Stevens v. Montreat College, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-00284-MR-WCM
RYAN CRAIG STEVENS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
MONTREAT COLLEGE, DR. PAUL )
J. MAURER, DR. DANIEL BENNETT, )
DR. DOROTHEA SHUMAN, and )
DR. RYAN ZWART, )
)
Defendants. )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the following motions:
(1) Defendant Montreat College’s Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint [Doc. 18];
(2) The Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint [Doc. 24];
(3) The Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to State the Deadline for Service
of Summons [Doc. 40];
(4) The Plaintiff’s Motion for Appropriate Sanctions [Doc. 41];
(5) The Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. 53];
(6) The Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended
Complaint [Doc. 54];
(7) The Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended
Complaint [Doc. 55];
_______________________________ )
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(8) The Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time [Doc. 56];
(9) The Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Deeming Defendants Properly
and Timely Served [Doc. 57];
(10) The Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Case [Doc. 58];
(11) The Individual Defendants’ Motion to Quash [Doc. 49]; and
(12) The Defendants’ Motion to Strike Fourth Amended Complaint
[Doc. 51].
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The lengthy procedural history of this case is detailed in prior orders of
this Court. [Docs. 21, 32]. It will therefore not be repeated in full here. The
Plaintiff Ryan Craig Stevens (“Plaintiff”) originally filed suit in Buncombe
County Superior Court on October 25, 2022, alleging several federal civil
rights claims related to his time as a student at, and his eventual expulsion
from, Montreat College. [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff names as Defendants
Montreat College, as well as Dr. Paul J. Maurer, Dr. Daniel Bennett, Dr.
Dorothea Shuman, and Dr. Ryan Zwart (collectively, “the Individual
Defendants”). On October 6, 2023, prior to service on the Individual
Defendants, Montreat College removed the action to this Court. [Id.]. The
Plaintiff thereafter filed his Second Amended Complaint, the now operative
complaint in this matter, on December 29, 2023. [Doc. 14].
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In his Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff brings claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his First Amendment rights to free exercise
of religion and free speech and for violation of his due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment; Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000c-2 to 2000c-9; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681; the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6101
et seq.; the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1964 (“FERPA”),
20 U.S.C. § 1232g; and 25 C.F.R. § 11.404. [Doc. 14].
Montreat College and the Individual Defendants now move to dismiss
the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.1 [Docs. 18, 24]. The Plaintiff
filed a response, which is primarily directed to the Individual Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss. [See Doc. 27]. Despite being given the opportunity to do
so [Docs. 26, 32], the Plaintiff has not filed any other responses, and the time
to do so has passed.
Having been fully briefed, this matter is now ripe for disposition.
1 In addition to moving for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the Individual Defendants also
move to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims against them pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), (b)(4) and
12(b)(5). Because the Court finds Rule 12(b)(6) to be dispositive of the Defendants’
motions, the Court need not address the Defendants’ arguments regarding insufficient
process, insufficient service of process, and a lack of personal jurisdiction.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) “is to test the sufficiency of a complaint
and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d
480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “must accept
as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” and must
“draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.”
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th
Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court need
not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, see Revene v. Charles
Cty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched
as factual allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or
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conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events,
United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.
1979).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewing the well-pled allegations set forth in the Second Amended
Complaint as true, the following is a recitation of the relevant facts.
The Plaintiff was a student at Montreat College from the beginning of
the Fall semester of 2019 through October 22, 2020. [Doc. 14 at ¶ 12]. The
Plaintiff alleges that during his time as a student, the Defendants forced him
to “censor his speech and religious expression on and off campus.” [Id. at
¶ 14]. This included “using preferred pronouns that contradict a person’s
biological gender” and “sharing the restroom and tent with someone of a
different biological gender.” [Id.]. The Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully
expelled because of his refusal to comply with Montreat College’s
“Community Standards,” which he alleges include “speech-restrictive,
overbroad, and vague” policies. [Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21]. In his Complaint, the
Plaintiff refers to several different instances that he alleges violated his right
to religious freedom, including Defendant Dr. Shuman “promot[ing] the
LGBTQ agenda” in her curriculum, telling Plaintiff not to pray for an individual
and then threatening the Plaintiff not to tell anyone that she had done so,
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and ordering him to change his speech topic “regarding the purpose and plan
God has for us.” [Id. at ¶¶ 27, 29, 30]. The Plaintiff also alleges that on one
occasion, Dr. Bennett greeted the Plaintiff by raising his voice and stating,
“What are you, 40! [sic]” [Id. at ¶ 33].
