Backfisch v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. et al

1:24-cv-00213Moed9 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
BREANNA BACKFISCH, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. 1:24-cv-00213-SNLJ
)
PENSKE TRUCK LEASING 	)
CO., L.P. et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Federal Express Corporation’s motion
to stay case pending U.S. Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II,
LLC. [Doc. 88]. Plaintiff opposes the motion. [Docs. 90, 97]. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion to stay [Doc. 88] is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a personal injury case arising out of a commercial motor vehicle crash
that occurred on December 16, 2019. The crash allegedly occurred when the vehicle
Plaintiff was riding in was rear-ended by a tractor-trailer drive by defendant Bahromov. At
the time, Bahromov was allegedly working for defendant Trucking Times Inc., a motor
carrier, and was allegedly delivering cargo pursuant to a transportation agreement between
Trucking Times Inc. and defendant Federal Express Corporation. The tractor-trailer that
Bahromov was driving was allegedly rented or leased from defendant Penske Trucking
Leasing Co, L.P.
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Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges two counts against Federal Express
Corporation: Count III for bodily injury based on independent negligence of Federal
Express Corporation and Count V for bodily injury based on the negligence of Federal
Express Corporation in hiring, retaining, or selecting Trucking Times and Bahromov.
[Doc. 74]. Federal Express Corporation has moved to stay this entire case pending the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in a case that will decide whether the Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization Act (49 U.S.C. §14501(c)) preempts negligent
hiring or selection claims. [Doc. 88]. See Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, No. 24-
1238, 2025 WL 2808807 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2025) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
Plaintiff opposes the motion. [Docs. 90, 97].
II. 	DISCUSSION
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for
itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238, 1248 (8th Cir. 2013)
quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1036); Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238,
1248 (8th Cir. 2013). Thus, a district court has “broad discretion to stay proceedings as an
incident to its power to control its own docket.” Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
446 F.3d 808, 816 (8th Cir. 2006) quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). This
discretion requires courts to exercise “judgment, which must weight competing interests
and maintain an even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55.
Since staying proceedings can potentially harm the party opposing the stay, the
court’s decision should weigh the “competing interests and maintain an even balance,”
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while recalling that the Supreme Court has cautioned moderation. Id. at 255. Generally
speaking, the Court is to weigh “the potential prejudice or hardships to the parties, as well
as the interest of judicial economy.” St. Louis Heart Ctr, Inc. v. Athenahealth, Inc., 2015
WL 6777873 at *5 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 2015).
Despite a court’s broad discretion to stay proceedings, it is “[t]he proponent of the
stay that bears the burden of establishing its need.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 708. That burden
requires the moving party to show a specific hardship or inequity that would result if the
court denies a stay and the party must proceed with the litigation. Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d
1354, 1364 (8th Cir. 1996) (Beam, J., concurring) citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-56. The
moving party’s burden is so substantial that it creates a presumption favoring the party
opposing the stay. Id. at 1365.
The Court finds that Federal Express Corporation has failed to establish a specific
hardship or inequity that would result if this Court denied a stay and it must proceed with
the litigation. While Federal Express Corporation has argued that a decision in
Montgomery could possibly preempt all claims against it in the present action, that alone is
insufficient to stay a case in its entirety. First, the duration of the stay is indeterminate and
would most likely be quite lengthy since the Supreme Court just granted certiorari in
Montgomery on October 3, 2025. Granting the motion to stay would result in this case
lingering on the court’s docket, potentially for years, while the Montgomery case is briefed,
argued, and submitted for decision. Such a request goes against the interests of judicial
economy and this Court’s control of its docket. Further, any protracted stay while awaiting
a decision that relates to one (or possibly two) cause[s] of action against one defendant, but
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is not dispositive of this case in its entirety, is not necessary, does not conserve judicial
resources, and will not provide for a speedy and just determination of this case. Finally,
any such stay would prejudice the remaining parties who otherwise have an interest in the
prompt and fair management of their case. A better approach for purposes of judicial
economy is for the parties to continue complying with the case management deadlines and
move for a stay after discovery and before dispositive motions are due if a decision has not
yet come down on Montgomery.
Under the current circumstances, the Court finds that granting the requested
indeterminate stay would cause unfair prejudice or burden on the other parties and would
not conserve judicial resources.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Federal Express Corporation’s motion
to stay case pending U.S. Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, Inc.
[Doc. 88] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 9th day of December, 2025.
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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