Doc. 9 at 1. Gupta responded by objecting to dismissal and
claiming that the IJ’s bond ruling was fatally flawed both because the record
contains insufficient evidence to support her flight-risk determination and
because she failed to properly consider alternatives to detention before
refusing to release him. Doc. 14.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s power to review claims that a person is being held in
immigration custody in violation of the Constitution or other federal law is
limited by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). That provision states:
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The 	Attorney 	General’s 	discretionary 	judgment 	regarding 	the
application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court
may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under
this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation
or denial of bond or parole.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Although § 1226(e) strips the Court of the power to review
an IJ’s discretionary decision to detain a person subject to removal
proceedings, it does not restrict the Court’s authority to review claims that
the person is being detained in violation of his constitutional rights. Lopez
Flores v. Brackett, 2026 DNH 049, 2026 WL 1179959, at *2 (D.N.H. Apr. 30,
2026); Ribero-Almeida v. FCI Berlin, Warden, 2025 DNH 139, 811 F. Supp.
3d 245, 248 (D.N.H. 2025); Mayancela Mayancela v. FCI Berlin, Warden,
2025 DNH 135, 2025 WL 3215638, at *4 (D.N.H. Nov. 18, 2025). Nor does it
bar judicial review of other questions of law that are embedded in a detention
determination. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 782 (9th Cir. 2024).
Claims that an alien either presents an unacceptable danger to the
community or is a flight risk involve mixed questions of law and fact that are
subject to judicial review notwithstanding § 1226(e). Id. at 783
(dangerousness); Miri v. Bondi, 2026 WL 622302, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
2026) (flight risk). When reviewing such claims, however, the court is not free
to second-guess an IJ’s discretionary decisions. Instead, if the IJ properly
allocates the burden of proof and correctly resolves any pure issues of law
that bear upon her decision, her conclusion that an alien poses either a
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danger to the community or an unacceptable risk of flight cannot be
overturned as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Mayancela v.
Bondi, 136 F.4th 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2025) (applying substantial evidence standard
to asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture claims).
Under this standard, an IJ’s decision can be overturned “only if the record is
such as to compel a reasonable factfinder to reach a contrary determination.”
Id.1 Cf. Martinez, 124 F.4th at 784 (reviewing dangerousness determination
for “abuse of discretion”); Gonzalez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1005 (9th Cir.
2025) (noting that there is “little practical difference” between the two
standards).
In addition to being grounded in substantial evidence, an IJ’s bond
determination must be reasoned and sufficiently explained. To satisfy this
requirement, however, an IJ “need not discuss ad nauseum every piece of
evidence as long as she has given reasoned consideration to the evidence as a
whole, made supportable findings, and adequately explained her reasoning.”
1 	Although the First Circuit has not determined that bond hearing
determinations are reviewable for a lack of substantial evidence, its use of
that standard when considering challenges to other immigration decisions
that present mixed questions of law and fact suggests that it should apply
here as well. It also follows that when an IJ refuses to release a person at a
bond hearing without substantial evidence to support her decision, her
decision is not immune from review under § 1226(e), as an IJ lacks discretion
to deny a request for release where no rational IJ could do so given the
evidence presented.
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Bazile v. Garland, 76 F.4th 5, 16 (1st Cir. 2023) (citation modified)
(evaluating Convention Against Torture claim); see also Mayancela
Mayancela, 2025 WL 3215638, at *6 (applying this standard to bond
determinations).
III. ANALYSIS
Gupta argues that the IJ’s bond determination is fatally flawed both
because the record contains insufficient evidence to support her flight risk
determination and because the IJ failed to consider alternatives to detention
before deciding to detain him. I address each argument in turn.
1. 	Risk of Flight
Gupta challenges the IJ’s flight-risk determination on several grounds.
First, he argues that the IJ erred in giving weight to his failure to appear for
the May 2025 check-in because the government did not prove that his failure
to appear was willful. This argument is a nonstarter. An IJ ordinarily can
consider a recent unexplained failure to appear at a required check-in as
evidence that a person is a flight risk. Here, although Gupta was represented
by counsel at the bond hearing, he made no attempt to explain his failure to
appear. Because removal proceedings are civil in nature, a petitioner may not
remain silent when confronted with evidence that he missed a required
check-in and then fault the government for failing to prove that his failure to
appear was willful. See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043-04
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(1984) (“There is no provision [in immigration law] which forbids drawing an
adverse inference from the fact of standing mute.”); Garcia-Aguilar v. Lynch,
806 F.3d 671, 676 (1st Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the IJ was entitled to consider
Gupta’s recent unexplained failure to appear for an ICE check-in when
determining whether he was a flight risk.2
Gupta also attacks the IJ’s determination that his ties to the
community are limited. Although Gupta states that he has a cousin who lives
in the United States, as well as friends and employment, the IJ could
reasonably have concluded that his community ties were nevertheless limited
because his parents remain in India, he does not have a spouse or children
who live here, and he has only lived in the United States since 2023. See Doc.
