Montana Wildlife Federation et al v. Bernhardt et al

4:18-cv-00069Mtd17 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
GREAT FALLS DIVISION
MONTANA WILDLIFE
FEDERATION et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DOUGLAS BURGUM, in his
official capacity as Secretary of the
Interior, et al.,
Defendants.
CV-18-69-GF-BMM
ORDER ON
MOTION TO REMAND
Defendant U.S. Department of Interior (“Federal Defendants”) moves for a
voluntary remand of the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) leasing decisions at
issue in Phase Three. (Doc. 451.) Plaintiffs oppose the motion. (Docs. 471.) The
Court previously has allowed the State of Wyoming, Jonah Energy, LLC, Western
Energy Alliance, Anschutz Exploration Corporation, Inc., Peak Powder River
Acquisitions, LLC, R&R Royalty, Ltd., Continental Resources, LLC, Chesapeake
Exploration, LLC, and Rockies Resources, LLC to intervene as Defendants in this
action (collectively “Intervenor Defendants”). (Docs. 305, 365, 378, 402, 501.)
Intervenor Defendants generally support the motion. (Docs. 460, 463, 465.) The
Court held a hearing on the motion on December 1, 2025. (Doc. 499.)
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs challenge BLM’s issuance of the 2018 Instruction Memorandum
(“2018 IM”) on greater sage-grouse conservation and subsequent oil and gas leasing
decisions. The Court explained the background of this case in depth in the Phase
One and Phase Two summary judgment orders. (Doc. 147 at 1–13; Doc. 335 at 1–
3.) The Court will assume familiarity with the prior decisions and will summarize
only the outcome of the Phase One and Phase Two orders here.
The Court vacated the 2018 IM and three lease sales in Montana and
Wyoming for having violated FLPMA in the Phase One order. (Doc. 147 at 32.) The
Court found that Federal Defendants violated FLPMA as the 2018 IM presented
inconsistencies with the 2015 Resource Management Plans (“2015 Plans”). (Id.)
Federal Defendants appealed the decision. (Doc. 158.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the Court’s Phase One order in January 2025. (Doc. 416.)
The Court similarly vacated the 2018 IM and five lease sales in Nevada and
Wyoming for having violated FLPMA in the Phase Two order. (Doc. 335 at 4.) BLM
previously had sought voluntary remand of one of the Phase Two lease sales. (Doc.
207.) The Court denied the motion for voluntary remand. (Doc. 335 at 12–13.) The
Court determined that Federal Defendants had sought remand to avoid judicial
review. (Id. at 13.) Federal Defendants again appealed the decision. (Doc. 346.) The
Phase Two appeal remains pending.
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Phase Three consists of six Montana and Wyoming lease sales that Plaintiffs
added in their Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint. (Doc. 263.) The lease
sales at issue are the March and December 2019 Montana lease sales, the February,
September, and December 2019 Wyoming lease sales, and the December 2020
Wyoming lease sale. (Doc. 263.)
The Court entered a Scheduling Order for Phase Three that required Plaintiffs
to move for summary judgment by October 27, 2025. (Doc. 447.) The Scheduling
Order required Federal Defendants to respond and cross-move for summary
judgment by December 11, 2025. (Id.) Federal Defendants filed a motion for
voluntary remand on October 3, 2025. (Doc. 451.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A court possesses “broad discretion” in deciding whether to grant requests for
voluntary remand. Utility Solid Waste Activities Group v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 436
(D.C. Cir. 2018). A court must “weigh the seriousness of the agency’s errors against
‘the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed” when
determining whether to leave an agency action in place on remand. Cal. Cmtys.
Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit remands
agency actions without vacating that action only in “limited circumstances.”
Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015). The
agency must “establish an intent to seriously reconsider or re-review its decision.”
