Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
OLUWADAMILOLA BAMIGBOYE,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, DHS; IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
ICE; DIRECTOR OF ST. PAUL FIELD
OFFICE ICE; ADMINISTRATOR
SHERBURNE COUNTY JAIL; and
ACTING DIRECTOR ST. PAUL FIELD
OFFICE ICE,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-CV-2102 (LMP/JFD)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Oluwadamilola Bamigboye is currently being prosecuted in this District
on one count of having unlawfully resisted arrest by a federal official in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 111. See United States v. Bamigboye, No. 25-CR-0477 (LMP/JFD) (D. Minn.).
Mr. 	Bamigboye 	is 	also 	the 	subject 	of 	ongoing 	immigration 	removal 	proceedings.
Following his arrest in the criminal matter, Mr. Bamigboye was ordered released on
conditions. (Declaration of Angela Minner (“Minner Decl.”) Ex. E, Dkt. No. 13-5.) By the
time of his release on conditions, however, Mr. Bamigboye was subject to both an
immigration detainer (Minner Decl. Ex. F, Dkt. No. 13-6), and an administrative warrant
for his arrest for the purpose of initiating the removal proceedings that are now ongoing
against him (Minner Decl. Ex. H, Dkt. No. 13-8).
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After he was taken into immigration custody, Mr. Bamigboye was afforded a bond
hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and, later, a custody redetermination hearing
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. Both times, Mr. Bamigboye was kept in custody, with the
immigration judge explaining following the custody-redetermination hearing that Mr.
Bamigboye had “not established he does not pose a danger to persons or property and that
he does not pose a significant flight risk.” (Minner Decl. Ex. G, Dkt. No. 13-7.) Mr.
Bamigboye remains in immigration custody today.
Mr. Bamigboye has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising a panoply of
claims challenging the lawfulness of that ongoing detention. This Court ordered the
government to respond to the habeas petition, which it has (see Dkt. No. 12), and provided
Mr. Bamigboye with an opportunity to reply to that response, which he has (see Dkt.
No. 17). Each of the parties has also submitted documentary evidence in support of their
respective legal positions. After a review of the briefing and the evidence submitted by the
parties, this Court concludes that Mr. Bamigboye is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the habeas petition be denied and this case dismissed.
Mr. Bamigboye’s habeas petition raises four grounds for relief. (Pet. at 6-7, Dkt.
No. 1). The four grounds, however, do not map neatly onto specific legal claims. Aspects
of certain legal claims can be found in more than one ground for relief, while individual
grounds for relief sometimes contain more than one legal claim. Mr. Bamigboye is not an
attorney, and his habeas petition is therefore entitled to review under “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972) (per curiam). This Court finds that, fairly interpreted, the habeas petition can be
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read as raising the following three claims for relief (which do not correspond neatly to the
grounds for relief formally presented): (1) that Mr. Bamigboye is not subject to removal
from the United States and should not be held in detention during removal proceedings that
should not be occurring; (2) that Mr. Bamigboye has not been provided adequate medical
attention while in immigration custody; and (3) that the decision of the immigration judge
not to release Mr. Bamigboye on bond unlawfully contradicts the finding of the magistrate
judge as part of the criminal proceedings that he was not a risk to others or a risk to flee.
Unfortunately for Mr. Bamigboye, there are jurisdictional hurdles impeding each of
these claims as currently raised.
First, with respect to the lawfulness of the removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
provides (with exceptions not relevant here) that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against 	any 	alien 	under 	this 	chapter.” 	An 	immigration 	detainee 	may, 	in 	some
circumstances, invoke habeas corpus to challenge the lawfulness of his detention—
section 1252(g) does not wholly deprive federal district courts of jurisdiction over every
claim that brushes up against the reality of ongoing removal proceedings, see Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1999)—but the
provision does squarely preclude the Court from examining whether removal proceedings
should be ongoing against Mr. Bamigboye at all. Mr. Bamigboye cannot in this proceeding
challenge his detention on the grounds that he should not be removed from the United
States.
