Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Marleni S.B.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; David Easterwood,
Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
and Warden, Sheriff East Montana
Detention Center, El Paso, Texas,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-1707 (DWF/ECW)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Marleni S.B.’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus (the “Petition”). (Doc. No. 1.) Respondents filed an untimely response.
(Doc. No. 5.) 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Petition and orders
Respondents to release Petitioner immediately.
1 	In their response, Respondents also seek an extension, asserting that counsel
sought Petitioner’s position on an extension with no response and that counsel for
Respondents was involved in two court proceedings on the date the response was due.
The Court need not consider untimely responses, but due to the specific circumstances
here, it does. The Court also gave Petitioner additional time and directed her to file a
reply.
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela and resident of Faribault, Minnesota. (Doc.
No. 1 ¶ 14.) Petitioner has lived in the United States since June 2024. (Id.) Petitioner
presented herself at the border and was paroled into the United States after using the
CBP-One2 application. (Id. ¶ 15.) Within the one-year deadline, Petitioner filed an
application for asylum. (Id.) Petitioner has a pending asylum application and no final
order of removal. (Id.) Petitioner lives with her children, grandchildren, and partner and
has a work permit. (Id. ¶ 16.)
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested Petitioner on
January 8, 2026, when she was returning from running errands with her young grandson.
(Id. ¶ 17.) Her grandson was also detained, but he was then released roughly twenty-four
hours later. (Id.) Petitioner was initially brought to the Whipple Federal Building at Fort
Snelling in Minnesota, and at some point, transferred to Camp East Montana Detention
Center in El Paso, Texas. (Id. ¶ 21.) Importantly, as of March 13, 2026, Petitioner has
been moved back to Minnesota and remains in ICE custody at Kandiyohi County Jail in
Willmar, Minnesota. See Online Detainee Locator System, U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (last visited March 13, 2026).
2 	CBP-One is a mobile application launched by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security to provide a portal to a variety of Customs and Border Protection services. See
DHS/CBP/PIA-068 CBP One™ Mobile Application, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(Jan. 30, 2025), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhscbppia-068-cbp-one-mobile-
application.
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Petitioner filed the Petition on March 2, 2026. (Doc. No. 1 at 16.) Petitioner
asserts that her detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is unlawful because it violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. (Id.
¶¶ 32-46.) Petitioner requests, among other things, immediate release from detention.
(Id. at 13.) On March 3, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition on
or before March 5, 2026, at 12:00 p.m. CT, and enjoined Respondents from moving
Petitioner from this District pending further order, or if Petitioner was already moved
from Minnesota, that she be immediately returned to the state. (Doc. No. 3.)
Respondents filed an untimely response that the Court will consider.
DISCUSSION
A district court may provide habeas relief to a person who is being detained in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That
authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896,
900-01 (D. Minn. 2020). The burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149,
1154 (D. Minn. 2025).
Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Section 1225(b)(1) creates a process for expedited removal of
noncitizens arriving in the United States who are found inadmissible after initial
inspection. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). That process begins during the inspection of
noncitizens arriving in the United States, at which time:
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If an immigration officer determines that [a noncitizen] . . . who is arriving
in the United States . . . is inadmissible . . . and the [noncitizen] indicates
either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution, the officer
shall refer the [noncitizen] for an interview by an asylum officer under
subparagraph (B).
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). In turn, subparagraph B lays out the process for asylum
interviews: “An asylum officer shall conduct [credible fear] interviews of [noncitizens]
referred under subparagraph (A)(ii), either at a port of entry or at such other place
designated by the Attorney General.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i). And “[i]f the officer
determines at the time of the interview that [a noncitizen] has a credible fear of
persecution . . . the [noncitizen] shall be detained for further consideration of the
application for asylum.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the officer concludes that the
noncitizen “does not have a credible fear or persecution, the officer shall order the
[noncitizen] removed from the United States without further hearing or review.” Id.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). The statute continues: “Any [noncitizen] subject to the
procedures of this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear
of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.” Id.
§ 1255(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (emphasis added).
Respondents argue that, under this framework, Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention pending the outcome of her asylum claim as a noncitizen claiming fear of
persecution upon arrival. (Doc. No. 5 at 4-5.) The Court disagrees. The procedures
outlined above apply to asylum claims made by noncitizens arriving in the United States
at the time of entry. See, e.g., Bashir K.A. v. Klang, No. 25-cv-4559, 2026 WL 452353,
at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2026) (explaining that under § 1225(b)(1), mandatory detention
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may be permissible when a noncitizen indicates an intent to request asylum, but that such
detention is preceded by the procedure prescribed in the statute). Here, Petitioner has a
pending asylum application, but her application was not made upon entry.3 Moreover,
there is no evidence that Respondent referred Petitioner to an asylum officer for a
credible fear interview upon entry. Without evidence that an asylum officer made any
determination on Petitioner’s credible fear of persecution upon entry, Respondents cannot
invoke mandatory detention under the process that requires such a determination.
