Estate of Daniel Keith Ross v. Gallatin County

2:22-cv-00026Mtd6 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BUTTE DIVISION
ESTATE OF DANIEL KEITH ROSS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GALLATIN COUNTY and JOHN
DOES 5-10,
Defendants.
CV 22–26–BU–DLC
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Gallatin County’s First
Motion in Limine (Doc. 65), Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine (Doc. 70), and
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Untimely Amended Liability Expert
Disclosure (Doc. 102). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s First Motion
in Limine (Doc. 65) will be denied, Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine (Doc. 70) will be
granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 102) will
be denied.
B ACKGROUND
As the Court and the parties are aware, this case arises from Daniel Keith
Ross’s suicide attempt on or around March 13, 2019, while incarcerated in the
Gallatin County Detention Center (“GCDC”). Following his attempt, Ross was
transported to a local hospital where he ultimately died on April 4, 2019. Ross is
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survived by one daughter, K.R. The Estate of Daniel Keith Ross (the “Estate”)
filed this action on April 1, 2022, alleging several claims against Gallatin County
and several other defendants who have since been dismissed, including Western
Montana Mental Health Center (“WMMHC”) and WMMHC employee Clayleen
Pipinich. Following the Court’s January 6, 2026, ruling on Defendant’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, only two claims remain: Count II against Gallatin
County for negligence and Count IV against Gallatin County for wrongful death
and survivorship. (See Doc. 106.) This matter is set for trial on February 17, 2026.
Further background information may be found in the Court’s Order on Defendant’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Id.)
LEGAL STANDARD
“Motions in limine are well-established devices that streamline trials and
settle evidentiary disputes in advance, so that trials are not interrupted mid-course
for the consideration of lengthy and complex evidentiary issues.” United States v.
Tokash, 282 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2002). “In the case of a jury trial, a court’s
ruling ‘at the outset’ gives counsel advance notice of the scope of certain evidence
so that admissibility is settled before attempted use of the evidence before the
jury.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 111–12 (9th Cir. 2009). A district
court has discretion in ruling on a motion in limine. United States v. Ravel, 930
F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1991).
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D ISCUSSION
I. Defendant’s First Motion in Limine (Doc. 65)
The Estate has identified 53 “Non-Retained/Hybrid Witnesses” that it may
call to illicit testimony on various aspects of K.R.’s mental health treatment. (See
Doc. 58-3.) Defendant seeks to limit the testimony of these witnesses to the care,
treatment, and prognosis of Ross’s daughter, K.R., and to preclude any testimony
as to causation, specifically that K.R.’s emotional distress was caused in whole or
in part by her father’s death. (Doc. 66 at 2.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
disclosure of the hybrid experts fails to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the
Court’s Scheduling Order (Doc. 54) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2)(C). (Doc. 66 at 3.) Defendant contends that that any causation opinion
must have been disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and subject to a complete
expert report prepared in conformance with that rule. (Id. at 7.) The Court
disagrees.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires that the disclosure of expert testimony be
accompanied by a written report when “the witness is one retained or specifically
employed to provide expert testimony in the case.” Rule 26(a)(2)(C) provides that
if a witness is not required to provide a written report, the disclosure of that
witness must include the subject matter on which the witness will present evidence
and a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness will testify. Treating
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physicians are generally not subject to the mandatory expert witness disclosure
requirements. St. Vincent v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 267 F.R.D. 344, 345 (D.
Mont. 2010). A treating physician is exempt from the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) written
report requirements to the extent that his opinions were formed during the course
of treatment. Goodman v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC., 644 F.3d 817, 826
(9th Cir. 2011).
