Johnson v. Missouri Department of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTONIO JOHNSON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:24-CV-135-ZMB
)
KURT WEISS, et al. 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Antonio Johnson’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts
II and III against Officer Weiss. Doc. 83. While Defendant Kurt Weiss has accepted Johnson’s
Statement of Undisputed Material Fact, Doc. 85 (“SUMF”), for purposes of summary judgment,
see Doc. 103 at 1 n.1, Johnson is entitled only to partial judgment as a matter of law on the factual
record he presented to the Court. Accordingly, the Court grants in part Johnson’s motion.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual Background
Johnson was incarcerated at the Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Center in
Bonne Terre, Missouri, when he suffered a seizure. SUMF ¶¶ 1–2.1 Weiss was on duty as a corrections
officer that day. Doc. 46 ¶ 6; Doc. 60 ¶ 6. After responding to Johnson’s seizure, Weiss called a
“Code 16” indicating a medical emergency. SUMF ¶ 3. Weiss does not recall any details about the
incident, id., as seizures are “at least a weekly occurrence,” Doc. 85-3 at 6. However, a “Serious
Incident Report” lists him as the only officer involved in the initial response. Doc. 85-2.
1 While the documents Johnson cites to support the SUMF occasionally differ from the fact he asserts, the Court
accepts the SUMF in its entirety based on Weiss’s acceptance of it for summary-judgment purposes. See Doc. 103 at
1 n.1; E.D. M O. L.R. 4.01(E) (noting that a SUMF “shall be deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party).
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While not mentioned in the SUMF, the Amended Complaint asserts that Weiss originally
responded to the medical emergency but that Weiss, Defendant Gary Fenwick, and various unnamed
officers were responsible for putting him in administrative segregation and placing him “on a gurney,
bench, or seat with his hands cuffed or otherwise restrained behind his back.” Doc. 46 ¶¶ 21–29.
Other than Weiss’s initial involvement, Defendants denied each of these allegations. Doc. 60 ¶¶ 21–29.
The only new information following discovery is Johnson’s submission of undisputed expert
testimony that his injures were the result of being handcuffed behind his back during a seizure,
SUMF ¶ 17, and Weiss’s acknowledgement of an MDOC policy mandating a front restraint if an
inmate needs to be secured during a medical emergency to prevent injury to the inmate. Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
II. 	Procedural Background
Johnson moved for summary judgment in October 2025. Doc. 83. Weiss filed a timely
response in opposition but expressly accepted Johnson’s statement of material undisputed facts for
purposes of the motion. Doc. 103 at 1 n.1. Several weeks later, Johnson filed his reply. Doc. 104.
Nearly a month later, the Court received notice that the attorney representing the Defendants had
left employment with the Missouri Attorney General’s Office and that a new attorney would be
entering in his place. Doc. 106. Concurrently, the new attorney filed a Motion for Leave to File
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings out of Time. Doc. 107. After setting an expedited briefing
schedule and hearing, Docs. 109, 113, the Court denied that motion, Doc. 116. Shortly thereafter,
Johnson settled his claims against Defendant Tehum GUC Liquidating Trust, Doc. 114, and later
dismissed all but Weiss, Fenwick, and John and Jane Doe Defendants from this action, Doc. 127.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R.
C IV. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue for trial exists when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Huber v. Westar Foods, Inc., 139 F.4th 615, 620 (8th Cir. 2025) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court is required to
view disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable
inferences in its favor.” Sherr v. HealthEast Care Sys., 999 F.3d 589, 597 (8th Cir. 2021).
DISCUSSION
Despite Weiss’s acceptance of the SUMF, after drawing all inferences in his favor, the
Court holds that Johnson is entitled only to partial summary judgment on the question of whether
his injuries were caused by being handcuffed behind his back during a seizure. He otherwise fails
to show entitlement to judgment on his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and
Missouri negligence claim.
I. 	Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Failure to Protect
The first of Johnson’s remaining claims is for the violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. However, given the limited factual record, he has failed to show that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor. As such, the Court must deny summary judgment.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” has been
extended to protect prisoners from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. A.H. v.
St. Louis Cnty., 891 F.3d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 2018). The test for deliberate indifference “requires
both an objective and a subjective analysis.” Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 860 (8th Cir.
2018). Thus, Johnson must show both the objective prong—that he “suffered from an objectively
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serious medical need”—and the subjective prong—that “the defendant knew of, and yet
deliberately disregarded, that need.” Headley v. Centurion of Missouri LLC, No. 2:23-CV-52-
HEA, 2025 WL 973837, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2025) (citation omitted). Further, deliberate
indifference is a “highly culpable state of mind that resembles criminal-law recklessness and
approaches actual intent.” Hamilton v. Earl, 166 F.4th 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 2026).
Here, drawing all inferences in Weiss’s favor, the facts as presented in the SUMF and
accompanying records do not establish that Weiss was deliberately indifferent to Johnson’s
medical needs. Weiss admitted at his deposition that he was aware of MDOC’s policy against back
restraints for prisoners undergoing seizures and that the policy was motivated by inmate safety
concerns. Doc. 85 ¶¶ 8–12; Doc. 85-3 at 8–10. But “violations of prison policy or regulations alone
are not enough to establish deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.” Johnson v.
