USA v. Chabot

9:22-cr-00018Mtd21 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
THERESA ANNE CHABOT,
Defendant/Movant.
Cause No. CR 22-18-M-DLC
ORDER
This matter was initially before the Court on federal pro se prisoner
Defendant/Movant Theresa Anne Chabot’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
her sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 68.) This Court engaged in a
preliminary screening of Chabot’s motion and determined that her ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, as pled, failed to state a claim under the standards of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See generally, (Doc. 69.) Chabot
was given 45 days within which to file an amended motion. (Id. at 7.)
Chabot failed to timely file an amended petition and failed to keep her
address updated. See e.g., (Doc. 70.) On August 25, 2025, based upon Chabot’s
failure to prosecute and comply with the Court’s orders, the matter was dismissed.
(Doc. 71.) On October 15, 2025, Chabot filed a motion requesting an additional 60
days to respond to the Court’s order of June 24, 2025. (Doc. 73.) Chabot explains
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that she was transferred multiple times and did not receive any documents from the
Court until they were forwarded to her at the end of August. (Id.) Chabot is
currently incarcerated in the Yellowstone County Detention Center. (Id.)
Chabot’s motion for extension was granted, in part. Chabot was given 45
days within which to file an amended motion and was advised that if she pled
viable IAC claims, the matter would be reopened. (Doc. 74.) Chabot complied by
filing an amended motion on the Court’s standard form. (Doc. 75.)
Analysis
The Court has considered Chabot’s renewed challenges to the validity of her
sentence. For the reasons explained below, the amended § 2255 motion will be
dismissed, and this matter will remain closed.
A. Legal Standard
“A prisoner in custody under a sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States […] may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To warrant relief under § 2255, a prisoner must
allege a constitutional, jurisdictional, or otherwise “fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” United States v. Timmreck, 441
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U.S. 780, 783 (1979)(quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939)). In
contrast, “[e]rrors of law which might require reversal of a conviction or sentence
on appeal do not necessarily provide a basis for relief under § 2255.” United
States v. Wilcox, 640 F. 2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1981).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Chabot presents nine claims which all fall under the broad umbrella of
ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). (Doc. 75 at 4-5, 7-8.) IAC claims are
governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Chabot must allege
facts sufficient to support an inference (1) that counsel’s performance fell outside
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, id. at 687-88, and (2) that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different, id. at 694. In
her amended motion, Chabot claims:
Claim 1: She informed McFarland that she wanted to go to trial, but
McFarland informed her she had no choice but to accept the
plea agreement and he failed to “counter” the plea offer.
Claim 2: McFarland failed to provide supporting documentation that she
had no contact with the victims, which should have led to a
minor role adjustment and significantly reduce guidelines.
Claim 3: McFarland coerced her into accepting a restitution amount
because it would eliminated the Government presenting a
witness at sentencing. Despite this, a witness was presented,
and McFarland was surprised and unprepared. She agreed to
the restitution amount under false pretenses.
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Clain 4: McFarland failed to subpoena medical records which would
have provided crucial health considerations for sentencing.
Claim 5: McFarland’s claimed his friendship with the Undersigned
would result in a lesser sentence and that his recommendation
would likely be followed.
Claim 6: McFarland failed to provide proof that Chabot fully cooperated
with the Government once she was notified that she was being
used as a money mule.
Claim 7: McFarland failed to object to Government’s argument at
sentencing, which included misleading and false statements.
Claim 8: McFarland misled Chabot about filing a Section 2255 motion,
he did not explain the process or the corresponding timeline.
Claim 9: McFarland informed Chabot to write a statement claiming to be
a victim instead of accepting accountability in her role,
angering the court and the Assistant United States Attorney,
resulting in a harsher sentence.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective
assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668. “The essence of an ineffective-
assistance claim is that counsel's unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial
balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the
verdict rendered suspect.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986).
As set forth above, to obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show both that his attorney provided deficient
performance, and that prejudice ensued as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 687-96. To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show that
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“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id.
at 688. A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a “strong
presumption” that counsel’s representation fell within the “wide range” of
reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. Thus, in evaluating allegations of
deficient performance the reviewing court’s scrutiny of counsel’s actions or
omissions is highly deferential. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effect of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. The defendant’s burden is to
show that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687.