In this case, the treating providers are not subject to the disclosure
requirements provided for by Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Though minimal, Plaintiff’s
written disclosures include the dates of treatment as well as a brief synopsis of the
treating providers’ anticipated testimony related to their care, treatment, and
prognosis of K.R. This meets the minimal requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(C). See
Melashenko v. Unigard Ins. Co., 2017 WL 4781801, at *2 (D. Mont. Oct. 23,
2017). With respect to causation, this Court has found that,
A treating physician’s opinion on matters such as causation,
future treatment, extent of disability and the like are part of the
ordinary care of a patient. The treating physician may also give
an opinion as to the cause of the injury or degree of the injury in
the future if the opinion is based on personal knowledge, history,
treatment of the patient, and facts of his examination and
diagnosis.
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). “However, an opinion regarding
causation may be excluded when there is no evidence in the record suggesting the
treating provider considered or determined the cause of the injury.” Id. (citation
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omitted). The party offering the testimony bears the burden of establishing that the
treating providers “considered or determined the cause of [her] injuries during the
course of treatment.” Mears v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1048,
1056 (D. Mont. 2012).
Here, the record and disclosures suggest that the treating providers based
their treatment and diagnosis of K.R. in part on the impacts of her father’s death.
(See, e.g., Doc. 58-3 at 8, 25–26, 49.) For example, Dr. Margaret Siska, M.D.,
plans to testify about any trauma experienced by K.R., including the death of her
father, which she writes has caused K.R.’s medical issues including PTSD,
depression, nightmares, and suicidal ideation. (Id. at 8.) Similarly, Dr. Steven
Bishop, M.D., is expected to offer testimony related to his treatment of K.R. for
trauma and the cause of that trauma, including Ross’s death, (Id. at 25–26) and
Tamara Greeling, LCPC, will testify as to the effects of Ross’s death on K.R.,
specifically her grief, trauma, and response to that trauma. (Id. at 32). The
remaining treatment providers’ proffered testimony reflect a similar consideration
of K.R.’s treatment and history related to her father’s death. There is clearly
evidence in the record to suggest the providers “previously considered or
determined the cause of [K.R.’s] injuries during the course of treatment.”
Melashenko, 2017 WL 4781801, at *4 (quoting Mears, 888 F.Supp.2d at 1056).
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In the Court’s experience, it is neither unusual nor uncommon for physicians
and mental health providers to include a discussion of causation in their
examination notes or to consider causation as part of their “care, treatment and
prognosis.” There is thus no basis to preclude the Estate from offering causation
opinion testimony at trial from these 53 witnesses under Rule 26 or Rule 37(c)(1).
(See Doc. 66 at 9) (seeking to preclude testimony based upon Rule 37(c)(1).)
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this Motion will be denied. The treating
providers may offer opinion testimony regarding causation at trial, provided there
is a foundational showing that they developed their causation opinions during
the course of treating K.R., in which case a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report is not
required.1
II. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine (Doc. 70)
Plaintiff has filed eight Motions in Limine seeking to preclude admission of
the following evidence: (1) whether Ross’s death was caused by a party not joined
1 Plaintiff raises several additional issues in its response to Defendant’s Motion in
Limine, (Doc. 68) including whether K.R. can testify to her own mental distress.
K.R.’s testimony is not implicated by the present Motion, and the Court finds that
she may offer testimony as to her own mental distress. Plaintiff further raises the
issue of whether an expert is capable of apportioning K.R.’s emotional distress
between the loss of her father and other events in her life; in its reply brief, Gallatin
County concedes that it is not suggesting Plaintiff’s experts should apportion
causation. (See Doc. 69 at 2–3.) Thus, this Order does not address the issue of
whether a Rule 26(a)(2)(C) expert could offer opinions apportioning causation,
assuming such evidence is even admissible.
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to this action; (2) whether Ross’s death was caused by a party with whom Plaintiff
has settled; (3) Ross’s prior criminal conduct and incarceration; (4) Ross’s prior
drug and/or alcohol use; (5) Ross’s divorce from Mary Poucher; (6) allegations of
domestic violence perpetrated by Ross against Poucher; (7) allegations of abuse or
neglect of Poucher’s children; and (8) comparative fault as to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim. (See Doc. 70.) The Court will address each issue in turn.
