Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
SOULEIMANE C.,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney
General; MARKWAYNE MULLIN,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; TODD M. LYONS, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; DAVID EASTERWOOD,
Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
and ERIC TOLLEFSON, Sheriff of
Kandiyohi County,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-2215 (LMP/JFD)
ORDER GRANTING
HABEAS PETITION
Kira Aakre Kelley, Climate Defense Project, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner.
Worthington 	Phillips, 	United 	States 	Attorney’s 	Office, 	Minneapolis, 	MN, 	for
Respondents.1
Petitioner Souleimane C. petitions for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his release
from immigration detention. 	ECF No. 1. 	The Government opposes Souleimane C.’s
petition, arguing that he is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 5. For
the following reasons, Souleimane C.’s petition is granted as described below.
1 	When used in this Order, “Respondents” or “Government” refer to the federal
officials named as Respondents. Respondent Eric Tollefson, the Kandiyohi County Sheriff,
has not participated in these proceedings.
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BACKGROUND
Souleimane C. is a citizen of Mauritania, where he was enslaved but eventually
gained his freedom and attended university. 	ECF No. 1 ¶ 14. 	However, Souleimane C.
experienced threats from the Mauritanian government due to his opposition to the practice
of slavery. 	Id. 	Accordingly, Souleimane C. fled Mauritania and arrived at the United
States-Mexico border on June 13, 2023, where he was interviewed by immigration officers.
ECF No. 6 ¶ 4. The next day, Souleimane C. was issued a Notice to Appear for removal
proceedings, and on June 15, 2023, Souleimane C. was released from immigration
detention on an order of recognizance. Id. ¶¶ 5–6; see ECF No. 6-1.
After his release from immigration detention, Souleimane C. lived in New York City
and Philadelphia and remained law abiding. ECF No. 1 ¶ 17. Souleimane C. applied for
asylum on April 9, 2024. Id. ¶ 16. On July 27, 2025, however, Souleimane C. presented
himself at the United States-Canada border in an attempt to seek asylum in Canada. 	Id.
¶ 18. 	Canadian officials took Souleimane C. into custody and turned him over to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) the next day. 	ECF No. 6 ¶ 8. 	ICE then
took Souleimane C. into custody on a warrant of arrest issued “pursuant to section 236
[8 U.S.C. § 1226] and 287 [8 U.S.C. § 1357] of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” ECF
No. 6-4.
Since July 28, 2025, Souleimane C. has remained in immigration custody at various
detention facilities including, at present, the Kandiyohi County Jail in Willmar, Minnesota.
ECF No. 1 ¶ 19. While detained, Souleimane C.’s asylum application was granted by an
immigration judge on December 24, 2025. 	ECF No. 6 ¶ 9. 	However, the Government
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appealed the immigration judge’s decision, and the appeal remains pending before the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 	Id. ¶ 10. Accordingly, Souleimane C. remains
detained pending a final decision from the BIA on his asylum application.
On April 13, 2026, Souleimane C. filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that his continued immigration detention violates his Fifth Amendment
procedural and substantive due process rights. See generally ECF No. 1. Souleimane C.
alleges that he is subject to detention, if at all, under either 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or
“potentially under Respondents’ new expanded interpretation of mandatory detention
authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).” 	Id. ¶ 35. 	The Court ordered the Government to
respond to Souleimane C.’s petition no later than April 20, 2026, with any reply by
Souleimane C. due by April 27, 2026. 	ECF No. 3. 	The Government timely responded,
arguing that Souleimane C. is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). 	See ECF
No. 5; 	see also Avila v. Bondi, 170 	F.4th 1128, 1136 (8th Cir. 2026). 	Because
Souleimane C. is mandatorily detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), so says the
Government, he lacks a due process right to be released from custody. See ECF No. 5 at 7–
17. Souleimane C. timely filed a reply brief, asserting that Ҥ 1225(b)(2) and Avila are . . .
not dispositive of [Souleimane C.’s] habeas because Avila was factually distinct in material
ways.” 	ECF No. 7 at 2. 	Specifically, Souleimane C. notes that, unlike the petitioner in
Avila, he was released into the United States by immigration officials on an order of
recognizance and was granted asylum by an immigration judge. Id. at 2–3.
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ANALYSIS
“Congress has granted federal district courts, ‘within their respective jurisdictions,’
the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held
‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3)). 	The
protections of habeas corpus extend to those in immigration detention. See INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 305–06 (2001).
As a threshold matter, the Government argues that Souleimane C. must exhaust his
administrative remedies in immigration court before seeking habeas relief in this Court.
ECF No. 5 at 16–17. “[T]here is no statutory requirement that a habeas petitioner exhaust
his administrative remedies before challenging his immigration detention in federal court.”
Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (D. Minn. 2025). 	The exhaustion
requirement for habeas petitions “is judicially created, not statutorily mandated,” so it may
be excused in the Court’s discretion “due to time constraints or where proceeding through
the administrative remedy process would undoubtedly be an exercise in futility that could
serve no useful purpose.” Id. at 965–66 (citations omitted). The Court determines that any
exhaustion concerns from the Government are outweighed by the irreparable harm that
Souleimane C. asserts—unlawful detention—and the reality that review before the
immigration court is all but certain to be futile, given the BIA’s decision in In re Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025). 	Exhaustion does not bar review here. 	See
Jose J.O.E., 797 F. Supp. 3d at 965; Eliseo A. A. v. Olson, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1032
(D. Minn. 2025).
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On the merits, Government counsel argues that Souleimane C. is properly detained
under the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 5 at 3–6. If
immigration officials had elected to invoke its mandatory detention authority under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), the Court agrees that Souleimane C. would have been subject to
mandatory detention because he is an “unadmitted alien[] already present inside the United
States.” Avila, 170 F.4th at 1136. The problem for the Government, though, is that prior
to this litigation, it never invoked its mandatory detention authority under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) to justify Souleimane C.’s detention. Rather, the record plainly discloses that
the Government has always justified Souleimane C.’s detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Start 	with 	Souleimane 	C.’s 	arrival 	to 	the 	United 	States-Mexico 	border 	and
apprehension by immigration officials on June 13, 2023. ECF No. 6 ¶ 4. The mandatory
detention authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) provides that “if the examining immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled
to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” for removal proceedings. But that’s not what
happened. 	Instead, the Government released Souleimane C. into the community on an
order 	of 	recognizance. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	5–6. 	Clearly, 	the 	Government’s 	act 	of 	releasing
Souleimane C. does not purport to invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which requires the
detention of a noncitizen. 	Instead, release on an order of recognizance is “a form of
‘conditional parole’ from detention upon a charge of removability, authorized under section
1226.” Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 5, 2026) (emphasis added) (quoting Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 215
(D. Mass. 2025)); see J. U. v. Maldonado, 805 F. Supp. 3d 482, 493 (E.D.N.Y. 2025)
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(“[R]elease on recognizance constitutes a form of conditional parole from detention housed
in the provisions of § 1226’s discretionary detention.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B)
(providing that “the Attorney General may “release” a noncitizen on “conditional parole”).
Fast forward to July 28, 2025, when immigration officials re-arrested Souleimane C.
after he attempted to enter Canada. 	Immigration officials arrested Souleimane C. on a
warrant of arrest, which indicates that it was issued “pursuant to section 236 [8 U.S.C.
§ 1226] and 287 [8 U.S.C. § 1357] of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” ECF No. 6-4
(emphasis added). Again, then, the Government invoked 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), to justify Souleimane C.’s detention.
Now, for the first time, and only in response to Souleimane C.’s habeas petition,
counsel for the Government claims that everything the Government said before was wrong,
and that Souleimane C. has actually been detained all along under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
ECF No. 5 at 3–6. The Government, of course, is correct that it now possesses the authority
to detain “unadmitted aliens already present inside the United States.”2 	Avila, 170 F.4th
at 1136. 	But whether the Government possesses that authority is an entirely different
question from whether the Government invoked that authority in this case. To that end, it
is black-letter administrative law that “courts may not accept [] counsel’s post hoc
rationalizations for agency action,” and that “an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all,
2 	As Souleimane C. aptly notes, there are material factual differences between this
case and Avila. Notably, based on the Court’s review of the district court docket of Avila,
it appears that the petitioner in Avila was never released on an order of recognizance, nor
was the petitioner in Avila arrested on a warrant issued pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
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on the basis articulated by the agency itself.”3 	Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983); see Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 20 (2020) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (explaining that “a foundational principle of administrative law” is that
“judicial review of agency action is limited to the grounds that the agency invoked when it
took the action”). That rule serves salutary purposes, for “when so much is at stake, the
Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people.” Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 591 U.S. at 20, 24 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Put simply,
the Government is not allowed to change horses midstream. It is stuck with the horse on
which it rode into court.
Here, the “basis articulated by the agency” for Souleimane C.’s detention when it
encountered him in 2023 (and again in 2025) has been consistent and clear: 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). 	Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 50. 	The Court will therefore hold the
Government to its representations that it has made to Souleimane C. throughout his
3 	Although 	this 	principle 	is 	ordinarily 	applied 	in 	cases 	arising 	under 	the
Administrative Procedure Act, courts have also applied this principle when reviewing
agency action for due process violations under the Fifth Amendment. See Padara Cruz v.
Noem, No. 2:26-cv-1112 (NJC), 2026 WL 555038, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2026)
(collecting cases); cf. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 58 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch,
J.) (citation omitted) (explaining that “factually unsupported ‘post-hoc rationalizations’
aren’t the stuff of summary judgment victories in [Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act] cases (or in most any other)”). Indeed, even before the APA was enacted, the
Supreme Court explained that agency action “cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon
which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be
sustained.” 	SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943); see Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36 (1950) (discussing enactment of the APA in 1946).
