9:24-cv-00160•Thornton et al v. Brandon et al
Texte intégral
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA MISSOULA DIVISION THORCO, INC., Debtor. DENNIS THORNTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. BRANDON, et al., Defendants-Appellees. CV 24-160-M-DWM ORDER This bankruptcy appeal arises from an underlying Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. (See Doc. 1; Notice of Appeal, 9:22-bk-90119-WLH (Bnkr. D. Mont. 2024), Doc. 425.)1 From this proceeding, Dennis Thornton and Thorco Inc., debtor, appealed seven orders. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Six of the appealed orders were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 25 at 5-7.) The appeal of the seventh order proceeded. In that order, the Bankruptcy Court, inter alia, granted the motion to approve a proposed settlement of the adversary proceeding, 1 The underlying bankruptcy proceedings are cited as: Bnkr. [Docket No.]. 1 Case 9:24-cv-00160-DWM Document 72 Filed 12/17/25 Page 1 of 15
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
THORCO, INC., CV 24-160-M—DWM
Debtor.
ORDER
DENNIS THORNTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
BRANDON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
This bankruptcy appeal arises from an underlying Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding. (See Doc. 1; Notice of Appeal, 9:22-bk-90119-WLH (Bnkr. D. Mont.
2024), Doc. 425.)! From this proceeding, Dennis Thornton and Thorco Inc.,
debtor, appealed seven orders. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Six of the appealed orders were
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 25 at 5—7.) The appeal of
the seventh order proceeded. In that order, the Bankruptcy Court, inter alia,
granted the motion to approve a proposed settlement of the adversary proceeding,
' The underlying bankruptcy proceedings are cited as: Bnkr. [Docket No.].
1
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(Bnkr. Doc. 295). (Bnkr. Doc. 415 (the “Approval Order”).) The appeal was then
dismissed and sanctions were imposed against Appellant Dennis Thornton under
Rule 8020(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. (Doc. 61 (the
“Dismissal Order’”).) Appellees Whitefish Credit Union, Neal Bouma, MO
Somers, LLC, and Ruis Glacier, LLC (together, “Appellees”) were ordered to
provide a detailed declaration with supporting documentation for their requested
damages, attorney fees, and costs. (/d.) Whitefish Credit Union seeks a total of
$31,309.50 in attorney fees and costs. (Doc. 65.) Neal Bouma seeks a total of
$26,211.00 in attorney fees. (Doc. 66.) MO Somers, LLC and Ruis Glacier LLC
seek a total of $8,269.50 in attorney fees. (Doc. 64.) Thornton seeks to stay the
award of sanctions pending his appeal and objects to the amounts requested. (Doc.
69.) Ultimately, the request for a stay is denied and Appellees are awarded the
requested amounts.
ANALYSIS
I. Stay of Sanctions Pending Appeal
Thornton argues that because he has appealed the Dismissal Order, (Doc.
63), the award of monetary sanctions against him should be “stayed or denied
pending resolution of the appeal.” (Doc. 69.)
“A district court ... has the authority to enforce its past orders even while an
appeal is pending.” Barnes v. Sea Hawai’i Rafting, LLC, 444 F. Supp. 3d 1215,
2
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1221 (D. Haw. 2020); Hoffman for & on Behalf of N.L.R.B. v. Beer Drivers &
Salesmen’s Local Union No. 88, 536 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that
“in the kinds of cases where the court supervises a continuing course of conduct
and where as new facts develop additional supervisory action by the court is
required, an appeal from the supervisory order does not divest the district court of
jurisdiction to continue its supervision”) Moreover, a district court may retain
jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters, such as attorneys’ fees and sanctions. See
Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1983); United
Energy Owners v. United Energy Mgmt., 837 F.2d 356, 358 (9th Cir. 1988). Here,
because sanctions were awarded in the Dismissal Order, (Doc. 61), which was then
appealed, (Doc. 63), it is jurisdictionally proper to rule on the amounts that
comprise such sanctions.
