Taylor v. Dilday et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT TAYLOR, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. 6:26-cv-03022-MDH
)
DEPUTY JACKIE DILDAY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Deputy Jackie Dilday, Deputy Drew Ivey, and Greene
County, Missouri’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 30). Defendants filed suggestions in support, (Doc.
31), Plaintiff filed suggestions in opposition, (Doc. 36), and Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 43).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Taylor, proceeding pro se, is a disabled senior-citizen and resident of
Springfield, Missouri. Defendants Jackie Dilday and Drew Ivey are deputies employed by the
Sheriff of Greene County, Missouri. Six Counts are alleged by Plaintiff: (1) “Fourth Amendment
Unreasonable Seizure and Excessive Force,” (2) “First Amendment Retaliation,” (3) “Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection,” (4) “Municipal Liability / Ratification,” (5) “Title
II of the ADA and Section 504,” and (6) “ADA Retaliation / Interference.” (Doc. 28). Plaintiff
requests compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and costs and
attorney’s fees.
The allegations are summarized as follows. On or about August 2, 2024, Plaintiff entered
the Greene County Courthouse in Springfield, Missouri as a subpoenaed witness in a criminal
proceeding. Plaintiff arrived with two other disabled senior citizens and parked in a handicap
space. After Plaintiff had passed through the security checkpoint, Deputies Dilday and Ivey told
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Plaintiff that the GoPro camera he had brought into the courthouse was prohibited. Plaintiff,
disputing this with the Deputies, activated the GoPro and attempted to walk away. The Deputies
grabbed him and forced him through the glass doors of the entranceway.
Once outside, the Deputies told Plaintiff that he was trespassing on the property, including
the public parking lot. Plaintiff then told the Deputies that he was disabled and relied on a third
party for transportation, but the Deputies threatened to arrest him if he did not leave immediately.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff called 911. Neither party explains what ensued after this point. Presumably,
Plaintiff left.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants request that the Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
factual allegations that are sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Zutz v.
Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
The Court “must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005)
(internal citations omitted). The complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). “[T]he
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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ANALYSIS
I. 	Count I – Fourth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Deputies Dilday and Ivey pushed him through the courthouse exit
doors and this constituted an unreasonable seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment “prohibits unreasonable seizures, [and a] seizure may be
unreasonable when an officer uses excessive force.” Watkins v. City of St. Louis, 102 F.4th 947,
951–52 (8th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). “The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force
requires analyzing the totality of the circumstances.” Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 73 (2025)
(citations omitted).
Defendants contend that the Complaint lacks any allegations of excessive force beyond
that the Deputies grabbed and pushed Plaintiff. Further, Defendants note that because the Deputies
have qualified immunity, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support an inference that the
Deputies committed both a constitutional violation and that the right violated was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct. Watkins v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 102 F.4th
947, 951 (8th Cir. 2024).
The right to be free from excessive force by state actors is clearly established. Guite v.
Wright, 147 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1998). Because an excessive force analysis considers the
totality of the circumstances, Plaintiff’s claim should not be dismissed at this stage. Viewing the
totality of the circumstances in Plaintiff’s favor results in a non-speculative inference that his right
to be free from excessive force was violated. The Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss as
to Count I.
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II. 	Count II – First Amendment Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Deputies Dilday and Ivey removed him from the courthouse in
retaliation for his bringing in a camera, arguing about it, and trying to report the Deputies’ conduct
to 911.
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must plead facts showing that “(1)
[Plaintiff] engaged in protected expression, (2) [Defendant] took an adverse action that would chill
a person of ordinary firmness from continuing the activity, and (3) there was a but-for causal
connection between the [Defendant’s] retaliatory animus and [Plaintiff’s] injury.” De Mian v. City
of St. Louis, Missouri, 86 F.4th 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 2023).
Plaintiff was not engaged in protected activity. There is no recognized First Amendment
right to use a camera in a courthouse.1 The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count
II.
III. 	Count III – Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff alleges that the Deputies expelled him from the courthouse without notice or
meaningful process and discriminated against him by refusing to consider modifications after he
disclosed his disability.
The Due Process Clause “constrains governmental decisions which deprive individuals of
liberty or property interests.” Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 429 (8th Cir. 2019). A procedural
due-process claim requires the plaintiff to identify a protected liberty or property interest of which
1 See, e.g., Enoch v. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 2024 WL 3597026, at *5 (6th Cir. July 31,
2024) (“In a nonpublic forum like a courthouse, the First Amendment rights of everyone … are
at their constitutional nadir.”) (quotation omitted); Pace v. County of Cortland, 2023 WL
7324515, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2023) (finding camera ban “viewpoint neutral and reasonable
considering the function of a courthouse.”); Combined Communications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672
F.2d 818, 821 (10th Cir. 1982) (“The First Amendment does not guarantee the media a
constitutional right to televise inside a courthouse.”) (citations omitted).
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he was deprived and to plead facts showing that the process afforded was constitutionally
inadequate. Id.
