Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Paschal O. Nwokocha, NWOKOCHA & OPERANA LAW OFFICES, LLC, 105
Fifth Avenue South, Suite 550, Minneapolis, MN 55401, for Petitioner.
David J. Walker, FREEBORN COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 411 South
Broadway Avenue, Albert Lea, MN 56007, for Respondent Ryan Shea.
David W. Fuller and Jaymarie A. Miranda, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55415 for the
Federal Respondents.
Petitioner Hector J.A.S. was arrested and detained by United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on April 13, 2026. Hector J.A.S. petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus, arguing that ICE is unlawfully detaining him. Because the Court concludes
HECTOR J.A.S.,
Petitioner,
v.
RYAN SHEA, Sheriff, Freeborn County, MN;
DAVID EASTERWOOD, Acting Director, St.
Paul Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement;
MARKWAYNE 	MULLIN, 	Secretary, 	U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; and
TODD 	BLANCHE, 	Acting 	United 	States
Attorney General,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-2242 (JRT/DLM)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
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that Hector J.A.S.’s detention is unlawful, the Court will grant his petition for writ of
habeas corpus and order that he be released from custody.
BACKGROUND
Hector J.A.S. is a citizen of Ecuador and a Minnesota resident. (Pet. Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Pet.”) ¶ 15, Apr. 14, 2026, Docket No. 1.) He entered the United States without
inspection on September 29, 2023. (Id. ¶ 16.) On October 4, 2023, United States Customs
and Border Protection encountered Petitioner at Cyril E. King Airport in St. Thomas,
United States Virgin Islands. (Decl. of Ivan Sabin (“Sabin Decl.”) ¶ 4, Ex. C, Apr. 16, 2026,
Docket No. 8.) Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear and was released under an
Order of Recognizance due to limited bed space. (Id.)
On May 3, 2024, Petitioner filed an asylum application, which remains pending.
(Pet. ¶ 17.) On October 2, 2024, Petitioner applied for a work permit, and that application
was approved on October 29, 2024; his work permit expires on October 29, 2029. (Sabin
Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C.)
On March 16, 2025, Petition was arrested for Driving While Impaired; on June 24,
2025, he was convicted of Fourth Degree Driving While Impaired under Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5), a misdemeanor. (Id.); see also Minn. Stat. § 169A.27. On April 12,
2026, Hector J.A.S. was arrested again for Driving While Impaired in Wright County,
Minnesota and taken into custody. (Sabin Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C.) That same day, ICE filed an
immigration detainer with the Wright County Jail, requesting that jail personnel call ICE
before releasing Petitioner from custody because ICE had probable cause to believe that
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Petitioner lacked immigration status or was otherwise removable and because Petitioner
“otherwise pose[d] a risk to national security, border security, or public safety.” (Sabin
Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. D.) ICE also issued a Form I-200 administrative warrant for Petitioner’s arrest
on April 12, 2026. (Sabin Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) On April 13, 2026, ICE served Petitioner with
the arrest warrant at the Freeborn County Jail, where he remains in custody. (Id.)
On April 14, 2026, Hector J.A.S. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
challenging the lawfulness of his detention. 	(Docket No. 1.) 	That same day, the Court
issued an order which, among other things, (1) enjoined Respondents from transferring
Petitioner outside the District of Minnesota pending a ruling on his habeas petition or
returning Petitioner to Minnesota if he had already been removed, and (2) directed
Respondents to file an answer by April 16, 2026. (Docket No. 5.) Respondents timely filed
a response (Docket No. 7), and Petitioner replied (Docket No. 9).
DISCUSSION
Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). 	Petitioner concedes that the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Avila v.
Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8 th Cir. 2026) forecloses his statutory arguments concerning the
applicability of § 1225(b)(2), but he maintains that his continued detention violates his
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Respondents disagree and argue that Petitioner’s detention comports with
procedural due process. After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments,
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the Court finds it unnecessary to address Petitioner’s due process claims because the
Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful on other grounds.
Respondents’ position suffers flaws on two fronts. 	First, Respondents did not
arrest Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Indeed, until Hector J.A.S. filed his habeas
petition, Respondents represented to Hector J.A.S. that he was not subject to mandatory
detention 	under 	§ 1225(b)(2) 	because 	they 	invoked 	the 	discretionary 	detention
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 in the Form I-200 administrative warrant. The warrant was
directed to: “Any immigration officer authorized pursuant to sections 236 [8 U.S.C. §
1226] and 287 [8 U.S.C. § 1357] of the Immigration and Nationality Act and part 287 of
title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, to serve warrants of arrest for immigration
violations.” (Sabin Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) Because Respondents represented to Petitioner that
his 	arrest 	was 	based 	on 	§ 	1226(a), 	the 	Court 	will 	hold 	Respondent 	to 	those
representations. See Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 970 (D. Minn. 2025). The
Court will therefore consider Petitioner subject to the discretionary detention framework
set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
Section 1226(a) states that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien
may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States.” In other words, to detain a noncitizen under § 1226(a), a warrant
is required. See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-4711, 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn.
