Jeude v. SSM St. Clare Hospital et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
TODD JEUDE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SSM ST. CLARE HOSPITAL, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 4:25-cv-00604-RHH
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is self-represented Plaintiff Todd Jeude’s Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees and Costs. Doc. [7]. 	Based on
Plaintiff’s financial information, the Court grants his application and waives the
filing fee. 	For the following reasons, on initial review, the Court (1) dismisses
Plaintiff’s EMTALA claims as time-barred and, alternatively, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, and (2) dismisses Plaintiff’s state law
claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint
filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a
plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.”
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. at 678.
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” 	Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but
not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th
Cir. 2016).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court
must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. 	Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is
discernible . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that
permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.”
Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364
F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). But even pro se complaints must “allege facts, which
if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286
(8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would
have formed a stronger complaint”).
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The Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action under the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA) and state law, alleging Defendants negligently
discharged him from the hospital after treating him for injuries sustained in a
motorcycle accident. 	He names as Defendants SSM St. Clare Hospital, Koren
Schram, PA, Dr. David Brummett, and Dr. Mathew Schwab.
On July 4, 2022, Plaintiff presented to the SSM St. Clare Hospital emergency
room after a motorcycle/ATV accident. Doctors treated and bandaged his wounds,
prescribed pain medication, and ordered x-rays and a CT scan. After the radiology
reports showed Plaintiff’s injuries were “unremarkable,” medical staff stabilized
Plaintiff’s arm with a sling and discharged him. Doc. 1 at 9.
On July 12, 2022, Plaintiff’s ear was red and swollen and he complained of
severe pain and dizziness. 	Doctors at a different facility examined him and
discovered he had an rubber ear fitting from his ear buds lodged in his ear canal.
They removed it and treated the infection.
For relief, Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in damages on his EMTALA claims and
$75,000 against each Defendant on his state law claims.
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Discussion
I. 	EMTALA
(A) 	The two-year statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s EMTALA
claims.
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff brings his case outside the two-year statute of
limitations for EMTALA claims. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C). 	Plaintiff’s
injury occurred on July 4, 2022, and he had until July 4, 2024 to file this action. He
filed this action more than nine months late, on April 29, 2025.
By filing a motion for relief under Local Rule 2.14, Plaintiff seeks to have
these nine months tolled. See Doc. 2. He states that he attempted to file this action
on July 3, 2024, but because of technical difficulties, the Court did not receive his
complaint. 	He attaches email correspondence from July 5, 2024 showing that he
attempted to file this action on July 3, 2024, but he addressed his filing to the Court’s
self-represented litigant email address, moed_srl_filings@moeduscourts.gov. 	The
proper domain was moed.uscourts.gov. His emails did not reach the Court and his
email provider returned the filings to him with the automated message, “Address not
found. Your message wasn’t delivered to 	moed_srl_fiilngs@moeduscourts.gov
because the domain moeduscourts.gov couldn’t be found. 	Check for typos or
unnecessary spaces and try again.” Doc. 4-1 at 5.
Plaintiff tried again to submit these filings on July 5, 2024, this time to the
correct self-litigant email address, but he did not attach the documents he sought to
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have filed. 	As a result, the Court did not open a case. 	Five months later, on
December 	19, 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	followed 	up 	in 	writing 	to 	the 	Court, 	seeking
information about his case. See Doc. 3-1 at 6. The Clerk responded, informing him
that although the Court had received his July 5, 2024 email, he had not attached any
filings and the Court did not open a case. Doc. 3-1 at 8. He filed the instant action
on April 29, 2025.
“The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a plaintiff to sue after the statutory
time period has expired if he has been prevented from doing so due to inequitable
circumstances.” 	Davenport v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 2014 WL 2993739, *4
(E.D. Mo. Jul. 3, 2014) (internal quotations omitted). Equitable tolling applies only
in “extraordinary circumstances.” 	Id. 	Courts consider whether the litigant can
establish “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” 	Id. 	“And only circumstances ‘truly
beyond the plaintiff’s control’ are deemed exceptional.” 	Id. (quoting Jenkins v.
Mabus, 646 F.3d 1023, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 2011)).
Plaintiff’s untimely filing was not due to any circumstances beyond his
control. 	The Court did not receive Plaintiff’s filing on July 3, 2024, because he
entered the incorrect email address for the Court. The Court did not receive his filing
on July 5, 2024, because, although he entered the correct email address, he did not
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attach the documents he sought to have filed. 	Both these circumstances were
uniquely within Plaintiff’s control.
Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing he is entitled to equitable tolling
of the nine months from the running of the statute of limitations to the date on which
he filed his action. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s EMTALA claims as
time-barred.
(B) 	Even assuming a tolling of the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s
EMTALA claims, his claims fail on the merits.
Although the Court finds Plaintiff’s EMTALA claims time-barred, even if he
had timely filed his claims, they are subject to dismissal on initial review for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Congress enacted the EMTALA to prevent “patient dumping,” whereby a
hospital refuses care to non-insured patients. 	See Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr.
Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 1996). “A patient is ‘dumped’ when he
or she is shunted off by one hospital to another, the second one being, for example,
a so-called ‘charity institution.’” 	Id. 	“EMTALA requires a hospital to provide a
patient with an appropriate medical screening and to stabilize a patient’s condition
or arrange for an appropriate transfer to another facility.” Quinn v. BJC Health Sys.,
364 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (E.D. Mo. 2005). The statute provides:
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(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency medical conditions
and labor
(1) In general
If any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this
subchapter) comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that
the individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital
must provide either –
(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for
such further medical examination and such treatment as may
be required to stabilize the medical condition, or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility
in accordance with subsection (c).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
Plaintiff alleges Defendants discharged him from SSM St. Clare Hospital in
violation of the EMTALA by “glossing over” his “serious injuries” and discharging
him while he was unable to use his right arm or walk unassisted. Doc. 1 at 5. He
also states that Defendants should have ordered “further radiological images” to
reveal injuries to his arm. Id. at 14. “St. Clare treated [Plaintiff] to the second best
and sent him on his way in serious pain, with serious dysfunction of a body part, and
a foreign object in his ear.” Id. at 15.
At the hospital, Defendant Schram, PA, examined him, ordered x-rays and a
CT scan, and administered narcotic pain medication. Nurses treated and dressed his
wounds. The x-rays and CT scan returned with unremarkable findings. Doc 1 at 9.
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Defendant Schram discussed these results with Plaintiff, and fitted him with an arm
sling to immobilize his injured arm. Schram discussed with Plaintiff the possibility
of another CT scan, but said it was “completely precautionary . . . and would
probably reveal nothing.” Id. Although unclear, it appears Plaintiff did not seek the
second CT scan. 	Plaintiff states the hospital referred him to “an orthopedic” who
“would order an MRI.” Id. Then the hospital discharged him.
Two days later, Plaintiff began complaining of pain near his ear. After four
more days, his pain had escalated to the point that he was seen by a doctor at the St.
Louis City Justice Center.1 On July 14, 2022, ten days after his accident, a doctor
examined Plaintiff’s right ear and extracted a “rubber ear fitting from his mp3 ear
buds” that he had been wearing at the time of his accident. Doc. 1 at 11. Then the
doctors treated him for an infection.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds he
has failed to state a plausible claim for an EMTALA violation. Under EMTALA,
hospitals have an obligation to screen and stabilize patients. “Stabilized” is defined
as “to provide such medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary to assure,
within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the condition
is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility.”2
1 On July 6, 2022, Plaintiff was arrested for a supervised release violation and held at the St. Louis City Justice
Center.
2 “Transfer” is defined as “the movement (including the discharge) of an individual outside a hospital’s facilities at
the direction of any person employed by . . . the hospital . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4).
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42 U.S.C. §1395dd(e)(3)(B). EMTALA does not guarantee a proper diagnosis and
it does not guarantee that additional treatment will not be required. 	Quinn v. BJC
Health Sys., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1054 (E.D. Mo. 2005). It does not guarantee that
patients will be pain free upon discharge or that they will be ambulatory. Nor is it a
substitute for a state law medical malpractice claim. 	See Summers v. Baptist Med.
Ctr. of Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 1996) (“EMTALA is not a federal
malpractice statute and it does not set a national emergency health care standard;
claims of misdiagnosis or inadequate treatment are left to the state malpractice
arena.”).
As to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants violated EMTALA by discharging
him with a foreign object in his ear, his complaints of pain at the hospital were not
isolated to his ear. He complained of pain to his entire right side: his shoulder, neck,
arm, and leg. 	More than a week later, after Plaintiff experienced dizziness and
debilitating pain near his right ear, doctors reexamined his ear and discovered the
obstruction. 	Doc. 1 at 11. 	But, a later finding upon a different presentation of
symptoms does not evidence an EMTALA violation. See Summers, 91 F.3d at 1137-
38 (“[I]nstances of negligence in the screening or diagnostic process, or of mere
faulty screening, are not [actionable under EMTALA].”). For these reasons, in the
alternative, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s EMTALA claims for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
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II. 	State law claims
Counts II and III of Plaintiff’s complaint contain state law claims over which
the Court has no jurisdiction. See Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c), “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . .
. if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims. These claims will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in district
court without prepaying fees and costs is GRANTED. Doc. [7]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Rule 2.14 Relief for Out of
Time Commencement of Action Due To Technical Failure” is DENIED. Doc. [2]
IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	EMTALA 	claims 	are
DISMISSED as time-barred and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	state 	law 	claims 	are
DISMISSSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any pending motions are DENIED as
moot. Docs. [4] and [5]
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An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Opinion, Memorandum and
Order.
Dated this 29 th day of December, 2025.
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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