In her amended motion, Chabot fails to show that the acts counsel
purportedly took and/or failed to take on her behalf were objectively unreasonable.
For example, in Claim 1, Chabot faults counsel for “coercing” her into accepting a
plea agreement and failing to counter the offer, these claims, however, are defeated
by a review of the change of plea proceedings. It was conveyed during the hearing
that the plea offer which Chabot was accepting was “the most favorable plea
agreement offered to Ms. Chabot in writing.” See, Change of Plea Trans. (Doc. 51
at 19.) Further, Chabot affirmatively advised Judge DeSoto that no one had
threatened her or coerced her into taking the plea agreement. (Id. at 51.) It was
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determined that Chabot was entering into the plea knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily, after engaging in significant discussions with counsel. Finally, Chabot
testified that she reviewed the plea agreement in detail with McFarland, as
evidenced by her initialing each page of the document and providing her signature.
(Id. at 16-17.) Thus, there is no indication that McFarland forced her to enter into
the agreement or that she was unaware of its terms.
Similarly, in Claim 3 Chabot states McFarland coerced her into accepting a
set restitution amount in order to avoid the Government putting on witness
testimony related to the loss amount at the sentencing hearing. But Chabot did not
agree to a loss amount in the plea agreement. The Government estimated the
restitution amount to be $5,281,735.35, but Chabot explicitly retained the right to
argue for a lesser loss amount at sentencing. See, Plea agreement (Doc. 16 at 2.)
This provision was specifically discussed during the change of plea hearing. See,
Trans. (Doc. 51 at 19-20.) Not surprisingly, restitution was a point of contention
during the sentencing hearing. Following Special Agent Anderson’s testimony, it
was ultimately determined that the proper restitution amount was $2,043,340.18.
See e.g., (Doc. 49 at 79.) There is no evidence of coercion or of Chabot accepting
a “set” restitution amount. Finally, to the extent that Chabot asserts McFarland
was caught unaware by Special Agent Anderson’s appearance at sentencing, the
claim is not credible. McFarland was notified of the Government’s intent to call
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witnesses nearly two weeks before sentencing hearing. See, Not. Sentencing
Witnesses, (Doc. 35.) There is no indication that McFarland performed deficiently
relative to imposition of Chabot’s restitution.
Relative to sentencing, Chabot contends that McFarland failed to present
“supporting documentation” that she had no contact with the victims, which should
have led to a minor role adjustment. Chabot does not identify this supporting
documentation or its contents. But the Court notes McFarland argued for a minor
role adjustment argument in the Defense’s objections to PSR, see (Doc. 42 at 29,
objection 10), and also during the sentencing hearing. See, Trans. (Doc. 49 at 6-8.)
In deciding how to rule on the objection, the testimony from Special Agent
Anderson was taken into account as it related to this issue. Ultimately, the defense
argument was rejected, and it was determined that a minor role adjustment was
inappropriate in Chabot’s case. See, Trans. (Id. at 77-78.) The fact that the
argument was not successful, and the objection was overruled, does not equate to
deficient performance by counsel.
Chabot next contends that McFarland failed to provide proof that Chabot
fully cooperated with the Government upon becoming aware that she was being
used as a money mule. Again, Chabot does not explain what proof she believes
should have been introduced. While McFarland made this argument on Chabot’s
behalf, it was at odds with the evidence and testimony that was presented
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throughout the proceedings. Specifically, there were indications that Chabot had
been affirmatively notified by various entities that she had been acting as a money
mule and, undeterred, continued to do so. The Undersigned observed, “[t]his
offense stems from you being utilized as a money mule for years and refusing to
stop, even after being informed by the Secret Service, the IRS and FBI, and
notification by banks of suspicious activity on your accounts prior to collecting
them.” Sent. Trans. (Doc. 49 at 94.) Relative to the facts and evidence in this
matter, McFarland did not provide objectively unreasonable assistance.
Finally, in Claim 9 Chabot states that McFarland urged her to write a
statement in which she claimed to be a victim, instead of accepting responsibility,
which angered the Undersigned and resulted in a harsher sentence. But the record
does not support a viable claim of deficient performance. First, Chabot did not
submit a written acceptance of responsibility statement. See, PSR (Doc. 42 at 13.)
