Emrit v. Musk, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Presidential Candidate Number P6005535 	)
“also known as” (aka) Ronald Satish Emrit, 	)
& Presidential Committee/Political Action 	)
Committee/Separate Segregated Fund (SSF) 	) 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Number C0056987 d/b/a United Emrits of 	)
America, 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
vs. 	)
)
Elon Musk, Vivek Ramaswamy, Speaker 	) 	Case No. 1:25-cv-008
of the House Mike Johnson, & Department 	)
of Government Efficiency, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit (“Emrit”) initiated the above-captioned civil rights action
against Elon Musk (“Musk”), Vivek Ramaswamy (“Ramaswamy”), Speaker of the House Mike
Johnson (“Speaker Johnson”), and the Department of Government Efficiency with the submission
of a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a proposed Complaint. (Doc. No. 1, 1-1).
For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed as frivolous
and for failure to state a claim. The undersigned further recommends that Emrit’s motion for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 1) be deemed moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Emrit is a resident of Florida and Maryland. (Doc. No. 1-1 at ¶ 5). He initiated this action
pro se on January 17, 2025, with the submission of an motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a
proposed Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-1). In his proposed Complaint, he asserts the following as
the basis for jurisdiction and venue:
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10.) According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1), Plaintiff is required
to provide a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,
unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support;”
11.) Because the court does not already have personal or subject matter jurisdiction
over this issue, it is necessary to engage in a brief discussion of the court's
jurisdiction so that the defendants can not move to dismiss this case based on
procedural grounds involving a lack of proper jurisdiction.
12.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1332, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Eastern Louisiana (as an Article III court) has jurisdiction over this matter because
there is complete diversity of jurisdiction between the Plaintiff and the four
defendants given that the plaintiff lives in Sarasota, Florida and no longer in Fort
Worth, Texas.
13.) As an Article III court, the U.S. District Court for the District of Louisiana also
has subject matter jurisdiction over the present case at bar because this proceeding
involves a discussion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, Fourth
Amendment, and Privileges and Immunities Clause.
14.) Therefore, a federal question is presented by the implication of the black-letter
law of the aforementioned federal statutes in addition to the discussion Constitutional
Law provisions.
15.) Venue in this jurisdiction is also proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. Sections 1391
and 1400.
16.) 	Because the amount in controversy does exceed $75,000 . . . this court has
jursidiction on the grounds of diversity and a federal question presented.
(Doc. No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 10-16). Next, he asserts that Musk, Ramaswamy, Speaker Johnson, and the
Department of Government Efficiency are violating federal law and the Constitution because they
are trying to: (1) “make one trillion dollars worth of budget cuts which would affect the lives of
African-Americans who received food stamps (EBT/SNAP benefits), SSI, SSDI, Section 8 housing
vouchers, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Women Infants and Children Programs
(WIC), and other programs subsidized by [the] federal government;” and (2) “abolish the U.S.
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Department of Education which provides grants and loans for underprivileged Americans trying to
get a college education.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 17 and 18). He further asserts “the American people
did not give a mandate to either Elon Musk or Vivek Ramaswamy to destroy the lives of many
Americans living in poverty” as neither of them are elected officials. (Id. ¶ 19). Finally, he asserts
that he has standing as he is disabled and suffers from a bipolar disorder. (Id. ¶ 20). He seeks: $500
billion in damages; an injunction requiring the United States Attorney's Office in Louisiana to file
criminal charges against Musk for “interfering with the American election”; an injunction to enjoin
the 	Department 	of 	Government 	Efficiency 	from 	using 	social 	media 	posts 	and 	policy
recommendations to affect and obstruct the Office of Management and Budget and Congress; and
an injunction to prevent President Donald J. Trump from creating the Department of Government
Efficiency without congressional approval. (Id. at pp. 6-7).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1915(e)(2) provides that, notwithstanding
financial eligibility, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 	28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). 	A complaint is frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a claim for relief contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” To meet this standard, a
complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Robinson v. Bridgeport Pub. Sch.,
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No. 8:16CV177, 2016 WL 3920167, at *3 (D. Neb. July 15, 2016) (requiring plaintiffs to set forth
enough factual allegations to nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible). In
applying the standard, the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and make
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594
(8th Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); Jones v. Douglas Cty. Sheriff's
Dep't, 915 F.3d 498, 499 (8th Cir. 2019); Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). On
the other hand, the court “will not supply additional facts, nor . . . construct a legal theory for
plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded” and "is free to ignore legal conclusions,
unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form
of factual allegations.” Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002); see also
Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817-18 (8th Cir. 2010) (“A pleading that merely pleads labels and
conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid
of factual enhancement will not suffice.”
