Miesmer v. Jovanovich et al

6:25-cv-00052Mtd15 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

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However, the dismissal of Miesmer's state law claims is without prejudice to
refiling, should he timely complete the administrative procedure.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendant Johnson's motion is DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in
part. (Doc. 40.) His Answer must be filed according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.
2. Miesmer's state law claims against Johnson are DISMISSED, without
prejudice.
3. At all times during the pendency of this action, Plaintiff must
immediately advise the Court and opposing counsel of any change of address and
its effective date. Failure to file a Notice of Change of Address may result in the
dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
,�/....	DATED this� day of December, 2025.
10
o , District Judge
ates • ct Court
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

AUTHENTIC.
U.S. GOVERN

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION

BRANDEN MIESMER, Cause No. CV 25-52-H-DWM
Plaintiff,
ORDER

VS.

JOVANOVICH, ET AL.,

Defendants.

Defendant Vaughn Johnson has moved to dismiss Plaintiff Branden
Miesmer’s suit against him, for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 40.) The motion is
fully briefed and is granted, in part, and denied, in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Miesmer is an inmate at Montana State Prison, Deer Lodge,
Montana. (Doc. 27.) Briefly, Miesmer’s claims arise from an incident when he was
searched on suspicion of having hidden a weapon or part thereof in his rectum.
Miesmer alleges he was forcibly and brutally searched, despite denying there was
anything there, in violation of his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 27
at 7.)

When the object could not be retrieved by prison staff, Miesmer was taken
to Deer Lodge Hospital. (Doc. 27 at 16.) At the hospital, Miesmer was seen by

Defendant Dr. Vaughn Johnson in the emergency room. Miesmer alleges that he
]

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immediately “refused medical attention,” admitted that there was an address book
inside him, and asked to have time to pass it himself. (Doc. 27 at 17.) At some
point, an x-ray revealed a “large nonradiopaque tubular rectal foreign body”, which
Miesmer described as approximately five inches long. (Doc. 2-1 at 1 — 2.)!
Miesmer was not able to remove the object himself. Johnson told Miesmer that he
was going to “administer a cavity search.” (Doc. 27 at 17.)

Johnson manually attempted to locate the item, unsuccessfully, causing
Miesmer discomfort. Miesmer was given a sedative. Johnson then used a
speculum in order to get a better view to remove the item, but he could not see it.
(Doc. 27 at 18.) Johnson stopped, and Miesmer was discharged for return to the
prison, with instructions that he should return to the emergency department if he
had worsening symptoms. (Doc. 27 at 18.) (Miesmer’s description of these events
is considerably more detailed, but these facts suffice as background for the
discussion that follows.)

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must

accept the allegations of the complaint as true, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital

' This language is taken from the discharge notes attached to Miesmer’s original
Complaint, which is also referred to but not attached to his Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 27 at 18.) The parties dispute the import of this document, as discussed
below. The information is conveyed here to clarify that there was, in fact, a foreign
body, despite Miesmer’s previous denials.

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Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, (1976), construe the pleading in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). A plaintiff's
complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the court must
accept as true the plaintiff’s well-pled facts, conclusory allegations of law and
unwarranted inferences will not defeat an otherwise proper 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Vazquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007);
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A]
plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief?
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and footnotes omitted).

Ill. ANALYSIS

Johnson’s motion to dismiss asserts three contentions: Miesmer has failed to
allege an actionable federal claim against Johnson because Johnson is not a state
actor, the court should decline jurisdiction over Miesmer’s state law claims, and
any medical malpractice claims against Johnson are barred by Miesmer’s failure to

complete Montana’s Medical Legal Panel process. (Doc. 41 at 2.)

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In response, Miesmer contends, first, that Johnson’s motion is improper,
because Miesmer’s Complaint was ordered served by the Court. (Doc. 44.) Second,
Miesmer disputes whether the Court should review Johnson’s treatment notes and
asks the Court to take judicial notice of several Montana State Prison policies.
(Doc. 44 at 11.) Miesmer then extensively details the facts that he alleges support
the substance of his claims, which is irrelevant if, as Johnson argues, he is not a
proper defendant on a federal constitutional claim. (Doc. 44 at 12 — 16.) The crux
of this motion is discussed towards the end of Miesmer’s brief, when he addresses
Johnson’s arguments regarding when a private person can be considered a state
actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If Johnson is not a state actor, Miesmer cannot state
a claim for a violation of his constitutional rights against Johnson. Therefore, that
is where the analysis begins.

A. State Actor

As relevant here, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State [...], subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress[..]

Therefore, a claim under § 1983 requires: “(1) a violation of rights

protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately

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caused (3) by conduct of a person (4) acting under color of state law.”
Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Defendant Johnson moves to dismiss, in part, because he
was not “acting under color of state law” when he treated Miesmer.

A defendant acts under color of state law when he or she has “exercised
power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
49 (1988) (internal quotations omitted). “The state action inquiry boils down to
this: is the challenged conduct that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation
“fairly attributable” to the state?” Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir.
2020) (citing Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2013).)
The Ninth Circuit has recognized at least four different tests that aid in identifying
state action: “(1) public function; (2) joint action; (3) governmental compulsion or
coercion; and (4) governmental nexus.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092
(9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “Satisfaction of any one test is sufficient to find
state action, so long as no countervailing factor exists.” Rawson v. Recovery
Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2020).