Whether a stay is warranted in these circumstances is a matter of judicial
discretion. Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012). In exercising
such discretion, courts are guided by four factors: “(1) whether the stay [movant]
has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
the [movant] will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the
stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4)
where the public interest lies.” Jd. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433
(2009)). Although the first two factors are “the most critical,” Nken, 556 U.S. at
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434, a “sliding scale” approach is applied where “a stronger showing of one
element may offset a weaker showing of another,” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d
962, 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting AJL. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d
1127, 1131 (Oth Cir. 2011)). If the first two factors are not met, the remaining two
need not be reached. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. The burden is on the party requesting
the stay to show circumstances that justify a stay. Nken, 556 U.S. at 433-34
(explaining that a stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury may
result). Because Thornton fails to carry this burden, a stay is not warranted.
a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Although the movant need not show “it is more likely than not that they will
win on the merits,” he must “at minimum” show that there is a “substantial case for
relief on the merits.” Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968. Thornton states the issues for
which he seeks relief on appeal are: (1) the Appellees lacked standing; (2) the
“vexatious-litigant designation” failed to satisfy the requisite test prescribed by
caselaw; (3) the imposition of sanctions was improper “without specific bad-faith
findings;” (4) reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1927 was improper; and (5) various
“procedural rules” were violated. (Doc. 69 at 2-3.) The Dismissal Order not only
found the appeal in this matter to be “defective,” (Doc. 61 at 8), but that it was
“patently frivolous” to the point of sanctions under Rule 8020 being appropriate,
(id. at 10; see id. 8-13), and that Thornton had engaged in “years of abusive
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litigation tactics,” which continue in this matter, (id. at 12). None of the arguments
that Thornton raises on appeal pose serious legal questions as to these
determinations. Indeed, Thornton’s second, third, and fourth arguments fail as a
matter of law because he was not designated a vexatious litigant in the Dismissal
Order, the imposition of sanctions under Rule 8020 does not require bad-faith
findings, and the Dismissal Order did not impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927. As to his standing argument, Thornton improperly relies on cases that
address standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order, not defend against one. See
Matter of Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Pecan Groves Ariz.,
951 F.2d 242, 244-45 (9th Cir. 1991). Lastly, as to Thornton’s argument
regarding procedural rule violations, his reliance on Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure 9011 and 3001 through 3008, as well as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 17(a), is misplaced. These rules simply do not bear on the questions
presented in the underlying appeal or the disposition of those issues in the
Dismissal Order.
Because Thornton has not shown that there is a “substantial case for relief on
the merits,” Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 966, this factor weighs against a stay.
b. Irreparable Harm to Movant
A movant must also show that “there is a probability of irreparable injury if
the stay is not granted.” Lair, 697 F.3d at 1203. To determine such probability
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requires “anticipat[ing] what would happen as a practical matter following the
denial of a stay.” Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968. Thornton is correct that he would
be injured by the award of sanctions against him because he would suffer
“financial harm.” (See Doc. 69 at 5.) He further asserts that he is a “pro se litigant
without substantial resources.” (/d.) Notably, any financial harm that Thornton
faces is likely of his own making, as he has repeatedly initiated suits in numerous
jurisdictions.” Nevertheless, following the denial of a stay, Thornton would
certainly suffer financial injury as a practical matter. Whether this injury is
irreparable is a different matter. Lair, 697 F3.d at 1214. An “irreparable injury” is
“an injury that cannot be adequately measured or compensated by money and is
therefore often considered remediable by injunction.” In re Franz, 534 B.R. 378,
389 (Bnkr. D. Idaho 2015) (internal quotation and alteration omitted); compare In
re Fullmer, 323 B.R. 287, 303 (Bnkr. D. Nev. 2005) (explaining the loss of
“unique ... real property” is considered an irreparable injury), with In re Swartout,
554 B.R. 474, 478 (Bnkr. E.D. Cal. 2016) (explaining that an “economic injury
generally will not support a finding of irreparable harm”). A sufficient probability
of irreparable harm can be shown where judicial review is effectively prevented, or
2 E.g., Thornton v. Whitefish Credit Union, 455 P.3d 435 (Mont. 2019); Thorco,
Inc. v. Whitefish Credit Union, 492 P.3d 1228 (Mont. 2021); In re Thorco, Inc., 14-
bk-60633-RBK (Bnkr. D. Mont. 2014); Jn re Thorco, Inc., 7-bk-61219-BHP (Bnkr.