Pro se complaints must be liberally construed. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.
2004). “Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious
that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged, and it would be futile to give him an
opportunity to amend.” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Having reviewed and liberally construed the allegations of the Complaint, the undersigned
finds that Emrit has failed to state a plausible claim and that this action is frivolous.
Emrit’s Complaint is flawed in several respects. First, the Complaint “fails to differentiate
among individual defendants and specify which defendants are alleged to have taken which
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particular actions.” See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1253 (10th Cir. 2008).
Second, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations that Emrit has been personally injured
by Defendants’ alleged conduct. Consequently, Emrit has not established that he has standing. See
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (explaining that the party invoking federal
jurisdiction has the burden to establish standing, i.e., the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in
fact” that has a causal connection to the conduct complained of and is redressable by a favorable
decision). “Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA,
568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (internal quotation marks, brackets, emphasis, and citation omitted).
Third, there does not appear to be the state action necessary to sustain a cognizable § 1983
claim. 	To state a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Emrit acknowledged in his Complaint that Musk and Ramaswamy “are not elected officials” and
that the Department of Government Efficiency is “a non-existent agency. . . not authorized by
Congress to be making decisions.” (Doc. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 9, 19). 	Thus, the state action requirement for
a § 1983 claim has not been met. 	See Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 492 (10th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that the “under color of state law” requirement is a jurisdictional necessity for a § 1983
claim).
Fourth, Emrit has not otherwise asserted a cognizable Bivens claim. “A Bivens claim is a
cause of action brought directly under the United States Constitution against a federal official acting
in his or her individual capacity for violations of constitutionally protected rights.” 	Buford v.
Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1203 n.6 (8th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. 388).
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Again, as Emrit acknowledged in his Complaint, neither Musk nor Ramaswamy are elected officials
and the Department of Government Efficiency is a non-existent agency.1
Fifth, this district is not a proper venue. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be
brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides when all defendants are residents
of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred; or (3) if there is no district in which an action
may otherwise be brought, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's
personal jurisdiction with respect to the action. It is not entirely clear whether Emrit was intending
to file this action in the Eastern District of Louisiana or whether his references to the Eastern District
of Louisiana in the “Jurisdiction and Venue” section of his Complaint were a scrivener’s error.
Regardless, venue is not proper in this Court under § 1391(b). Defendants do not reside in North
Dakota, Emrit does not allege that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his
claims occurred in North Dakota, and the Complaint is devoid of any allegations to support this
Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Given that the Complaint fails to state a
claim, the interests of justice would not be served by transferring this action to the Eastern District
of Louisiana. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Sixth, there are not sufficient facts alleged in the Complaint to support this Court’s the
exercise of personal jurisdiction Defendants. Due process requires that the defendant “purposefully
established minimum contacts within the forum State” and that the “assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
1 If the Department of Government Efficiency was an official agency of the United States government, Emrit’s
claims against it would likely be barred.. See Buford v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1998) (“It is well settled
that a Bivens action cannot be prosecuted against the United States and its agencies because of sovereign immunity.”)
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462, 476 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). Neither Emrit
nor Defendants resides in or appear to have any connection to North Dakota.
IV. 	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Finding that Emrit has failed to state a plausible claim and that this action is frivolous, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action without prejudice and deem
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 1) MOOT.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to D.N.D. Civil L.R. 72.1(D)(3), object to this recommendation are due by
February 18, 2025. Failure to file appropriate objections may result in recommended action without
further notice or opportunity to respond.
Dated this 31st day of January, 2025.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
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