The Plaintiff describes additional issues with his assignments and
grades during his time at Montreat. [Id. at ¶¶ 44-47]. He describes an
incident where Dr. Shuman “forced [the Plaintiff] to take midterm exams
(outside of class time), when he was sick, even though a doctor’s excuse
was presented.” [Id. at ¶ 42]. In another instance, he alleges that Dr.
Shuman refused to give him feedback on a completed assignment even
though she provided feedback to other students. [Id. at ¶ 52]. He also
alleges that Dr. Shuman filed a complaint against him which led to Dr.
Bennett issuing the Plaintiff an interim suspension. [Id. at ¶ 54]. The Plaintiff
also alleges that Dr. Zwart sent him an “unprofessional email” and that he
failed to resolve an issue that the Plaintiff was having with submitting his
assignments online. [Id. at ¶¶ 56-57].
Finally, in November 2020, Montreat College notified the Plaintiff’s
employer of his dismissal from the Outdoor Recreation Studies Department,
which the Plaintiff alleges caused him to resign from his position as a
volunteer firefighter. [Id. at ¶ 59].
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983 Claims
The Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims are brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
establish three elements to state a cause of action: (1) the deprivation of a
right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3)
acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-
60 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Plaintiff brings constitutional claims against Montreat College, a
private educational institution, and the Individual Defendants, all of whom are
private parties employed by Montreat College. The Fourth Circuit has held
that a private party’s action can be treated as state action where “the private
party acts (1) in an exclusively state capacity, (2) for the state’s direct benefit,
or (3) at the state’s specific behest.” Modaber v. Culpeper Mem’l Hosp., Inc.,
674 F.2d 1023, 1025 (4th Cir. 1982). Nowhere in his Complaint does the
Plaintiff allege any facts showing that any of the Defendants were acting in
a state capacity, at the direction of the state, or for the state’s benefit.
Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to allege that any of the Defendants were
acting under color of state law, and his § 1983 claims must be dismissed.
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B. Title IV Claim
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act, codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2 to
2000c-9, is part of a statutory scheme concerning the desegregation of public
schools and does not on its own provide a private cause of action. Dai v. Le,
No. 23-30504, 2024 WL 415458, at *5 (5th Cir. Feb. 5, 2024). The Plaintiff’s
claims under Title IV therefore fail as a matter of law and must be dismissed.
C. Title IX Claim
Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). “In the Title IX
context, discrimination ‘means treating that individual worse than others who
are similarly situated.’” Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586,
618 (4th Cir. 2020), as amended (Aug. 28, 2020) (quoting Bostock v. Clayton
Cnty., Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 657 (2020)) (alterations omitted).
The Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that support a claim of sex
discrimination under Title IX. In fact, in his Title IX claim the Plaintiff presents
his allegations in terms of religious discrimination, asserting that “Defendants
acted deliberately indifferent toward Plaintiff, due to his religious expression,
speech, and age.” [Doc. 14 at ¶ 89]. Furthermore, the events alleged by the
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Plaintiff do not describe any instance of him being treated differently from
others similarly situated because of his sex. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Title IX
claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
D. ADA Claim
The ADA provides, in pertinent part, that “no person in the United
States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 6102. The ADA
also provides that:
(1) When any interested person brings an action in
any United States district court for the district in which
the defendant is found or transacts business to enjoin
a violation of the Act . . . , such interested person
shall give notice by registered mail not less than 30
days prior to the commencement of the action to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
Attorney General of the United States, and the
person against whom the action is directed . . . .
(2) The notice . . . shall state the nature of the alleged
violation, the relief to be requested, [and] the court in
which the action will be brought . . . . No action
described in paragraph (1) shall be brought . . . (B) if
administrative remedies have not been exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 6104(e).