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Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Burgum, 2025 WL 1255145, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
21, 2025). A court may deny motions for voluntary remand under the following
circumstances: (1) where parties bring the motion in bad faith; (2) when the motion
proves frivolous, Cal. Cmties. Against Toxics, 688 F.3d at 992; or (3) where a
remand would “unduly prejudice” other parties, Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp.,
901 F.3d at 436.
DISCUSSSION
I. Whether Remand Proves Appropriate for Review of the Leasing
Decisions
Federal Defendants seek voluntary remand of the Phase Three leasing
decisions. (Doc. 451.) Federal Defendants further contend that remand proves
warranted to allow BLM the opportunity to reevaluate the leasing decisions given
several new legal and factual interventions. (Doc. 451-1 at 6.) Plaintiffs oppose
voluntary remand. (Doc. 471.)
A. Whether Federal Defendants’ Motion to Remand Lacks Good
Faith or Proves Frivolous
Plaintiffs assert that avoiding judicial review represents Federal Defendants’
primary motivation in moving for voluntary remand. (Doc. 471 at 12.) Plaintiffs cite
the Court’s decision in Western Organization of Resource Councils v. BLM, 2022
WL 3082475 (D. Mont. Aug. 3, 2022), as support.
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Western Organization involved a challenge to an agency’s analysis of its
resource management plans. 2022 WL 3082475 at *1. The court initially remanded
the challenged resource management plans to BLM for further National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) review. Id. BLM later completed a new NEPA
analysis of the resource management plans. Id. at 4. The new analysis failed to
address the previous inadequacies identified in the court’s remand order. Id. The
plaintiffs challenged the new analysis. Id. at *1.
BLM moved for remand without vacatur right before submitting its reply for
summary judgment. Id. The court denied the motion for remand without vacatur. Id.
at *4. The remand motion proved “frivolous and demonstrate[d] a lack of good
faith.” Id. BLM “fail[ed] to admit specific error or demonstrate which actions will
be taken to correct the infirmities” the court previously had identified. Id. The court
further determined that remand without ruling on “the merits of the case [] would
substantially prejudice Plaintiffs.” Id.
Western Organization proves distinguishable. Unlike Western Organization
where BLM moved for remand before submitting its reply for summary judgment,
Federal Defendants moved for remand before the deadlines had passed to submit
summary judgment briefing on the merits of Phase Three. BLM’s motion for remand
in Western Organization also happened after the court previously had remanded the
resource management plans for a more robust NEPA analysis. Id. at *1. The court
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rejected the new motion to remand as a lack of good faith because BLM earlier had
failed to resolve the inadequacies of the NEPA analysis. Id. at *4. The Court, by
contrast, has never remanded the leasing decisions to BLM in this litigation. Federal
Defendants have shown no lack of good faith in following the Court’s orders.
The motion to remand is also likely not frivolous. Federal Defendants present
plausible reasons to support the motion to remand. Federal Defendants assert that
significant changes in the law and certain changes in the facts warrant remand. (Doc.
451-1 at 6; Doc. 478 at 1.) The Court remains unconvinced that Federal Defendants
filed the motion to remand as a tactic to avoid judicial review on the merits.
B. Whether BLM Intends to Seriously Review Its Leasing Decisions
Federal Defendants first argue that the One Big Beautiful Bill Act
(“OBBBA”) changed how BLM must consider expressions of interest in conducting
its leasing processes. (Doc. 451-1 at 16, 18.) Federal Defendants further argue that
BLM’s revisions to the greater sage-grouse resource management plan may remove
or change the prioritization objective that stands central to Plaintiffs’ FLPMA
claims. (Id. at 21.) Lastly, Federal Defendants contend that new regulations
governing NEPA changed Plaintiffs’ NEPA claims. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiffs disagree
that the OBBBA and the potential revisions to the greater sage-grouse management
plan require remand. (Doc. 471 at 17, 18.) Plaintiffs argue that the changes and
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potential revisions would apply only prospectively to the leases and fail to invalidate
the 2019 and 2020 leasing decisions. (Id. at 20.)
