Fridley Public School District, Independent School District 14 et al v. Mullin et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
FRIDLEY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT,
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 14;
DULUTH PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT,
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 709;
and EDUCATION MINNESOTA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN,1 in his official
capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; TODD LYONS, in his
official capacity as Acting Director of U.S.
Immigration and Custom Enforcement;
MARCOS CHARLES, in his official
capacity as Acting Executive Associate
Director, Enforcement and Removal
Operations; DAVID EASTERWOOD, in his
official capacity as Acting Director, Saint
Paul Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION; RODNEY
SCOTT, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, GREGORY BOVINO, or his
successor, in his official capacity as
Commander of the U.S. Border Patrol; and
THOMAS HOMAN, in his official capacity
as White House Executive Associate Director
of Enforcement and Removal Operations,
Defendants.
Case No. 26-cv-1023 (LMP/LIB)
ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
A STAY OR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
1 	The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Markwayne Mullin was confirmed
as the Secretary of Homeland Security on March 23, 2026, while this matter was pending.
Accordingly, Secretary Mullin is substituted in place of former Secretary of Homeland
Security Kristi Noem pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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Sean Ouellette, Elena Goldstein, Allyson R. Scher, and Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Democracy
Forward Foundation, Washington, D.C.; Amanda M. Cialkowski and Kathleen K.
Curtis, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA, Minneapolis, MN; David M. Cialkowski, June P.
Hoidal, Michael J. Laird, Jeffrey J. Harrington, Molly F. Billion, and Katja Lange,
Zimmerman Reed LLP; and Kevin C. Riach, The Law Office of Kevin C. Riach,
Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.
David W. Fuller, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN; and Jessica
Lundberg, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendants.
Chelsea A. Walcker and Irina Vaynerman, Groundwork Legal, St. Louis Park, MN;
Lauren R. Goldman, Mark J. Cherry, and Iason G. Togias, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, New York, NY; Katherine M. Marquart and Matt A. Getz, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, CA; and Katharine M. Janes, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Interfaith Action of Greater Saint Paul, First
Universalist 	Church, 	Minnesota 	Council 	of 	Churches, 	Minnesota 	Rabbinical
Association, Bishop Kevin Kenney, Rabbi Harold Kravitz, the Right Reverend Craig
Loya, Reverend Jen Crow, and Reverend Ben Connelly.
Angela M. Vichick and Caitlin C. McHugh, Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP,
Denver, CO; Jay Strandjord, Forsgren Fisher McCalmont Demarea Tysver LLP,
Minneapolis, MN; and Mary C. Lawson, 	Council of the Great City Schools,
Washington, D.C., for Amicus Council of the Great City Schools.
Joseph D. Weiner, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, St. Paul, MN, for Amicus
Minnesota State Colleges and Universities.
From 1993 until early 2025, immigration enforcement activity at or near certain
“sensitive” or “protected” locations, like schools and places of worship, was generally
discouraged under federal agency guidance. 	In January 2025, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) rescinded the previous guidance and broadly directed its
agents to use their discretion in choosing whether to engage in enforcement operations at
such locations. Plaintiffs Fridley Public School District (“FPSD”), Duluth Public School
District (“DPSD”), and Education Minnesota (“EdMN”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) assert
that DHS’s implementation of the new guidance violated the Administrative Procedure Act
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(“APA”) and has caused and will continue to cause them substantial and irreparable harm.
See generally ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs now move the Court, while this matter is pending, to
stay the implementation of the new policy guidance pursuant to Section 705 of the APA or,
alternatively, to preliminarily enjoin its implementation. 	ECF No. 32. 	Defendants
(collectively, the “Government”) oppose Plaintiffs’ motion on multiple grounds. 	See
generally ECF No. 68.
The Court first notes what it does not decide here. 	The Court makes no final
determination on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, nor does the Court offer its opinion as to
the wisdom of DHS’s policy guidance or the sincerity of the harm Plaintiffs allege. Rather,
the Court narrowly decides only whether Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that they
are entitled to entry of a stay or a preliminary injunction. Having considered the parties’
arguments and the record at this stage, the Court concludes as a matter of law that Plaintiffs
have not met that burden. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Determining 	the 	contours 	of 	DHS’s 	policy 	guidance 	governing 	immigration
enforcement at “protected locations” is key to analyzing Plaintiffs’ claims. 	The Court
therefore begins by discussing the foundation and development of the policy guidance
before turning to the factual allegations underlying Plaintiffs’ motion.
I. 	Statutory Framework
The United States Government “has broad, undoubted power over the subject of
immigration.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012). As an exercise of that
power, 	Congress 	established 	an 	“extensive 	and 	complex” 	framework 	governing
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immigration in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), id. at 395, and charged DHS
with the “administration and enforcement” of this country’s immigration laws, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(1). 	A “principal feature” of this enforcement responsibility is the “broad
discretion” accorded to DHS and its sub-agencies, including U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), to identify
and remove noncitizens who may not enter or remain in the United States, Arizona,
567 U.S. at 396–97, and to “prioritize its enforcement efforts” in pursuit of the Executive
Branch’s “foreign-policy objectives,” United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 679–80 (2023)
(citation omitted).
DHS’s broad enforcement authority is subject to only a few location-based statutory
rules. For example, DHS is prohibited from entering “onto the premises of a farm or other
outdoor agricultural 	operation” to 	investigate potential 	immigration-related offenses
“without the consent of the owner” or “a properly executed warrant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(e).
Conversely, 	immigration 	officials’ 	authority 	is 	more 	expansive 	when 	conducting
enforcement-related activities “within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of
the United States.” 	See id. § 1357(a)(3). 	Otherwise, no specific statutory or regulatory
provisions limit DHS’s authority to engage in immigration enforcement activity based on
location. See generally id.
II. 	DHS Guidance Governing Immigration Enforcement at “Protected Locations”
A. 	Initial Implementation (1993–2008)
In May 1993, the Immigration and Nationality Service (“INS”), DHS’s predecessor
agency, issued policy guidance (the “1993 Guidance”) stating, in relevant part, that INS’s
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policy was “to attempt to avoid apprehension of persons and to tightly control investigative
operations on the premises of schools, places of worship, funerals and other religious
ceremonies” (the “Protected Locations Policy” or “Policy”). 	ECF No. 28-1 at 2.2 	The
1993 Guidance established a requirement that any immigration enforcement operations that
were “likely to involve apprehensions on the premises of schools” receive “advance written
approval” by certain high-level INS officials.3 	Id. 	The 1993 Guidance acknowledged,
however, that “exigent circumstances” could arise such that receiving written authorization
prior to entering onto the premises of a school was impractical. 	Id. at 3. 	In those cases,
immigration 	officers 	were 	required 	to 	report 	the 	situation 	to 	a 	high-level 	official
“immediately” and “explain the exigency requiring the officer’s action, any steps which
were taken to secure supervisory authorization in the absence of written approval . . . , the
seriousness of the suspected violation, whether the facility was in operation (e.g., were
classes in session), and other pertinent facts.” Id.
