Wilson v. NH State Prison, Warden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jarrell Wilson
v. 	Case No. 19-cv-00786-JL
Warden, New Hampshire State
Prison for Men
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is pro se plaintiff Jarrell Wilson’s
amended complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that prison medical staff have violated his constitutional
rights. 	See § 1983 Compl. (Doc. No. 1), as amended by Doc. No.
5 (collectively “complaint”). 	The complaint is before this
magistrate judge for preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) and LR 4.3(d)(1). 	Also before this magistrate judge
for a report and recommendation is Wilson’s motion for
preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. No. 4). 	See Sept. 17, 2019
Order.
Background
Wilson is a prisoner of the State of New Hampshire. 	At all
relevant times he was housed at the New Hampshire State Prison
for Men (“NHSP”).
Wilson alleges that on an unspecified date, he was sucker-
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punched by another inmate and suffered a broken jaw. 	He spent
five and a half weeks in the prison’s medical wing before
surgery was performed on his jaw. 	He alleges he was in severe
pain and that prison medical staff knew of and disregarded his
medical needs during that time. 	Wilson also alleges that the
surgery was botched and that his jaw is misaligned as a result.
He asserts that he remains in severe pain due to the
misalignment, but prison medical staff refuse him treatment for
the jaw.
Wilson claims that prison medical staff have harmed him
mentally, physically, and emotionally. 	He seeks compensatory
damages in the amount of $180,000 for his pain and suffering and
punitive damages in the amount of $180,000. 	He also seeks
injunctive relief in the form of an order that he receive
reconstructive surgery on his jaw.
On September 17, 2019, Wilson filed a motion for
preliminary injunctive relief against Michelle Edmark, Warden of
NHSP, and Robbin Maddous, identified as the head of finance at
NHSP. 	According to the motion, Wilson pled guilty to numerous
disciplinary code violations, and in response, Edmark and
Maddous began, in 2015, withdrawing 50 percent of all deposits
made to his prisoner financial account. 	Wilson contends these
withdrawals are unlawful without his consent. 	He seeks
declaratory relief and an order requiring Edmark and Maddous to
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return all the money withdrawn from his account.
Discussion
I. 	Preliminary Review of § 1983 Complaint
A. 	Preliminary Review Standard
The court reviews complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs to
determine, among other things, whether the plaintiff has
asserted any claim upon which relief might be granted. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), LR 4.3(d)(1). 	In determining whether a pro
se pleading states a claim, the court construes the pleading
liberally. 	See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(citation omitted). 	Disregarding any legal conclusions, the
court considers whether the factual content in the pleading and
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, taken as true, state a
claim to relief. 	Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 102-
03 (1st Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
B. 	Eighth Amendment Claim
“Government officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they
display ‘deliberate indifference’ to a prisoner’s ‘serious
medical needs.’” 	Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Dávila, 813 F.3d 64,
74 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Gaudreault v. Muni. of Salem, 923
F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)). 	“[T]o prove an Eighth Amendment
violation, a prisoner must satisfy both of two prongs: (1) an
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objective prong that requires proof of a serious medical need,
and (2) a subjective prong that mandates a showing of prison
administrators’ deliberate indifference to that need.” 	Kosilek
v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 12
(1st Cir. 1987)).
“A ‘serious medical need’ ‘is one that has been diagnosed
by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.’” 	Miranda-Rivera, 813 F.3d at 74 (quoting
Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 208). 	“Deliberate indifference requires
(1) that ‘the official . . . be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists,’ and (2) that he draw that inference.” 	Id. (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
As to the subjective prong specifically, an inmate must
allege that defendants committed “acts or omissions . . .
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.” 	Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., 645 F.3d
484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106)
(internal quotation marks omitted). 	At a minimum, the plaintiff
must allege facts showing that the defendant possessed “a
purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind[,]”
as “liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically
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beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” 	Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015) (citation and
internal quote omitted) (emphasis in original).
Assuming, without deciding, that Wilson’s claims of severe
pain and misaligned jaw constitute serious medical needs, he has
not stated facts to demonstrate that Warden Edmark, the only
named defendant in his complaint, was aware of Wilson’s need for
care or treatment for those serious medical needs and denied him
care or treatment. 	See Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d
40, 47 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that supervisors may be held
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only for their own actions or
inactions, amounting to deliberate indifference). 	Accordingly,
Wilson has failed to allege adequate facts to demonstrate an
Eighth Amendment claim against the Warden based on the denial of
medical care.
Nevertheless, the district judge should not dismiss
Wilson’s Eighth Amendment claim at this stage of the case. 	To
the extent he can identify the prison medical personnel who
denied, withheld, or delayed treatment prior to and/or after his
surgery, Wilson may be able to state grounds for relief under
the Eighth Amendment. 	Additionally, to the extent he can allege
specific facts that show Warden Edmark’s actions or inactions
constituted “ ‘supervisory encouragement, condonation or
acquiescence[,] or gross negligence . . . amounting to
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deliberate indifference’” to his serious medical needs, id.,
Wilson may be able to state grounds for relief against the
Warden, under the Eighth Amendment. 	In an Order issued
simultaneously with this Report and Recommendation, the court
grants Wilson leave to amend his complaint to identify the
proper defendants and allege whatever additional facts are
necessary to state an Eighth Amendment claim for relief.
II. 	Motion for Preliminary Injunction
A. 	Preliminary Injunction Standard
“‘A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy that is never awarded as of right.’” 	Peoples Fed. Sav.
Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2012)
(quoting Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now,
Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011)). 	“‘A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the
public interest.’” 	Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736
(2015) (citation omitted). 	Irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, weighs most heavily in the analysis. 	See
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).
The burden of proof is on the movant. 	See Esso Std. Oil Co. v.
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Monroig–Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006).
“Irreparable harm most often exists where a party has no
adequate remedy at law.” 	Charlesbank Equity Fund II, Ltd.
P’ship v. Blinds To Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 162 (1st Cir. 2004).
“A finding of irreparable harm must be grounded on something
more than conjecture, surmise, or a party’s unsubstantiated
fears of what the future may have in store.” 	Id. 	“To
demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiffs must
show ‘more than mere possibility’ of success – rather, they must
establish a ‘strong likelihood’ that they will ultimately
prevail.” 	Sindicato Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores v. Fortuno,
699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
B. 	Analysis
Wilson has shown neither irreparable harm nor a likelihood
of success on the merits to warrant granting him preliminary
injunctive relief. 	As an initial matter, this court notes that
claims relating to the alleged improper withdrawal of funds from
Wilson’s inmate account are not asserted in the complaint, have
not been pleaded in any amended complaint, and do not appear to
be properly joined with the Eighth Amendment claims in this
action. 	Cf. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in
different suits.”).
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Next, Wilson has not demonstrated that he has no adequate
remedy at law in the absence of an injunction, with respect to
his claims seeking the return of funds taken from his inmate
account. 	See Charlesbank Equity Fund II, 370 F.3d at 162.
Damages could be available, and the State of New Hampshire
provides a remedy for the unauthorized conversion of property by
a state employee. 	See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 541–B:9 (1999)
and 541–B:14 (2018).
Finally, Wilson has not demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits of any claim in this action. 	Rather, he
bases his motion on a claim regarding removal of funds from his
prison trust account that he has not sought to add to this case,
and which arises from incidents wholly unrelated to the facts
forming the basis of the Eighth Amendment claims raised in the
complaint.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should deny
Wilson’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. No. 4).
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. 	Failure to file specific written objections to the
Report and Recommendation within the specified time waives the
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right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos
v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
________________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
October 15, 2019
cc: 	Jarrell Wilson, pro se
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