USA v. Romero-Salazar et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MIGUEL RUIG-NUNEZ,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:25-cr-00510-MTS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Government’s Motion for Revocation of Release
Order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), Doc. [31]. Upon review of the complete record, the
Court will grant the Government’s Motion for Revocation of the Release Order, Doc. [31], and
order Defendant be detained pending trial.
I. Findings of Fact
The defendant Miguel Ruig-Nunez is charged in the above-entitled cause with one count of
Conspiracy to Commit Financial Institution Theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, based upon his participation in an ATM “jackpotting” ring through which he and his co-
conspirators stole close to $1,000,000 from financial institutions in the St. Louis, Missouri area.
Defendant had his initial appearance in the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division on
October 28, 2025, pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by this Court. See 6:25-mj-02221-DCI. The
Government made an oral motion for detention on the basis that Defendant posed a serious risk of
flight under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A). United States Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick asked the
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Government to proffer the basis for that belief to determine whether a sufficient basis existed to
even hold a detention hearing under § 3142(f)(2)(A). Based upon the information proffered to Judge
Irick, he issued an order finding that the Government had not met its burden to establish that the
court should hold a detention hearing based on a serious risk of flight or that Defendant posed a
danger to the community. See Doc. [4] and Doc. [30] at 17 in 6:25-mj-02221-DCI. Subsequently,
Judge Irick issued an order setting conditions of release and ordered the United States Marshals
Service to keep the Defendant in custody until notified that Defendant had posted bond and/or
complied with all other conditions for release. See Doc. [17] in 6:25-mj-02221-DCI. Judge Irick
also granted the Government’s request for a stay of the release order setting conditions of release,
allowing the Government to file a request for a stay of the magistrate judge’s release order and an
appeal with this Court. See Doc. [4] in 6:25-mj-02221-DCI.
II. Legal Standard
“Pretrial detention is an issue that should be resolved at the outset of the case.” United
States v. Cook, 87 F.4th 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2023). The Court must first consider, as a threshold
matter, if the government has shown that the case involves one of the circumstances defined §
3142(f)(1) or (2). Id. Here, the Government’s motion for pretrial detention was based upon a serious
risk of flight under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A). Once that threshold matter has been established, a
court may order a defendant detained before trial “[o]nly if the government shows by clear and
convincing evidence that no release condition or set of conditions will reasonably assure the safety
of the community and by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or set of conditions. . .
will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance.” United States v. Kisling, 334 F.3d 734, 735
(8th Cir. 2003) (first quoting United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 n.20 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
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banc) (emphasis in original)), then citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), (e)-(f)). “‘[E]ither danger to the
community or risk of flight is sufficient to authorize detention.’” United States v. Cantu, 935 F.2d
950, 952 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Sazenski, 806 F.2d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 1986).
“[W]hile the § 3142(e)(1) and (g) inquiry is not identical to the § 3142(f)(2)(A) inquiry,
many of the same considerations apply.” Cook, 87 F.4th at 925. The § 3142(g) factors include: 1)
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, 2) the weight of the evidence against the
person, 3) the history and characteristics of the person, including- -
(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,
community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse,
criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings;
and
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on
probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal,
or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local
law; and
4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed
by the defendant’s release.
III. Discussion and Statement of Reasons for Detention
The Court makes its written findings of fact and statement of the reasons for detention as
contemplated in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1). As stated previously, a magistrate judge in Florida issued
a pretrial release order and then stayed it so this Court could hear the Government’s motion for
revocation of the pretrial release order. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1), the Government may file “a
motion for revocation of the [release] order or amendment of the conditions of release.” United
States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1481–82 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). A district judge reviewing a
magistrate judge’s pretrial order of release or detention must conduct a de novo review of that order.
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Id. “Reviewing without deference does not require the district court to start over in every case and
proceed as if the magistrate’s decision and findings do not exist.” Cook, 87 F.4th at 924 (cleaned
up); see also United States v. Stephenson, 2025 WL 999557, *6 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 3, 2025)
(discussing standard of review of detention decisions).
The Court will first consider the nature and circumstances of the offense charged and the
weight of the evidence against Defendant. Defendant is charged with Conspiracy to Commit
Financial Institution Theft based upon his participation in an ATM “jackpotting” ring through
which he and his co-conspirators stole well over $900,000 from financial institutions in St. Louis,
Missouri and surrounding areas. Specifically, the Indictment alleges that a co-conspirator was a
technician for a company that provided maintenance services for ATMs. That co-conspirator used
his position to install malware on the hard drives of ATMs at various financial institutions. This
enabled the other co-conspirators to take control of the ATMs and force the ATMs to dispense
substantial amounts of money without conducting legitimate transactions. Further, Defendant and
the other co-conspirators traveled from various locations in the United States to Missouri for the
sole purpose of stealing large sums of money from these financial institutions. In fact, between
December 6, 2024, and December 12, 2024, another co-conspirator rented numerous Airbnb
properties to provide lodging for the conspirators and Defendant rented a vehicle to transport
himself and other co-conspirators around the St. Louis area to carry out their criminal endeavors.
The weight of the evidence, the brazen nature and circumstances of the offense, and Defendant’s
role in the conspiracy are factors that weigh against Defendant’s release.
