Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WISLANDI ESCOBAR CASTEJON,
Plaintiff,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; SAMUEL
OLSEN, FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR,
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE ICE; AND
JAMES ARNOTT, AS SHERRIFF,
GREENE COUNTY JAIL;
Defendants.
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Case No. 6:26-cv-03049-RK
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Wislandi Escobar Castejon’s post-judgment motion to
enforce the Court’s Order, (Doc. 8), granting habeas relief. (Doc. 10.) The motion to enforce is
fully briefed. (Docs. 12, 13.) After careful consideration and review, and for the reasons explained
below, the Court ORDERS that the motion to enforce is DENIED.
Background and Procedural Posture
Petitioner is currently detained in the custody of federal immigration authorities at the
Greene County Justice Center in Springfield, Missouri. 	Petitioner is a native and citizen of
Venezuela. 	He was detained and held without a bond hearing under the Immigration and
Nationality Act as being present in the United States illegally or without legal authorization,
pending removal proceedings. On January 30, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus challenging his detention without a bond hearing. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner raised two claims
for release from detention or a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge: (1) Petitioner challenged
the constitutionality of his detention and his detention without bond under the Due Process Clause,
and (2) Petitioner challenged the legality of his detention without a bond hearing under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
On February 24, 2026, the Court granted habeas relief, finding that Petitioner’s detention
without a bond hearing was unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 	(Doc. 8.)
Specifically, consistent with the then-prevailing caselaw of both district courts within this circuit
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and federal courts nationwide, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)—and not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)—applied to Petitioner’s detention as a matter of law and statutory interpretation.
Accordingly, the Court ordered that “Petitioner be released or granted a bond hearing within 10
days of the date of this Order.” 	(Id. at 3.) 	The Court—consistent with Federal Respondents’
suggestion, (Doc. 6 at 3)—therefore did not further address or consider Petitioner’s due process
challenge to his detention or his detention without bond.
On the next day, February 25, 2026, the following occurred in Petitioner’s immigration
case:
(1) Petitioner filed a Bond Redetermination Request;
(2) the Immigration Court issued a “Notice of Custody Redetermination Hearing in
Immigration Proceedings” that a “custody redetermination hearing” before an Immigration Judge
was scheduled in Petitioner’s case for the same day at 1:00 PM,1 (Doc. 10-2); and
(3) the Immigration Judge held the hearing and denied Petitioner release on bond, (Doc.
10-3).
The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s request for release on bond, finding that:
The respondent has not proven that he is not a danger to the community. The record
includes evidence that he was arrested for domestic violence. 	He claims that he
was ordered to perform community service. 	The Court otherwise has very little
evidence in the record to make an assessment on this incident. 	[Mr. Castejon]
entered the United States illegally and has since been arrested for a crime of
violence. Additionally, the Court finds [Mr. Castejon] is subject to custody under
the Laken Riley Act. INA Sec. 236(c).
(Doc. 10-3 at 3.) 	The Immigration Judge further noted that while Petitioner “claims that he
completed anger management” and “claims that he has letters from friends tending to show that
he is not a danger to the community,” neither of those records were “in the file.” 	(Id.) 	The
Immigration Judge thus concluded that Petitioner “has not carried his burden to prove that he is
not a danger to the community,” and therefore denied Petitioner’s request for release on bond. (Id.)
Judgment was entered in this habeas case on February 26, 2025. (Doc. 9.)
Four days later, on March 2, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant motion to enforce. (Doc. 10.)
In the motion to enforce, Petitioner argues that the bond redetermination hearing was inconsistent
1 It appears that Petitioner had previously been scheduled to appear before the Immigration Court
on February 25, 2026, “for his removal proceedings master calendar hearing,” which is an initial procedural
hearing in Petitioner’s immigration case. (Doc. 10 at 1.) See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10.
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with the Due Process Clause, both as a direct challenge to the proceeding itself and because of the
extraordinarily short notice (less than 24 hours) provided to Petitioner prior to the bond
redetermination hearing.