14-2 at 6. Accordingly, the IJ did not abuse her discretion in determining that
Gupta’s community ties were limited.
Finally, Gupta faults the IJ for basing her flight-risk determination in
part on her conclusion that his likelihood of success on his asylum application
was “speculative.” Id. The First Circuit has explained that while a removal
2 	Gupta claims in a brief filed in this Court that he missed the check-in
because he never received a notice to appear. Although Gupta was
represented by counsel, he failed to present this explanation to the IJ, and he
cannot challenge the IJ’s ruling by citing to evidence that he did not present
during the bond hearing. Lokombe v. Wesling, 2026 DNH 056, 2026 WL
1270814, at *3 (D.N.H. May 8, 2026).
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defense can be “one of several factors potentially relevant to gauging whether
a person is a flight risk pending the removal decision,” relief pursuant to that
defense is “necessarily tentative.” Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 34
(1st Cir. 2021). Although Gupta’s counsel explained during the bond hearing
that Gupta had filed a timely request for asylum, he did not otherwise
address the merits of Gupta’s application. Doc. 14-2 at 5. Under these
circumstances, the IJ did not err in treating Gupta’s likelihood of success on
his asylum claim as speculative.
As I have noted before, “[w]hile other courts might have concluded
otherwise,” Gupta’s “mere disagreement with the IJ’s reasonable alternative
weighing of the evidence is insufficient to conclude that his bond hearing was
constitutionally defective.”3 Lopez Flores, 2026 WL 1179959, at *4. Here, the
record indicates that the IJ considered the evidence before her and applied
the correct standard in evaluating whether Gupta was a danger to the
community or flight risk. She first expressly found that Gupta was not a
danger to the community, concluding that there was “insufficient evidence” to
3 	“In this posture, my review is limited to the circumstances of [Gupta’s]
bond hearing specifically and whether they facially cast doubt on his
detention’s constitutionality.” Lopez Flores, 2026 WL 1179959, at *4 n.2. To
the extent that Gupta alleges a “systemic scheme to deny meaningful bond
review,” see Doc. 14 at 12, “that claim would require commensurate factual
development not conducted in this individualized habeas proceeding.” Lopez
Flores, 2026 WL 1179959, at *4 n. 2.
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show Gupta was involved in the drug activity discovered at his place of work.
Doc. 14-2 at 6. She then weighed the evidence presented to her on Gupta’s
risk of flight and, based on his “relatively recent entry in the United States,”
“very limited ties to the community,” and “failure to attend the ICE
immigration check-in” of May 2025, concluded that the government had
shown by a preponderance of evidence that Gupta was a flight risk. Id.
Although I would have reached a different conclusion from this evidence, I
cannot say that the IJ’s decision was so lacking in evidentiary support that it
is not entitled to deference.
2. 	Alternatives to Detention
Gupta also alleges that the IJ’s detention decision is flawed because she
failed to consider alternatives to detention before denying him bond. In
pressing this argument, Gupta focuses specifically on what he claims was the
IJ’s failure to address evidence in the record suggesting that Gupta had a
sponsor who was prepared to post a bond on his behalf.
Gupta’s argument fails to persuade because the record demonstrates
that the IJ considered alternatives to detention when announcing her
decision. See id. Although Gupta’s counsel did not mention the unsigned bond
affidavit during the hearing, the IJ obviously considered and rejected the
possibility of releasing Gupta on bond as an alternative to detention because
she explained when she ordered Gupta detained that “no amount of bond can
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ameliorate the flight risk in this case.” Id. Further, because Gupta did not
ask the IJ to consider other alternatives to detention, she did not err in
refusing to consider alternatives that Gupta did not raise.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Gupta fails to show that his bond hearing violated his due
process rights, his motion, Doc. 14, is denied. Furthermore, because his
motion constituted his response to my prior order, Doc. 9, he has failed to
show cause why his petition should not be dismissed. The clerk shall enter
judgment accordingly and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro
Paul J. Barbadoro
United States District Judge
June 16, 2026
cc: 	Counsel of Record
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