Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR T
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Cristo fer A. Ortega-Varela
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-483-PB-TSM
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 020
Chris Brac kett, Superintendent,
Straffo rd Co unty Department o f
Co rrec tio ns, et al.
MEMORANDUM AND OR DER
Before the Court is petitioner Cristofer A. Ortega-Varela’s motion for a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining his imminent removal from
the United States. See Doc. 13. Because I lack jurisdiction to issue such relief,
I deny Ortega-Varela’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Ortega-Varela, a citizen of Honduras, was detained by federal
immigration officials in New Hampshire on July 16, 2025. Doc. 1 at 7. Since
then, he has remained in federal custody at Strafford County Department of
Corrections in Dover, New Hampshire. See id. at 3. Ortega-Varela is subject
to a final order of removal issued by an immigration judge (“IJ”) at Newark
Immigration Court in 2019 and affirmed by the Board of Immigration
Appeals in 2024. Doc. 1-2; Doc. 1-3. Ortega-Varela is also classified as a
Special Immigrant-Juvenile (“SIJ”) under 8 C.F.R. § 204.11, a status he
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obtained on June 12, 2025. Doc. 1-4. Ortega-Varela moved to reopen his
removal proceedings after achieving SIJ status but was denied. Doc. 1-8. His
appeal from that denial is pending in the Third Circuit. See Doc. 1 at 8.
Ortega-Varela filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court on November 26, 2025. Id. at 4. In that
petition, Ortega-Varela asked the Court to grant his immediate release from
federal custody in New Hampshire and enjoin his removal from the United
States until he is afforded an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status
based on his SIJ status. Id. at 19-20.
While briefing on the merits of his petition was underway, the Third
Circuit lifted its administrative stay on Ortega-Varela’s removal, leading him
to seek the same from this Court on an emergency basis on February 13,
2026. Doc. 13; see Doc. 1-9; Doc. 13-4. At a status conference held that day,
with the government’s assurances that it would not remove Ortega-Varela
without seventy-two hours’ notice as required by the Court’s service order,
see Doc. 2 at 3, the parties agreed to a briefing schedule on the newly-filed
motion. On March 5, the government notified the Court of its intent to
remove Ortega-Varela “at a future time no less than 72 hours from the time
of filing.” Doc. 15. The government subsequently agreed to delay any removal
action until March 10 so that the Court could resolve the pending motion
after briefing was completed on March 6.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether construed as a motion for a TRO or for a preliminary
injunction, the same four factors determine whether a court should act to
preserve the status quo in advance of a dispositive ruling. Liu v. Noem, 777
F. Supp. 3d 83, 85-86 (D.N.H. 2025). I must consider (1) “the movant’s
likelihood of success on the merits;” (2) “whether and to what extent the
movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive
relief;” (3) “the balance of relative hardships, that is, the hardship to the
nonmovant if enjoined as opposed to the hardship to the movant if no
injunction issues;” and (4) “the effect, if any, that either a preliminary
injunction or the absence of one will have on the public interest.” Ryan v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 974 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2020); see also
Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 893 F.3d 153, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2018). The first
factor weighs “most heavily” in this analysis—so much so that a failure to
demonstrate likelihood of success is usually fatal. See Ryan, 974 F.3d at 18.
III. ANALYSIS
In his motion for temporary relief, Ortega-Varela previews several
constitutional arguments against his removal. But to reach those arguments,
I must have jurisdiction to issue the relief he seeks. The government
contends that I do not. I must therefore begin by assessing the parties’
jurisdictional contentions.
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The government invokes 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), maintaining that I lack
jurisdiction to grant Ortega-Varela’s requested relief because doing so
necessarily requires “reviewing the merits of his removal order.” Doc. 14 at 3.
In relevant part, that subsection reads, “[A] petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and exclusive means for
judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision
of this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The First Circuit has interpreted this
provision to strip district courts of jurisdiction “to entertain a habeas
challenge to the legality . . . of” a final order of removal. Ireland v. Garland,
2022 WL 4289617, at *1 (1st Cir. May 13, 2022); see also Ishak v. Gonzales,
422 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The plain language of” provisions including
subsection 1252(a)(5), “in effect, strips the district court of habeas jurisdiction
over final orders of removal . . . .”).
