USA v. Vasquez-Yax

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1:25-cr-00092-MR-WCM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
)
FELICIANO ISMAEL VASQUEZ-YAX, )
)
Defendant. )
________________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Defendant’s Appeal of
Order of Detention [Doc. 14].
I. BACKGROUND
On November 13, 2025, the Defendant was charged by way of a
Criminal Complaint with possessing a firearm as an illegal alien, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). [See Case No. 1:25-mj-00040-WCM, Doc. 1 at 1].
On November 21, 2025, the Defendant was arrested in the Northern District
of Georgia. On December 2, 2025, the Defendant was charged in a Bill of
Indictment with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). [Case No. 1:25-
cr-00092-MR-WCM, Doc. 5]. On December 2, 2025, the Criminal Complaint
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against the Defendant was terminated, and Case No. 1:25-mj-00040-WCM
was closed.1
On December 29, 2025, the Defendant made his initial appearance
before the Honorable W. Carleton Metcalf, United States Magistrate Judge,
at which time the Government moved for detention. A detention hearing was
held on January 5, 2026. At that hearing, the Government presented the
Pretrial Services Report, which details that the Defendant was born in
Guatemala; that he most recently resided in Morganton, North Carolina; that
he has a nineteen-year-old daughter who also resides in Morganton, North
Carolina; and that he was arrested in December of 2024 for a domestic
violence charge. [Doc. 9 at 1-2].
After considering the evidence and hearing the arguments of counsel,
the Magistrate Judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that no
condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably assure
the Defendant’s appearance as required and therefore ordered that the
Defendant be detained. [Doc. 12]. The Defendant now appeals that Order.
[Doc. 14].
1 Per this District’s usual practice, the Criminal Complaint was docketed as the first entry
in Case No. 1:25-cr-00092-MR-WCM, even though the Bill of Indictment [Doc. 5] has
become the operative charging document.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 3145 of Title 18 of the United States Code governs the review
and appeal of detention orders. This statute provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
If a person is ordered detained by a magistrate
judge, . . . the person may file, with the court having
original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for
revocation or amendment of the order. The motion
shall be determined promptly.
18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). In reviewing a motion to revoke or amend an order of
detention, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge’s Order de novo. United
States v. Stewart, 19 F. App’x 46, 48 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). In so
doing, the Court “must make an independent determination of the proper
pretrial detention or conditions of release.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
If the Court finds, after holding a hearing, that “no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required and the safety of any other person and the community,”
the Court shall order the detention of the person pending trial. 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e)(1).
In determining whether detention pending trial is appropriate, the Court
must consider the following factors:
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(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, including whether the offense is a crime of
violence, a violation of section 1591, a Federal crime
of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled
substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person,
including—
(A) the person’s character, physical and
mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length
of residence in the community,
community ties, past conduct, history
relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal
history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings; and
(B) whether, at the time of the current
offense or arrest, the person was on
probation, on parole, or on other release
pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or
completion of sentence for an offense
under Federal, State, or local law; and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any
person or the community that would be posed by the
person’s release.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
Turning to the first factor, the nature and circumstances of the offense
do not warrant detention. First, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) likely
does not constitute a “crime of violence” under the Bail Reform Act. See 18
U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B) (defining a “crime of violence” as an “offense that is
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a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense”); United States v. Ingle, 454 F.3d 1082, 1085-86
(10th Cir. 2006) (stating that a majority of Circuit courts have determined that
§ 922(g)(1) is not a crime of violence under the Bail Reform Act); United
States v. Clark, No. 1:13-cr-332-1, 2014 WL 791856, at *2 n.3 (M.D.N.C.
Feb. 25, 2014) (“It thus seems highly unlikely that, in this Circuit, [ֻ§] 922(g)(1)
would qualify as a ‘crime of violence’ under [§] 3156(a)(4).”). Second, the
Defendant’s underlying conduct does not trigger a presumption of detention
under the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2)-(3). Third, the
Government alleges that the Defendant only possessed firearms; it does not
allege that he engaged in violent or threatening conduct. [See Doc. 5 at 1].