Despite these procedural requirements, the 1993 Guidance noted that the Policy was
“an internal statement of procedure” which did “not affect the scope of authority of [INS]
officers under the [INA].” Id. at 4.
2 	Unless otherwise noted or apparent from context, the Court cites to the page
numbers found in the headers generated by the CM/ECF filing system.
3 	To determine the “appropriateness of a proposed action,” INS officials were
required to consider: (1) the “availability of alternative measures which would achieve the
enforcement objective,” such as “making the arrest off the premises”; (2) the “importance
of the enforcement objective in the context of [INS] priorities”; (3) “[m]easures which can
be taken to minimize the impact on operation of the school”; and (4) “[w]hether the action
has been requested or approved by managers of the institution involved.” ECF No. 28-1
at 2–3.
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B. 	Additional Guidance and Clarification (2008–2021)
In July 2008, October 2011, and January 2013, DHS issued additional guidance
(respectively, the “2008 Guidance,” “2011 Guidance,” and “2013 Guidance”) clarifying
the Protected Locations Policy. See ECF Nos. 28-2, 28-3, 28-4. The 2008 Guidance, issued
by ICE, stated that the Protected Locations Policy as implemented in 1993 remained “in
effect,” id. at 3, and that enforcement actions at “sensitive locations” like schools were
“discouraged,” id. at 2. 	The 2008 Guidance directed ICE to “refrain from conducting
enforcement actions or investigative activities at or near” such locations “except in limited
circumstances,” such as “terrorism-related investigations” and “matters of public safety.”
Id. at 2–3. The 2008 Guidance also “reminded” ICE agents “to be cognizant of the impact
of their activity, exercise good judgment and act with an appropriate level of compassion
in light of the location while exercising their authority in such circumstances.” 	Id. at 3.
Still, the 2008 Guidance noted that “ICE policies and procedures do not specifically
preclude enforcement actions or investigative activities” at sensitive locations. Id.
The 2011 Guidance, also issued by ICE, added greater specificity regarding the
boundaries and requirements of the Protected Locations Policy. See ECF No. 28-3 at 2–4.
The 	covered 	“enforcement 	actions” 	included 	arrests, 	interviews, 	searches, 	and
surveillance. Id. at 2. The 2011 Guidance further clarified that the Policy was “designed
to ensure that these enforcement actions do not occur at nor are focused on sensitive
locations such as schools” unless “exigent circumstances exist,” “other law enforcement
actions have led officers to a sensitive location,” or “prior approval is obtained.” Id. The
2011 Guidance also more specifically defined the types of “exigent circumstances” that
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justified carrying out enforcement actions at sensitive locations without prior approval as
those involving: (1) “a national security or terrorism matter”; (2) “an imminent risk of
death, violence, or physical harm to any person or property”; (3) “the immediate arrest or
pursuit of a dangerous felon, terrorist suspect, or any other individual(s) that present an
imminent danger to public safety”; or (4) an “imminent risk of destruction of evidence
material to an ongoing criminal case.” 	Id. at 3–4. 	Like the 2008 Guidance, the 2011
Guidance was “meant to ensure that ICE officers and agents exercise sound judgment when
enforcing federal law at or focused on sensitive locations,” but noted that the Policy was
“not intended to categorically prohibit lawful enforcement operations when there is an
immediate need for enforcement action” due to the existence of “exigent circumstances.”
Id. at 3.
The 2013 Guidance, issued by CBP, largely reiterated the guidelines set forth in the
2011 Guidance and previous memoranda, including the requirements to seek prior approval
for enforcement actions absent exigent circumstances. See ECF No. 28-4 at 2–3. The 2013
Guidance 	restated 	that 	when 	circumstances 	precluded 	obtaining 	prior 	approval,
immigration agents were “expected to exercise sound judgment and common sense” and
to report those circumstances and any related enforcement activity “immediately through
the respective chain of command.” Id.
C. 	2021 Guidance (October 2021–January 2025)
In October 2021, DHS issued new policy guidance (the “2021 Guidance”) again
refining and clarifying the boundaries and requirements of the Protected Locations Policy.
See ECF No. 28-5 at 3–6. 	The 2021 Guidance states that it was DHS’s “obligation to
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refrain, to the fullest extent possible, from conducting a law enforcement action in or near
a protected area”—defined, as relevant here, as a “school”4 or other “place where children
gather” like a “school bus stop”—if it “would restrain people from accessing the protected
area to receive essential services or engage in essential activities.” 	Id. at 3–4. The 2021
Guidance also expanded the scope of enforcement actions affected by the Policy to include,
without limitation, “arrests, civil apprehensions, searches, inspections, seizures, service of
charging documents or subpoenas, interviews, and immigration enforcement surveillance.”
Id. at 5.
As with the previous guidance, the 2021 Guidance “recognize[d] that there might
be limited circumstances under which an enforcement action needs to be taken in or near a
protected area,” including, but not limited to, situations where: (1) the “enforcement action
involves a national security threat”; (2) there is “an imminent risk of death, violence, or
physical harm to a person”; (3) the “enforcement action involves the hot pursuit of an
individual who poses a public safety threat”; (4) there is “an imminent risk that evidence
material to a criminal case will be destroyed”; and (5) a “safe alternative location does not
exist.” Id. at 4–5. As before, if no such “exigent circumstances” existed, the immigration
officer was required to seek “prior approval from their Agency’s headquarters . . . before
taking an enforcement action in or near a protected area.” Id. at 5. But the 2021 Guidance
required that specific information be included in post-enforcement reports done in
4 	As used in the 2021 Guidance, “school” is broadly defined as “a pre-school, primary
or secondary school, vocational or trade school, or college or university.” ECF No. 28-5
at 3.
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situations where, due to exigent circumstances, an enforcement action was conducted “in
or near a protected area” without prior approval, including:
identification of the protected area; the reason(s) why the enforcement action
was taken there; whether or not prior approval was obtained and, if not, why
not; the notification to headquarters (or headquarters’ delegate) that occurred
after an action was taken without prior approval; a situational report of what
occurred during and immediately after the enforcement action; and[] any
additional information that would assist in evaluating the effectiveness of this
guidance in achieving our law enforcement and humanitarian objectives.
Id. at 5–6.
Notwithstanding 	its 	broadening 	of 	the 	Protected 	Locations 	Policy, 	the 	2021
Guidance states, as did the guidance it superseded, that it “d[id] not limit an agency’s or
employee’s statutory authority” and “[was] not intended to, d[id] not, and may not be relied
upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any
party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.” Id.
D. 	Current Guidance (January 2025–present)
On January 20, 2025, then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Benjamine C.
Huffman issued a memorandum (the “Huffman Memo”) “supersed[ing] and rescind[ing]”
the 2021 Guidance “effective immediately.” 	ECF No. 28-6 at 2. 	The Huffman Memo
noted that immigration officers “frequently apply enforcement discretion to balance a
variety of interests, including the degree to which any law enforcement action occurs in a
sensitive location,” and that it is “not necessary” for DHS to “create bright line rules
regarding where our immigration laws are permitted to be enforced.” 	Id. 	Instead, the
Huffman Memo directed that, “[g]oing forward, law enforcement officers should continue
to use that discretion along with a healthy dose of common sense.” Id.