D. Mont. 2017); Thornton v. Whitefish Credit Union, 25-cv-54-M (D. Mont. 2025);
and Thornton v. Whitefish Credit Union, 25-cv-78-M-DWM (D. Mont. 2025).
6
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“effective relief” could not be afforded even upon prevailing on the merits. Leiva-
Perez, 640 F.3d at 969 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thornton can show
neither here, as judicial review will be effectuated because his appeal is currently
pending, and should he succeed on appeal, then relief can be granted. See In re
Estates, 2014 WL 12088558, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014); Harris v. United
States Bankruptcy Court, 2010 WL 11549715, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining
“suffer[ing] some financial difficulties by paying [a] sanctions award ... is
unlikely” to constitute “irreparable harm”).
Accordingly, because Thornton is unable to show a probability that
irreparable harm will occur, see Lair, 697 F.3d at 1203, this factor weighs against
imposing a stay.
ce. Substantial Harm to Other Parties and Public Interest
Because Thornton is unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits or
a probability that irreparable harm will occur, the remaining two factors need not
be reached. However, even if they were reached, both weigh against a stay.
As explained in the Dismissal Order, Thornton has engaged in years of
abusive litigation against the Appellees. (Doc. 61 at 2-6 (recounting years of
litigation), 10 (““Thorton’s appeal was patently frivolous”), 12 (“Thornton’s prior
conduct shows years of abusive litigation tactics.”).) Indeed, the Montana
Supreme Court has affirmed the state court’s designation of Thornton as a
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vexatious litigant, Thorco, Inc. v. Whitefish Credit Union, 492 P.3d 1228, 1230
(Mont. 2021), and the United States Bankruptcy Court has declared Thornton to be
a vexatious litigant as well, (Bnkr. Doc. 509, 22-bk-90119-WLH (Bnkr. D. Mont.
2025)). In the above-captioned matter alone, as shown in counsels’ time sheets,
Appellees have spent significant time and money defending a frivolous appeal.
Granting a stay would only increase such “substantial harm,” In re Frantz, 534
B.R. at 390, that Appellees have suffered.
As to the final factor, the public has a legitimate interest in judicial
efficiency and courts’ abilities to ensure justice. See In re Frantz, 534 B.R. at 390.
Frivolous litigation, particularly when a litigant is abusive in his tactics, derogates
judicial efficiency and offends justice. See, e.g., Ventress v. Kilgore, 2021 WL
1742246, at *2 (C.D. Cal Feb. 19, 2021); Labossiere v. GMAC Mortg., 2010 WL
4225544, at *1 (D. Idaho 2010). Thus, it is not in the public interest to stay this
matter.
IJ. Fees and Costs
Pursuant to the Dismissal Order, (Doc. 61), Appellees Whitefish Credit
Union, Neal Bouma, and MO Somers, LLC and Ruis Glacier, LLC have filed
declarations with supporting documentation to request a specific award amount.
(Docs. 64, 65, 66, 67.) Thornton opposes the award amounts as “exorbitant,”
“unreasonable,” “inflated,” and “unsubstantiated.” (Doc. 69 at 2, 5-6.) He argues
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that a single time entry that has been partially redacted in MO Sommers and Ruis
Glacier’s declaration,’ violated the requirement that billing be detailed. (Jd. at 6.)
He also quotes Laird Crowley, PLLC partner, associate, and paralegal hourly rates
and remarks that “[t]hese fees are ridiculous,” (id. at 6), without providing any
support for this assertion.
A district court has discretion to award just damages and single or double
costs as a sanction against bringing a frivolous appeal. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020(a).
This award may include attorney fees. In re Beham, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1043
(C.D. Cal. 2016). In determination of the appropriate award amount, a court must
“fulfill the deterrent purposes of Rule 8020.” Jn re Baroni, 2023 WL 4879843, at
*15 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2023) (quoting Jn re Sokolik, 635 F.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir.