Ortega-Varela responds that subsection 1252(a)(5) does not apply
because he is “not attacking the merits or validity of his removal order”
through his habeas petition. Doc. 16 at 8. Instead, he contends that he only
“seeks to preserve his rights as an SIJ recipient and to prevent ICE from
unlawfully stripping him of SIJ status.” Id.
Stated differently, I understand Ortega-Varela to argue that his TRO
request is not affected by subsection 1252(a)(5) because he does not challenge
his removal order directly but instead merely contends that the government
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lacks the power to enforce the order, as doing so would deprive him of his SIJ
status in violation of his constitutional rights.1 This argument fails to
persuade because his TRO request is plainly a challenge to his removal order.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). While neither party has cited a case applying
subsection 1252(a)(5) in this precise context, courts have regularly
acknowledged that a request for a stay of a removal order based on the
order’s asserted inoperability, even when purportedly arising from rights
independent of the removal process, falls under subsection 1252(a)(5). See
United States v. Morillo, 2025 DNH 075, 2025 WL 170770, at *1-3 (D.N.H.
June 18, 2025) (holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to stay removal
even where a writ of coram nobis would, if granted, hold unconstitutional a
criminal conviction triggering the petitioner’s removal); see also Imran v.
Harper, 2026 WL 93131, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (affirming denial of
TRO request pursuant to subsection 1252(a)(5) because “[a] request for stay
of removal is a challenge to a removal order”); Amores v. Dir., Newark N.J.
Field Off., Immigr. & Customs Enf., 2024 WL 2044033, at *1-2 (3d Cir.
1 	In this way, Ortega-Varela does not challenge a discretionary “decision
or action” by the government to “execute” his removal order, which “no court”
would have jurisdiction to review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); see also Kong v.
United States, 62 F.4th 608, 617-18 (1st Cir. 2023) (distinguishing a
challenge to the government’s “discretionary decision” to carry out an action
listed in subsection 1252(g) from a challenge to its “very authority” to do so
(quoting Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 553 F.3d 724, 729 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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May 8, 2024) (concluding that subsection 1252(a)(5) stripped district court’s
jurisdiction to vacate removal order premised on “unlawfully obtained
conviction”); De Gonzalez v. Holder, 2012 WL 3610958, at *1 (D. Mass.
Aug. 20, 2012) (finding a lack of jurisdiction to review emergency motion for
stay of removal “arguing that the removal order is invalid based upon
ineffective assistance of counsel”); Al-Garidi v. Holder, 2009 WL 1439216, at
*1 (W.D.N.Y. May 15, 2009) (“This Court and other district courts throughout
the country have routinely held that because district courts have no
jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, they have no jurisdiction to
review requests for stays of removal.”).
Persuaded by that weight of authority, I conclude that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain Ortega-Varela’s motion, which subsection 1252(a)(5)
instead channels to the Third Circuit.2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(2)
(channeling judicial review of removal orders to “the judicial circuit in which
the immigration judge completed the proceedings”). Ortega-Varela remains
free to address his “constitutional claims” and “questions of law” targeting his
removal order to the Third Circuit. See id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Indeed, Ortega-
2 	To the extent that Ortega-Varela argues that this conclusion runs afoul
of the Suspension Clause by leaving him without a forum to assert that his
removal is unconstitutional, see U.S. Const. art 1, § 9, cl.2, his argument is
foreclosed by precedent. See Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 33 (1st Cir.
2006).
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Varela has already alluded to some of these issues in his briefing on his
motion for a stay of removal there. See Pet’r’s Mot. for a Stay of Removal,
Ortega-Varela v. Bondi, No. 25-3098 (3d Cir. 2025), ECF No. 8.
In any event, because I conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
grant the relief Ortega-Varela seeks, he is unable to show a likelihood of
success on the merits of his petition insofar as he asks this Court to enjoin his
removal. As the remaining three factors for temporary relief cannot rescue
his request absent a likelihood of success, see Ryan, 974 F.3d at 18, I need
not address them.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I deny Ortega-Varela’s motion for a
temporary restraining order. Doc. 13.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro
Paul J. Barbadoro
United States District Judge
March 9, 2026
cc: 	Counsel of Record
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