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On January 31, 2025, then-Acting Director of ICE Caleb Vitello issued a follow-up
memorandum (the “Vitello Memo”). ECF No. 28-8 at 2–3. The Vitello Memo reiterates
the directive stated in the Huffman Memo and charges ICE’s Assistant Field Office
Directors 	(“AFODs”) 	and 	Assistant 	Special 	Agents 	in 	Charge 	(“ASACs”) 	with
“responsibility for making case-by-case determinations regarding whether, where, and
when to conduct an immigration enforcement action in or near a protected area,” id. at 3,
including schools, see id. at 2 n.1. The Vitello Memo also notes that “AFODs and ASACs
may provide authorization for such actions either verbally or in writing.” Id. at 3.
The Huffman Memo and Vitello Memo (together, the “2025 Guidance”) both
contain similar disclaimers that were articulated in prior guidance. 	The Huffman Memo
states: “This memorandum is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any
administrative, civil, or criminal matter.” ECF No. 28-6 at 2. Similarly, the Vitello Memo
states: “This guidance does not, is not intended to, and may not be construed to create or
modify any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party
against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.” ECF No. 28-8 at 3.
III. 	Factual Background
The Government at this stage largely does not dispute the factual allegations in
Plaintiffs’ complaint or Plaintiffs’ recitation of the relevant facts in their opening brief and
exhibits. 	See generally ECF No. 68. 	Plaintiffs, for their part, largely do not dispute the
factual information offered by the Government in its responsive brief and exhibits. 	See
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generally ECF No. 85. 	The Court therefore draws the relevant facts from both parties’
filings, including Plaintiffs’ complaint.
A. 	Operation Metro Surge
In 	December 	2025, 	DHS 	initiated 	“Operation 	Metro 	Surge,” 	a 	large-scale
immigration 	enforcement 	action 	focused 	primarily 	on 	the 	Minneapolis-St. 	Paul
metropolitan area. 	ECF No. 1 ¶ 48; see ECF No. 70 ¶¶ 5, 8; ECF No. 71 ¶¶ 6–7.
Approximately 3,000 ICE agents and more than 1,000 CBP agents were assigned to
Operation Metro Surge. ECF No. 70 ¶ 8; ECF No. 71 ¶ 7.
Among other things, these DHS agents engaged in immigration enforcement
activity at or near schools and school bus stops in Minnesota, including the arrest and
surveillance of students, their parents or guardians, and school staff, in some cases in the
presence of students. See, e.g., ECF No. 28-12 ¶ 12; ECF No. 28-25 ¶ 11; ECF No. 28-32
¶¶ 3–5; ECF No. 28-40 ¶ 9; ECF No. 28-47 ¶¶ 5–7. 	DHS agents also used parking lots
belonging to FPSD schools as staging areas for nearby enforcement activity, ECF
No. 28-47 ¶¶ 8–10, and patrolled around schools in FPSD and DPSD (collectively, the
“School Districts”) during school hours, id. ¶ 11; ECF No. 28-48 ¶ 6. 	These and other
incidents that occurred during Operation Metro Surge were widely reported in local and
national news media. See, e.g., ECF 28-9 at 3; ECF No. 28-18 at 2–3; ECF No. 28-19 at
4–5; ECF No. 28-39 at 2–3; ECF No. 28-45 at 2–13.
By early March 2026, DHS had withdrawn nearly all the additional agents sent to
Minnesota as part of Operation Metro Surge, and David Easterwood, the Acting Director
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of ICE’s St. Paul Field Office, reports that the remaining DHS agents are focused on
“developing criminal investigations.” See ECF No. 70 ¶¶ 9–11; ECF No. 71 ¶¶ 7–10.
B. 	Plaintiffs’ Allegations
FPSD serves approximately 2,800 students across 6 schools in and around Fridley,
Minnesota. ECF No. 1 ¶ 15. DPSD serves approximately 9,100 students across 21 schools
in and around Duluth, Minnesota. 	Id. ¶ 16. 	EdMN is a union that advocates for public
education in Minnesota and has more than 89,000 members, including nearly all of
Minnesota’s public-school teachers and other education support professionals. Id. ¶ 17.
As the enforcement incidents occurred at or near schools and school bus stops, and
news of those incidents spread, many of the School Districts’ students and staff and
EdMN’s members began reporting that they were afraid to come to school because of the
potential for encounters with DHS agents. See ECF No. 28-40 ¶ 21; ECF No. 28-47 ¶ 19;
ECF No. 28-48 ¶ 7. Attendance at FPSD schools dropped by approximately 33%, and on
two different days in January 2026, FPSD had to cancel classes because so many students
and staff were absent. 	ECF No. 28-47 ¶¶ 19, 21. 	DPSD also saw decreased attendance,
including in its adult English Language Learner courses which “are now almost empty.”
ECF No. 28-48 ¶¶ 7–8. 	This has placed a strain on the School Districts’ budgets and
resources because, under Minnesota law, state funding is allocated on a per capita basis to
schools based on the number of enrolled students. See ECF No. 28-47 ¶ 24; ECF No. 28-48
¶ 10. And when a student is absent from school for fifteen consecutive days, the student
must 	be 	unenrolled, 	Minn. 	Stat. 	§ 120A.37, 	subd. 	9. 	Since 	the 	beginning 	of
December 2025, FPSD has had to unenroll at least 20 students due to excessive consecutive
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absences, and 92 other students either have transferred out of FPSD or have moved out of
the state of Minnesota, including some who have left the United States entirely. 	ECF
No. 28-47 ¶ 25. 	These unenrollments and departures from FPSD are “far higher than
usual.” 	Id. 	DPSD has “at least one student who is facing unenrollment” because of
excessive absences and “[s]everal more students [who] have been absent for multiple
consecutive days.” ECF No. 28-48 ¶ 9.
The School Districts implemented several changes to address these concerns and to
minimize disruption to their operations and their students’ education, but those changes
imposed other resource constraints. 	For example, FPSD began providing door-to-door
transportation to accommodate requests from families who “did not feel comfortable
waiting at school bus stops where they might encounter immigration agents,” but door-to-
door transportation “requires additional logistical work and is more costly.” 	ECF
No. 28-47 ¶ 20. And after the 2025 Guidance was issued, all Plaintiffs diverted resources
to develop protocols and to train their members about how to manage potential disruptions
caused by immigration enforcement at or near their schools, even before Operation Metro
Surge. See id. ¶ 34; ECF No. 28-48 ¶ 14; ECF No. 28-40 ¶ 6.
