Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Sergio P.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; David
Easterwood, Acting Director, Saint Paul,
Minnesota Field Office Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and Joel Brott,
Sheriff of Sherburne County,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-1538 (ECT/DTS)
OPINION AND ORDER
Adam J. Kolb, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner Sergio P.
David W. Fuller, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents
Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Todd M. Lyons, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, David Easterwood, and Joel Brott.
Petitioner Sergio P. is a citizen of Ecuador who has lived in the United States since
September 2023. Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 26. Sergio “was apprehended shortly after entering
the United States and was released on recognizance.” Id. ¶ 27. According to the Petition,
Sergio “has complied with all requirements of his immigration status.” 	Id. 	Sergio’s
“criminal record involves . . . a single gross misdemeanor [DWI in February 2026] and a
few misdemeanors,” but Sergio “has never been convicted of a violent crime.” Id. ¶¶ 31,
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48. 	On February 18, 2026, Sergio was arrested in St. Paul, Minnesota, by individuals
“believed to be agents of Respondent [Immigration and Customs Enforcement],” as part of
“Operation Metro Surge.” 	Id. ¶¶ 32–33. 	“The individuals did not supply a warrant or
provide any explanation as to the reason for detaining [Sergio].” Id. ¶ 32. At the time of
the Petition’s filing, Sergio was believed to be “in federal detention in Elk River,
Minnesota,” at “the Sherburne County Facility.” 	Id. ¶ 34. 	Sergio asserts that he is “a
member of the Bond Denial Class certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-
CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.).” Id. ¶¶ 2–11.
Sergio challenges his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	Pet. ¶ 13. 	He claims he
has been wrongly classified as an 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is
mandatory) rather than an 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) detainee (whose detention is discretionary
and who is entitled to a bond hearing). 	Pet. ¶¶ 50–72; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F.
Supp. 3d 957, 961–62 (D. Minn. 2025) (explaining legal framework). According to Sergio,
that misclassification and denial of a bond hearing violate his right to due process under
the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative
Procedure Act. 	See Pet. ¶¶ 76–93. 	Sergio seeks a declaration that he is a Bond Class
Member under Maldonado Bautista; a declaration that his arrest and detention violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and its
implementing regulations; issuance of an order enjoining his transfer out of the District of
Minnesota during the pendency of his Petition, and if he has been moved, ordering his
return; issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing his immediate release unless he is
provided a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); issuance of an order prohibiting
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Respondents from seeking a stay of any order granting bond by an immigration judge;
issuance of an order prohibiting Respondents from re-detaining him without a pre-
deprivation hearing; and “any other and further relief that this Court may deem just and
proper.” See id. at 22–23.
Recognizing that “[t]his petition raises legal and factual issues similar to those in
prior habeas petitions this Court has decided,” Respondents argue that Sergio is subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), relying on their position in the appeal
of Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248 (8th Cir. docketed Nov. 10, 2025). See ECF No. 4. This
raises an issue of statutory interpretation1 that courts in this District have repeatedly
considered and rejected, and it will be rejected here as well.
Sergio has shown he has been misclassified under § 1225(b)(2) rather than
§ 1226(a). 	As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking
admission,” and the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c));
see Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v.
Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D.
Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF),
2025 WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
1 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Sergio’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find that the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to “the narrow
question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455
(ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
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(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-
3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025
WL 3146312, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS),
2025 WL 3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-
4264 (PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing,
two federal courts of appeals have ruled on the question, one reaching and one rejecting
this conclusion. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1062
(7th Cir. 2025) (concluding that respondent was not likely to prevail on the merits that
petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)); Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, --- F.4th ---, Nos. 25-20496, 25-40701, 2026 WL 323330, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 6,
2026) (finding petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)). Sergio
has lived in the United States for more than two years, Pet. ¶ 26, and I find his detention
falls under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).2
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v. 	Scott,
804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D. Me. 2025), appeal filed (Nov. 6, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that
absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a).” Id.
2 	Respondents do not argue that Sergio is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), or that any other statutory scheme other than that raised in the Petition
would apply to Sergio’s detention. See ECF No. 4.
