Payton v. State of Minnesota

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Troy Mike Payton,
Petitioner,
v.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Case No. 26-cv-1721 (ECT/DTS)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Troy Mike Payton’s Defense Motion
for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., Dkt No. 1 (Petition); and Motion
Requesting to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Dkt No. 2 (IFP
Application). For the following reasons, the Court recommends denying the Petition, dis-
missing this action, and denying the IFP Application as moot.
Payton is a state pretrial detainee at the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Min-
nesota. See Pet. 1, 9. He is the defendant in a pending state criminal prosecution: State
v. Payton, No. 27-cr-25-22602. See id. at 1. He faces 11 felony counts. See id. at 2; see
also, e.g., Register of Action, State v. Payton, No. 27-cr-25-22602 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (Pay-
ton State-Court Docket).1
1 The eleven counts are: fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle resulting in death
(Counts 1–2, Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 4(a)); fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle
resulting in great bodily harm (Count 3, Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 4(b)); possessing
ammunition or a firearm as an ineligible person (Count 4, Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2)); making threats of violence (Count 5, Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1); first-
degree carjacking (Counts 6–7, Minn. Stat. § 609.247, subd. 2); doing a drive-by shooting
(Count 8, Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(a)(2)); and committing second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon (Counts 9–11, Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1). See Compl. 2;
Payton State-Court Docket.
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Payton’s exact list of arguments is unclear, but construed liberally, the Court views
the Petition as presenting six grounds for relief. First, Payton argues that his September
2025 arrest was an unlawful warrantless seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and the Minnesota Constitution. See Pet. 2–3. Second, Payton contends that the multiple
fleeing counts (Counts 1–3), carjacking counts (Counts 6–7), and assault counts (Counts
9–11) are impermissibly multiplicitous and violate double-jeopardy protections because
each group arises from a single course of conduct. See id. at 4, 6–7. Third, Payton chal-
lenges the firearms-possession statute underlying Count 4 (Minn. Stat. § 624.713) as an
unconstitutional bill of attainder and a violation of the Second Amendment. See id. at 4.
Fourth, Payton denies possessing the requisite criminal intent for the threats-of-
violence charge (Count 5), the carjacking charges (Counts 6–7), the drive-by shooting
charge (Count 8), and the assault charges (Counts 9–11). He suggests here that his ac-
tions were driven by trauma-induced paranoia and a desire for self-preservation, not crim-
inal intent. See id. at 3, 6–7. Fifth, Payton alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial has been violated because he demanded a speedy trial in state court but the
State failed to bring him to trial within the applicable time limitations. See id. at 7–8. Fi-
nally, Payton alleges “prosecutorial vindictiveness” and a Brady violation,2 contending
that the State withheld exculpatory evidence (including “[d]iscovery material,” “video foot-
age,” and “witness testimony”). Id. at 8.
For relief, Payton seeks dismissal of all state-court charges. See, e.g., id. at 8.
The Payton State-Court Docket does not appear in this federal action’s docket. But a
federal court can take judicial notice of public state-court records. See, e.g., Stutzka v.
McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Eagleboy, 200
F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1999)).
2 Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Because the relief Payton seeks would interrupt an ongoing state prosecution, the
Court must consider the so-called Younger abstention doctrine.3 Federal courts have con-
sistently noted that under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, state pretrial detainees can challenge their
confinement as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Palmer v. Clarke, 961 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir.
1992) (citing cases); Terry v. Ryals, No. 25-cv-1152 (BSM/ERE), 2026 WL 546489, at *2
(E.D. Ark. Feb. 10, 2026) (citing Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973)).
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that federal courts are not to serve as a
“‘pretrial-motion forum for state prisoners.’” Braden, 410 U.S. at 493 (quoting id. at 508
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
Under Younger, federal courts must refrain from interfering in certain ongoing state
proceedings. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (citing
cases). The Eighth Circuit uses “a three-part inquiry” to consider whether Younger ab-
stention applies:
First, does the underlying state proceeding fall within one of
the three “exceptional circumstances” where Younger absten-
tion is appropriate? Second, if the underlying proceeding fits
within a Younger category, does the state proceeding satisfy
what are known as the “Middlesex” factors?[4] And third, even
if the underlying state proceeding satisfies the first two inquir-
ies, is abstention nevertheless inappropriate because an ex-
ception to abstention applies?