2011)). In this determination, a court may “consider[] the broader context of
litigation.” Jd. at *14-15.
“The calculation of fees and costs under Rule 8020 is distinct from the
analysis of reasonable fees and costs awarded to a ‘prevailing party’ by statute, in
that damages must only be ‘just.’” In re S. Cal. Sunbelt Developer’s Inc. v. S. Cal.
Sunbelt Developers, Inc., 2009 WL 2138490, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 15, 2009) (citing
Sun-Tek Indus., Inc. v. Kennedy Sky-Lites, Inc., 865 F.2d 1254, 1255 (Fed. Cir.
3 The task for the 0.20-hour entry performed by Wavra and billed at $55.00 is
“Teleconference with client regarding [ACP REDACTION].” (Doc. 64 at 5.)
9
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1989)). The calculation of just fees and costs can include the “fees and costs
actually incurred . . . defending against [the] frivolous appeal.” Sun-Tek Industries,
Inc., 865 F.2d at 1255 (discussing a fee award under Fed. R. App. P. 38). In
evaluating the appropriate fee award, courts can also consider the portion of the
litigation “devoted to frivolous issues,” and the hourly rates charged in the relevant
community. In re S. Cal. Sunbelt Developer’s Inc., 2009 WL 2138490, at *2
(citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). A “trial court must provide
adequate explanation [of its calculation] . . . , but ‘a brief explanation of how the
court arrived at its figures’” is sufficient. Jd. at *1 (quoting Cunningham v. Cty. of
Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1988)).
a. Whitefish Credit Union
Whitefish Credit Union seeks $31,036.50 in attorney fees* and $273.00 in
costs. (Doc. 65 at Ff 13, 14, 15; Doc. 65-2; Doc. 65-2). To substantiate its request,
Whitefish Credit Union provides the applicable Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani
LLP partner and paralegal hourly rates, (Doc. 65 Jf 5, 8, 9), the billing records of
time spent defending the above-captioned appeal, which includes, inter alia, the
dates of time expended and billing, timekeeper, matter, applicable rate, billed
hours, billed amount, and description of work, (Doc. 65-2), the educational and
4 All entries included in the billing records have been billed, except the final entry
in the amount of $153.00, which at the time of filing was entered but not yet billed.
(Doc. 65-2 at 11.)
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professional background of counsel, Meagan P. VanderWeele, (Doc. 65 at Jf 6, 7;
Doc. 65-1 (VanderWeele’s Curriculum Vitae)), and the professional background of
the paralegal that worked on this appeal, (Doc. 65 at J 9). The fees incurred are
calculated based solely on work performed for the above-captioned appeal and do
not include fees for work performed in the related adversary proceeding, the
underlying bankruptcy proceeding, or the related appeals. (Doc. 65 at { 12; Doc.
65-2.) VanderWeele, a partner with Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, who has
been practicing for over ten years, has an hourly rate of $225/hour. (Doc. 65 at {J
6, 8). Her paralegal’s rate is $95/hour. (Id. J 9).
Vander Weele believes these rates are “reasonable and within the range of
usual and customary rates normally charged by attorneys and paralegals in
[Montana] for similar representation.” (Doc. 65 410). Based on recent attorney
fee awards in this District, she is correct. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm'n yv. Norval Elec. Coop., Inc., 2024 WL 4667265, at *6—7 (D. Mont. Nov. 4,
2024) (approving $325/hour for attorney with 17 years of experience and
$125/hour for paralegals); Victory Processing, LLC v. Knudsen, 2021 WL 587905,
at *4 (D. Mont. Feb. 16, 2021) (approving $350/hour for an attorney with 25 years
of experience, $300/hour for an attorney with 15 years of experience, $250/hour
for an attorney with 6 years of experience, and $180/hour for a new associate).
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Based on the record in this case, Thornton’s arguments that the requested fee
amount is unsubstantiated or inflated, or in some way unreasonable or exorbitant,
are meritless. The declaration and attached exhibits demonstrate that the requested
fee amount accurately accounts for VanderWeele and her paralegal’s time spent
defending this appeal at rates that are appropriate. The requested costs of $273.00,
which cover filings fees, are supported by the documentation as well. (Doc. 65-3.)