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removal proceedings and find that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Lopez
Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (rejecting the Government’s
position, “adopted post hoc and raised for the first time in this litigation,” that petitioner
had been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)); Jose J.O.E., 797 F. Supp. 3d at 969–70
(same); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 782–83 (E.D. Mich. 2025)
(same).4
Zoom out to the broader legal landscape over the past year, and that conclusion
becomes more reasonable. 	For decades, the Government invoked 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to
justify discretionary detention of “noncitizens found in the United States without legal
status and therefore subject to removal.” 	Selvin Adonay E. M. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-3975
(SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839, at *6 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025) (citation omitted). The
Government’s push to invoke the mandatory detention authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
against such noncitizens en masse arose from a July 8, 2025 guidance memo from ICE,
which concluded that Section 1225(b)(2) applied to any noncitizen in the United States
who did not possess lawful immigration status. 	See Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Interim
Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission (Jul. 8, 2025).5
The guidance memo, however, recognized that “additional operational guidance” would
need to be developed, and that ICE attorneys should continue to argue the merits of a bond
4 	Souleimane C. argues that his removal proceedings have been “dismissed,” ECF
No. 7 at 4, but that is not correct. Souleimane C.’s asylum application remains pending on
appeal before the BIA, meaning he is still awaiting “a decision on whether [he] is to be
removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
5 	This guidance may be found at https://perma.cc/EDD5-35FV.
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request when made by such a noncitizen. See id. The Government’s push gained real teeth
on September 5, 2025, when the BIA decided in Yajure Hurtado that immigration judges
“lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond” to noncitizens who are unlawfully
present in the United States. 29 I. & N. Dec. at 216, 225. Although this Court and hundreds
of other federal courts disagreed with the Government’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), see Roberto M. F. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4456 (LMP/ECW), 2025 WL 3524455,
at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2025), the Eighth Circuit eventually sided with the Government’s
reading of Section 1225(b)(2) on March 25, 2026, see Avila, 170 F.4th at 1136.
Recall that Souleimane C. was detained on July 28, 2025—just a few weeks after
ICE issued its interim guidance memo, and months before the Government’s reading of
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) would gain real legal footing in Yajure Hurtado. ECF No. 1 ¶ 19.
It is entirely plausible, then, that immigration officers treated Souleimane C. how they for
decades had been treating noncitizens found in the United States without legal status:
invoking the discretionary detention authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 	That is what the
record reflects, ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 4–6; ECF No. 6-4, so 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies.
Having found that Souleimane C. is properly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), the next question is one of remedy. 	Noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing. 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306
(2018) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)) (“Federal regulations provide that
aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.”). There
is no evidence in the record, however, that the Government has ever afforded a bond
hearing to Souleimane C. 	Depriving Souleimane C. of his right to a bond hearing—a
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protection to which federal regulations plainly entitle him—strikes at the heart of his due
process right to be free of arbitrary detention.6 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690
(2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects.”); see Selvin Adonay E. M., 2025 WL 3157839, at *9 (finding petitioner’s due
process rights violated when he was denied a bond hearing despite being detained under 8
U.S.C. 	§ 1226(a)). 	Accordingly, the 	Court will 	order 	the 	Government 	to provide
Souleimane C. with a bond hearing within seven days of this Order.7
ORDER
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Souleimane 	C.’s 	Petition 	for 	a Writ 	of 	Habeas 	Corpus 	(ECF 	No. 	1) 	is
GRANTED as follows:
a. 	The Court DECLARES that Souleimane C. is not subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and is instead subject to detention,
if at all, pursuant to the discretionary provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
6 	The Government’s arguments on Souleimane C.’s due process claims are premised
on the belief that Souleimane C. is properly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
See ECF No. 5 at 7–17. As explained above, that premise is incorrect.
7 	Souleimane C. requests immediate release from detention as a remedy. ECF No. 1
at 16. 	This Court, however, has previously concluded that when a petitioner is properly
subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) but denied the opportunity for a bond hearing,
“the remedy for that violation is to order the Government to provide [the petitioner] with a
bond redetermination hearing.” 	Roberto M. F. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4456 (LMP/ECW),
2025 WL 3524455, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2025). That makes sense from a constitutional
perspective, as well, because the “process” that is “due” to someone detained under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is an individualized bond hearing. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306. The
Court consequently orders a bond hearing as a remedy at which the immigration judge can
evaluate Souleimane C.’s amenability for release. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d).
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b. 	The Government is ORDERED to provide Souleimane C. with a bond
redetermination hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on the merits of his
release no later than Thursday, May 7, 2026.
c. 	If 	the 	Government 	does 	not 	provide 	Souleimane 	C. 	with 	a 	bond
redetermination hearing by May 7, 2026, as required by this Order, the
Government is ORDERED to release Souleimane C. from detention
immediately.
d. 	No later than Friday, May 8, 2026, the Government is ORDERED to
provide the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond
hearing conducted pursuant to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held,
advise the Court regarding Souleimane C.’s release.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: April 30, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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