Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:25-cv-00938-MOC
MOSTAFA SAID, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
)
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
____________________________________)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. 1], Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 35], Petitioner’s Response to Order to Show Cause [Doc. 47], and
Respondents’ Motion to Seal [Doc. 50].
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For efficiency’s sake, the Court herein incorporates by reference its previous Orders in this
matter. Briefly, for ease of reference, the following history and background are provided.
Petitioner Mostafa Said (“Petitioner”) is a native and citizen of Egypt. He fled Egypt due
to persecution and entered the United States on September 9, 2024, without inspection. [Doc. 1 at
¶¶ 1, 15; Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 4-5: Stephens Dec.]. On Friday, November 21, 2025, during a routine
ISAP1 check-in, Petitioner was detained by ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) in
Charlotte, North Carolina, apparently pursuant to an arrest warrant but without warning and
without a custody redetermination hearing (“bond hearing”). [Id. at ¶¶ 27, 29; Doc. 1-7 at ¶ 5; see
1 “ISAP” refers to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Alternatives to Detention-
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program.
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Doc. 8-1 at 6].
The same day, Petitioner, through his attorney Amro Elsayed, filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”), seeking release from ICE custody
or, alternatively, a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on the grounds that his ongoing detention
violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), §§ 236 and 241, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226,
and his constitutional due process rights.2 [See Doc. 1].
A few days later, Petitioner filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, asking the
Court to order Respondents to provide him with an individualized bond hearing pursuant to §
1226(a) or release Petitioner from custody under reasonable conditions of supervision (“First TRO
Motion”). [Doc. 3]. The Court granted Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief and
ordered Respondents to hold a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) within 48 hours of the Court’s
Order and enjoined Respondents from denying bond on grounds that Petitioner is detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). [Doc. 18 (“First TRO Order”)]. The bond hearing was conducted,
but Petitioner was not released on bond because he had “not met his burden to show that he would
not be a significant flight risk.” [Doc. 19 at 1, 4].
On February 3, 2026, Petitioner filed a Second Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (“Second TRO Motion”), seeking, among other
things, immediate release from custody under reasonable conditions of supervision or,
alternatively, release on bond; for the Court to continue an Immigration Court hearing scheduled
for February 5, 2026, on the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) motion to pretermit
2 Petitioner also sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order prohibiting Respondents from
removing or transferring the Petitioner outside the jurisdiction of this Court or the United States pending
adjudication of this case, which the Court granted on November 25, 2025, and extended on December 9,
2025. [Id.; Doc. 12 at 3]. This temporary restraining order expired on December 23, 2025. [See Doc. 12].
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Petitioner’s asylum application; and to enjoin Respondents from rearresting Petitioner should he
be released on bond or under conditions of supervision. [Doc. 22]. Given the immediacy of the
February 5 hearing and based on the representations made by the Petitioner regarding the conduct
of the bond hearing, the Court granted Petitioner’s Second TRO Motion, in part, ordering that the
February 5 hearing be continued and enjoining the Immigration Court from issuing, enforcing, or
executing any order of removal until this habeas action is fully adjudicated. [Doc. 24 at 11
(“Second TRO Order”)].
The parties fully briefed the matter, and Respondents filed the audio recording of the bond
hearing. At the hearing on the Second TRO Motion, the Court listened to the audio recording of
the bond hearing and heard the arguments of the parties on Petitioner’s motion for injunctive relief.
About ten days after this Court’s hearing, Respondents filed a transcript of the bond hearing and a
supplemental brief. [Docs. 32-1, 33]. In reply, Petitioner stated that he appeared at a second bond
hearing on February 23, 2026, before a different Immigration Judge, IJ Harness, where bond was
again denied. [Doc. 34 at 6; Doc. 34-1]. Petitioner provided a copy of the IJ’s Order denying
bond. [Doc. 34-1]. Other than claiming that IJ Harness’ Order “contradicted” putative
discrepancies that Petitioner identified in the Log of Petitioner’s ISAP violations,3 Petitioner did
not identify any errors or otherwise take issue with this second bond redetermination hearing. [See
3 That is, the Log of Petitioner’s ISAP violations, which Respondents initially asserted as grounds to
terminate Petitioner’s humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and arrest him, indicates that
Petitioner is in “expedited removal” proceedings, which Petitioner states is “demonstrably incorrect.” [Doc.
8-1 at 19: Log; Doc. 34 at 6]. Once the Court noted Respondents’ failure to allege or demonstrate
compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) [Doc. 9 at 2], which requires written notice that the purposes of
a particular noncitizen’s parole have been met or that the statutorily-provided reasons for parole no longer
exist after “an individualized review,” Darwich v. Kemerling, 1:25-CV-1162, 2026 WL 170801, at *7
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 22, 2026) (citation omitted), in revoking Petitioner’s parole, Respondents argued that
Petitioner was actually arrested after his humanitarian parole, which was granted on November 6, 2024,
automatically terminated after one year. [Doc. 10]. Under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(ii), written notice of
automatic termination is not required.