A. Motion in Limine No. 1 – Excluding Evidence that Ross’s Death was
Caused by a Party not Joined to this Action
Non-party or empty-chair defenses attempt to attribute fault to unnamed
third parties and are prohibited under Montana law. Teague v. Remington Arms
Co., 2022 WL 16574241, at *6 (D. Mont. Nov. 1, 2022). “Montana law further
prohibits a defendant from attempting to apportion fault to the conduct of a non-
party. Assignment of liability to a non-party without affording that party the
opportunity to defend against liability risks an unreliable and disproportionate
assignment of liability, and places the burden of defending the non-party on the
plaintiff.” Truman v. Mont. Eleventh Dist. Court, 68 P.3d 654, 660 (Mont. 2003).
“In an action based on negligence, a defendant may assert as a defense that the
damages of the claimant were caused in full or in part by a person with whom the
claimant has settled or whom the claimant has released from liability.” Mont. Code
Ann. § 27-1-703(6)(a) (2023). That defense, however, is only allowed against
persons who have settled with or been released by the claimant. Id. “Except for
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persons who have settled with or have been released by the claimant, comparison
of fault with any of the following is prohibited: (i) a person who is immune from
liability to the claimant; (ii) a person who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court; or (iii) any other person who could have been, but was not, named as a third
party.” Id. § 72-1-703(6)(c).
The Estate seeks to preclude the Defendant from assigning blame for Ross’s
death to several non-parties, specifically Ross’s ex-wife Poucher, Ross’s mother
who ultimately decided to take him off life support, and the hospital where Ross
was treated and died. (Doc. 71 at 5–7.) Because the Defendant has filed neither a
third-party complaint nor cross-claim against Poucher, 2 Ross’s mother, nor the
hospital, it may not assign blame for Ross’s death to any of these aforementioned
parties. See Mont. Code Ann. § 27-7-703(6)(c)(iii).
Accordingly, in consideration of the above, Plaintiff’s first Motion in Limine
is granted. Defendants may not argue, suggest or present evidence suggesting that
Ross’s death was caused by Poucher, Ross’s mother, or the treating hospital. The
Defendant may, however, present relevant fact evidence with respect to the jail-
house conversation between Poucher and Ross and the fact that Ross was taken off
2 In its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant asserted a
Seventeenth Affirmative Defense on this issue. (Doc. 33 at 14.) In that defense,
Defendant reserved the right to assert a third-party claim against Poucher, but
indicated they would seek leave of court to do so pursuant to Montana Code
Annotated § 27-1-703. The Court has received no such request.
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life support prior to his death, granted that evidence is not used to assign blame for
Ross’s death to any non-party.
B. Motion in Limine No. 2 – Prohibiting any Argument that Ross’s Death
was Caused by a Settled Party
The Estate further seeks to preclude Defendant from assigning blame for
Ross’s death to a settled party. (Doc. 74 at 7.) Following Plaintiff’s filing of its
Motions in Limine, the Estate settled its claims against Pipinich and WMMHC,
and those parties have been dismissed with prejudice from this matter. (See Docs.
72, 75.) In response to Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine, Defendant indicated it had
not made a decision “about how to move forward” in the event Plaintiff settled
with Pipinich and WMMHC. (Doc. 74 at 8.) As of the date of this Order, however,
Defendant has not alleged that a settled or released party is at fault, nor have they
sought to amend their Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint to make
any such allegation.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s second Motion in
Limine is granted. Defendant may not argue, suggest, or present evidence
suggesting that Ross’s death was caused by a settled party.
C. Motions in Limine Nos. 3 and 4 – Exclusion of Ross’s Prior Criminal
Conduct, Incarcerations, and Prior Drug and/or Alcohol Abuse
Plaintiff next seeks to exclude evidence of Ross’s prior criminal conduct,
incarcerations, and his prior drug and/or alcohol use. (Doc. 71 at 9–12.) Plaintiff
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argues this evidence will unfairly prejudice Plaintiff, does not bear any relevance
to the claims or defenses in this matter, and should be precluded under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Id.) The Court disagrees.