The School Districts and other schools where EdMN’s members teach also offered
remote-learning options for students who were reluctant to attend school in person. ECF
No. 28-47 ¶ 26; ECF No. 28-28 ¶ 12; ECF No. 28-40 ¶ 15. 	But this requires the School
Districts to expend additional financial and staff resources, and teachers are required to
divert time from regular instruction to support remote students and to redesign curricula to
accommodate remote instruction. 	See ECF No. 28-47 ¶ 27; ECF No. 28-48 ¶ 12; ECF
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No. 28-40 ¶ 15. Further, Plaintiffs state that remote learning is less effective than in-person
instruction and, as a result, when students who used remote-learning options return to
school in person, teachers are required to invest additional time and resources to support
those students. See ECF No. 28-40 ¶ 16; ECF No. 28-47 ¶ 28; ECF No. 28-48 ¶ 13.
IV. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed suit on February 4, 2026, alleging that the Government violated the
APA because the changes to the Protected Locations Policy under the 2025 Guidance are
arbitrary and capricious, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 87–92, and because DHS did not engage in the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process, id. ¶¶ 94–102. Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare
the issuance of the 2025 Guidance unlawful and to permanently enjoin it from being further
implemented. Id. at 32. On February 23, 2026, Plaintiffs moved to stay the implementation
of the 2025 Guidance under Section 705 of the APA or, alternatively, to preliminarily enjoin
its implementation, which would effectively reinstate the 2021 Guidance. See ECF No. 32.
The parties briefed the issues raised in Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF Nos. 27, 68, 85. The
Court also received unopposed motions to appear as amicus curiae and briefing from
several religious organizations and leaders, ECF Nos. 42, 44-1; the Council of the Great
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City Schools, ECF Nos. 63, 65-1; and Minnesota State Colleges and Universities, ECF
Nos. 81–82.5 The Court held a hearing on April 8, 2026. ECF No. 90.
ANALYSIS
Section 705 of the APA authorizes federal courts to stay an agency action or to
postpone its effective date to “preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review
proceedings.” 	5 U.S.C. § 705. 	Likewise, the “primary function of a preliminary
injunction” is to “preserv[e] the status quo until the district court has an opportunity to
grant full effective relief.” 	Tumey v. Mycroft AI, Inc., 27 F.4th 657, 664 (8th Cir. 2022).
Accordingly, because a Section 705 stay and a preliminary injunction offer substantively
the same relief, courts analyze requests for a Section 705 stay under the legal standard
applied to requests for a preliminary injunction.6 	See Immigrant Defs. L. Ctr. v. Noem,
145 F.4th 972, 995 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he factors used to determine whether to issue a
§ 705 stay under the APA are the same equitable factors used to consider whether to issue
a preliminary injunction.”); see also, e.g., B & D Land & Livestock Co. v. Conner, 534 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 905 (N.D. Iowa 2008); Busboom Grain Co., Inc. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n,
830 F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1987).
5 	As discussed at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for a stay or preliminary injunction,
the Court, in its discretion, grants the motions to appear as amici curiae (ECF Nos. 42, 63,
81). The Court has reviewed and considered amici’s briefs (ECF Nos. 44-1, 65-1, 82) in
deciding Plaintiffs’ motion.
6 	The parties appear to agree that a request for a Section 705 stay is analyzed under
the standard applied to a request for a preliminary injunction. See ECF No. 27 at 25–26;
ECF No. 68 at 17–18.
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A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To demonstrate entitlement
to a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must show: (1) that they are likely to succeed on the
merits of their claims; (2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm if they do not
receive preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) that an
injunction is in the public interest. Tumey, 27 F.4th at 664 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).
Plaintiffs’ burden is “heavier” here because granting a preliminary injunction would have
“the effect of awarding [them] substantially the relief [they] could obtain after a trial on the
merits.” H&R Block, Inc. v. Block, Inc., 58 F.4th 939, 946 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
I. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Although the Government opposes Plaintiffs’ motion on the merits, see ECF No. 68
at 38–51, the Government also challenges Plaintiffs’ Article III standing to seek a
preliminary injunction, see id. at 18–36. 	The Court therefore “must first decide whether
[P]laintiffs have standing,” Iowa Migrant Movement for Just. v. Bird, 157 F.4th 904, 913
(8th Cir. 2025), because a “plaintiff that is unlikely to prevail on the question of standing
is unlikely to prevail on the merits and, accordingly, ‘is not entitled to a preliminary
injunction,’” Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 496 F. Supp.
3d 31, 45 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913
(D.C. Cir. 2015)).
Federal court jurisdiction under Article III is limited to “cases and controversies.”
Missouri v. Yellen, 39 F.4th 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). 	The case-or-
controversy requirement is “fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of
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government,” and federal courts may review executive actions only “when necessary to
redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by . . . official
violation of law.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 56–57 (2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citations omitted); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408
(2013) (“The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles,
serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches.”). “If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business
deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.” 	DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006).
To satisfy the “irreducible constitutional minimum” required to establish standing,
a plaintiff must (1) have suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision. 	Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds, 94 F.4th 707, 710 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)). Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking federal
court jurisdiction, bear the burden of establishing these elements. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338.
At the preliminary injunction stage, courts assume “the complaint’s allegations are true”
and view them “in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff, Dakotans for Health v. Noem,
52 F.4th 381, 386 (2022), and the plaintiff must make a “clear showing” that it is “likely”
to establish each element of standing, Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S.
at 22).
To establish injury-in-fact, Plaintiffs must show that they suffered “an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not
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conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted). 	When a plaintiff seeks prospective relief, such as an injunction, the
plaintiff must establish a “sufficient likelihood of future injury.” 	FDA v. All. for
Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024).
Further, for standing purposes, “an important difference exists between (i) a
plaintiff’s statutory cause of action to sue a defendant over the defendant’s violation of
federal law, and (ii) a plaintiff’s suffering concrete harm because of the defendant’s
violation of federal law.” 	TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 426–27 (2021)
(emphasis added). 	In other words, a plaintiff has no standing to sue merely because it
believes the defendant’s conduct is unlawful. 	See Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381
(noting that a plaintiff “does not have standing to challenge a government regulation simply
because the plaintiff believes that the government is acting illegally”). Agency actions that
“require or forbid some action by the plaintiff almost invariably satisfy both the injury in
fact and causation requirements.” 	Id. at 382; see Diamond Alt. Energy LLC v. EPA,
606 U.S. 100, 114 (2025) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992))
(“When a plaintiff is the ‘object’ of a government regulation, there should ‘ordinarily’ be
‘little question’ that the regulation causes injury to the plaintiff.”). 	By contrast, when a
plaintiff “challenges the government’s unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of
someone else,” the plaintiff “may have more difficulty establishing causation—that is,
linking their asserted injuries to the government’s regulation (or lack of regulation) of
someone else.” 	Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 382 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citations omitted).
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Plaintiffs 	each 	assert 	that 	the 	changes 	to 	the 	Protected 	Locations 	Policy
implemented by the 2025 Guidance have and will continue to harm them in various ways,
and that staying further enforcement of the 2025 Guidance would prevent further harm.
