2:25-cr-00010•USA v. Punch
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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA BUTTE DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs. SHAWN MICHAEL SCHOLLER, Defendant. CR 25–10–BU–DLC–7 ORDER This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Shawn Michael Scholler’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 218) and Motion in Limine (Doc. 215). The Court held a hearing on the Motions on October 28, 2025. (Doc. 278.) For the reasons herein, the Motion to Suppress will be denied, and the Motion in Limine will be denied with leave to refile. B ACKGROUND In October 2023, the Southwest Montana Drug Task Force (“SWMDTF”) began investigating a criminal drug conspiracy operating in Montana, which later came to be known as the Punch drug trafficking organization (“DTO”). (Doc. 219- 1 at 2.) The DTO was suspected of sending packages containing fentanyl pills through the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) from Arizona to Montana and Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 1 of 13
2 various other states. (Id.) During the course of the investigation, over 60 packages were ultimately attributed to the DTO. (Id.) On April 4, 2024, the United States Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”), working in conjunction with SWMDTF, identified a package sent from Tempe, Arizona to an address in Butte, Montana, using Priority Mail Express (2-day shipping) and paid for using cash. (Id.) The address belonged to Scholler’s mother, Christine Daniels. (Id.) The package was addressed to a Nathan Daniels and was sent from a seemingly fictitious sender. (Id.; 219-11 at 30.) The listed phone number was (000)000-0000. (Doc. 219-1 at 2.) Prior to delivery, an unknown person allegedly called USPS and specifically requested that the package in question not be delivered to Christine’s address, but to a community mailbox located elsewhere in the apartment complex. (Id. at 3.) Law enforcement conducted a controlled delivery to the Butte address on April 5, 2024. (Id.) Law enforcement encountered Christine when conducting the controlled delivery. (Id.) Christine showed law enforcement text messages between her and Scholler in which he claimed the package was for a friend of his. (Id.) Scholler subsequently arrived at his mother’s house to retrieve the package. (Id.) Upon arrival, Scholler encountered law enforcement. (Id.) Scholler was interviewed and denied any knowledge of the contents of the package, claiming that he was picking up the package on behalf of a friend. (Id.) Law enforcement Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 2 of 13
3 detained Scholler, discovered drug paraphernalia on his person, seized Scholler’s phone, and applied for a warrant to search both the phone and the USPS package. (Id.) Law enforcement ultimately discovered the package contained 299 pills containing fentanyl. (Doc. 219-5 at 3.) Scholler was indicted on April 23, 2025, and was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 851 (Count I), and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 851 (Count II). (Doc. 22.) Scholler now moves to suppress the evidence gathered from the package and from his phone, arguing the warrants authorizing the searches were not supported by probable cause. (Doc. 218 at 1.) LEGAL STANDARD The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. Searches without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless an exception applies. United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961, 971 (9th Cir. 2021). “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (quoting Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 3 of 13
4 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, “a search warrant must not be overbroad; its breadth must be limited to the scope of the probable cause on which the warrant was based.” Blight v. City Manteca, 944 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). A search warrant affidavit demonstrates probable cause when, “under the totality of the circumstances, it reveals a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Celestine, 324 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003). Only a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found is needed, not certainty. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 238 (1983). D ISCUSSION I. Fourth Amendment Standing A person may challenge the validity of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment only if the person possesses a legitimate expectation of privacy in the places searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). “The burden of proof is on the defendant to demonstrate that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005). To demonstrate a “legitimate expectation of privacy,” a person must show that he or she has an actual subjective expectation of privacy in the invaded space that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., Concurring). “Letters and other sealed packages are in the Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 4 of 13
5 general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy[.]” United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). Both the named sender and addressees of sealed letters and packages may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the package or letter’s contents, even while in transit. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 n.12 (1980). Whether Fourth Amendment protections extend to packages sent by a fictitious sender or received by a fictitious addressee, however, presents a split amongst the circuit courts of appeal. United States v. Lozano, 623 F.3d 1055, 1064 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curium) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (observing an “intra- and inter-circuit split regarding aliases, particularly criminal aliases” used in lieu of an individual’s legal name). The Ninth Circuit has yet to render an opinion on the use of fictitious names when sending or receiving mail. Of the circuit courts of appeal that have addressed this issue, six out of seven hold that a defendant generally does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in mail when they are neither the listed sender nor the addressee. United States v. Stokes, 829 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Givens, 733 F.2d 339, 342 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rose, 3 F.4th 722, 728 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, No. 21-6186, 2022 WL 1131413 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2022); United States v. Daniel, 982 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 846 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 916, 920 n.2 (8th Cir. Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 5 of 13