Thus, this factor does not weigh in favor of detention.
Turning to the second factor, the evidence against the Defendant
appears to be strong. The Defendant freely admitted to purchasing the
handguns at issue and to not currently having legal immigration status in the
United States. [See Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 5, 9]. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of
detention.
As for the Defendant’s history and characteristics, the Pretrial Services
Report indicates that the Defendant does not have a significant criminal
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history. [Doc. 9 at 2]. As previously noted, the Defendant was arrested in
December 2024 on a charge of domestic violence, but he has not been
convicted of this crime. [Id.]. Additionally, the Defendant has filed a number
of letters of support that claim he has strong ties to the community and a
history of stable employment. [Doc. 15-3 at 1-15]. Thus, on balance, the
Defendant’s history and characteristics do not warrant detention.
Finally, the Court considers the nature and seriousness of the danger
to the community in the event that the Defendant is released. The
Defendant’s criminal history consists of only the domestic violence charge,
and no criminal convictions. [See Doc. 9 at 2]. Further, the Defendant’s
alleged conduct underlying the present charge involved no violence or threat
of violence. [See Doc. 1-1 at 1-4]. On the facts before the Court, the
Defendant does not appear to present a threat of danger to the community.
Thus, this factor does not weigh in favor of detention.
The Government primarily contends that the Defendant presents a risk
of flight. [Doc. 16 at 3]. It bases this claim on two arguments. First, the
Government argues that the Defendant has been offered—and has at least
preliminarily accepted—a financial incentive to self-deport. [Id. at 5]. The
Government therefore argues that the Defendant has a powerful motivation
to self-deport and not appear at trial if he is not detained. [Id.]. Second, the
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Government argues that the Defendant is subject to an ICE detainer and
therefore ICE may deport him or remove him to another jurisdiction before
the trial of this matter can be conducted. [Id.].
“[T]he Bail Reform Act considers flight as an act of volition; non-
appearance caused by the action of another entity—including a different
government agency—does not suggest that the accused chose to flee and
not appear in court.” United States v. Mejias-Mejias, 771 F. Supp. 3d 688,
692 (D. Md. 2025). Thus, an “immigration detainer cannot support the
categorical denial of bail.” United States v. Diaz-Hernandez, 943 F.3d 1196,
1199 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). However, the potential of a forced removal
remains relevant to the determination of flight risk “to the extent that the
potential removal provides incentive to an individual able to flee.” Mejias-
Mejias, 771 F. Supp. 3d at 692.
Here, the Defendant’s prior acceptance of the Government’s offer to
self-deport demonstrates that he is willing to flee the country. Further, the
charges brought in this case, plus the threat of involuntary removal, provide
the Defendant with a strong incentive to flee. Because the Defendant
appears to be both willing and incentivized to flee the country, the Court
agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Defendant is a flight risk. Thus,
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the Government has established by a preponderance of the evidence2 that
no condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably assure
the Defendant’s appearance as required.
Thus, upon reviewing the evidence presented at the detention hearing,
the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings, and concludes
that the Government has met its burden of showing that the Defendant
presents a danger to the community or a risk of flight.
Having conducted an independent review of the transcript of the
detention hearing and the Magistrate Judge’s Order of Detention, and having
considered the arguments of counsel, the Court concludes that the
Magistrate Judge’s Order should be affirmed.
O R D E R
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendant’s Appeal of Order
of Detention [Doc. 14] is DENIED, and the Order of Detention [Doc. 12] is
hereby AFFIRMED.
2 The Defendant argues that risk of flight must be established by clear and convincing
evidence rather than a preponderance of the evidence. [Doc. 15 at 4]. But Fourth Circuit
precedent forecloses this argument. See United States v. Stewart, 19 F. App’x 46, 48
(4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“With regard to the risk of flight as a basis for detention, the
government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that no combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the defendant’s presence at future court proceedings.”
(emphasis added)).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: February 6, 2026
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