See ECF No. 85 at 8–16. 	Regardless of the harm alleged, however, the analysis must
remain focused on the specific conduct that Plaintiffs challenge here (the implementation
and enforcement of the 2025 Guidance) and the relief that Plaintiffs seek (effectively, the
reinstatement of the 2021 Guidance). 	Therefore, before turning to Plaintiffs’ arguments
relating to standing, it is crucial to understand precisely what the 2025 Guidance changed
regarding the Protected Locations Policy relative to the 2021 Guidance.
A. 	Differences Between the 2021 Guidance and the 2025 Guidance
Plaintiffs imply, but carefully avoid expressly stating, that the Protected Locations
Policy as articulated by the 2021 Guidance effectively prevented, if not prohibited, DHS
from conducting immigration enforcement activity at or near schools. See, e.g., ECF No. 1
¶ 28 (“The federal government has had a long-standing policy and practice, dating back to
at least the early 1990s, to refrain from immigration enforcement operations in or near
schools or other ‘sensitive’ or ‘protected’ locations.”); ECF No. 27 at 13 (“[E]ducators from
Minnesota and across the country cannot recall any immigration enforcement actions near
schools and school bus stops when federal policy protected those locations.”). 	Plaintiffs
state that “DHS’s decision to rescind the Protected Locations Policy has predictably
increased immigration enforcement operations in previous protected areas.” ECF No. 27
at 7.
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The prior guidance, however, did not categorically preclude such activity. 	For
example, the 2021 Guidance directed DHS only “to refrain, to the fullest extent possible,
from conducting a law enforcement action in or near a protected area,” and further states
that the phrase “‘to the fullest extent possible’ recognizes that there might be limited
circumstances under which an enforcement action needs to be taken in or near a protected
area.” ECF No. 28-5 at 4 (emphasis added). Indeed, since the Protected Locations Policy
was first introduced in 1993, such enforcement actions were never categorically prohibited,
even if they were discouraged as a matter of internal policy. See ECF No. 28-1 at 4 (1993
Guidance stating that it “does not affect the scope of authority of [INS] officers” under the
INA); ECF No. 28-2 at 2–3 (2008 Guidance reaffirming the 1993 Guidance and stating that
“ICE policies and procedures do not specifically preclude enforcement actions” at schools
(emphasis added)); ECF No. 28-3 at 3 (2011 Guidance stating the “policy is not intended
to categorically prohibit lawful enforcement operations when there is an immediate need
for enforcement action” (emphasis added)); ECF No. 28-4 at 2 (2013 Guidance stating the
“policy does not summarily preclude enforcement actions” at schools (emphasis added)).
It is true that the prior guidance discouraged such activity and laid out specific
guidelines for how and under what circumstances DHS would engage in, and who could
authorize, such enforcement activity. 	Those guidelines are what most clearly differ
between the 2025 Guidance and the prior guidance. 	For instance, the 2021 Guidance
required that “an Agent or Officer 	must 	seek prior approval from their Agency’s
headquarters . . . before taking an enforcement action in or near a protected area.” 	ECF
No. 28-5 at 5. 	The 2025 Guidance, by contrast, states that “AFODs and ASACs may
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provide authorization” for such enforcement actions. ECF No. 28-8 at 2–3. Likewise, the
2025 Guidance, unlike the prior guidance, does not specifically articulate or define any
“exigent circumstances” that may justify immigration enforcement actions at or near
protected areas without prior approval. Compare ECF No. 28-6 (Huffman Memo stating
that it “is not necessary . . . for the head of [DHS] to create bright line rules regarding where
our immigration laws are permitted to be enforced”), and ECF No. 28-8 (Vitello Memo
stating the same), with ECF No. 28-5 at 4–5 (2021 Guidance articulating “exigent
circumstances” justifying an immigration enforcement action at or near a protected area
without prior approval). 	But the 2025 Guidance nonetheless directs DHS officers to use
their enforcement discretion “with a healthy dose of common sense,” ECF No. 28-6 at 2,
and 	charges 	AFODs 	and 	ASACs 	with 	“responsibility 	for 	making 	case-by-case
determinations 	regarding 	whether, 	where, 	and 	when 	to 	conduct 	an 	immigration
enforcement action in or near a protected area,” ECF No. 28-8 at 3. 	This direction is
similarly acknowledged in the 2021 Guidance and other preceding guidance. 	See ECF
No. 28-5 	at 	3–4 	(2021 	Guidance 	stating 	the 	determination 	of 	whether 	to 	conduct
immigration enforcement activity at or near a “protected area” “requires an analysis of the
facts and the exercise of judgment”); see also ECF No. 28-4 at 2–3 (2013 Guidance stating
that DHS “Agents and Officers are expected to exercise sound judgment and common
sense” when “situations arise that call for enforcement actions at or near [protected
locations] without prior written approval”).
The 2025 Guidance, in short, did not change DHS’s ability or authority to engage
in enforcement activity at or near protected areas. What has changed, evidently, is DHS’s
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willingness—not its authority—to conduct immigration enforcement activity at or near
protected areas like schools. But such immigration enforcement has always been subject
to DHS’s judgment and discretion, even under the 2021 Guidance. See, e.g., ECF No. 28-5
at 3–5.
With that context in mind, the Court turns to analyzing Plaintiffs’ arguments relating
to the threshold issue of standing.
B. 	The School Districts
The School Districts offer three separate theories of injury. First, specific to FPSD,
they assert that “DHS agents have repeatedly encroached on [FPSD’s] property” since the
implementation of the 2025 Guidance. ECF No. 85 at 8–9. Second, both School Districts
argue that immigration enforcement operations at and near schools and school bus stops
following the issuance of the 2025 Guidance have caused substantial decreases in school
attendance. Id. at 9. Third, they argue that the 2025 Guidance has forced them to expend
resources to adjust their operations. Id.
i. 	Intrusions on FPSD Property
FPSD argues that “[i]nstrusions on property have long been justiciable injuries.”
ECF No. 85 at 8. It is true that unauthorized physical entry by law enforcement on a private
person’s or entity’s property “is a trespass at common law.” 	Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984). And the Court acknowledges that “with respect to the concrete-
harm requirement in particular,” the inquiry focuses on “whether the alleged injury to the
plaintiff has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a basis
for a lawsuit in American courts.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 424 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S.
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at 341). 	FPSD’s “trespass” theory therefore ostensibly fits within the category of a
traditionally recognized harm.
It is not clear, however, that this constitutes a cognizable injury in the specific
context of Plaintiffs’ claims. For example, FPSD is a state governmental entity, see Minn.
Stat. § 118A.01, subd. 2, not a private person or entity, and FPSD does not allege that its
schools’ parking lots are private property. 	And other than broad statements of law that
trespass is a traditionally recognized harm for standing purposes, see ECF No. 85 at 8,
Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that such a “trespass” in the specific context
of the facts FPSD alleges—that is, an “intrusion” onto what is presumably publicly owned
property 	by 	federal 	agents, 	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	conducting 	statutorily 	authorized
enforcement activity—is similarly recognized as a traditional harm for purposes of
standing. 	In fact, nowhere do Plaintiffs expressly allege that any of DHS’s activity on
FPSD’s property, by itself, was unlawful.7 	As such, it is questionable whether DHS
engaging in enforcement activity on FPSD’s property constitutes the type of “invasion of
a legally protected interest” necessary to demonstrate injury in fact for standing purposes.
See Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (citation omitted).
7 	Notably, in the criminal context, trespass on school property in Minnesota includes
only: (1) a person being inside a school building or on a school building’s roof without
permission, and (2) a person being on school property within one year after being told by
the school principal to leave and not to return. See Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 4. There
are no allegations that DHS agents ever entered any FPSD school building, nor that the
principal of any FPSD school ever told DHS to leave and not to return, to the extent such
an instruction would be enforceable at law.
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Even assuming this is a cognizable harm, however, the traceability of that harm to
the implementation of the 2025 Guidance is further in question. It may be true, as Plaintiffs
suggest, that immigration enforcement activity at or near schools was rare, if not
nonexistent, before the 2025 Guidance was implemented. See ECF No. 27 at 13. But the
2025 Guidance does not direct or encourage DHS agents to conduct immigration
enforcement activity at any specific location or to target any specific locations for such
activity, including the previously designated “protected areas.” 	See generally ECF
Nos. 28-6, 28-8. And as discussed above, such enforcement activity at or near “protected
areas” was never categorically prohibited, even under the 2021 Guidance. 	See ECF
No. 28-5 	at 	4–5. 	It 	cannot 	reasonably 	be 	said, 	therefore, 	that 	the 	issuance 	or
implementation of the 2025 Guidance, rather than the broader increases in immigration
enforcement during Operation Metro Surge, was the direct cause of the “intrusions” on
FPSD’s property. Instead, this harm flows more directly, if not entirely, from DHS’s policy
decision to engage in enforcement activity at or near schools—a decision which was not
prohibited even by the 2021 Guidance.
For similar reasons, the harm FPSD alleges would not be redressed by reinstating
the 2021 Guidance. That is because the enforcement activity on FPSD’s property was not
categorically precluded under the 2021 Guidance,8 see ECF No. 28-5 at 4–5, nor is it
prohibited by law, see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1357. 	Instead, whether DHS agents would
8 	It is worth noting again that the 2021 Guidance expressly stated it was “not intended
to, d[id] not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law.” ECF No. 28-5 at 6.
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engage in immigration enforcement activity at or near “protected areas” under the 2021
Guidance was subject to the judgment and discretion of DHS officials, see ECF No. 28-5
at 4–5, as it is under the 2025 Guidance, see ECF No. 28-8 at 2–3. Even if the Court were
to grant Plaintiffs the relief they request and effectively reinstate the 2021 Guidance, the
Court could not direct DHS or its officials as to how they may exercise their enforcement
discretion under the 2021 Guidance. 	Nor could the Court order DHS to return to the
immigration enforcement priorities of prior administrations and DHS officials.9 Cf. Texas,
599 U.S. at 680 (“[F]ederal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims
that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions.”). 	In
other words, reinstating the 2021 Guidance would not by itself have the legal effect of
preventing any future “intrusions” on FPSD’s property by DHS agents, and Plaintiffs’
suggestion to the contrary is rooted in speculation about how DHS would exercise its
judgment and enforcement discretion under the 2021 Guidance. 	Ultimately, this Court
cannot “undo anything other than the narrow differences between” the 2021 Guidance and
9 	To illustrate the point, consider a counterfactual. If the 2025 Guidance was never
issued, meaning the 2021 Guidance was still in effect, and DHS nonetheless engaged in
exactly the same enforcement activity as Plaintiffs allege, would Plaintiffs have a cause of
action under the APA to challenge that activity? 	Almost certainly not. 	This is because
DHS is broadly “charged with the administration and enforcement” of our country’s
immigration laws, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), and the manner in which DHS exercises its broad
discretion 	“when 	devising 	arrest 	and 	prosecution 	policies . . . leaves 	courts 	without
meaningful standards for assessing those policies,” United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670,
680 (2023); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (barring judicial review under the APA of an
agency action that is “committed to agency discretion by law”).
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the 2025 Guidance, ECF No. 69 at 55:2–18,10 and “it is questionable that any substantive
distinctions between the memoranda deter the kinds of immigration enforcement actions
that the plaintiffs seek to prevent,” Mennonite Church USA v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
778 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2025).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that FPSD is unlikely to establish standing
based on its trespass theory of harm.
ii. 	Decreased Attendance
The School Districts argue that increased enforcement operations at and near
schools and school bus stops have “deterred families from sending their children to school,
causing large drops in attendance” at the School Districts. ECF No. 85 at 9. They argue
that this decreased attendance negatively affects them in two ways.
First, the School Districts assert that the decreased attendance “‘directly . . .
interfere[s]’ with the school districts’ duty-bound missions to educate their students.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394). 	In support of this
argument, Plaintiffs cite New England Synod v. Department of Homeland Security, a recent
decision involving a challenge to the 2025 Guidance brought by several religious
organizations. No. 25-cv-40102-FDS, 2026 WL 412329, at *5–6 (D. Mass. Feb. 13, 2026).
In assessing standing, the court noted that “a decline in attendance at religious services can
constitute an injury to a religious organization in certain circumstances.” 	Id. at *8
10 	This document is a copy of the transcript of a hearing on a motion to preliminarily
enjoin the 2025 Guidance in Denver Public Schools v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-00474-DDD-
KAS (D. Colo. June 9, 2025).
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(collecting cases). 	But the court explained that this conclusion was rooted in the “long
tradition of churches and religious organizations suing based on injury to their religious
exercise,” which is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment, and that
decreased attendance at religious services therefore “has a close relationship to a harm
traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 432).
Here, the School Districts cite no authority for the proposition that there is a tradition
of recognizing decreased student attendance at public schools, by itself, as a “basis for a
lawsuit in American courts.” 	TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 432. 	While the Court shares
Plaintiffs’ belief that education is manifestly important, public-school education is not
recognized as a “fundamental right or liberty.” 	See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–38 (1973) (“Education, of course, is not among the rights
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for
saying it is implicitly so protected.”); cf. Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5, 800 F.3d
955, 967 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation modified) (holding that no “relevant precedent support[s]
the proposition that a parent’s ability to choose where his or her child is educated within
the public school system is a fundamental right or liberty”). And the School Districts “must
show far more than simply a setback to [their] abstract social interests” to establish
standing.11 Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394 (citation omitted).
11 	This harm also appears to belong more appropriately to the School Districts’
students, as the ones purportedly deprived of educational opportunities, not the School
Districts themselves. But the School Districts do not purport to bring suit on their students’
behalf. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15–16; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“[A]
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Second, the School Districts argue that decreased attendance harms them because it
“cost[s] the districts money.” ECF No. 85 at 9. More specifically, the School Districts are
at risk of losing funding because Minnesota law requires them to unenroll students with
too many consecutive absences. 	See ECF No. 28-47 ¶¶ 24–25; ECF No. 28-48 ¶¶ 9–10;
see also Minn. Stat. § 120A.37, subd. 9. “Monetary costs are of course an injury.” Texas,
599 U.S. at 676. 	And because the School Districts have students who remain at risk of
unenrollment due to excessive absenteeism, see ECF No. 28-47 ¶¶ 24–25; ECF No. 28-48
¶ 9, they have shown a “sufficient likelihood of future injury,” Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.