Chabot not being a victim was an overarching theme of McFarland’s sentencing
memorandum and allocution. For example, during the sentencing hearing he
directly addressed this issue, stating, “[Chabot’s] aware of the impact that she has
had in this case, and that’s why it was a difficult one for me to even go into in this
sentencing memorandum because every time I thought I was explaining the
situation, it just sounded like excuses, and I know I’m not—she doesn’t need me to
make excuses for her.” Sent. Trans. (Doc. 49 at 82.) Thus, it is simply not
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believable that McFarland, as an experienced criminal attorney, would have
instructed Chabot to portray herself as a victim. Moreover, the Undersigned
observed that to the extent that Chabot indicated during her sentencing testimony
that she felt bad for the victims, it was not considered to be a sincere statement of
acceptance of responsibility. See, (Id. at 96.)
As to these five claims, Chabot has not made the requisite showing of
deficient performance. In deciding IAC issues, courts “will neither second-guess
counsel’s decisions, nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty vision of hindsight.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. “The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable
competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.”
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)(per curiam). The undersigned
presided over sentencing and observed that McFarland was prepared and appeared
to have pursued all pertinent avenues relative to sentencing. Chabot has not shown
that defense counsel’s performance fell “outside of the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Accordingly, this Court affords counsel the high level of deference required under
the prevailing professional norms. Id. at 689. McFarland did not perform
deficiently.
In relation to the claims, Claims 4, 7, and 8, Chabot cannot show the
attendant prejudice. While the Court is not suggesting defense counsel performed
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deficiently, even assuming Chabot could make such a showing, she cannot meet
Stickland’s prejudice prong. The second prong of the Strickland test requires a
showing of actual prejudice related to counsel's performance. In order to establish
prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
In Claim 4 Chabot faults McFarland for failing to subpoena medical records
which would have provided “crucial health considerations” for her at sentencing.
Chabot does not identify either the records or what crucial considerations would
have been gleaned from the records. Notably, Chabot’s medical information was
provided to the PSR-writer, and included in the report. See e.g., PSR (Doc. 42 at
17)(documenting Chabot’s overall poor health, a torn carotid artery following a
stroke, neck pain and major headaches, a back surgery which occurred in 2018, her
gall bladder removal in 2010, a hiatal hernia, and generalized back issues, in
addition to other health concerns following the birth of her second daughter).
Moreover, these same issues were discussed during sentencing and given the
appropriate weight and consideration as required in relation to the other 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. See, (Doc. 49 at 95.) Had McFarland obtained additional
records, which would likely be duplicative in nature, Chabot does not explain how
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the sentence would have been impacted by this information. Or, put another way,
Chabot has not shown a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to
obtain medical records, the sentence imposed would have been different. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
Similarly, in Claim 7, Chabot faults McFarland for failing to object to
“misleading” and “false” statements made by the Government during sentencing.
Not only does she fail to identify these statements, but she also fails to show
resulting prejudice, that is how the outcome of her sentencing would have been
affected by defense counsel’s potential objections. See, Strickland, 466 at 694.
In Claim 8, Chabot alleges that McFarland misled her about filing a Section
2255 motion, by not adequately explaining the process or the corresponding
timeline. But even if she was given inadequate advice, Chabot was not prejudiced.
She filed a premature 2255 motion which was dismissed, see (Docs. 53 & 55), and
she then timely filed the instant matter. See, (Doc. 68.)
Finally, to the extent that Chabot alleges McFarland claimed his friendship
with the Undersigned would result in a lesser sentence and that his
recommendation would likely be followed, see Claim 5, Chabot still does not state
a viable claim. She has not alleged facts sufficient to support an inference that
counsel performed unprofessionally or that there is a reasonable probability that
but for counsel’s performance, the result of the proceeding would have been
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different. See, Strickland, at 687-88, 694.
C. Conclusion
Chabot has not shown that McFarland provided unreasonable assistance or
that she was prejudiced. Further, Chabot has not shown the denial of a
constitutional right, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), she is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003), see also, Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Accordingly, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
1. Chabot’s amended motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 75) is DISMISSED. This matter shall remain
closed.
2. A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
3. The clerk shall ensure that all pending motions in this case and in CV 25-
93-M-DLC are terminated.
DATED this 21st day of January, 2026.
/s/ Dana L. Christensen
Dana L. Christensen
United States District Court Judge
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