6 1984); United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1994). Several circuits, however, recognize a so-called alias exception, wherein “[i]ndividuals may assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in packages addressed to them under fictious names” so long as they demonstrate the fictious name is an established alias. Rose, 3 F.4th at 728 (citing United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828, 834 (4th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Pierce, 959 F.2d 1297, 1303 n.11 (5th Cir.1992) (drawing a distinction between packages addressed to the “alter ego” of a defendant, and those addressed to individuals other than the defendant). The Fourth Circuit, for example, has twice held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a package not addressed to him or his alter ego, despite being the intended recipient of the package. See Givens, 733 F.2d at 342; Rose, 3 F.4th at 722. Indeed, “[t]he majority consensus of courts of appeal is that individuals have standing when the parcel is addressed to their alias rather than a real person.” United States v. Coma, 2024 WL 4164770, at *4 (D. Alaska March 7, 2024) (collecting cases). Conversely, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits recognize that a defendant may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in packages addressed to them under a fictitious name. See United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 454, 457–58 (7th Cir. 2003). In Villarreal, the court found this expectation of privacy existed even where the fictitious name was Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 6 of 13
7 not a known alias of the defendant. 963 F.2d at 774. However, the Fifth Circuit is split, and the court has also questioned whether an alias used solely for a criminal purpose confers Fourth Amendment privacy rights. See Daniel, 982 F.2d at 149 (a defendant does not have standing where an alias was used to protect defendant in the course of a criminal scheme). More recently, the First and Fourth Circuits have recognized that a defendant may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in mail where they are neither the listed sender nor recipient, at least absent some other indicia of connection to or control over the package in question. Stokes, 829 F.3d at 52 (noting that courts “have been reluctant to find that a defendant holds a reasonable expectation of privacy in mail where he is listed as neither the sender nor the recipient, at least absent some showing by the defendant of a connection.”). (emphasis added); Rose, 3 F.4th at 728 (reasoning that “[w]hen a sealed package is addressed to a party other than the intended recipient, [] that recipient does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the package absent other indicia of ownership, possession, or control existing at the time of the search.”). Specifically, in Rose, the Fourth Circuit found that nothing about the packages, including the named sender and addressee, the address, or listed phone number “signaled in an objective sense that [defendant] had a protected interest in the packages.” 3 F.4th at 729. The court also noted that the package was addressed to a deceased individual Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 7 of 13
8 lacking any established connection to defendant, and at the time of the search, defendant had not taken possession of the package. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to definitively address the question of whether a defendant maintains an expectation of privacy when using an alias or an otherwise fictitious name. The Ninth Circuit has, however, briefly addressed a variation of this issue in a 2019 unpublished decision, United States v. Johnson, 778 Fed. Appx. 474, 475 (9th Cir. 2019). There, the court found the defendant lacked standing to challenge a package search because he (1) was not the sender or addressee of the package, (2) was not on the lease for the listed address, and (3) did not claim the contents of the package as belonging to him. Johnson, 778 Fed. Appx. at 475. The Ninth Circuit concluded the defendant had failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package that society would recognize as objectively reasonable. Id. Though Johnson is not binding upon this Court, its reasoning is nonetheless persuasive and follows the trend of the First and Fourth Circuits—as well as at least one district court within the Ninth Circuit— who look to both the listed addressee as well as other indicia of control or possession over the package, including whether the listed name is an alias. See, e.g., Rose, 3 F.4th at 728; United States v. Morta, 2022 WL 1447021, at *8–10. (D. Guam May 9, 2022) (applying an “other indicia” approach to find that defendant lacks standing to challenge search of parcel). The Court therefore respectfully Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 8 of 13