367, 381.
It is not clear, however, that this decreased attendance and the potential loss of
enrollment-based funding is traceable to 	the 2025 Guidance 	rather than the more
generalized fears of the School Districts’ students and their families about broader
immigration enforcement policy changes and activity, specifically during Operation Metro
Surge. 	See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 9 (“School districts and teachers across Minnesota have
reported significant reductions in attendance rates since the onset of ‘Operation Metro
Surge.’”); id. ¶ 69 (“Fridley Schools’ attendance rate has dropped nearly one-third during
the surge.”); id. ¶ 77 (“Duluth Schools has seen increased absenteeism among its students
from immigrant communities because, due to the threat of ICE enforcement near school
grounds and bus stops, they do not feel safe coming to school.”); ECF No. 28-47 ¶ 19
(stating that immigration enforcement activity during Operation Metro Surge “had a
plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim
to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”).
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chilling effect on the willingness of [FPSD’s] staff and students to come to school”); ECF
No. 28-48 ¶ 7 (stating DPSD “currently has many students who are absent from school due
to safety concerns related to immigration enforcement near school grounds and bus stops”).
Again, the analysis here must remain focused on the specific conduct Plaintiffs challenge:
implementation of the 2025 Guidance, not Operation Metro Surge or immigration
enforcement activity more broadly. And as already discussed, immigration enforcement
activity at or near schools was not categorically prohibited under the 2021 Guidance, see
ECF No. 28-5 at 4–5, nor does the 2025 Guidance direct or encourage DHS agents to target
schools for immigration enforcement activity,12 see ECF No. 28-8 at 2–3.
Likewise, the School Districts are unlikely to establish redressability as it relates to
their allegations of decreased attendance. 	To the extent families are afraid to send their
students to school because of concerns about immigration enforcement, restoring the 2021
Guidance would not abate those concerns because, as discussed above, it would not have
the legal effect of preventing any future immigration enforcement at or near schools and
school bus stops. 	Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 294 (2023) (citation omitted)
(“[R]edressability requires that the court be able to afford relief through the exercise of its
power, not through the persuasive or even awe-inspiring effect of the opinion explaining
the exercise of its power.”). 	Further, the School Districts’ students and their families are
“independent actors” who are not parties before this Court, and the “exercise of [their]
broad and legitimate discretion” as to whether to send their children to school, regardless
12 	Nor, for that matter, do Plaintiffs allege that Operation Metro Surge specifically or
exclusively targeted schools or other protected areas. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 48–50.
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of the outcome here, is something the Court cannot “presume either to control or to
predict.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the School Districts are unlikely to make a
clear showing that they can satisfy the elements of standing as it relates to their allegations
of decreased student attendance.
iii. 	Resource Expenditures
Finally, the School Districts argue that the “‘money, time, and resources’ [they] must
spend to mitigate the disruption caused by the rescission [of the Protected Locations
Policy]—including the hours spent preparing remote lessons to educate students afraid to
attend school in person—are cognizable injuries.” 	ECF No. 85 at 9 (quoting Bost v. Ill.
State Bd. of Elections, 146 S. Ct. 513, 524 (2026) (Barrett, J., concurring)). As noted above,
monetary costs may constitute a cognizable harm for standing purposes. 	See Texas,
599 U.S. at 676. 	In the specific context of Plaintiffs’ claims, however, these resource
expenditures are insufficient to confer standing.
The School Districts no doubt believed it was necessary, if not their duty, to expend
or 	divert 	resources 	to 	“mitigate 	the 	disruption” 	caused 	by 	increased 	immigration
enforcement activity at or near their schools, see ECF No. 85 at 9, including by offering
remote learning, delivering food to students’ families, patrolling their schools to anticipate
and respond to potential immigration enforcement activity, and increasing communication
to students and their families, see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 70–71, 73, 77–78. By no means does the
Court intend to second-guess those choices or to diminish the difficult circumstances that
led to them. But the 2025 Guidance, by its terms, legally does not “regulate, constrain, or
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compel any action” by the School Districts. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 419. In other words, the
School Districts, for understandable and even admirable reasons, chose to implement these
measures; the 2025 Guidance did not require them to do so. 	And the School Districts
“cannot manufacture standing by voluntarily incurring costs.” 	Bost, 146 S. Ct. at 522
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 	Moreover, at least some of the
School 	Districts’ anticipated 	resource 	expenditures—for 	example, 	“devot[ing] 	more
resources to remediate the harm” of students’ “academic and social setbacks” resulting
from remote learning, ECF No. 1 ¶ 70—are speculative on this record.
Separately, 	the 	School 	Districts 	are 	unlikely 	to 	establish 	traceability 	and
redressability for the same reasons already discussed. 	The resource expenditures and
diversions the School Districts allege are more accurately traced to a generalized increase
in immigration enforcement activity, and because the enforcement activity underlying the
School Districts’ claims was not precluded under the 2021 Guidance, reinstating the 2021
Guidance would not redress those expenditures.
In sum, the School Districts have not shown a cognizable harm that is both traceable
to the 2025 Guidance itself and redressable by this Court. 	Instead, the School Districts’
alleged harms flow directly from DHS’s enforcement activity during Operation Metro
Surge at or near schools, which they do not squarely challenge here. And in any event, the
relief they seek would not remedy those harms or make them less likely to occur in the
future. 	The Court therefore concludes that the School Districts have not made a “clear
showing” that they are “likely” to establish each element of standing relating to any of their
alleged harms. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22).
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C. 	EdMN
EdMN asserts claims both on its own behalf and on behalf of its members. 	ECF
No. 1 ¶ 17. Therefore, EdMN either must establish its own individual standing, or it must
establish standing “as the representative of its members.” 	Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc. v. Pres. & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 199 (2023) (citation omitted).
i. 	Individual Standing
EdMN argues that the 2025 Guidance “harms EdMN itself because it ‘perceptibly
impairs’ the organization’s core activities and drains its resources.” 	ECF No. 85 at 14
(quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)). EdMN also argues
that it “has had to divert hours of time and resources to train members about how to handle
immigration enforcement near schools and to answer member questions about the threat of
such enforcement,” which has resulted in EdMN staff spending “less time on their usual
duties, like assisting members with labor rights matters.” Id. at 14–15.