Wassef v. Tibben, 68 F.4th 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting 375 Slane Chapel Rd.,
LLC v. Stone Cnty., 53 F.4th 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2022)); see also, e.g., Auleciems v.
3 Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). A district court may consider Younger ab-
stention issues sua sponte. See, e.g., Geier v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 715 F.3d 674, 676
(8th Cir. 2013).
4 Cf. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
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Twp. of W. Lakeland, No. 24-cv-1661, 2025 WL 509188, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb. 14, 2025)
(quoting Wassef), aff’d, No. 25-1387, 2025 WL 3062719 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 2025).
Under this inquiry, the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction here. The
first Younger factor is met because one of the “exceptional circumstances” mentioned in
Wassef includes ongoing state criminal proceedings. 68 F.4th at 1087 (quoting Sprint
Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 78). So is the second. The Middlesex factors require “(1) an on-
going state judicial proceeding that (2) implicates important state interests and (3) pro-
vides the federal plaintiff adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges.” Id. (citing Mid-
dlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm’n, 457 U.S. at 432–35); Auleciems, 2026 WL 509188, at *11
(same). The Petition provides no reason to believe that Payton cannot raise his argu-
ments in state-court proceedings (which plainly implicate the State of Minnesota’s im-
portant interest in enforcing its criminal laws).
Nor do any abstention exceptions apply here. The main exceptions are when a
state action was brought in bad faith or to harass someone, or when other “extraordinary
circumstances” apply. See, e.g., Plouffe v. Ligon, 606 F.3d 890, 893 (8th Cir. 2010) (quot-
ing Middlesex Cnty., 457 U.S. at 435); Tietz v. Hennepin Cnty. Hum. Servs., No. 26-cv-
0053, 2026 WL 353111, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2026) (quoting Trainor v. Hernandez, 431
U.S. 434, 446–47 (1977)).
Payton claims in the Petition that Younger “is inapplicable herein.” Pet. 1. The
Court reads this as arguing that one or more abstention exceptions applies. See id. (“Mr.
Payton move to seek Federal Corpus relief due to harassment from the State of Minne-
sota, bad faith prosecution, harassment and bad faith from the prosecution, that contrib-
ute to irreparable harm and injury.”). But merely reciting “bad faith” and “harassment” is
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insufficient to invoke an exception. Nothing in the Petition plausibly suggests that Payton’s
prosecution exhibits bad faith or is proceeding merely to harass him.5
The Court therefore recommends denying all grounds of the Petition and dismiss-
ing this action. Given this recommendation, the Court also recommends denying the IFP
Application as moot.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
THE COURT HEREBY RECOMMENDS:
1. 	Petitioner Troy Mike Payton’s Defense Motion for Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., Dkt No. 1, be DENIED.
2. 	This action be DISMISSED.
3. 	Payton’s Motion Requesting to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Dkt No. 2, be DENIED as moot.
Dated: March 6, 2026 	s/ David T. Schultz__________
DAVID T. SCHULTZ
United States Magistrate Judge
5 Furthermore, even if Younger abstention did not apply, the Court would still recommend
denying the Petition because Payton plainly has not exhausted his state-court remedies
bearing on the Petition’s grounds. See Olson v. Washington Cnty., No. 12-cv-2807
(MJD/AJB), 2013 WL 1871523, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2013) (“Although § 2241 does not
include a statutory exhaustion requirement comparable to that found at § 2254(b), federal
courts have consistently recognized that the principles of comity and federalism require
state pre-trial detainees to present their constitutional claims in state court before seeking
federal habeas corpus relief under § 2241.” (citing cases)), report and recommendation
adopted, 2013 WL 1867571 (D. Minn. May 3, 2013), aff’d, No. 13-2264 (8th Cir. Aug. 16,
2013); see also, e.g., Palmer v. Minnesota, No. 25-cv-1148, 2025 WL 1426815, at *1 (D.
Minn. Apr. 16, 2025) (quoting Olson), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
1426499 (D. Minn. May 16, 2025).
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those ob-
jections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. 	See Local Rule
72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth
in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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