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(emphasis in original); accord Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025
WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me. Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025
WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F.
Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest
warrant is issued” and that “[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the
subsequent provisions giving the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the
arrested alien’ are likewise not triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir.
July 11, 2023). 	Sergio alleges that he was arrested without a warrant. See Pet. ¶ 32.
Respondents argue that if § 1225(b)(2) does not apply, Sergio is entitled to a bond
hearing, not release, see ECF No. 4 at 2, pointing to a Notice to Appear for Sergio dated
September 29, 2023, ECF No. 5-2, and a copy of a Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest with
Sergio’s 	name 	dated 	February 	18, 	2026, 	the 	day 	he 	was 	arrested, 	ECF 	No. 	5-1.
Respondents argue that a bond hearing would be appropriate “given the Notice to Appear
. . . served on [Sergio] shortly after his apprehension at the border.” 	ECF No. 4 at 2.
Respondents do not explain the September 29, 2023 Notice to Appear’s relevance to this
issue. For instance, Respondents do not argue, nor do they provide any evidence to support,
that Sergio failed to comply with the Notice to Appear, which required his appearance
before an immigration judge in Chicago, Illinois, on November 24, 2023. See ECF No. 4;
see also ECF No. 5-2. And the warrant provided with Respondents’ answer raises several
concerns. None of the boxes are checked that would explain the basis for Sergio’s arrest.
See ECF No. 5-1. 	The warrant is dated the same day as Sergio’s arrest, and there is no
evidence from which I could determine whether the warrant preceded the arrest. See ECF
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No. 4 at 2 (stating that “the warrant of arrest [was] served on [Sergio] the day he was
recently arrested”). Respondents cite 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, from which I can infer that Sergio
was arrested without a warrant. See ECF No. 4 at 2; see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (describing
“disposition of cases of aliens arrested without warrant”; id. § 287.3(a) (applying to “[a]n
alien arrested without a warrant of arrest under the authority contained in section 287(a)(2)
of the Act,” (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2))). Respondents argue that the presence of a
warrant “served on [Sergio] the day he was recently arrested” makes a bond hearing—not
release—appropriate, because 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) “allow[s] for up to 48 hours after arrest
to provide [the] detainee with [a] warrant of arrest and [Notice to Appear].” ECF No. 4 at
2. Respondents’ argument presupposes that Sergio’s warrantless arrest was made pursuant
to § 1357(a)(2), see 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a) (applying to “[a]n alien arrested without a warrant
of arrest under the authority contained in section 287(a)(2) of the Act,” (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(2))), but Respondents do not explain how § 1357’s exceptions to the warrant
requirement would apply to Sergio’s arrest. 	Indeed, as described above, no boxes are
checked on the provided warrant to explain why probable cause existed to believe that
Sergio was removable from the United States, and Respondents have provided no other
evidence or argument describing the circumstances of Sergio’s arrest. 	For these reasons,
I find Respondents’ arguments regarding the provided Notice to Appear and Form I-200
Warrant unpersuasive.
“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Vedat C. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS), slip op. at 6 (D. Minn. Dec.
19, 2025) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows
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Respondents have not identified a valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the
remedy is not to supply one through further proceedings.” Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, 804 F.
Supp. 3d at 264 (“Since the Government did not comply with the plain language of section
1226(a), [petitioners’] immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8
(same); Chiliquinga Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see
also Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive
detention. 	The 	typical 	remedy 	for 	such 	detention 	is, 	of 	course, 	release.” 	(citation
modified)).3
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Sergio P.’s Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),
and is instead subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to the discretionary provisions of
8 U.S.C. § 1226.
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as follows:
a. 	If Petitioner remains detained in Minnesota, Respondents shall release
Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but not later than 48 hours after entry of this
Order.
3 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Sergio’s favor makes it
unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds.
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b. 	If Petitioner has been moved outside of Minnesota, as soon as
practicable, but not later than 72 hours after entry of this Order, Respondents shall return
Petitioner to Minnesota and then release Petitioner from custody.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 23, 2026, at 5:30 p.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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