Kendall et al v. Valley Park, Missouri, City of

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LUCAS D. KENDALL, SCRAP MART 	)
PROPERTIES, LLC and SCRAP MART LLC., 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:21CV1353 HEA
)
CITY OF VALLEY PARK, MISSOURI, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Order on
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amend, [Doc. No. 53]. Defendants
oppose the Motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on November 16, 2021. In this
Complaint, Plaintiffs sought an order declaring the subject scrap metal business
was legally operating prior to the 2013 Zoning Code and that it was currently
operating as a valid non-conforming business. Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Motion was granted and Plaintiffs were
granted leave to file an amended complaint.
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on December 27, 2022. On
February 22, 2023 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended
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Complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court conducted a hearing on this
Motion to Dismiss on May 10,2023. On June 12, 2023, the Court granted
Plaintiffs; leave to file their Second Amended Complaint. The Court again
concluded Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint failed again for a variety of
reasons .Plaintiffs were once again given leave to file an Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs’ second Amended Complaint was filed June 26, 2023. Defendants once
again filed a motion to dismiss on July 31, 2023. The Court conducted a hearing on
February 29, 2024. Thereafter, on March 30, 2024, the Court granted Defendants’
motion and issued an Order of Dismissal.
The fundamental basis of the Court Orders dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaints
was the lack of factual allegations to set forth a legal non-conforming use of the
subject property. In each Complaint, Plaintiffs continuously claim the scrap metal
business was legally operating prior to the zoning ordinance and therefore
continues to be a legal non-conforming use business. Each Complaint was
challenged by Defendants for failure of Plaintiffs to set forth their allegations
supported by sufficient facts to overcome the conclusory statements. None of the
complaints provided sufficient facts to do so. Plaintiffs appear to rely on the
previous issuance of licenses to conclude the business was operating legally
without making any connection between whether the issuance of the licenses
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rendered the business operating legal within the constraints of the applicable
zoning ordinance at the time.
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not mention motions for
reconsideration.” Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 1999). Nor do
the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Missouri. “Depending on the
circumstances,” however, such motions “may be properly analyzed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b).” Doe, C.P. v. Key, No. 4:20-cv-
01233-KGB, 2024 WL 6843183, *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 11, 2024) (citing Kirt v.
Fashion Bug # 3252, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 957, 964–65 (N.D. Iowa 2007)).
Rule 59(e)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may apply under these circumstances. Rule
59(e) provides for a “motion to alter or amend a judgment,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e),
and such a motion must be “directed to” a “judgment” rather than “a nonfinal
order.” Broadway, 193 F.3d at 989; see Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 507
(2020) (Rule 59(e) “enables a party to request that a district court reconsider a just-
issued judgment”); accord Nordgren v. Hennepin County, 96 F.4th 1072, 1077 (8th
Cir. 2024). As “used in” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the term “judgment”
includes “a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a).
The term thus “includes any appealable order, whether the order is appealable as a
final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 “or is otherwise made appealable by statute
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on an interlocutory basis.” 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.02[2] at 54-
20 (3d ed. 2025) (footnote omitted).
Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider might fall under Rule 60(b), which permits a
court, on “motion and just terms,” to “relieve a party ... from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding” for six specified “reasons” (including, as discussed below, a
court's “mistake” or “inadvertence”). Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Although Rule 59(e), as
mentioned, requires there to have been a “judgment,” Rule 60(b) applies somewhat
more broadly to motions for relief from a “judgment, order, or proceeding.” Under
the rule's “plain language,” though, the judgment or order at issue must have been
“final.” Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 984 n.5 (8th Cir. 2006); see Evans,
2023 WL 3170525, at *2 (Rule 60(b) “references ‘final’ orders”). The “addition”
of that “qualifying word” to the rule's text nearly 80 years ago was intended to
emphasize[ ] the character of the judgments, orders or proceedings from which
Rule 60(b) affords relief; and hence interlocutory judgments are not brought within
the restrictions of the rule, but rather they are left subject to the complete power of
the court rendering them to afford such relief from them as justice requires.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), Advisory Committee Note, 1946 Amendment; see 12
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.23 at 60-82 (3d ed. 2025) (“Rule 60(b)
does not govern relief from interlocutory orders, that is to say any orders in which
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there is something left for the court to decide after issuing the order.”) (footnote
omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has acknowledged and enforced
this “finality” limitation in a number of decisions. See Julianello v. K-V Pharm.
