Roy et al v. NH Department of Corrections, Commissioner et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Steven J. Roy
v. 	Case No. 18-cv-817-JL
Centurion of New Hampshire LLC;
MHM Solutions, Inc.; Dr. Edward
Dransite; Dr. David Anzel; Dr. Keith
Batchelder; Dr. Raj Pande; and N.H.
Department of Corrections Dental
Director Dr. Ingjerd Bergstedt 1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is Northern New Hampshire Correctional
Facility (“NCF”) inmate Steven J. Roy’s motion for a preliminary
injunction (Doc. No. 63), stating that, in retaliation for his
engagement in First Amendment activity, he lost his prison
computer job in October 2020 and was transferred for five days
to solitary confinement in Pending Administrative Review (“PAR”)
status. 	This lawsuit generally concerns the dental care Mr. Roy
has received at NCF, which he alleges has violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. 	The individual defendant NCF dental care
providers and their private employers who have appeared through
counsel in this action -- Centurion of New Hampshire, LLC; MHM
Solutions, Inc.; Dr. Edward Dransite; Dr. David Anzel; Dr. Keith
1 Other parties named in the complaint, not listed in the
caption of this Order, have been dropped from the case. 	See
Feb. 19, 2020 Order (Doc. No. 52) (approving Jan. 23, 2020 R&R
(Doc. No. 50)); May 9, 2019 Order (Doc. No. 25) (approving Apr.
24, 2019 R&R (Doc. No. 20)).
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Batchelder; and Dr. Raj Pande; and the official capacity
defendant, New Hampshire Department of Corrections Dental
Director Dr. Ingjerd Bergstedt (hereinafter, collectively,
“Dental Providers”) -- have objected to Mr. Roy’s motion,
arguing that they are not responsible for any of incidents
described in the motion. 	See Dental Providers’ Obj. (Doc. No.
64).
Discussion
I. 	Preliminary Injunction Standard
“[T]he issuance of preliminary injunctive relief is ‘an
extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of
right.’” 	Harry v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 3d
183, 186 (D. Mass. 2016) (citations omitted), aff’d, 902 F.3d
16, 18 (1st Cir. 2018). 	“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.’” 	Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736 (2015)
(citation omitted). 	Irreparable harm and likelihood of success
are the factors that weigh most heavily in the analysis. 	Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008);
Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 928 F.3d 166, 171 n.3 (1st Cir.
2019); Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now,
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Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). 	“‘[P]erhaps the single
most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted the
applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision
on the merits can be rendered.’” 	Voice of the Arab World, 645
F.3d at 32 (quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 2948, at 129 (2d ed. 1995)).
II. 	Irreparable Harm
“Irreparable harm most often exists where a party has no
adequate remedy at law.” 	Charlesbank Equity Fund II, Ltd.
P’ship v. Blinds To Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 162 (1st Cir. 2004).
“A finding of irreparable harm must be grounded on something
more than conjecture, surmise, or a party’s unsubstantiated
fears of what the future may have in store.” 	Id.
Mr. Roy points to his present inability to obtain a job at
the same level of pay, the ongoing restriction on his access to
prison computers, and the emotional distress and anguish he
suffered while confined in PAR status, as irreparable harm.
Such harms, however, appear compensable. 	Accordingly, Mr. Roy
has failed to demonstrate the existence of any harm for which he
would have no adequate remedy at law, as to which preliminary
injunctive relief may be necessary to avoid irreparable harm.
For that reason, the district judge should deny his motion for a
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preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 63).
III. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
“To demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits,
plaintiffs must show ‘more than mere possibility’ of success –
rather, they must establish a ‘strong likelihood’ that they will
ultimately prevail.” 	Sindicato Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores,
SEIU Local 1996 v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citations omitted). 	Here, plaintiff bases his motion
on claims of First Amendment retaliation that he has not
previously sought to add to this case, which arise from
incidents involving other individuals who are not parties to
this case, and that do not concern Mr. Roy’s dental care and
teeth, which form the basis of his existing claims in this case.
The standard that applies for deciding whether to allow new
claims and new defendants to be joined with existing claims and
defendants in a single case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), does not
work in Mr. Roy’s favor here. 	Cf. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d
605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (in general, “[u]nrelated claims
against different defendants belong in different suits,” to
“ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees,” and to
prevent them from avoiding exposure to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)’s
“three strikes” provision). 	Under such circumstances, Mr. Roy
has not demonstrated any likelihood that the new First Amendment
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retaliation claims upon which his preliminary injunction motion
is based could be properly, and successfully, joined and
litigated here. 	Accordingly, without expressing any opinion as
to whether Mr. Roy could prevail on First Amendment retaliation
claims in a new lawsuit against different defendants, he is
unlikely to succeed on such claims in this suit, and the
district judge should deny the motion for a preliminary
injunction (Doc. No. 63) on that basis.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should deny
Mr. Roy’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 63).
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. 	Failure to file objections within the specified time
waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
March 15, 2021
cc: 	Steven J. Roy, pro se
Anthony Galdieri, Esq.
Jonathan A. Lax, Esq.
Christina M. Wilson, Esq.
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