A voluntary remand may prove appropriate where an “intervening event may
affect the validity of the agency action.” SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d
1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2001). An agency “ordinarily needs to profess intention to
reconsider, re-review, or modify the original agency decision that is the subject of
the legal challenge” for a court to grant voluntary remand. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity, 2025 WL 1255145, at *5. For example, the court in Keltner v. United
States denied an agency’s motion for remand where “the government’s primary goal
on remand [wa]s to write a better decision for a predetermined outcome.” 148 Fed.
Cl. 552, 565 (2020). The court in American Waterway Operators v. Wheeler
similarly denied a motion for voluntary remand where “[i]t appear[ed] . . . that [an
agency] would simply like a second bite at the apple” to reaffirm its prior decisions.
427 F. Supp. 3d 95, 98 (D. D.C. 2019).
Federal Defendants fail to demonstrate “an intent to seriously reconsider or
re-review [their] decision” on the Phase Three leases. Ctr. for Biological Diversity,
2025 WL 1255145, at *5. Federal Defendants suggest that remand potentially would
require BLM to reaffirm the leases by applying a potential rule that effectively would
cancel the prioritization requirement. (Doc. 451-1 at 16.) Federal Defendants also
point to the fact that the Department of Interior recently rescinded and amended
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certain NEPA regulations relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id. at 22–23, citing 90 Fed.
Reg. 12,690 (Mar. 19, 2025)). Federal Defendants cannot rely on new or potential
laws that would apply to future leasing decisions to demonstrate an intent to
reconsider or review seriously their previous decision. Courts “look to the
regulations in place at the time of the challenged decision.” Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Bureau
of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 36 F.4th 850, 879 n.5 (9th Cir. 2022).
The OBBBA would not govern the Phase Three leasing decisions. Id. The text
of the OBBBA expressly requires BLM to apply the OBBBA’s provisions
prospectively. Pub. L. No. 119-21, § 50101(b)(1) (2025). Federal Defendants also
have failed to demonstrate Congress’s intent for BLM to apply the OBBBA’s
provisions to past lease sale determinations. See Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian v.
U.S. Dep’t of Airforce, 128 F.4th 1089, 1100 n.3 (9th Cir. 2025). The Ninth Circuit
in Prutehi Litekyan specifically recognized that “Congressional enactments . . . will
not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.”
Id. (citation omitted). Federal Defendants seem to request remand as means to
provide a new rationale for reaffirming the prior leasing decisions. Keltner, 148 Fed.
Cl. at 565; see also Am. Waterway Operators, 427 F. Supp. 3d. at 98.
Federal Defendants next contend that the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, 605 U.S. 168 (2025)
supports voluntary remand. (Doc. 451-1 at 22.) Plaintiffs assert that the holding in
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Seven County fails to provide a basis for remand unless Federal Defendants identify
a flaw in the prior NEPA analysis that would warrant a correction or reconsideration
of the decision. (Doc. 471 at 22.)
Seven County dealt with the question of whether a circuit court followed the
appropriate standards of review in evaluating an agency’s environmental analysis.
605 U.S. at 179. The D.C. Circuit had vacated the U.S. Surface Transportation
Board’s final order approving an 88-mile railroad line across several counties in
Utah. Id. at 173. The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the agency for further review
and NEPA analysis upon ruling on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 173–74,
177. The U.S. Surface Transportation Board petitioned for certiorari review. Id. at
177. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that “deference” remains the “bedrock
principle” governing judicial review of NEPA cases. Id. at 1511, 1515. The U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged that an agency “will invariably make a series of fact-
dependent, context-specific, and policy-laden choices about the depth and breadth
of its inquiry.” Id. at 1513. The U.S. Supreme Court warned that “courts should
afford substantial deference” to an agency’s determinations “so long as [the
decisions] fall within a broad zone of reasonableness.” Id. at 183.
