Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
TOU VANG,
Petitioner,
vs.
PAMELA BONDI, United States
Attorney General, et al.,
Defendants.
0:26-CV-1381
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner is a noncitizen currently detained by U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Filing 1. He asserts his detention is unlawful because the government
revoked his order of supervision without regard for his due process rights. The
Court will grant the petition.1
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The writ of habeas corpus is available to every individual detained in the
United States. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2008); Boumediene v.
1 A petitioner seeking release from immigration detention shall be awarded costs and
reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d), unless the Court finds that the government's position was substantially justified or
that special circumstances make an award unjust. See Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley
Corr. Ctr., No. 24-2990, 2026 WL 263483 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026); see also, e.g., Yeferson G.C. v.
Easterwood, No. 25-CV-4814, 2026 WL 207266, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 21), report and
recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 209825 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2026); Mairena-Munguia v.
Arnott, No. 25-CV-3318, 2025 WL 3229132, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 19, 2025); cf. Bah v.
Cangemi, 548 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2008) (evaluating the merits of immigration habeas
petitioner's EAJA claim). Any motion for costs and fees pursuant to the EAJA in this case
should be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See § 2412(d)(1)(B).
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Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742-43 (2008). Historically, the protections of the writ have
been strongest when reviewing the legality of executive detention. I.N.S. v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). The Great Writ is "a vital instrument" to protect
individual liberties, and is an essential check on abuses of government power.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743.
Except during periods of formal suspension, federal courts "have a time-
tested device, the writ, to maintain the 'delicate balance of governance' that is
itself the surest safeguard of liberty." Id. at 745 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
536). The writ protects against "arbitrary imprisonments," which "have been,
in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny." Id. at
744 (quoting The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)).2
28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers federal jurisdiction to hear statutory and
constitutional challenges to immigration-related detention. See Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); accord Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d 719, 724 (8th
Cir. 1999). Petitioners must show they are in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States. See § 2241(c)(3); Maldonado v.
Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1143 (D. Minn. 2025). Release is the typical
remedy for unlawful detention. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008).
2 "[C]onfinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings
are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous
engine of arbitrary government." The Federalist No. 84 (quoting 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *136) (emphasis in original).
The writ of habeas corpus, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, prevent
tyrannical governments from making "scape goats [sic] of the weak, or of helpless political,
religious, or racial minorities and those who differed, who would not conform and who
resisted tyranny." See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940). The right of habeas
corpus, among others, is an "assurance against ancient evils," preserving the "blessings of
liberty." Id. at 237 n.10.
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II. BACKGROUND
The petitioner came from Laos to the United States as a refugee in 1994.
He was a lawful permanent resident as of March 1996. In 2005, he was
convicted of an aggravated felony in Minnesota, and the government initiated
removal proceedings. In October 2006, he was ordered removed from the
United States.
However, the government did not (and could not) remove the petitioner
within 90 days as required by law. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Laos would not
take the petitioner, so he was stateless and had nowhere to be removed to.
Therefore, the petitioner was released from detention, "subject to supervision
under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General." § 1231(a)(3). He was
"placed under supervision and permitted to be at large" in February 2007,
subject to certain conditions. Filing 1-2 at 2; see 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.
The petitioner was "encountered" and detained by ICE on December 10,
2025. Filing 8 at 2. There was no warrant for his arrest, nor any notification
that his order of supervision had been revoked. He was provided an informal
interview on December 10, filing 9-2 at 1, but not provided a notice of
revocation of release until December 16, filing 9-2 at 3.
III. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
An order of supervision under § 241.13 can be revoked, and a noncitizen
can be re-detained, under two circumstances: (1) the noncitizen violated any of
the conditions of his release, or (2) the government identifies "changed
circumstances" that indicate a "significant likelihood that the alien may be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future." § 241.13(i). If release is revoked,
the government must notify the noncitizen of the reasons for revocation. §
241.13(i)(3). The noncitizen, once in custody, is entitled to a prompt "initial
informal interview," and must have an "opportunity to respond to the reasons
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for revocation stated in the notification." Id. The noncitizen "may submit any
evidence or information" showing there is no significant likelihood that he will
be removed, or that he has not violated the conditions of his supervision. Id.
Willful violations of an order of supervision may result in up to one year
in prison. § 1253(b). Continued detention, beyond the removal period, of
noncitizens who are likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future
is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. See § 241.13(i)(2). The government's failure to
follow the regulations set forth in § 241.13 indicates an unlawful detention. See
Rokhfirooz v. Larose, 804 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1099 (S.D. Cali. 2025) ("Courts
have determined that where ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking
release, the detention is unlawful and the petitioner's release must be
ordered."); Faysal N. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4641, 2026 WL 36066, at *5 (D. Minn.