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Jan. 5, 2026) (“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to justify discretionary
detention under section 1226(a).” (citation omitted)).
Upon review of the warrant presented by Respondents, the Court concludes that
Petitioner’s detention is unlawful because it appears that ICE did not serve him with the
Form I-200 administrative warrant until after he was arrested at the Wright County Jail
and transported to the Freeborn County Jail, where he remains in ICE custody. (See Sabin
Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B (certifying “that the Warrant for Arrest of Alien was served by [the
arresting officer] at Freeborn County Jail”). 	Because the warrant was not served until
after he was taken into custody by ICE and in detention at the Freeborn County Jail, the
warrant is invalid. See Ruben D.A.G. v. Blanche, Civ. No. 26-2041, slip op. at 5 (D. Minn.
Apr. 20, 2026) (disregarding Form I-200 administrative warrant that “clearly was not
served on Petitioner until he arrived at the Freeborn County Adult Detention Center” after
being arrested at the Rice County Courthouse). 	Because the warrant is invalid,
Petitioner’s detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 is unlawful. Gabriela G. v. Noem, Civ. No. 26-
590, 2026 WL 242007, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2026) (“[I]t follows that absent a warrant
a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a).” (citation
omitted)).
Second, to the extent Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and is subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), see Avila, 170 F.4th at 1138, it does not
follow that Petitioner can be arrested and detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) without first
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complying with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a), which addresses federal immigration officials’
authority to make warrantless arrests. 	Under § 1357(a)(2), an immigration officer may
“arrest any alien in the United States” without a warrant “if he has reason to believe that
the alien . . . is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely
to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)
(emphasis added). 	After the warrantless arrest is made, noncitizens “shall be taken
without unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of the Service . . . to examine
aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United States.” Id. The Eighth Circuit has
interpreted “the term ‘reason to believe’ in § 1357(a)(2) [to] mean[] constitutionally
required probable cause.” United States v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237, 1239 (8 th Cir. 2010).
Although the record supports the inference that that there was probable cause to
believe that Petitioner was unlawfully present in the United States, the record is void of
evidence that Petitioner was likely to escape before a valid warrant could be obtained
and properly executed. 	Just because a noncitizen is unlawfully present in the United
States does not mean that he or she is likely to escape. Ruben D.A.G., Civ. No. 26-2041,
slip op. at 8 (“Anyone without a lawful presence does not immediately present a
likelihood of escape merely by being a noncitizen.”). To hold that a noncitizen is likely to
escape merely because they are removable would effectively collapse § 1357(a)(2)’s two
distinct requirements into one: Section 1357(a)(2) requires that the officer must have
“reason to believe” that (1) the noncitizen is in the United States illegally and (2) the
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noncitizen is “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” If every
noncitizen 	that 	is 	here 	illegally 	is 	presumed 	likely 	to 	escape 	authorities, 	then
§ 1357(a)(2)’s second, independent requirement is rendered superfluous. See Corley v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, (2009) (“[A] statute should be construed so that effect
is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant[.]”). Respondents make no effort to justify Petitioner’s arrest under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a). 	Because Respondents have not shown that Petitioner was likely to escape,
they failed to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1357—the requirement for arresting a noncitizen
without a warrant. Respondents, therefore, improperly arrested and detained Petitioner
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
In sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful. Respondents
represented to Petitioner in the Form I-200 administrative warrant that he was being
arrested and detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which requires a warrant. 	Because the
warrant presented by Respondents is invalid, Petitioner cannot be legally detained under
§ 1226. But even if Respondent is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)—which may not
require a warrant—Respondents have failed to show that the warrantless arrest was
justified under 8 U.S.C. § 1357.
The Court therefore turns to the proper remedy. Because ICE failed to comply with
federal 	immigration 	law 	when 	arresting 	and 	detaining 	Petitioner 	and 	because
Respondents have not justified Petitioner’s continued detention, release is the proper
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remedy. See, e.g., Ahmed M. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-4711, 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn.
Jan. 5, 2026); Lauro M. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-134, 2026 WL 115022, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 15,
2026); cf. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for
unlawful executive detention. . . . The typical remedy for such detention is, of course,
release.”).
Accordingly, the Court will grant Hector J.A.S.’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
and order that he be released from custody.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Hector J.A.S.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(Docket No. [1]) is GRANTED, as follows:
1. 	Respondents shall RELEASE Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable,
and no later than 48 hours from the filing of this Order.
2. 	Respondents must release Petitioner with all personal effects, such as
driver’s 	licenses, 	passports, 	or 	immigration 	documents, 	and 	without
conditions such as location tracking devices.
3. 	The parties shall provide the Court with a status update concerning the
status of Petitioner’s release by no later than 5:00 p.m. on May 11, 2026.
Further, 	the 	parties 	shall 	advise 	the 	Court 	whether 	any 	additional
proceedings in this matter are required and submit any proposals for the
scope of further litigation.
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DATED: May 6, 2026 	_____/s/ John R. Tunheim ____
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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