Here, Plaintiff did not have a liberty interest entitling him to a hearing before the Deputies
could remove him from the premises. As already noted, there is no liberty interest in bringing a
camera into a courthouse or in remaining in a courthouse in contravention of its policies.
Nor can Plaintiff state an equal protection claim based on disability. An equal protection
claim can be brought as a “class of one” when “the plaintiff alleges that [he] has been intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference
in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). The Eighth Circuit
requires a plaintiff asserting a class of one theory to identify comparators “alleged to have been
treated more favorably”; the comparators “must be identical or directly comparable to the plaintiff
in all material respects.” Robbins v. Becker, 794 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff does not
identify comparators and presents only conclusory allegations that he was discriminated against.
The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count III.
IV. 	Count IV – Municipal Liability
Plaintiff seeks § 1983 liability against Greene County for the August 2024 incident with
Deputies Dilday and Ivey, as well as for a similar July 2020 incident where Plaintiff was physically
removed from the courthouse for attempting to film while present as a witness. Plaintiff also seeks
liability against the County for its failure to investigate Plaintiff’s various complaints.
Municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation caused by an official
municipal policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.
Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal citations
omitted). “Dismissal is proper when a complaint does not contain any allegations, reference, or
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language by which one could begin to draw an inference that the conduct complained of … resulted
from an unconstitutional policy or custom.” Watkins v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 102 F.4th 947,
954 (internal quotation omitted). Section 1983 does not provide municipal liability under a theory
of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694–95
(1978).
Plaintiff identifies no municipal custom, policy, or failure to train or supervise that led to
his ejection from the courthouse. A failure to investigate or discipline an employee after an alleged
constitutional violation does not, without more, establish municipal liability. See City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988). The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to
Count IV.
V. 	Count V – ADA or § 504 Claim Against Greene County
Plaintiff alleges that Greene County denied him meaningful access to the courthouse
because of his disability. Plaintiff also alleges that the County failed to process his later ADA
grievances and accommodation requests.
Title II prohibits a public entity from excluding, denying benefits to, or otherwise
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability with respect to the entity’s services,
programs, or activities “by reason of” disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added). The Eighth
Circuit has applied this statutory standard to claims involving public entities. Folkerts v. City of
Waverly, Iowa, 707 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2013). It has also applied the similar substantive
standard in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which covers public entities receiving federal
funds. Id.
Removing Plaintiff from the courthouse was not “by reason of” his disability, for Plaintiff
informed the Deputies of his disability after they removed him from the courthouse.
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Nor can Plaintiff rely on the Deputies’ failure to accommodate once informed of his
disability. A Plaintiff asserting failure to accommodate must plausibly allege that a reasonable
accommodation was necessary to provide meaningful access to the public entity’s services,
programs, or activities. Id. (emphasis added). There are no allegations that Plaintiff needed a
camera in the courthouse in order to access the facility or accommodate his disability. Certainly
Plaintiff cannot maintain he was physically unable to access the courthouse because of disability:
he was inside the courthouse directly before he was removed for trying to bring in the camera.
Plaintiff references 28 C.F.R. § 35.107. That regulation, concerning ADA grievance
procedures, cannot be invoked to state a claim. “Like substantive federal law itself, private rights
of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. … Without it, a cause of action does
not exist, and courts may not create one.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001).
The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss at to Count V.
VI. 	Count VI – ADA Retaliation or Interference
Plaintiff alleges he was retaliated against under the ADA for engaging in protected activity,
namely: complaining about the Deputies, filing motions, asserting ADA rights, serving ADA
grievances, requesting accommodations, and seeking preservation of evidence.
To state a claim of retaliation or interference under the ADA, a plaintiff generally must
allege that he engaged in a protected activity, suffered an adverse action, and that there is a causal
connection between the two. See, e.g., Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1180–81 (11th
Cir. 2003); Weixel v. Board of Education of City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 148–49 (2d Cir.
2002). As in Section V, Plaintiff fails to show a causal connection between his alleged ADA-
protected activity and an adverse action. The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to
Count VI.
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VII. 	Prospective Relief
Along with damages, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Greene
County that would require it to cease unconstitutional exclusion, cease retaliatory enforcement
concerning recording devices, and provide lawful ADA grievance and accommodation access.
Article III standing requires an injury in fact—“an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). For prospective relief,
this requires “a real and immediate threat that [the plaintiff] would again suffer similar injury in
the future.” Frost v. Sioux City, Iowa, 920 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff does not identify a “real and immediate threat.” He requests that this Court
prospectively regulate the County’s conduct because of his dissatisfaction with past events. That
would be outside this Court’s jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s claims for prospective injunctive and
declaratory relief are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. The case will proceed with Count I against Defendants Deputy Jackie Dilday
and Deputy Drew Ivey, with relief sought in the form of compensatory and punitive damages.
Counts II–VI, as well as Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, are dismissed.
Defendant Greene County, Missouri is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	October 1, 2026 	/s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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