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Second, with respect to the quality of the medical care that Mr. Bamigboye has
received while detained, the Eighth Circuit has long been clear that “[i]f the prisoner is not
challenging the validity of his conviction or the length of his detention, such as loss of good
time, then a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.” Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d
1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); accord Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469 (8th
Cir. 2014). Claims of medical negligence or deliberate indifference to medical needs could
be raised by Mr. Bamigboye only through a non-habeas civil complaint. Because Mr.
Bamigboye is a prisoner1 for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), he would be required to pay
the statutory filing fee for such a proceeding, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), and he would not
be permitted to go forward with his conditions-of-confinement claims until he had fully
exhausted available administrative remedies for those claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Third, with respect to the claim regarding the immigration judge’s decision not to
release Mr. Bamigboye on bond pursuant to § 1226(a), discretionary decisions of an
immigration judge regarding bond determinations have similarly been placed outside the
jurisdiction of the Court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The Attorney General’s discretionary
judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court
may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding
the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”). Section 1226(e)
does not preclude a habeas petitioner from raising structural or constitutional challenges to
1 Immigration detainees usually fall outside of the definition of “prisoner” used by
§ 1915(h), but Mr. Bamigboye, unlike most immigration detainees, is “accused of . . .
violations of criminal law.”
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the immigration detention statutes, see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295-96
(2018), but it does prevent the Court from looking at the case file and then concluding that
the immigration judge should have released the petitioner on bond. In other words,
discretionary decisions under § 1226(a) are committed to the discretion of the immigration
judge, not the discretion of this Court.
Mr. Bamigboye attempts to evade the consequences of § 1226(e) by characterizing
his claims as constitutional challenges to his detention and therefore outside the ambit of
the jurisdiction-stripping provision of § 1226(e). See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295-96. For the
most part, however, these constitutional claims are merely dressing for what is, at heart, a
challenge to the discretionary decision of the immigration judge. Mr. Bamigboye does not,
for example, adequately explain why the denial of bond amounts to a violation of his due-
process rights, except to argue that a federal magistrate judge had previously concluded
that he should be released during the pendency of the criminal prosecution against him.
But the fact that one judge reached one discretionary decision regarding release as part of
one proceeding, while a different judge reached a different discretionary decision regarding
release as part of a different proceeding, does not amount to a violation of due process.2
Indeed, that two different judges could reach two different conclusions with respect to a
discretionary bond decision is exactly the circumstance contemplated by § 1226(e).
2 Mr. Bamigboye also suggests in his briefing that the duration of his confinement has
extended to the point that continued detention would amount to a violation of his due-
process rights. But due-process claims that an immigration detainee has been held in
custody for too long during pending immigration proceedings are precluded within the
Eighth Circuit. See Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 931-34 (8th Cir. 2024).
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Mr. Bamigboye is more particular about the constitutional aspect of his claim in one
respect. In his reply brief, Mr. Bamigboye argues that his initial arrest was carried out
without a warrant and that the absence of a warrant renders unlawful any continuing
detention resulting from that arrest. However, Mr. Bamigboye did not raise this argument
in his habeas petition; it is only in Mr. Bamigboye’s reply to the government’s response
that the argument first appears. Courts do not, as a general matter, consider arguments or
claims first raised in a reply brief, see Redking Foods LLC v. Minn Associates LP, No. 13-
CV-0002 (PJS/JSM), 2014 WL 754686, at *4 n.4 & n.5 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2014), for the
simple reason that by raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief, a litigant deprives
the opposing party from having a fair opportunity to respond to the argument. The
government could not reasonably have known from the habeas petition that Mr. Bamigboye
intended to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest and therefore, understandably, did not
offer any arguments responsive to the claim.
Mr. Bamigboye has not established an entitlement to habeas corpus relief; indeed,
his claims largely fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court even to consider. Because of
those jurisdictional barriers, it is recommended that the habeas petition be denied and this
case dismissed without prejudice.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	The petition for a writ of habeas corpus of Petitioner Oluwadamilola
Bamigboye (Dkt. No. 1) be DENIED.
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2. 	This case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Dated: May 5, 2026 	s/ John F. Docherty______________
JOHN F. DOCHERTY
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days
after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. 	A party may respond to
those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. 	See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set
forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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