Rule 404(b) applies in both civil and criminal proceedings, and provides in
pertinent part that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”
F.R.E. 404(b). Trial courts “should assess [Rule 404(b)] evidence under the usual
rules for admissibility.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988).
“The determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice
outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other
means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind
under Rule 403.” Id. Here, evidence of Ross’s prior criminal conduct,
incarcerations, and drug and/or alcohol use is relevant to the issues of liability and
damages. See F.R.E. 401. Though this evidence may not present Ross in the most
favorable light, it is not prejudicial to the extent that it overrides the evidence’s
relevance to issues at trial. Indeed, Plaintiff’s own liability expert, A.E. Daniel,
M.D., makes repeated references to Ross’s criminal history as well as his drug and
alcohol use in forming his opinions in this case. (See Doc. 58-3 at 55–61.)
As a final matter, Plaintiff seeks bifurcation at trial on the issues of liability
and damages. Because the above evidence is relevant to both liability and
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damages, this request would have no practical or salutatory effect and would likely
cause confusion and inefficiency. The Court therefore will not agree to bifurcation
of these issues under any circumstance. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third and fourth
Motions in Limine are denied.
D. Motions in Limine Nos. 5, 6, 7 – Exclusion of Ross’s Divorce from Mary
Poucher, Allegations of Domestic Violence Perpetrated by Ross against
Poucher, and Allegations of Abuse or Neglect of Poucher’s Children
Plaintiff further seeks to exclude several pieces of evidence related to
Poucher, including her divorce from Ross, allegations that Ross abused Poucher,
and evidence of abuse and/or neglect of Poucher’s other children. (Doc. 71 at 12–
13.) Poucher and Ross were married in 2009 and divorced in 2012. During
Poucher’s deposition, Poucher testified that Ross was violent towards her during
their relationship and was repeatedly asked about allegations that she abused or
neglected her four other children. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff argues this evidence should
be excluded from introduction at trial because it will unfairly prejudice Plaintiff,
and that prejudice would outweigh any probative value. The Court is inclined to
agree with Plaintiff regarding the relevancy and prejudicial nature of evidence
related to Ross’s relationship with Poucher and to Poucher’s four other children.
However, the undersigned reserves ruling on Plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, and seventh
Motions in Limine until trial.
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E. Motion in Limine 8 – Comparative Fault as to the Estate’s Section 1983
Claim
Because the Court has granted summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on
the Estate’s Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff’s seventh Motion in Limine will be
denied as moot.
III. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Untimely Amended
Liability Expert Disclosure (Doc. 102)
As a final matter, Plaintiff seeks to strike Defendant’s Amended Liability
Expert Disclosure and to exclude Dr. Sally Ann Cunningham Johnson, M.D. (“Dr.
Johnson”) as a witness at trial. (Doc. 102 at 1.) Additional background is required
here for context. On April 1, 2022, Poucher became Personal Representative of
Ross’s Estate and filed the original Complaint against Gallatin County. (Doc. 1.)
The County filed its Answer on May 16, 2022. (Doc. 3.) Due to several pretrial
delays and discovery disputes, the parties have gone through multiple Scheduling
Orders and trial dates. On April 14, 2025, in accordance with the most recent
Scheduling Order (Doc. 54), Gallatin County and other now-dismissed defendants
provided their Liability Expert Disclosure (the “Original Disclosure”). (Doc. 103-
1.) The Original Disclosure listed Dennis R. McCave, CJM, as the sole retained
expert. (Id. at 2.) The Original Disclosure further listed representatives of GCDC,
any and all medical providers for Ross, and “Any Other Expert Identified By Any
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Other Party” as non-retained fact/hybrid experts. (Id. at 2–3.) WMMHC and
Pipinich also provided their Expert Witness Disclosure on April 14 and listed Dr.