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Doc. 34 at 6; see also Doc. 41 at 21, n.6 (noting the discrepancy appears to be nothing more than
an administrative error)].
On April 2, 2026, as further set forth in its Order (the “Order”), the Court denied the
remaining portion of the Second TRO Motion as moot. [Doc. 41]. Although the Court determined
that Plaintiff’s due process rights were violated in the conduct of the court-ordered bond hearing
before Judge Ward, the Court found that the second bond hearing before Judge Harness comported
with due process. [Id. at 20-21]. Although noting that it likely would have reached a different
conclusion regarding Petitioner’s risk of flight, the Court was “constrained not to second guess
and substitute its own judgment for that of the Immigration Judge.” [Id. at 21]. The Court,
therefore, denied Petitioner’s motion for injunctive relief as moot. [Id.]. The Court, however,
extended its order enjoining the Immigration Court from issuing, enforcing, or executing any order
of removal until this habeas action is fully adjudicated pending further orders of this Court. [Id.
at 21-22].
Meanwhile, on March 11, 2026, the Respondents moved to dismiss or, alternatively, for
summary judgment on the Petition on the grounds stated in the motion. [Doc. 35]. Petitioner
responded in opposition to Respondents’ motion to dismiss, arguing among other things that the
bond hearings in this case “were not conducted in good faith but instead reflect a broader pattern
of undermining habeas relief.” [Doc. 39 at 9-10]. Two days later, the Court entered the Order
denying preliminary injunctive relief, holding among other things that the second bond hearing
comported with due process. [Doc. 41; see Doc. 22]. Thereafter, Respondents replied to
Petitioner’s opposition to their motion to dismiss, arguing that the Order, along with previous
action by the Court, effectively adjudicated most of the relief sought by the Petitioner in the
Petition and that the remaining issue(s) can be decided as a matter of law. [See Doc. 43]. The
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Court ordered the Petitioner to show cause why the Petition should not be dismissed in light of the
Order. [Doc. 45].
Petitioner responded. [Doc. 47]. Petitioner does not address Respondents’ mootness
argument. [See id.]. Rather, he argues that his de facto mandatory detention remains unlawful.
[Id. at 1, 6-7]. Alternatively, he asks the Court to grant leave to amend his Petition “to address
Respondents’ newly asserted parole-expiration theory” where the statutory purpose underlying his
parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) has not been served. [Id. at 8-10].
The Court also ordered Petitioner to update it on the status of his immigration proceedings.
[Doc. 45 at 2]. Among other things, Petitioner reports that the parties had engaged in settlement
negotiations, which faltered due to DHS insisting on conditions that Petitioner cannot reasonably
accept, and that Petitioner has been transferred to Moshannon Valley Processing Center in
Pennsylvania. [Doc. 46]. Recently, Respondents informed the Court that the Immigration Court
held a merits hearing on July 1, 2026, and rendered a merits decision in Petitioner’s immigration
proceedings. [Docs. 48, 49]. Respondents have also filed a consent motion to seal certain
documents related to those proceedings [Doc. 50], which the Court addresses below.
This matter is ripe for adjudication.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Mootness
Mootness “goes to the heart of the Article III jurisdiction of the courts.” Suarez Corp.
Indus. V. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 228 (4th Cir. 1997). See Arizonians for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (“To qualify as a case fit for
federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely
at the time the complaint is filed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] federal court has no
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authority ‘to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology
of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (quoting Mills v.
Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 133, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895)). A claim may be mooted “when
the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). “A
change in factual circumstances can moot a case,” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 809 (4th
Cir. 2013), such as “when an event occurs that makes it impossible for the court to grant any
effectual relief to the plaintiff,” Id. (citing Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S.
9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992)).
In his Petition, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to release
him from custody or to provide him with a prompt bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), a
declaration that Matter of Yajure-Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025),4 is unlawful as applied
to Petitioner and inconsistent with the INA and the Due Process Clause, and an award of attorney’s
fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. [Doc. 1
at 12].
Respondents argue that the crux of the relief sought by Petitioner, that is, a constitutionally
adequate bond hearing under § 1226(a), is moot where the Court determined Petitioner’s second
4 In Matter of Yajure-Hurtado, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that individuals who entered
without inspection are “applicants for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) for the duration of their removal proceedings. 29 I&N at 220. The United States has adopted
this position to categorically deny bond eligibility to noncitizens like the Petitioner. The Circuits are split
on the issue. See Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026) (upholding mandatory detention);
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026) (same). Cf. Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175
F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026) (bond hearing required); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026)
(same); Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 175 F.4th 828 (7th Cir. 2026) (same); Alvarez v.
Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026) (same). The Fourth Circuit has not yet
weighed in.
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bond hearing comported with due process and effectively rejected Petitioner’s request for
immediate release on bond or other supervised conditions. [Doc. 43 at 3-5]. Moreover, in ordering
a bond hearing under § 1226(a), the Court determined that Matter of Yajure-Hurtado was unlawful
as applied to Petitioner. [Id. at 4-5]. Respondents further contend that the preliminary injunction
should be lifted because there is no longer a reason to preserve the Court’s jurisdiction by
prohibiting Petitioner’s transfer. [Id. at 4].
As noted, Petitioner does not counter Respondents’ mootness argument. [See Doc. 47].
Rather, he contends that his detention “is not truly discretionary” because it generally resulted from
“a system in which release under § 1226(a) exists in theory only,” [id. at 7], and, in passing fashion,
argues that “the denial of his release on bond was not meaningfully based on the record presented
before the Immigration Judge,” [id. (citing Doc. 34)].
While the Petitioner may disagree with the Court’s assessment of the second bond hearing,
the Court finds that the relief sought by Petitioner, other than his request for attorney’s fees, has
been resolved and adjudicated by the Court and intervening events. See Eden, LLC v. Justice, 36
F.4th 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Win or lose, they have already received the ‘precise relief’ they
sought in this case: termination of the challenged executive orders.”). As such, as for these requests
for relief, Petitioner’s Petition is moot and will be dismissed on that ground.5
As for attorney’s fees, under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, “[a] court shall award to a
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses … incurred by that party in
any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of
agency action, brought by or against the United States … unless the court finds that the position
5 The Court, therefore, will deny Respondents’ motion to dismiss as moot.
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of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust.” Id., § 2412(d)(1)(A).
Petitioner asks for an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the EAJA. [Doc. 1 at
12]. In Obando-Segura v. Garland, the Fourth Circuit held that a habeas proceeding is not a “civil
action” under the EAJA and, therefore, affirmed the district court’s denial of a federal immigration
detainee’s action for attorney fees under the EAJA. 999 F.3d 190, 195 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting that
the “dual” criminal and civil aspects of a habeas proceeding, “as well as the differences between
habeas proceedings and normal civil actions, render habeas proceedings as a whole hybrid
proceedings and dictate that [petitioner’s] application for the writ of habeas corpus is not
unambiguously a civil action”) (internal quotations omitted). The Court is constrained to apply
Obando-Segura here and deny Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees under the EAJA.
B. Request to Amend the Petition
Alternatively, in his Show Cause Response, Petitioner asks to amend his Petition to assert
an independent claim for relief on the grounds that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful because
Respondents did not find that the purpose of his humanitarian parole had been served under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) before arresting him in November 2025. [Doc. 47 at 8-10]. Petitioner
argues that, despite relying on this provision to support Petitioner’s arrest and detention,
Respondents have never explained how the purpose of Petitioner’s parole has been served as
required by that provision. [Id. at 9-10]. Furthermore, Petitioner provides that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole – pursuit of his ongoing asylum application – has not, in fact, been served. [Id.
at 10].
In support of this new claim, Petitioner points to two cases, Seleznev v. Mullin, 2026 WL
907692 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2026), and Darwich, 2026 WL 170801. [Doc. 47 at 8-9]. In Seleznev,
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the petitioner, who had been granted humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and filed
an asylum application, was detained without an arrest warrant. 2026 WL 907692, at *1-*2.
Despite recognizing that the petitioner’s parole may have automatically terminated before his
arrest, the District Court concluded that the respondents deprived the petitioner of due process
under the INA by revoking his parole while petitioner’s asylum application remained pending,
noting that respondents made no contrary argument and that the parties had failed to discuss the
regulations implementing § 1182(d)(5)(A) or what protections respondents must afford petitioner
under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)-(2). 2026 WL 907692, at *6 & n.5. In so finding, the District Court
noted, however, that “[t]he automatic expiration of an individual’s parole typically determines
whether or not that individual is entitled to notice before their parole is revoked.” Id. at *6 (citing
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(ii)).
