Windeknecht v. Dr. John Doe or Jane Doe et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LARRY WINDEKNECHT, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. 4:25-cv-0597-MTS
)
DR. JOHN DOE, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Larry Windeknecht is a frequent filer in this Court and consistently seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis. 	See, e.g., 1:24-cv-0044-MTS; 4:24-cv-0373-MTS; 4:25-cv-
0284-AGF; 4:25-cv-1018-ZMB; 4:25-cv-1183-JAR. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In his
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs in this case, just
like in the applications he has filed in his other cases, Plaintiff declared under penalty of
perjury that he has no wages, no money, and has received no income of any kind—including
any gifts—in the last twelve months. 	Doc. [2]. 	Despite these declarations, he somehow
acquires a significant amount of postage that he uses to regularly mail documents to the
Court. 	Because of the obvious inconsistency between spending money and simultaneously
claiming one has no money (and has received no money whatsoever from any source for
over twelve months), the Court ordered Plaintiff to submit a copy of his trust fund account
statement or institutional equivalent at Fulton State Hospital where he is committed as a
sexually violent predator. See Doc. [5] (2025 WL 2926196).
Plaintiff responded that he “has no earthly intentions of providing or submitting” the
account statement as the Court ordered, and that he is “not pleased” to have the contradiction
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between reality and his representations pointed out to him. 	See Doc. [6] at 1–2. 	Plaintiff
also discusses at length in his response the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 	As the Court
already explained to Plaintiff, though, the Court recognizes that he is not a “prisoner” within
the meaning of the PLRA since he is civilly committed as a sexually violent predator. 	See
Doc. [5] (citing Perkins v. Hedricks, 340 F.3d 582, 583 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)); see
also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.495 (providing that a person found to be a sexually violent
predator “shall be committed to the custody of the director of the department of mental
health for control, care and treatment”). But whether a plaintiff is a prisoner or not, the Court
“may consider evidence of a plaintiff’s financial status when examining the truthfulness of
an application to proceed in forma pauperis.” See Kirkland v. Donahoe, 1:11-cv-0048-KLL,
2012 WL 2360862, at *2 n.3 (S.D. Ohio June 20, 2012) (citing Speiser v. U.S. Bank, 3:10-
cv-0098-TAV, 2011 WL 42232, at *4–5 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 6, 2011)); accord Olteanu v.
Schneider, 2:23-cv-2006-RFB-NJK, 2025 WL 1880283, at *3 (D. Nev. May 6, 2025)
(“Courts may look beyond an in forma pauperis application to determine an applicant’s true
financial condition.”).
Indeed, the statute that governs proceeding in forma pauperis contemplates as much.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A) (requiring that a court dismiss a case “if the court determines
that” the plaintiff’s “allegation of poverty is untrue”). And a district court, of course, has the
authority to require parties to prove they are entitled to relief before it rules on a motion. Cf.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(c). It is nonsense to think that a district court is somehow hamstrung and
must grant a litigant in forma pauperis status when the litigant appears to misrepresent his
finances in his declaration to the court. 	See United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940
(9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (finding it was within the district court’s discretion to make a
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factual inquiry into a litigant’s poverty and to deny the motion when the litigant was
unwilling to verify his poverty); cf. Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court,
128 Yale L.J. 1478, 1495 (2019) (recognizing that “the federal IFP statute and Rule 83 afford
federal judges broad discretion in determining whether a litigant can proceed in forma
pauperis”). 	After all, proceeding in forma pauperis in a civil matter is a privilege, not a
right. See Williams v. McKenzie, 834 F.2d 152, 154 (8th Cir. 1987); accord Allen v. Briggs,
331 F. App’x 603, 604 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J.); Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434, 437
(11th Cir. 1986); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965).
The Court warned Plaintiff that if he failed to comply with its order then the Court
would dismiss this action without prejudice and without further notice. 	Doc. [5] at 2; see
also Rodgers v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 135 F.3d 1216, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting
that dismissal with prejudice is an “extreme sanction” and inappropriate where a litigant
“accidentally or involuntarily” fails to comply with a court order). 	But given Plaintiff’s
contumacious response to the order, the Court will dismiss his action with prejudice. 	He
outright announced that he refused to comply with the order and declared that he “does not
care whether this court or this Judge doubts the veracity of the statements.” 	See Doc. [6] at
1–2. Besides demonstrating a complete lack of respect for the Court, see White v. Williams,
423 F. App’x 645, 647 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting dismissal may be appropriate “when a party
has 	shown 	a 	lack 	of 	respect 	for 	the 	court”), 	Plaintiff’s 	response shows 	his 	“willful
disobedience” of the Court’s order, see Hunt v. City of Minneapolis, 203 F.3d 524, 527 (8th
Cir. 2000). Indeed, “it is difficult to imagine how a plaintiff can disobey a court order more
willfully or in worse faith than when,” like here, Plaintiff “ha[d] knowledge of the order and
deliberately disobey[ed] it.” Holden v. Simpson Paper Co., 48 F. App’x 917 (5th Cir. 2002).
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And “it is well settled that [dismissal with prejudice] is appropriate in cases involving willful
disobedience of a court order.” 	See In re Reid, 197 F.3d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1999); accord
Rasidescu v. Globe Coll., Inc., 105 F. App’x 121, 123 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(“Dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction, and it is appropriate when a plaintiff
willfully 	or 	deliberately 	disobeys 	a 	court 	order.”). 	Having 	carefully 	considered 	and
determined that no other less-severe sanction would adequately address Plaintiff’s intentional
contumacious conduct and willful disobedience, the Court will enter herewith an Order of
Dismissal, dismissing this action with prejudice.*
Dated this 7th day of November 2025.
MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
* Plaintiff’s refusal to submit his account statement provides further indication that the
declarations he made under penalty of perjury in his Application were false. His refusal strongly
suggests that his account statement would show that he lied. 	Cf. Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d
445, 462 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Int’l Union, UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (“Simply stated,” the adverse inference rule “provides that when a party has relevant
evidence within his control which he fails to produce, that failure gives rise to an inference that
the evidence is unfavorable to him.”)). 	Based on this failure and the blatant inconsistency
between Plaintiff’s representations and his expenditures, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
deliberately misstated his financial condition, which provides another basis for dismissal with
prejudice of this case. See Romesburg v. Trickey, 908 F.2d 258, 260 (8th Cir. 1990); Donelson v.
Tanner, 768 F. App’x 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2019) (unsigned order) (joined by Barrett, J.).
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