The Plaintiff here has made no assertion that he has exhausted his
administrative remedies by giving notice to the required parties. Therefore,
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his claim must be dismissed on this basis alone. Additionally, the only
allegation that the Plaintiff makes that relates to his age is an incident where
Dr. Bennet said to him, “What are you, 40! [sic].” [Doc. 14 at ¶ 33]. This
seemingly isolated incident is not sufficient to state a viable claim for age
discrimination under the ADA, as it provides no indication that the Plaintiff’s
age was even a factor that led to the academic sanctions imposed against
him or to his ultimate expulsion. In fact, nowhere in the Second Amended
Complaint does the Plaintiff even allege what his age is.
For these reasons, the Plaintiff’s ADA claim will be dismissed with
prejudice.
E. FERPA Claim
FERPA’s statutory provisions do not create enforceable rights and
cannot support a private right of action. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 287 (2002). Therefore, the Plaintiff has no viable claim under FERPA,
and this claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
F. False Imprisonment Claim
The Plaintiff also alleges a claim under 25 C.F.R. § 11.404, which
provides that “[a] person commits a misdemeanor if he or she knowingly
restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his or her
liberty.” 25 C.F.R. § 11.404. This regulation, however, is part of a regulatory
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scheme that applies to the Courts of Indian Offenses and therefore is not an
available claim in this Court. 25 C.F.R. § 11.104. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s
claim under this regulation fails as a matter of law and must be dismissed.
G. Leave to Amend
After the Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a
Third Amended Complaint [Doc. 54], a Motion for Leave to File a Fourth
Amended Complaint [Doc. 55], and a Motion to Withdraw Case [Doc. 58].
Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court should freely
give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
The Fourth Circuit “ha[s] interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide that ‘leave to
amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be
prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the
moving party, or the amendment would have been futile.’” Laber v. Harvey,
438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co.,
785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir.1986)).
Here, the Court finds that any further amendment by the Plaintiff would
be futile, as the facts presented by the Plaintiff do not state any viable claim
for relief, and the proposed Third and Fourth Amended Complaints would
pose the same issues under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
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Court further finds that the interests of justice do not require granting the
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint for a third or fourth time.
The Defendants have already filed motions to dismiss and have otherwise
invested significant time and resources into defending this action, which had
already been pending for over a year when the Court allowed the Plaintiff to
file a Second Amended Complaint. [Doc. 4]. Allowing further amendment
would prejudice the Defendants, as they would have to conduct further
research and revise their pending motions to dismiss based on the new legal
theories presented by the Plaintiff. Finally, the procedural history of this case
and the excessive filings by the Plaintiff lead this Court to find that the Plaintiff
is acting in bad faith by attempting to further delay the inevitable dismissal of
his case. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s request to voluntarily dismiss this action
so that he may refile it at a later date must be denied as well.
For all of these reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third
Amended Complaint [Doc. 54] and Motion for Leave to File a Fourth
Amended Complaint [Doc. 55] will be denied. For the same reasons, the
Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Case [Doc. 58] will also be denied, and the
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. 51] will be
granted.
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H. Sanctions
As for the Plaintiff’s Motion for Appropriate Sanctions [Doc. 41], none
of the actions of defense counsel described in said motion warrants the
imposition of sanctions. To the contrary, it appears that counsel was
attempting to be cooperative and to resolve the issues with service with the
Plaintiff without either party having to make additional court filings. Indeed,
none of the exhibits the Plaintiff submits in support of his motion for sanctions
demonstrate anything other than respectful and professional conduct and
communication on the part of defense counsel. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s
Motion for Appropriate Sanctions [Doc. 41] will be denied.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
(1) The Defendant Montreat College’s Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint [Doc. 18] and the Individual Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 24] are
GRANTED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [Doc.
14] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
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(2) The Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to State the Deadline for Service
of Summons [Doc. 40], Motion for Appropriate Sanctions [Doc.
41], Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. 53], Motion for Leave to
File a Third Amended Complaint [Doc. 54], Motion for Leave to
File a Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. 55], Motion for Extension
of Time [Doc. 56], Motion for Order Deeming Defendants
Properly and Timely Served [Doc. 57], Motion to Withdraw Case
[Doc. 58] are DENIED; and
(3) The Individual Defendants’ Motion to Quash [Doc. 49] and
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc.
51] are GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate this civil action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: November 4, 2024
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