9 declines to follow the approach articulated by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in Villarreal and Pitts. With the above standard in mind, the Court now turns to the parties’ arguments. Relying on Johnson, the United States argues that Scholler has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the package and therefore lacks standing to challenge the search. (Doc. 231 at 8.) The Court agrees. As in Johnson, Scholler was neither the sender nor the addressee of the package, nor was he on the lease for the listed address. Like Johnson, Scholler never claimed ownership over the package; rather, he consistently maintained—both in text messages to his mother and to law enforcement—that he did not know the contents of the package and was only retrieving it on behalf of a friend. As in Johnson, Scholler has failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Relying on Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, and Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, Scholler argues that “[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with a desire to remain anonymous when sending or receiving a package.” (Doc. 233 at 4.) Scholler is correct in that the Seventh and Fifth Circuits have recognized an individual maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in packages addressed to him under fictitious names, even if that name is not an established alias. However, as discussed above, because Villareal and Pitts represent a minority opinion in the circuit courts of Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 9 of 13
10 appeal and appear at odds with the direction of the Ninth Circuit, the Court declines to follow this approach. Scholler further argues that he used Nathan Daniels as his alias. (Doc. 233 at 4.) Black’s Law Dictionary defines alias as “[a]n assumed or additional name that a person has or is known by[.]” Alias, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). At oral argument, counsel for Scholler acknowledged he had not previously used Nathan Daniels as an alias nor was he known to go by Nathan Daniels; indeed, the only apparent connection to Scholler is that “Daniels” is his mother’s last name. (See Doc. 233 at 4–5.) The Court is not convinced that the mere connection to Scholler’s mother’s surname is sufficient to establish that Nathan Danials is, in fact, Scholler’s alias. Moreover, Scholler consistently represented—both to his mother and to law enforcement—that Nathan Daniels was a real person; claiming an alias now, ostensibly for the sole purpose of challenging the search, is insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a parcel. See Pierce, 959 F.2d at 1303 n.11 (drawing a distinction between packages addressed to the “alter ego” of a defendant, and those addressed to individuals other than the defendant); see also Lozano, 623 F.3d at 1064 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (“I would hold that a defendant does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a package not addressed to him, even if it listed his street address and even if the addressee was his criminal alias.”). Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 10 of 13
11 Finally, Scholler argues that law enforcement understood Scholler to be the intended recipient, the package was mailed to his mother’s house, he was expecting and tracking the package, he intended to take possession of the package, and he arrived at his mother’s house to retrieve the package almost immediately upon its arrival. (Doc. 233 at 4–5.) The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the fact that law enforcement may have subjectively understood the package to be intended for Scholler (Doc. 233 at 5–6) does not necessarily confer a Fourth Amendment privacy interest; the standard, rather, is that Scholler must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, though the package was mailed to Scholler’s mother’s house, Scholler had not resided there for several months. At the direction of an unknown caller, the package was redirected for delivery at a community mailbox. And though Scholler was indeed actively tracking the package and intended to take control of the package, he nonetheless repeatedly disclaimed any ownership over it, instead representing that the package belonged to a friend and that he was unaware of its contents. As the United States articulated in oral argument, Scholler cannot disclaim ownership in a parcel and then later challenge its contents under the Fourth Amendment. As in Givens, although Nathan Daniels is not—at least as far as the Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 11 of 13
12 Court can ascertain—a real person, the fact that Scholler knew he was the intended recipient does not automatically confer a reasonable expectation of privacy over a parcel not addressed to him or his alias. See Givens, 733 F.2d at 341–42. Therefore, the Court finds that Scholler does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the package and thus has no standing to challenge to the search. II. Motion in Limine Defendant seeks an order precluding admission of irrelevant, confusing, and prejudicial material under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Doc. 215.) However, there is currently no indication in the record that the United States seeks to admit Rule 404(b) evidence. Therefore, though the Motion will be denied for this reason, the Defendant may refile his Motion in Limine in the event the United States seeks to admit Rule 404(b) evidence. C ONCLUSION Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 218) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 215) is DENIED with leave to refile in the event the United States files a notice of intent to raise Rule 404(b) evidence. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because this Order quotes and cites from Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 12 of 13
13 material filed under seal, this Order shall remain sealed for 28 days. The Order will be unsealed on December 22, 2025, unless, on or before December 22, 2025, either party (1) objects to the unsealing, and (2) provides proposed redactions to the Order so that it may be filed publicly. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial in this matter will be reset following the Court’s ruling on co-Defendant D’Andre Dontae Glass’s Motion to Suppress. A hearing on that Motion is currently set for December 1, 2025. DATED this 24th day of November, 2025. Case 2:25-cr-00010-DLC Document 312 Filed 11/24/25 Page 13 of 13
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