Even if an application for asylum filed after a noncitizen is granted parole could
qualify under § 1225(b)(1) and require mandatory detention following the termination or
revocation of that noncitizen’s parole,4 mandatory detention would still be inappropriate
in Petitioner’s case. Respondents have not shown that Petitioner has ever had a credible
fear interview, even after her recent arrest and detention. In addition, there is no evidence
that Respondents have taken any steps to process her asylum claim. By accepting
Respondents’ theory, the Court would allow them to revoke a noncitizen’s parole and
detain them indefinitely without any indication that they will ever process that
3 	Petitioner was released into the United States pursuant to humanitarian parole
authority and ordered to report to immigration court. (Doc. No. 7 at 6; Doc. No. 5 at 11
(noting “DT” parole status).) While the Department of Homeland Security categorized
Petitioner as an “arriving alien” on her Notice to Appear, there is no evidence that at the
time, Respondents invoked the procedure for those indicating an intent to apply for
asylum or referred Petitioner for a credible fear interview.
4 	Respondents also submit that per Petitioner’s I-94, her parole expired on April 18,
2025 (Doc. No. 5 at 8), and that Petitioner therefore lacks legal status. The record,
however, also contains a document that indicates that Petitioner’s parole does not expire
until June 1, 2026. (Doc. No. 5 at 11.)
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noncitizen’s asylum application. This would result in indefinite detention without means
for review, a clear violation of the Due Process Clause.
Respondents alternatively argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)(2). (Doc. No. 5 at 6-7.) As this Court has explained on multiple
occasions, Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) contradicts the plain language of
the statute. See Jose L.M.S. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-474, 2026 WL 185066, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 25, 2026); Omar E.F.G. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-451, 2026 WL 184571, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 23, 2026); Victor S.M. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-400, 2026 WL 161445, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 21, 2026). Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission”—noncitizens who are
either “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted or who arrive[] in the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Section 1226 applies where § 1225 is
inapplicable and provides immigration judges with the discretion to grant release on bond
to noncitizens subject to removal proceedings. See id. § 1226(a).
Here, Petitioner is not an arriving noncitizen because she has been in the United
States for over a year and a half and has a pending asylum application. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (noting that § 1226(a) applies to “certain aliens
already in the country”). Petitioner is therefore subject to the discretionary bond
provisions of § 1226(a), not the mandatory bond provisions of § 1225(b)(2).
Having found that Petitioner is being detained unlawfully, the question becomes
the correct remedy. A detainee being held pursuant to § 1226(a), as Petitioner is here,
must have been served an arrest warrant prior to detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also
Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4711, 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026)
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(collecting cases). Respondents submit that ICE agents issued a Form I-200 warrant “in
the field” after she was arrested. (Doc. No. 5 at 10.) A Form I-200 must be served at the
time of arrest, not after. See Alberto C.M. v. Noem, et al., No. 26-CV-380, 2026 WL
184530, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2026). In addition, Respondents attached the Form I-
200 without any accompanying supporting documents, affidavits, or declarations that
would establish what evidence formed the basis for its issuance. These critical
insufficiencies prevent the Court from determining that the warrant is valid. See, e.g.,
Enyer O.L. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-1078, at 7 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2026) (“Aside from the
Form I-200, there were no accompanying exhibits, supporting documents, or attached
affidavits/declarations that establish when the warrant was created, what evidence formed
the basis for its issuance, or how and when it was served.”). Respondents have attached a
Form I-213 with details about Petitioner’s arrest. However, this form is dated
January 19, 2026—more than ten days after Petitioner’s arrest—and there is no indication
of which details formed the basis for the Form I-200 warrant. On the record before it, the
Court concludes that this arrest warrant is invalid. Therefore, Petitioner was not lawfully
arrested under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. See, e.g., Alberto C.M., 2026 WL 184530, at *2
(concluding respondents did not have the authority to detain the petitioner under § 1226
where a Form I-200 was invalid).
The remedy for a warrantless arrest is immediate release. Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive
detention. The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” (citation
omitted)).
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1. 	Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. [1]) is
GRANTED.
2. 	The Court DECLARES that Petitioner’s current detention is unlawful
under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
3. 	Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody
immediately.
4. 	Within three (3) days of the date of this Order, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update confirming Petitioner’s release.
5. 	Respondents are directed to release Petitioner:
a. 	In Minnesota;
b. 	With all personal documents and belongings, such as her driver’s
license, passport, work authorization, and other immigration documents, and cell
phone;
c. 	Without any conditions on release, including but not limited to
requiring Petitioner to sign an “Order of Release on Recognizance” or requiring
Petitioner to enroll in and complete an “Alternatives to Detention” program;
d. 	Without any tracking devices or use of a tracking application; and
e. 	With all clothing and outerwear she was wearing at the time of
detention, or other proper winter attire.
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6. 	Respondents shall provide reasonable advance notice to counsel to arrange
for a safe release of Petitioner. Petitioner’s counsel is Patrick Francis Hellier who can be
reached at 612-500-4327
7. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under this same
statutory theory, absent materially changed circumstances.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 13, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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