In Darwich, the petitioner, who had been released on parole pending exclusion proceedings
in 1992 and later applied for asylum and withholding of removal, was arrested at his home in
Charlotte in October 2025 without any warrant or order for arrest and absent any evidence that his
parole had terminated. 2026 WL 170801, at *1-*2. On November 3, 2025, after the petitioner’s
arrest, the ICE Field Office Director issued a letter purporting to terminate the petitioner’s parole
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which noted that “[n]either urgent humanitarian reasons nor
significant public benefit warrant [his] continued parole at this time.” Id. at *2. In ordering the
petitioner’s release, the District Court concluded that the petitioner was “in custody in violation of
the laws of the United States” because the government failed to terminate his parole by providing
written notice as required by 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) before his arrest and such purported notice
had no indicia of an individualized review. Id. at *5-*7.
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Because Petitioner’s humanitarian parole automatically terminated after one year [see Doc.
10-1 at 2], written notice after an individualized determination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i)
was not required. See A.A. v. Crawford, No. 3:26cv301, 2026 WL 1601798, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jun.
4, 2026) (explaining that notice and accomplishment of parole’s purpose are required for
termination of parole only where parolee is subject to a fixed period of parole that has not run).
As such, amendment of Petitioner’s Petition to assert a claim on the grounds sought would be
futile. The Court, therefore, denies this request.
The Court nonetheless is troubled by the heavy-handed manner in which the Petitioner’s
immigration proceedings have been conducted, beginning with his November 2025 arrest through
the conduct of the merits hearing despite the Court’s Order enjoining the issuing or enforcing of a
removal order. While the Petitioner has consistently raised important questions illuminating the
Court’s concerns, the Court is constrained to limit its reach to that allowed by the relevant legal
framework.
C. Respondents’ Motion to Seal
As noted, on July 1, 2026, the Immigration Court held a merits hearing and issued a
decision in Petitioner’s immigration proceedings. [Docs. 48-1, 49]. The next day, Respondents
filed a motion to seal (1) the July 1, 2026 Order of the Immigration Judge, (2) the referenced
citation to federal law, and (3) the supporting memorandum and filed those documents under seal.6
[Doc. 50; see Docs. 51, 51-1, 51-2].
As grounds to seal, Respondents state that the July 1, 2026 Order contains sensitive
immigration-related adjudicative information protected by federal law more specifically identified
in the Respondents’ sealed Memorandum. [Id. at 4; Doc. 51 at 4]. Respondents contend that
6 Respondents also filed a redacted version of the July 1, 2026 Order for the Court’s reference. [Doc. 51-
3].
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sealing is necessary to comply with federal law, protect Petitioner’s interests, and protect the
integrity of the immigration process. [Id. at 4]. Respondents argue that there is no alternative to
sealing and request permanent sealing. [Id.; Doc. 51 at 6]. In their sealed Memorandum,
Respondents also provide the information justifying sealing in accordance with LCvR 6.1(b)(4).
[Doc. 51 at 6].
Before sealing a court document, the Court must “(1) provide public notice of the request
to seal and allow interested parties a reasonable opportunity to object, (2) consider less drastic
alternatives to sealing the documents, and (3) provide specific reasons and factual findings
supporting its decision to seal the documents and for rejecting the alternatives.” Ashcraft v.
Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 302 (4th Cir. 2000).
In the present case, the public has been provided with adequate notice and an opportunity
to object to the Respondents’ motion. Respondents filed their motion on July 2, 2026, and it has
been accessible through the Court’s electronic case filing system since that time. Moreover, the
public’s right of access to the subject records is substantially outweighed by the competing interest
in complying with federal law and protecting the confidentiality of the materials, Petitioner’s
interests therein, and the integrity of the immigration process. Having considered less drastic
alternatives to sealing these records, the Court concludes that sealing the subject materials is
necessary to protect the implicated interests. As such, the Court will grant Respondents’ motion to
seal and order that Docket Nos. 51, 51-1, 51-2, and 51-3 remain sealed. The Court will, however,
order the Respondents to file the redacted version of the July 1, 2026 Order in the docket in this
matter, as it does not implicate the foregoing concerns. [See Doc. 51-3].
IV. CONCLUSION
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In sum, the Court will deny and dismiss Petitioner’s Petition, deny Respondents’ motion
to dismiss as moot, grant the consent motion to seal, order Respondents to file the redacted July 1,
2026 Order, and lift the Court’s Order enjoining the Immigration Court from issuing or enforcing
an order of removal.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[Doc. 1] is DENIED and DISMISSED in accordance with the terms of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 35] is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents’ Motion to Seal [Doc. 50] is GRANTED
and Docket Nos. 51, 51-1, 51-2, and 51-3 shall remain sealed and that Respondents shall FILE a
copy of the redacted July 1, 2026 Order in the immigration proceedings in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court’s Order enjoining the Immigration Court
from issuing, enforcing, or executing any order of removal until this action is fully adjudicated is
hereby LIFTED.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: July 7, 2026
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