While Petitioner’s motion to enforce was being briefed, the Eighth Circuit issued its
opinion in Avila v. Bondi, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). In Avila, the
Eighth Circuit held in a habeas case that as a matter of law and statutory interpretation, the federal
government may detain aliens who are present within the United States and who have previously
entered the United States illegally or without legal authorization under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A),
that is, without bond. 	The Eighth Circuit in Avila only addressed the legality of the habeas
petitioner’s detention as a matter of statutory authority and statutory interpretation and did not
consider a specific due process challenge to such detention. 	See id. at *8 n.8 (J. Erickson,
dissenting).
Accordingly, following Avila, the Government asserts in its response to Petitioner’s motion
to enforce, inter alia, that (1) Avila makes clear that in the Eighth Circuit, Petitioner is not entitled
to a bond hearing and may be detained without bond under the Immigration and Nationality Act,
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), as a matter of law and statutory interpretation, and (2) the
bond redetermination hearing did comply with the Court’s habeas order because a bond hearing
was held “within 10 days” of the Court’s order. (See generally Doc. 12.)
Discussion
The Court has a significant concern whether the bond redetermination hearing in this
case—held almost exactly 24 hours after the Court’s habeas order requiring a bond hearing and
with mere hours’ notice of the hearing to Petitioner, if at all—comports with the fundamental
fairness and notice requirements of the Due Process Clause, and is therefore consistent or in
compliance with the Court’s habeas order. 	See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974)
(holding that due process requires both “written notice” and “a brief period of time after the notice,
no less than 24 hours” to allow an inmate to prepare for a disciplinary hearing; recognizing that
“[p]art of the function of notice is to give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his
defense and to clarify what the charges are, in fact”); cf. Hughes v. Lee Cty. Dist. Ct., Ft. Madison,
IA, 9 F.3d 1366, 1367 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding no due process violation where “[p]etitioner received
notice of the disciplinary actions against him at least twenty-four hours before his disciplinary
hearings, as constitutionally required under” Wolff). 	Federal Respondents do not meaningfully
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attempt to argue that the bond redetermination hearing provided under the extraordinarily
compressed timeframe comports with due process notice requirements. 	Federal Respondents’
suggestion that the short-notice hearing was consistent with the Court’s habeas order because it
occurred “within 10 days” is accordingly not well taken. Surely, the Court’s habeas order cannot
reasonably be understood to permit a bond hearing that did not comport with the basic fairness and
notice requirements of procedural due process required by the U.S. Constitution.
Nevertheless and notwithstanding, the Eighth Circuit’s intervening opinion in Avila, after
the Court’s habeas order and judgment was entered in this case, has necessarily changed the legal
landscape within which Petitioner’s motion to enforce must be considered. Under Avila, Petitioner
may (at least as a matter of statutory authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act) be
lawfully detained without a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In other words,
following Avila, Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing under the Immigration and Nationality
Act.
To be sure, Petitioner did raise a separate constitutional due process challenge to his
detention and his detention without bond in this habeas action (and which was not directly
addressed by the Eighth Circuit in Avila). Consistent with the pre-Avila approach taken by other
district courts in the Western District and this circuit, the Court granted Petitioner’s habeas petition
only on the basis of the statutory authority question. The Court did not consider (or grant habeas
relief based on) Petitioner’s separate due process argument.
Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Petitioner’s motion to enforce is not the
proper vehicle to address or consider Petitioner’s due process challenge arising from the bond
redetermination hearing. 	Nor is Petitioner’s motion to enforce the proper vehicle to address
Petitioners’ due process challenge to his detention/detention without bond as an alternative
argument asserted in the habeas petition but which the Court did not previously address because it
granted habeas relief on another ground (which question of law or statutory interpretation the
Eighth Circuit then squarely addressed in Avila).2
2 Other avenues may exist to pursue and present Petitioner’s due process challenges, whether in the
underlying administrative immigration case, through another habeas petition, or through another procedural
mechanism under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the immediate juncture, the only relief Petitioner
seeks is to enforce the Court’s habeas order. The Court merely finds here that in light of Avila, a motion to
enforce is not the proper vehicle to address these due process challenges.
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Conclusion
After careful consideration and review, and for the reasons explained above, Petitioner’s
motion to enforce is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: April 13, 2026
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