“Before we can answer the question of whether Defendants acted under
color of law, we must identify the specific conduct of which the plaintiff

complains.” Rawson, at 747 (internal citations and quotations omitted.) The

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analysis here hinges on whether that specific conduct--Johnson’s attempted
removal of the object--was medical care or a search. Johnson construes it as
medical care. Miesmer calls it a search, and the Court must accept the allegations
of Miesmer’s Amended Complaint as true.

The allegations of the Amended Complaint regarding Johnson’s actions are
that Johnson said he was going to “administer a cavity search”, and Miesmer
“plead[ed] with Johnson not to do this”. (Doc. 27 at 17.) Johnson proceeded, and
over Miesmer’s continued objection, said that if Miesmer did not comply, “he
would go to Missoula where it would be much worse.” When Johnson said this, the
three Montana State Prison personnel who were there guarding Miesmer all stood
up, “as if to enforce this threat.” These facts allege the conditions of a search, and
not of consensual medical care.

Against this background, the question is whether Johnson’s actions thus
make him a state actor under one of the tests outlined above. The public function
test asks whether the challenged action is a traditional and exclusive function of the
state. Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1978). “Under the public
function test, when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or

instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.” Wright v.

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Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Loc. 503, 48 F.4th 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing
Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).)

A search for evidence of a crime (or to ensure security in a prison) is a state
function. There are other contexts in which a person might submit to a search, such
as of an employee locker, or a dorm room, but no other authority has the ability to
order a cavity search over an individual’s objection. Thus, “any deprivation
effected by Defendants here was in some sense caused by the State's exercise of its
right, pursuant to both its police powers and parens patriae powers, to deprive
[Plaintiff] of his liberty...” Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742,
752 (9th Cir. 2020). In Rawson, the plaintiff was a civilly committed person, but
the analysis is similar. “[I]f Defendants misused [their] power by demonstrating
deliberate indifference to [the Plaintiff's] rights [...], “the resultant deprivation was
caused, in the sense relevant for state-action inquiry, by the State's exercise of its
right to” search Miesmer. Rawson, 975 F.3d at 752 (citations omitted).

If Miesmer had come to the hospital with a foreign object in his
rectum and asked for it to be removed, that clearly would have been medical
care. If an unincarcerated person came to the emergency room with a foreign
object in his rectum and refused to allow its removal, removing it would
likely be medical malpractice, but it would not be a search or an exercise of

state power. In this circumstance, based only on the allegations of the

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Complaint, Miesmer came to the hospital for the purpose of a search and
was subsequently searched, over his objection.

This conclusion does not foretell anything related to Johnson’s
ultimate liability. A search of Miesmer in the prison context will be
scrutinized under constitutional standards, which are fact intensive. In
addition, development of the facts may eventually show that Johnson was, in
fact, only providing medical care, or his actions were not a search, and he is
not subject to a § 1983 claim. At this juncture, however, Johnson’s motion to
dismiss Miesmer’s § 1983 claim must be denied.

B. State Law Claims

Johnson also contends that Miesmer’s state law claims against him should be
dismissed because they are medical malpractice claims that have not been properly
presented to Montana’s Medical-Legal Panel. (Doc. 41 at 15.) Miesmer responds
that his claims are not medical malpractice at all, because he refused treatment,
and, thus, any “treatment,” was battery. (Doc. 44 at 20.) Johnson replies that, under
Montana law, even medical battery would be considered “malpractice.” (Doc. 46 at
11.)

Mont. Code Ann. § 27-6-103(5) reads:

[A] claim or potential claim of a claimant against a health care

provider for medical or dental treatment, lack of medical or dental

treatment, or other alleged departure from accepted standards of
health care that proximately results in damage to the claimant,

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whether the claimant’s claim or potential claim sounds in tort or

contract, and includes but is not limited to allegations of battery or

wrongful death.
Montana defines the claims subject to its medical malpractice statute
broadly, to include not only negligence, but intentional torts and contract
claims. As the statute is written, it is difficult to imagine a claim against a
medical or dental provider, related to conduct in the treatment context, that
would not fall under its scope.

Miesmer’s potential constitutional claims against Johnson arise only
because, for purposes of this preliminary motion, Johnson can be construed
as performing a state function of a search for contraband. As to any other
state law claim related to medical treatment—even if it is battery, by
conducting treatment that the patient to which the patient does not consent—
that claim is subject to Montana’s Medical Legal Panel Act. As such, these
claims must be dismissed, because Miesmer failed to bring the claims to the
medical legal panel prior to filing them in court. Mont. Code
Ann. § 27-6-701. Running Crane v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 3d 946,
955-56 (D. Mont. 2022) (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 27-6-701) (“The
MMLPA requires plaintiffs to file an administrative complaint and obtain a

decision from the MMLP before initiating a lawsuit in federal court.”). As a

result, Miesmer’s state law claims against Johnson must be dismissed.

However, the dismissal of Miesmer's state law claims is without prejudice to
refiling, should he timely complete the administrative procedure.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendant Johnson's motion is DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in
part. (Doc. 40.) His Answer must be filed according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.
2. Miesmer's state law claims against Johnson are DISMISSED, without
prejudice.
3. At all times during the pendency of this action, Plaintiff must
immediately advise the Court and opposing counsel of any change of address and
its effective date. Failure to file a Notice of Change of Address may result in the
dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
,�/....	DATED this� day of December, 2025.
10
o , District Judge
ates • ct Court
Case 6:25-cv-00052-DLC Document 48 Filed 12/15/25 Page 10 of 10

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