Seven County fails to support voluntary remand in this case. Seven County
involved a different question than the one presented here of whether Federal
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Defendants have demonstrated “an intent to seriously reconsider or re-review [their
prior] decision.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2025 WL 1255145, at *5. Seven
County fails to opine that a court should grant voluntary remand upon a motion by
an agency that it seeks to re-review its previous decision. Seven County suggests
instead that a court must apply “substantial deference” to an agency’s decisions
when evaluating the “reasonableness” of the decision. 605 U.S. at 183. The Court
can apply the judicial standards pronounced in Seven County when evaluating the
merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
Federal Defendants next assert that the facts of the case have changed
significantly. (Doc. 451-1 at 24.) Federal Defendants point out that only nine leases
among the 1,111 lease parcels sold have producing wells. (Id.) Federal Defendants
contend that remand would allow BLM to review leasing decisions where a
continued interest in leasing remains present, including any recent data on greater
sage-grouse populations and habitat. (Id.) The Court will not grant remand on this
fact alone. Federal Defendants remain free to present the fact that only a small
number of the challenged leases have been developed in their response to Plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment and cross-motion for summary judgment.
C. Whether Remand Would Be Prejudicial
Federal Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs will not suffer prejudice if
the Court grants voluntary remand and that voluntary remand will conserve judicial
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resources and resolve litigation. (Doc. 451-1 at 27, 29.) Plaintiffs disagree. (Doc.
471 at 24, 25.)
To remand the Phase Three leases at this late stage would unduly prejudice
Plaintiffs. See Util. Solid Waste Activities, Grp., 901 F.3d at 436. Litigation has
gone on for more than seven years. The Court retained the administrative record
for all six Phase Three sales. (Docs. 330, 331, 342.) Plaintiffs have filed their
summary judgment briefing. (Doc. 452.) The Ninth Circuit previously resolved
issues pertinent to Phase Three in its former decisions on Phase One claims: (1)
what the prioritization requirement entails; (2) whether BLM violated the
prioritization requirement; and (3) whether vacatur of the sold leases offers an
appropriate remedy for any alleged violations. Mont. Wildlife Fed’n, 127 F.4th at
42–46, 50–52. The Ninth Circuit’s decision necessarily streamlined the process
upon which the Court may determine the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
Remand would leave the Phase Three leases in effect without having
considered the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. The court in Chlorine Chemistry
Council v. EPA, denied voluntary remand without vacatur where remand would
have left the challenged agency regulation in effect while ignoring the merits of
plaintiffs’ claims. 206 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 200). The Court agrees with this
approach.
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Plaintiffs allege that the leases could threaten their interests in conserving
greater sage-grouse. (Doc. 471 at 26.) Plaintiffs also allege that greater sage-grouse
populations have declined “by 13-24% since 2013 across Wyoming and Montana.”
(Id.) Plaintiffs contend that oil and gas development of the Phase Three leases
would further reduce greater sage-grouse populations. (Id.) “The need for finality
in this matter clearly outweighs the government’s justification[s] for requesting a
voluntary remand.” Keltner, 148 Fed. Cl. at 565. Remand would fail to serve “the
public interest of allowing the agency to act more swiftly, given that the litigation
in this case has come to its close.” Western Org. of Res. Councils, 2022 WL
3082475, at *4; see also Rock Creek All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CV 01-
152-M-DWM (D. Mont. Mar. 19, 2002) (rejecting request by agency to leave
biological opinion in effect during remand to “re-work” it).
CONCLUSION
The Court denies Federal Defendants’ motion for voluntary remand. (Doc.
452.) Federal Defendants have not filed the motion for remand to avoid judicial
review. Western Org. of Res. Councils, 2022 WL 3082475 at *4. The motion to
remand proves prejudicial, however, to Plaintiffs and likely would not conserve
judicial resources. Id.; see also Keltner, 148 Fed. Cl. at 565. Plaintiffs deserve final
resolution of their claims.
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ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Federal Defendants’ Motion
to Remand (Doc. 451) is DENIED. The Court lifts the stay on summary judgment
briefing. The Court directs the parties to meet and confer to present any proposed
amendments to the deadlines for summary judgment briefing outlined in the Court’s
scheduling order. (Doc. 447.)
DATED this 17th day of December, 2025.
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