Co., 791 F.3d 915, 923 n.3 (8th Cir. 2015) (plaintiffs' motion to reconsider order
limiting their leave to amend was properly considered under Rule 54(b) rather than
Rule 60(b), as district court “had not yet entered final judgment on any of
plaintiffs' claims when the plaintiffs filed the motion for reconsideration”);
Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 992 F.2d 804, 807 (8th
Cir. 1993) (as Rule 60(b) “only applies to motions for relief from ‘a final
judgment, order, or proceeding,’ ” the district court erred in denying a motion to
reconsider for failure to satisfy Rule 60(b), as motion addressed a non-final order
and thus was not governed by that rule and, instead, should have been analyzed
“[u]nder the last clause of Rule 54(b)”); Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161,
168 n.12 (8th Cir. 1988) (“a district court may not entertain a Rule 60(b) motion
filed before entry of final judgment”); St. Mary's Health Ctr. of Jefferson City v.
Bowen, 821 F.2d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Rule 60(b) applies only to relief from
a final judgment or order.”).
Rule 60(b)
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A district court may grant relief from a “final” judgment or order “for the
following reasons” under Rule 60(b):
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Of these six “limited ... grounds,” BLOM Bank SAL v.
Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 206 (2025), four are clearly inapplicable here. Plaintiffs
neither challenge the order on the basis of “newly discovered evidence” under Rule
60(b)(2), nor claims under Rule 60(b)(3) that either order resulted from any
defendant's “fraud,” “misrepresentation,” or “misconduct.” Likewise, Plaintiffs do
not contend the judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4)-(5). Thus, at most, “only
options one ... and six” are potentially “available.” Burks, 2016 WL 11728948, at
*1.
The Supreme Court resolved a circuit split that had developed on the
mistake or inadvertence issue and held that, “[a]s a matter of text, structure, and
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history, ... a ‘mistake’ under Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge's errors of law.” Kemp
v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533–34 (2022). Kemp thus “permits any kind of
judicial mistake to be raised” under Rule 60(b)(1). 11 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra, 2025 Supp. § 2858.1 at 49. Even so, a litigant seeking relief for a court's
purported “mistake” or “inadvertence” may not use Rule 60(b) as “a vehicle for
simple rearmament on the merits.” Broadway, 193 F.3d at 990; see Arnold v.
Wood, 238 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 2001) (district court did not abuse discretion in
denying Rule 60(b) motion that “largely reasserted contentions made in earlier
motions”); accord Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Robinson, 113 F. App'x 723, 725 (8th Cir.
2004) (per curiam).
As for the sixth subsection, it provides for relief based on “any other reason
that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). But this “last option”—a “catchall”—is
“available only when Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are inapplicable.” Kemp, 596
U.S. at 533 (citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863
n.11 (1988)); see BLOM Bank, 605 U.S. at 211 (“Rule 60(b)(6) provides only
grounds for relief not already covered by the preceding five paragraphs”). And
even then, “only ‘extraordinary circumstances’ can justify relief under the Rule
60(b)(6) catchall.” Id. at 206.
The Eighth Circuit has long said as much. See Harley v. Zoesch, 413 F.3d
866, 871 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Relief is available under Rule 60(b)(6) only where
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exceptional circumstances have denied the moving party a full and fair opportunity
to litigate his claim and have prevented the moving party from receiving adequate
redress.”). Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has described all Rule 60(b) subsections as
providing for “extraordinary relief which may be granted only upon an adequate
showing of exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Young, 806 F.2d 805, 806
(8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); accord Williams, 891 F.3d at 706; Mitchell v. Shalala,
48 F.3d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 1995); see Patel v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 4:10-CV-
04195, 2015 WL 1637304, *1 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 13, 2015) (a party seeking
reconsideration under “any portion of Rule 60(b) must establish ‘exceptional
circumstances’ to obtain the ‘extraordinary relief’ the rule provides”); accord
Halloran, 2013 WL 544011, at *1; Discount Tobacco, 2010 WL 3522476, at *1.
Analysis
Plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to reconsideration of the
Opinion, Memorandum, and Order. Plaintiffs have had “a fair opportunity to
argue” their position throughout the course of this litigation. The Court detailed its
findings that Plaintiffs’ complaints failed to contain sufficient facts to a plausible
claim. Plaintiffs continued to set out conclusory allegations without detailing the
basis for the conclusions. Although Plaintiffs focus on the Court taking judicial
notice of the zoning ordinance at the time of the commencement of the business,
and how the Court should not have done so, this argument fails to overcome the
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Motion to Dismiss standard which requires Plaintiffs to set forth a plausible claim.
Plaintiffs present nothing new to demonstrate the Motion to Amend the Order
denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint is
meritorious and will be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Order
denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint, [Doc. No.
142] is DENIED.
Dated this 23 rd day of January, 2026.
________________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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