Garcia v. Yepez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
DIEGO IVAN GARCIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RODRIGO YEPEZ,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:26-cv-00561-RK
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Diego Ivan Garcia’s pro se motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and Affidavit of Financial Status in Support. (Docs. 1, 2.) Also before the Court
is Plaintiff’s pro se motion for a status update. (Doc. 3.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court
ORDERS that (1) Plaintiff’s pro se motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and
(2) this case is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), for failure
to state a claim and also for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s pro se motion
for a status update, is therefore DENIED as moot.
Discussion
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) authorizes the Court to allow indigent persons to commence
a civil action without the prepayment of costs. However, “[t]he opportunity to proceed in forma
pauperis is a privilege, not a right.” Weaver v. Pung, 925 F.2d 1097, 1099 n.4 (8th Cir. 1991).
When presented with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court first determines whether
the plaintiff satisfies the economic eligibility requirements. Local Rule 83.7(a) provides that the
standard for determining in forma pauperis status is whether the requirement to pay the costs of
the lawsuit would cause the applicant to be forced to give up the basic necessities of life. If the
applicant meets the economic eligibility requirements, the Court then determines whether the
applicant’s complaint is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). 	Upon careful review and consideration, it appears based on the submitted
affidavit that Plaintiff is financially unable to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
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While Plaintiff is therefore not required to pay the required filing fee, the Court considers
whether it has—and should exercise—subject matter jurisdiction, and whether Plaintiff’s
complaint is otherwise subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). In the form complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendant Rodrigo Yepez
a “body shop [technician]” for violation of the Federal Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2051, et seq. (Doc. 1-1 at 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges that the defendant “intentionally cut[] brake
lines off” a car he sold to Plaintiff, causing an accident in which Plaintiff suffered serious physical
injuries. (Id. at 3 & 5.) Plaintiff seeks criminal charges against Defendant in addition to monetary
damages. (Id. at 5.)
The Eighth Circuit has held that there is no private cause of action for a violation of the
Consumer Product Safety Act itself. 	Drake v. Honeywell, 797 F.2d 603, 606 (8th Cir. 1986).
Instead, a private cause of action is authorized under the Consumer Product Safety Act only if it
arises from a violation of a consumer product safety rule issued by the Consumer Protection Safety
Commission, with exceptions. 	15 U.S.C. § 2072; see Mwesigwa v. Dap, Inc., No. 	4:08CV605
JCH, 2010 WL 979697, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2010);; Drake, 797 F.2d at 606 (Commission’s
reporting rules do not give rise to a private cause of action); Avery v. Mapco Gas Prods., Inc.,
18 F.3d 448, 455 n.6 (7th Cir. 1994) (same). Regardless, the Consumer Product Safety Act does
not apply to or govern motor vehicles. 	15 U.S.C. § 5052(a)(5)(C) (excluding personal motor
vehicles from the statutory definition of “consumer product[s]” which the statute governs); see
Emergency Servs. Billing Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 459, 467 (7th Cir. 2012).1
As best as the Court can tell, Plaintiff’s claims in this case may arise somehow under state
law (whether for negligence, another intentional tort, or possibly a state consumer protection
statute). For present purposes, Plaintiff has not asserted any plausible claim for relief that gives
rise to the Court’s federal question jurisdiction.2
1 To the extent Plaintiff intended to cite the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.,
there is similarly no private federal cause of action under that statute, either. Duffy v. Stellantis, No. 22-
06038 (GC) (RLS), 2023 WL 4601034, at *2 (D.N.J. July 18, 2023); Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
232 F. Supp. 2d 715, 721 n.3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2002)
2 Nor does Plaintiff’s pro se complaint support diversity-of-citizenship subject-matter jurisdiction
because he alleges that the Defendant, like Plaintiff, is a citizen of Missouri. (Doc. 1-2 at 2 & 4.) Federal
diversity-of-citizenship 	subject-matter 	jurisdiction requires 	complete 	diversity 	among the 	parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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Conclusion
Therefore, after careful consideration and review, the Court ORDERS that (1) Plaintiff’s
pro se motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 1), is GRANTED, and (2) this action
is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a
claim and also for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s pro se motion for a status
update, (Doc. 3), is therefore DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: October 14, 2026
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