Perrett v. Lindenwood University et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RYANN PERRETT, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:25 CV 846 CDP
)
LINDENWOOD UNIVERSITY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ryann Perrett, who lives and attends school in Canada, has filed a
Motion for Protective Order concerning her upcoming deposition, which is
currently scheduled to take place in St. Louis, Missouri on May 1, 2026. Perrett
states that it would be unduly burdensome and expensive to appear in person for
her deposition, and she asks the Court to allow her deposition to be taken remotely
by videoconference. Defendant Lindenwood University opposes the motion. For
the reasons that follow, I will grant the motion.
The discovery rules, like all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should
be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that “district
courts should not neglect their power to restrict discovery where justice requires
protection for a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
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undue burden or expense.” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (citation
modified); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
Under Rule 26(c)(1), a party from whom discovery is sought may move for
a protective order, and the Court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). To show good cause, the movant’s claim of
harm must be based on more than stereotypical and conclusory statements.
Miscellaneous Docket Matter No. 1 v. Miscellaneous Docket Matter No. 2, 197
F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481
F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973)). In determining whether a protective order
should issue, I must also consider the relative hardship to the non-movant should
the protective order be granted. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 F.2d at 1212 (citing
United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 8 (1970)).
Lindenwood argues that Perrett’s assertions regarding the expense and
burden of traveling to her deposition are conclusory and not sufficient to show
good cause. I disagree. Perrett states that her request is based on the following
facts: She lives in Alberta, Canada; she would be required to pay for airfare and
lodging to travel to her deposition in St. Louis, Missouri; and her annual income is
less than $1,000. These are more than stereotypical and conclusory statements,
and Perrett has submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury in support of her
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statements regarding her annual income and inability to afford to travel to Missouri
for an in-person deposition. Further, the discovery rules expressly provide that
protecting a party from “undue burden or expense” constitutes good cause for
issuing a protective order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (c)(1). Thus, I find that Perrett has
shown good cause.
Lindenwood asserts that allowing Perrett to appear for a videoconference
deposition would impose a hardship because a videoconference would hinder its
ability to assess Perrett’s credibility. But the discovery rules specifically
contemplate that the Court may on motion “order that a deposition be taken by
telephone or other remote means,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4), and Lindenwood
provides no explanation for why its ability to observe Perrett would be hindered by
a videoconference deposition. Remote depositions have become routine in recent
years, and “many courts have held that remote videoconference depositions offer
the deposing party a sufficient opportunity to evaluate a deponent’s nonverbal
responses, demeanor, and overall credibility.” Learning Res., Inc. v. Playgo Toys
Enters. Ltd., 335 F.R.D. 536, 539 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (collecting cases); United States
v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Aircraft Displaying Tail No. VPCES, 304 F.R.D. 10,
17-18 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Ample case law recognizes that a videoconference
deposition can be an adequate substitute for an in-person deposition, particularly
when significant expenses are at issue or when the deposition will cover a limited
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set of topics.”). The cases Lindenwood cites in support of its argument are
distinguishable, as this case does not involve any accusations of bad faith or
dishonest conduct between the parties, neither party has previously failed to appear
for a deposition, and there is no need for Perrett to examine numerous or complex
original documents during her deposition. In sum, while Lindenwood’s preference
for an in-person deposition is understandable, that preference is outweighed by the
undue burden and expense Perrett would incur by traveling to Missouri for her
deposition.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order [39]
is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s deposition shall be conducted by videoconference.
_______________________________
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 17th day of April, 2026.
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