Johnson as a retained expert. (Doc. 103-2 at 2.) As noted above, WMMHC and
Pipinich were dismissed from this case on July 11, 2025. (Doc. 75.)
Plaintiff argues that it first learned of Defendant’s intent to call Dr. Johnson
in its July 11, 2025, response to Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine. (See Doc. 74 at 8.)
Thereafter, on October 3, 2025, Defendant provided an Amended Expert Witness
Disclosure (“Supplemental Disclosure”) which revealed Dr. Johnson as a retained
expert for Gallatin County and referenced her previously disclosed report in
WMMHC and Pipinich’s Expert Witness Disclosure. (Doc. 103-3 at 3.) Plaintiff
argues that the Defendant failed to show exceptional circumstances warranting its
intended use of Dr. Johnson and failed to adhere to the Court’s Scheduling Order
and the federal rules of discovery when it identified Dr. Johnson as a retained
expert on October 3, 2025. (Doc. 102 at 1–2.) Plaintiff seeks to strike this
testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (Doc. 103 at 6.)
Rule 12(f) provides that “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter. The court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either
before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days
after being served with the pleading.” Generally, motions to strike should be
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denied unless the matter has no logical connection to the controversy at issue and
may prejudice a party to the suit. See Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382 (1990). Granting a motion to strike is
within the trial court’s sound discretion. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524,
1527 (9th Cir. 1993), reversed on other grounds, Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S.
517, 127 (1994).
As an initial matter, the Court recognizes that Defendant’s expert disclosure
is not a pleading and thus is likely not subject to the parameters of Rule 12(f); with
that being said, even if the disclosure could be construed as a pleading, Plaintiff
fails to make any argument with respect to the disclosure’s immateriality,
redundancy, impertinency, or scandalous matter. It seems Plaintiff recognizes this,
and in the Reply Brief directs this Court to its inherent authority to strike and to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. (Doc. 105 at 2–3.) Rule 37 permits the court to
sanction a party who fails to comply with discovery rules by “prohibiting the
disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or
from introducing designated matters in evidence,” or “striking pleadings in whole
or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii–iii).
The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. First, the disclosure is not
untimely. Trial is not set in this matter until February 2026. Plaintiff has been
aware of Dr. Johnson’s opinions since April 14, 2025, and has been aware of
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Defendant’s intent to use these opinions since July 11, 2025; this timeline, in the
Court’s opinion, obviates any prejudice Plaintiff may suffer as a result of the
testimony. Indeed, Gallatin County is not seeking to amend Dr. Johnson’s opinions
and is relying on her original report. And though Dr. Johnson’s report is focused
primarily on the liability of WMMHC and Pipinich, she does offer several opinions
with respect to the liability of Gallatin County. Finally, Plaintiff was plainly put on
notice of Defendant’s right to call experts identified by other parties in its Original
Disclosure. (See Doc. 103-3 at 4.) Plaintiff’s cited authority does not persuade the
Court otherwise.
With that being said, the Court will implement several siderails on Gallatin
County’s use of Dr. Johnson. These siderails include but are not limited to: (1)
precluding cumulative expert testimony on any issue; and (2) precluding any
mention, by any party, that WMMHC and Pipinich were previously defendants in
this case, that Dr. Johnson was previously retained as an expert by WMMHC and
Pipinich, and that WMMHC and Pipinich settled with the Plaintiff. Therefore, the
Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike with these parameters in place.
C ONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendant’s First Motion in Limine (Doc. 65) is DENIED;
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2. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine (Doc. 70) are GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part as follows:
a. 	Plaintiff’s first motion in limine is GRANTED;
b. Plaintiff’s second motion in limine is GRANTED;
c. 	Plaintiff’s third and fourth motions in limine are DENIED;
d. The Court reserves ruling on Plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, and seventh
motions in limine; and
e. 	Plaintiff’s eighth motion in limine is DENIED as moot;
3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 102) is DENIED.
DATED this 6th day of January, 2026.
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