Womble v. Honeycutt et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:26-cv-00059-MOC
EDWARD LAMONT WOMBLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
) ON INITIAL REVIEW
)
RONNIE L. HONEYCUTT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,
[Doc. 6], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis in this matter. [Docs. 2, 4].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Edward Lamont Womble (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State of North
Carolina currently incarcerated at Alexander Correctional Institution (“Alexander”) in
Taylorsville, North Carolina. On March 18, 2026, he filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, naming Ronnie L. Honeycutt, identified as the Warden at Alexander, and FNU Wilson,
identified as a Security Risk Group (“SRG”) Lieutenant at Alexander, as Defendants in this matter.
[Doc. 1]. Plaintiff named them in their individual and official capacities. [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff
purported to state claims against these Defendants for their alleged failure to protect him from
harm under the Eighth Amendment. [See Doc. 1]. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, failed initial
review for his failure to state a claim for relief. [Doc. 5]. The Court allowed him to file an amended
Complaint correcting the deficiencies within 30 days. [Id. at 6].
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is now before the Court on initial review. [Doc. 6].
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Plaintiff again names Wilson and Honeycutt as Defendants and now also names the North Carolina
Department of Adult Correction (NCDAC). [Id. at 1-2, 9]. Plaintiff does not allege the capacities
in which he purports to sue the individual Defendants. Plaintiff alleges as follows.
On January 1, 2025, Plaintiff requested protective custody from, among others, fellow
inmate Wallace Belfield, PID 0910762. Defendant Wilson denied Plaintiff’s request for protective
custody. [Id. at 4]. On July 14, 2025, two gang members, Belfield and inmate Tyler Nelson,
assaulted the Plaintiff on Green Unit, D-Block. [Id. at 3-4]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wilson
“had knowledge” of Belfield from the denial of the protective custody request, but Wilson failed
to protect to protect the Plaintiff by denying protective custody. [Id. at 4]. As for Defendant
Honeycutt, Plaintiff alleges only that Honeycutt was the Warden at Alexander, “had knowledge of
potential danger when [Plaintiff] filed for protective custody,” and violated the Eighth Amendment
by failing to prevent inmate assault. [Id. at 5].
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment based on
their failure to protect him from harm. [Id. at 1-2, 4-5]. Plaintiff claims he suffered various
physical injuries, including a broken eye socket, bleeding on his brain, pain, residual blurry vision,
and scarring, as well as paranoia, depression, and insomnia. [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff seeks monetary
relief only. [Id. at 7].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must review the Complaint to determine
whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, § 1915A requires
an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and the court must identify
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cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an
indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as
fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore,
a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear
failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law.
Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S.
166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).
Plaintiff attempts to name the NCDAC as a Defendant. However, “neither a state nor its
officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, NCDAC is not a “person” under § 1983. See Fox
v. Harwood, 2009 WL 1117890, at *1 (W.D.N.C. April 24, 2009). Plaintiff's claim against the
NCDAC is, therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
To the extent Plaintiff purports to sue Defendants Honeycutt and Wilson in their official
capacities, he has failed to state a claim for relief. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”
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Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because a state is not a “person” under §
1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen
v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore,
the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against the State of North Carolina and
its various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such,
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Honeycutt and Wilson in their official capacities do not
survive initial review and will be dismissed.
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause imposes on prison
officials a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners and other prison
officials. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Still, not “every injury suffered by
one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials
responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. To state a claim against a prison official for failure
to protect, an inmate must show: (1) “serious or significant physical or emotional injury,” and (2)
that prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” De’Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be deliberately
indifferent, a prison official must “know of and disregard an objectively serious … risk of harm.”
Id.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every reasonable
inference, Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment based on
the failure to protect. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Wilson denied Plaintiff’s request for
protective custody from inmate Belfield, who assaulted the Plaintiff over six months later, and that
Defendant Honeycutt “had knowledge” of the protective custody request. These allegations are
again insufficient to state a failure to protect claim under the Eight Amendment. That is, Plaintiff’s
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allegations are too vague and conclusory to show that either Defendant knew of and disregarded
an objectively serious risk of harm. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d
33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of material fact
are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader
must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the claim). Specifically,
Plaintiff must allege facts showing that the substance of Plaintiff’s request for protective custody
from inmate Belfield alerted Defendants to an objectively serious risk of harm, which Defendants
disregarded. The Court will allow Plaintiff one additional opportunity to amend his Complaint.
Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails
initial review, and the Court will dismiss it without prejudice. The Court, however, will allow
Plaintiff one additional opportunity to amend his Complaint to state a claim for relief, if the facts
support such amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails
initial review and will be dismissed without prejudice. The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30)
days to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses, to properly state a claim upon which relief can be
granted in accordance with the terms of this Order. Any amended complaint will be subject to all
timeliness and procedural requirements and will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment
will not be permitted. Should Plaintiff fail to timely and properly amend his Complaint in
accordance with the terms of this Order, the Court will dismiss this action with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails initial
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review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B) for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim
for relief and shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in accordance with the terms of
this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend
his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to so amend his
Complaint, the matter will be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Wilson and Honeycutt are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE as Defendants, and Defendant North Carolina Department of Adult
Correction is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as a Defendant in this matter.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner § 1983 form and to
add the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction as a Defendant in this docket in this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: May 13, 2026
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