Jan. 6, 2026) (detention is unlawful where "ICE did not comply with its own
regulations under section 241.13(i)(2)."); Phongsavanh v. Williams, No. 4:25-
cv-426, 2025 WL 3124032, at *5 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 7, 2025) (same); accord Zhu v.
Genalo, 798 F. Supp. 3d 400, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (detention is unlawful where
ICE failed to follow procedures in § 241.4).
IV. DISCUSSION
The government in this case asserts that it revoked the petitioner's order
of supervision on December 16, 2025, because of a change in circumstances
that indicate a foreseeable removal to Laos. Filing 8 at 2. But the petitioner
was detained on December 10, and the travel documents demonstrating the
purported "change in circumstance" were not obtained until earlier this month.
See filing 8 at 2. The government detained the petitioner first, and asked
questions later. That's not how this works.
The petitioner is not alleged to have violated the conditions of his release,
nor has he committed any crimes since 2005. The only basis for his detention
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is an alleged "change in circumstance" that didn't occur until two months after
his detention. The government provided the petitioner with a notice of
revocation after his purported opportunity to respond to the reasons for
revocation, contrary to the requirements of § 241.13. 3
The government relies on Zadvydas v. Davis for the proposition that "an
alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." 533 U.S.
678, 701 (2001). The government argues it has shown a likelihood of removal
because it obtained travel documents for the petitioner. See filing 8 at 2.
But Zadvydas does not apply to noncitizens subject to an order of
supervision, where there has already been a determination that a noncitizen is
not likely to be removed. See, e.g., Trejo v. Warden of ERO El Paso E. Mont.,
25-cv-401, 2025 WL 2992187, at *6-7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025) (distinguishing
noncitizens released pursuant to an order of supervision from "typical
Zadvydas petitioners"). Rather, under these circumstances, the regulations in
§ 241.13 apply, and it is the government's burden to show a change in
circumstance before revoking an order of supervision and detaining a person
indefinitely.
The petitioner's detention violates the basic pillars of the Fifth
Amendment. Considering the perennial factors of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), the petitioner's detention without the codified regulatory
protections violates the Constitution. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th
3 The government provided evidence (after the response deadline) that an informal
interview occurred on December 10, 2025. Filing 9-2 at 1. But that evidence doesn't make
sense. The undated statement from an immigration officer says the petitioner had the
opportunity "to respond to the reasons for revocation . . . stated in the notification letter," but
the notification letter didn't exist yet. Compare filing 9-2 at 1, with filing 9-2 at 3 (Notice of
Revocation of Release dated Dec. 16, 2025).
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1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (applying Mathews test in the immigration
detention context). In determining whether a person has been provided due
process, the Court considers the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous
deprivation through additional procedures, and the government's interest,
both financially and administratively, in providing the additional process.
The petitioner has "the most elemental of liberty interests" in being free
from detention. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; Trejo, 2025 WL 2992187, at *6.
The government's failure to follow the codified regulations creates a high risk
of erroneous deprivation of that liberty. And the government has no interest in
re-detaining noncitizens who have not violated the conditions of their
supervision without a hearing already required by law; there are no additional
burdens—financial, administrative, or otherwise—in securing codified
procedural safeguards. The regulatory requirement for an "informal interview"
after re-detention is a bare minimum procedural protection that the
government is already required to provide.
The government decided in 2007 that the petitioner was not likely to be
removed in the foreseeable future, and was not a risk to the community, when
it released him subject to an order of supervision. He was re-detained in 2025,
and provided an "informal interview" and an opportunity to challenge the
reasons for the revocation of his release before being given the reasons for the
revocation of release. That is a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
The petitioner is entitled to challenge the reasons for revoking his
release after he learns what those reasons are, and, for the government to
detain him beyond the removal period (which has long passed), he is entitled
to the procedures in § 241.4, which include a bond hearing in front of an
immigration judge. See § 241.13(i)(2); E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d
1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
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Nothing in this Order invalidates the 2006 removal order. But the
government's custody of a person without regard for its own regulations is an
unlawful detention indeed. The writ will be granted. To remove or detain the
petitioner, the government must strictly follow the procedures outlined in §§
241.13 and 241.4. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (filing 1) is granted.
2. The government shall, if necessary, immediately return the
petitioner to the District of Minnesota.
3. When the petitioner is in Minnesota, the government shall
immediately release the petitioner subject to and in
accordance with the conditions in his preexisting Order of
Supervision (filing 1-2), and shall return any personal
property seized from the petitioner when detained.
4. No later than February 20, 2026, the government shall file
a status report certifying compliance with this Order.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY
Dated this 18th day of February, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
John M. Gerrard
Senior United States District Judge
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