Schurman, 145 F.4th 897, 905 (8th Cir. 2025). And critically, nothing in the record suggests that
Weiss was aware of that the restraint policy at the time of the incident, which was nearly 4 years
before his deposition. Doc. 85-3 at 1–2. In other words, the Court would need to draw an
impermissible inference in Johnson’s favor to conclude that Weiss knew about the policy at the
time of the incident for purposes of assessing his mental state. See Sherr, 999 F.3d at 597 (the
Court must “draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the non-movant’s] favor.”).
More importantly, Johnson fails to supply any facts regarding Weiss’s role in restraining
him. While Weiss is listed as the only responder on a report prepared after the incident, Doc. 85-
2, Johnson’s own Amended Complaint indicates there was a time gap between Weiss’s initial
response and Johnson’s placement in administrative segregation and restraint once he was there.
Thus, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Weiss played any role in restraining Johnson
or that he deliberately ignored the resulting danger to Johnson. And while this factual void is, in
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part, due to Weiss’s lack of memory, “the Eighth Amendment does not . . . impose liability for
lack of recollection.” See Hodges v. Dep’t of Corr., 61 F.4th 588, 592 (8th Cir. 2023).
Given Johnson’s silence as to who was responsible for restraining him, the high mental
state required for a holding of deliberate indifference, and the requirement to draw all inferences
in Weiss’s favor, the Court holds that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict” in his favor. Huber,
139 F.4th at 620. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to show that Weiss was deliberately
indifferent, and Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim fails.
II. 	Missouri Negligence Claim
Johnson’s final claim is for negligence under Missouri law. However, similar to his claim
above, he has failed to meet his burden and demonstrate a link between Officer Weiss and the
shackling which led to his injury.
To prove a negligence claim in Missouri, a plaintiff must show “(1) a legal duty owed to
the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) proximate cause; and
(4) injury to the plaintiff.” Campbell v. Baxter Int’l, 697 S.W.3d 36, 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024). In
the prison-medicine context, Missouri courts have held that “[t]he duty owed is generally measured
by whether or not a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated danger and provided against
it.” Geiger v. Bowersox, 974 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).
As an initial matter, Weiss effectively failed to respond to this argument in his opposition
to summary judgment. See Doc. 103 n.2 (contending, in a footnote, that Johnson’s negligence
argument fails without providing any argument). But the Court still must find that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Giles v. Saint Luke’s Northland-Smithville, 908 F.3d 365,
369 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Even if a motion for summary judgment on a particular claim stands
unopposed, the district court must still determine that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
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a matter of law on that claim.”) (citation omitted). Similar to Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim,
lack of evidence regarding proximate cause prevents an award of summary judgment in his favor.
In particular, while there is no dispute that Weiss initially responded to the medical emergency,
the SUMF and accompanying record are utterly silent as to who was responsible for Johnson’s
restraints before and during his seizures, despite naming multiple potential actors in the Amended
Complaint. See Doc. 46 ¶¶ 26, 29. As such, Johnson’s negligence claim fails for similar reasons
to his Eighth Amendment claim.
III. 	Partial Summary Judgment on Injury Causation
Johnson alternatively moves for partial summary judgment as the cause of his injuries,
Doc. 84 at 9, and Defendants do not oppose this request, Doc. 103. Indeed, undisputed expert
testimony confirms that Johnson suffered injuries consistent with being handcuffed behind his
back during a seizure, SUMF ¶ 17, which sufficiently establishes that the manner of restraint was
responsible for Johnson’s injuries. Thus, Johnson is entitled to his unopposed alternative request
for partial summary judgment, and the Court will instruct the jury accordingly.
IV. 	Show-Cause Order for Service on John and Jane Doe Defendants
After reviewing the docket, the Court notes that there are still unserved Defendants in this
case—namely, John and Jane Doe Officers and John and Jane Doe Nurses. Given the 90-day
deadline for service under Rule 4(m) has long elapsed, Doc. 46 (operative complaint filed Nov. 6,
2024), the Court orders Johnson to show cause why the action should not be dismissed against the
unserved Defendants for insufficient service. See United Pentecostal Church Int’l v. Doe, No.
4:25-CV-27-MTS, 2025 WL 1663983, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 12, 2025) (collecting cases).
Accordingly, the Court orders that, no later than May 1, 2026, Johnson must either effect service
on Defendant John and Jane Doe Officers and John and Jane Doe Nurses, show cause in writing
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why the Court should not dismiss these Defendants without prejudice for insufficient service, or
voluntarily dismiss them as parties to this action.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff Antonio
Johnson’s [83] Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts II and III against Officer Kurt Weiss.
Further, the Court ORDERS that, no later than May 1, 2026, Johnson must either effect service
on Defendants John and Jane Doe Officers and John and Jane Doe Nurses, show cause in writing
why the Court should not dismiss these Defendants without prejudice for insufficient service, or
voluntarily dismiss them as parties to this action.
So ordered this 20th day of April 2026.
ZACHARY M. BLUESTONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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