Accordingly, Whitefish Credit Union is awarded the requested amount of
$31,309.50 pursuant to Rule 8020(a).
b. Neal Bouma
Neal Bouma seeks a total of $26,112.00 in attorney fees. (Doc. 66 at 3.) In
support of that request, Neal Bouma has provided the applicable hourly rates,
(Doc. 66 at 2-3), the billing records of time spent defending the above-captioned
appeal, which includes, inter alia, the date of time expended, timekeeper, matter,
description of work, applicable rate, billed hours, and billed amount, (Doc. 12—14),
and the educational and professional background of sole counsel, Ward E. Taleff,
(Doc. 66 at 2, 5—11). In further support of his sought amount, Neal Bouma filed
the “Opinion of James A. Patten,” who is an attorney in Montana that primarily
practices “bankruptcy and civil litigation leading up to bankruptcy.” (Doc. 67.)
The fees incurred are calculated based solely on work performed for the
above-captioned appeal and do not include fees for work performed in the related
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adversary proceeding, the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, or the related
appeals. (Doc. 66 at 12-14). Tarleff’s hourly rate is $320/hour, (Doc. 66 at 3),
which is below the rates commonly charged by attorneys with his nearly 50 years
of experience in this District, (Doc. 66 at 3; Doc. 67 at 4). See Victory Processing,
LLC, 2021 WL 587905, at *4 (approving $350/hour for an attorney with 25 years
of experience). Based on the record in this case, Thornton’s arguments that the
requested fee amount is unsubstantiated or inflated, or in some way unreasonable
or exorbitant, is again meritless. The declaration and opinion demonstrate that the
requested fee amount accurately accounts for Tarleff’s time spent defending this
appeal at a rate that is appropriate. Neal Bouma is awarded the requested amount
of $26,112.00 pursuant to Rule 8020(a).
c. MO Somers, LLC and Ruis Glacier LLC
MO Somers and Ruis Glacier seek a total of $8,269.50 in attorney fees.
(Doc. 64 at 21, 23.) In support of that request, they have provided the applicable
Laird Crowley, PLLC partner, associate, and paralegal hourly rates, (Doc. 64 at 2),
the billing records of time spent defending the above-captioned appeal in a table
that provides the date of time expended, description of work, timekeeper, time
expended, applicable rate, and total billed, (id. at 3-21), and the educational and
professional background of primary counsel, Riley M. Wavra, (id. at 22), and
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another attorney (id. at 22 (Cory R. Laird)), that worked on this appeal, as well as
the professional background of the two relevant paralegals, (id. at 22).
The fees incurred are calculated based solely on work performed for the
above-captioned appeal and do not include fees for work performed in the related
adversary proceeding, the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, or the related
appeals. (Doc. 64 at 3-21.) Wavra’s hourly rate is $275/hour, Laird’s rate is
$325/hour, Hanninen’s rate is $120/hour, and Pace’s rate is $120/hour. (Doc. 64 at
2, 3-21.) These rates are within the range of commonly charged rates by attorneys
with similar experience in Montana. See, e.g., Victory Processing, LLC, 2021 WL
587905, at *4. The majority of the time billed defending this appeal was
performed by Wavra and Hanninen. (Doc. 64 at 3-21 (Laird only billed six
entries, totaling $942.50).) Based on the record in this case, Thornton’s arguments
that the requested fee amount is unsubstantiated or inflated, or in some way
unreasonable or exorbitant, are once again meritless. The declaration demonstrates
that the requested fee amount accurately accounts for Wavra, Laird, Hanninen, and
Pace’s time spent defending this appeal at rates that are appropriate. MO Somers
and Ruis Glacier are awarded the requested amount of $8,269.50 pursuant to Rule
8020(a).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Appellees are awarded the
following amounts pursuant to Rule 8020(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure and Court Order, (Doc. 61):
e Whitefish Credit Union: $31,309.50;
e Neal Bouma: $26,112.00; and
e MO Sommers, LLC and Ruis Glacier, LLC; $8,269.50.
Ne
DATED this uy day of December, 2025.
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