Next, the Court will consider the history and characteristics of Defendant. Based upon
interviews and pretrial service reports provided by both the Middle District of Florida, Doc. [103-
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1], and the Eastern District of Missouri, Doc. [103]1, Defendant is in his mid-forties and a citizen
of Venezuela. Although unclear, it appears Defendant previously held some form of temporary
protected status, both ICE and HSI reported that Defendant is currently in the country illegally, has
an ICE detainer lodged against him, and “is removable under U.S. immigration law.” See Docs.
[103], [103-1], and Doc. [35-1].2 The Florida Report details that: 1) ICE records show Defendant
was paroled into the United States in 2016 and assigned an alien registration number; 2) He was
granted an employment authorization document and granted a temporary protected status that is no
longer recognized; 3) Defendant has a valid driver’s license and social security number; 4)
Defendant claimed he does not possess a United States passport, and that his Venezuelan passport
and green card were stolen. Doc. [103-1] at 1. The Missouri Report indicates that: 1) Defendant
made no mention of receiving employment authorization documents or temporary protected status,
but reported he is in the “process of receiving political asylum in the United States;” 2) Although
Defendant claimed his passport and green card were stolen, his sister advised that she is in
possession of Defendant’s Venezuelan passport. Doc. [103] at 2.
The Missouri Report noted that although the information in the Florida Report was “mostly
consistent,” the Missouri Report contains an entire page of discrepancies between what Defendant
told pretrial services in Florida and what he told pretrial services in Missouri, including the address
and city in Florida that Defendant intends to return to if released and with whom he intends to
reside. The Florida report lists an address in St. Cloud, Florida where Defendant claims he rented a
room from a friend for the past 10 months. However, he told Missouri pretrial services that he had
1 Information was provided to the pretrial offices by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
and Homeland Security Investigations Agency (“HIS”). The pretrial services report will be referred to as the “Florida
Report” and the “Missouri Report.”
2 Doc. [35-1], is Defendant’s immigration detainer.
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lived at that address for two years. Defendant also indicated in the Florida report that he wanted to
return to that address if released but told Missouri pretrial services he wanted to live with his sister,
Claudia Ruig in Kissimmee, Florida. At the hearing on the Motion, however, Defendant’s counsel
explained that if Defendant were released, he wanted to stay at yet another sister’s home in Orlando,
Florida. These factors weigh against Defendant’s release. Defendant is in the United States illegally
and the information he provided to the pretrial services offices in Missouri and Florida contain
multiple discrepancies that are deceptive in nature.
As to family ties, employment, financial resources, and length of residency in the
community, it appears Defendant has relatives that live in Orlando, Florida, including his mother,
another sibling, two kids, and his wife. Defendant claims to have lived in Florida for the past nine
years. He also claims he has worked at Mechanical One for the past two years, and earns $4,500
per month.3 On the other hand, the only ties Defendant has to the Eastern District of Missouri are
the crimes he committed when he and his co-conspirators traveled from all over the country to
Missouri for the sole purpose of stealing substantial sums of money from financial institutions.4
Although it does not appear that Defendant has any prior convictions, if convicted, he faces his first
criminal conviction subject to up to five years in federal prison followed by removal proceedings.
These factors weight against Defendant’s release.
Given the nature and circumstances of Defendant’s criminal endeavors, lack of community
ties to the Eastern District of Missouri, the multiple discrepancies in information Defendant
3 In the Missouri Report he claims to earn $5,000 per month. Other financial discrepancies provided by Defendant are
noted in the Missouri report, as well as discrepancies concerning his medical conditions and medication, and his alcohol
consumption.
4 The fact that Defendant is in the United States illegally, was less than forthcoming and deceptive as to information
he provided to the pretrial service offices in both Florida and Missouri, and that he was involved in a nationwide
conspiracy to travel to Missouri and steal well over $900,000 in less than a week speaks to the nature and seriousness
of the danger to the community that would be posed by the defendant’s release.
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provided to the Florida and Missouri pretrial services, and the implications of Defendant being
faced with his first federal felony conviction and potential to serve up to a five-year federal prison
sentence followed by removal proceedings, demonstrate that Defendant poses a serious risk of
flight. It further shows that no condition or set of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance
of Defendant, given his strong incentive to flee based upon the factors previously discussed.5
IV. Conclusion
Based upon a de novo review of the evidentiary record and arguments of counsel, the Court
finds that the Government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant presents
a serious risk of flight if released, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A), and that no condition or set of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of Defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The Court
therefore concludes detention of the Defendant is appropriate pending trial.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Government’s Motion for Revocation of Release
Order, Doc. [31], is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Government’s motion for pretrial detention,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A), is GRANTED.
Dated this 16th day of December, 2025.
MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5 It must be noted that this Court had much more information available to it concerning Defendant’s history,
characteristics, and circumstances than the information available to Judge Irick at the time of the initial hearing in
Florida.
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Directions Regarding Detention
The Defendant is remanded to the custody of the Attorney General or to the Attorney General’s
designated representative for confinement in a corrections facility separate, to the extent
practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody. The Defendant
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity for private consultation with defense counsel. On order
of a court of the United States or on request of an attorney for the Government, the person in charge
of the corrections facility must deliver the defendant to a United States Marshal for the purpose of
an appearance in connection with a court proceeding.
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