The Supreme Court has held that this kind of “harm” is not cognizable. For instance,
in Hippocratic Medicine, several medical associations sought to enjoin FDA guidance
relaxing the conditions of use for mifepristone, which the medical associations thought to
be unsafe. 	See 602 U.S. at 376. 	The medical associations asserted standing based on
“incurring costs” to “conduct their own studies on mifepristone so that the associations
[could] better inform their members . . . about mifepristone’s risks,” and contended they
were “forced” to “expend considerable time, energy, and resources” to engage in “public
advocacy and public education.” Id. at 394. All of this, the medical associations argued,
caused them “to spend ‘considerable resources’ to the detriment of other spending
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priorities.” 	Id. (citation omitted). 	The Supreme Court rejected this argument and
explained 	that 	the 	associations 	could 	not 	“manufacture 	[their] 	own 	standing” 	by
“expending money to gather information and advocate against the [FDA’s] action.” Id.
EdMN’s argument is not materially different from the medical associations’
argument in Hippocratic Medicine. Indeed, the Supreme Court squarely rejected Plaintiffs’
argument under Havens that “standing exists when an organization diverts its resources in
response 	to 	a 	defendant’s 	actions” 	because 	“that 	theory 	would 	mean 	that 	all 	the
organizations in America would have standing to challenge almost every federal policy that
they dislike, provided they spend a single dollar opposing those policies.” 	Hippocratic
Med., 602 U.S. at 394–95. Although EdMN’s resources here may not have been diverted
strictly to “oppose” the 2025 Guidance, this is a similarly insufficient theory of harm.
Moreover, as with the School Districts, the 2025 Guidance, by its own terms, does
not “require or forbid” any action by EdMN. 	See id. at 382. 	Said another way, while
EdMN believed it was necessary to expend resources to “train members about how to
handle immigration enforcement near schools,” ECF No. 85 at 15, EdMN was not
compelled to do so by the 2025 Guidance. Even if this constituted a cognizable harm, it is
questionable whether it could be called “fairly traceable” to the specific conduct Plaintiffs
challenge here: implementation of the 2025 Guidance.
Finally, even if EdMN could demonstrate a cognizable harm that is traceable to the
issuance of the 2025 Guidance, EdMN’s argument fails on redressability for the reasons
already discussed. 	That is, reinstating the 2021 Guidance would not have the effect of
eliminating any threat of immigration enforcement activity at or near schools. 	See ECF
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No. 69 at 55:2–18 (noting that the court “could not undo anything other than the narrow
differences between” the 2021 Guidance and the 2025 Guidance, which “would not
redress” the plaintiff’s alleged harm); Mennonite Church, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 12 (“[I]t is
questionable that any substantive distinctions between the memoranda deter the kinds of
immigration enforcement actions that the plaintiffs seek to prevent.”).
ii. 	Representational Standing
To establish representational (or associational) standing, EdMN must demonstrate
that: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue on their own; (2) the interests
it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief sought requires its individual members to participate in the lawsuit.
Fair Admissions, 600 U.S. at 199. 	EdMN’s representational standing argument fares no
better than its individual standing argument.
EdMN first asserts that EdMN’s members would have standing because the 2025
Guidance “exposes EdMN’s noncitizen members to a credible threat of arrest and
surveillance in and near their schools.” ECF No. 85 at 15; see also, e.g., ECF No. 28-12
¶ 10; ECF No. 28-13 ¶¶ 15–16. But as a general matter, a plaintiff “does not have standing
to challenge a government regulation simply because the plaintiff believes that the
government is acting illegally.” Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381.
For example, in Laird v. Tatum, the plaintiffs brought a class action seeking to enjoin
the Army’s alleged “surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity.”
408 U.S. 1, 2 (1972). The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, concluding that
the plaintiffs had not presented a “justiciable claim for relief.” 	Id. at 2–3. 	The Court of
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Appeals reversed the district court, concluding that the citizens “presented a justiciable
controversy” by alleging a “chilling effect on the exercise of their First Amendment rights”
caused “not by any specific action of the Army against them, but only by the existence and
operation of the intelligence gathering and distributing system.” 	Id. at 3 (citation
modified). 	The Supreme Court disagreed and explained that allegations of a subjective
“chilling effect aris[ing] merely from [an] individual’s knowledge that a governmental
agency was engaged in certain activities or from the individual’s concomitant fear that,
armed with the fruits of those activities, the agency might in the future take some other and
additional action detrimental to that individual” are inadequate to show a “specific present
objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.” Id. at 11, 13–14.
The same principle applies here. As an initial matter, the 2025 Guidance by itself
does not direct the arrest or surveillance of any specific individuals. 	And the 2025
Guidance does not direct where any such arrests or surveillance should occur. 	See
generally ECF Nos. 28-6, 28-8. Nor, for that matter, is it clear that EdMN’s members have
a “legally protected interest,” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (citation omitted), in remaining free
from immigration enforcement activity at or near schools. 	Indeed, the 2021 Guidance
expressly disclaimed that it created such a “right or benefit.” 	ECF No. 28-5 at 6. And,
importantly, such enforcement activity is not inherently unlawful. See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357. As in Laird, the fears of EdMN’s members that they may be “expose[d]” to “a
credible threat of arrest and surveillance in and near their schools,” ECF No. 85 at 15, arises
from their “knowledge that [DHS] was engaged in certain activities” and “might in the
future take some other and additional action detrimental to [them],” Laird, 408 U.S. at 11.
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EdMN also asserts that its members have been “force[d]” to “double their workloads
by preparing and delivering online lessons for students afraid to come to school” and have
experienced emotional distress from answering their students’ “questions about the threat
of immigration enforcement near schools and bus stops.” 	ECF No. 85 at 15 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). As it relates to increased workloads, this is
not caused by the 2025 Guidance but rather the decisions of schools where EdMN members
teach to offer remote learning during Operation Metro Surge. 	See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 79;
ECF No. 28-40 ¶ 15. And while the Court believes that EdMN’s members have suffered a
significant emotional toll while helping students and their families process their fears
relating to DHS’s enforcement activity, that is essentially the type of harm found
insufficient to establish standing in Laird and other Supreme Court decisions. See 408 U.S.
at 11; see also Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)) (explaining
that plaintiffs may not sue “merely because their legal objection is accompanied by a strong
moral, ideological, or policy objection to a government action”).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that EdMN has not made a “clear showing”
that it is “likely” to establish each element of standing, whether individually or as a
representative of its members. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22).
D. 	Conclusion
None of the Plaintiffs has demonstrated a cognizable harm that is both traceable to
the specific conduct they challenge—issuance and implementation of the 2025 Guidance—
and redressable by this Court. Without such a showing, they are left with claims “based
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only on an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law,” which is
insufficient to establish standing. 	Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citation omitted). Accordingly, because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs
have not shown they are likely to establish standing, the Court also must conclude that
Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits.13 	See Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project, 496 F.
Supp. 3d at 45.
II. 	Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors
Because none of the Plaintiffs have demonstrated they are likely to establish
standing, they necessarily are “not entitled to a preliminary injunction.” Id. (quoting Food
& Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 913). 	The Court therefore need not reach the remaining
preliminary injunction factors. 	See Murthy, 603 U.S. at 56 (analyzing only plaintiffs’
standing to seek a preliminary injunction and, because the plaintiffs had not established
standing, explaining that there was no “jurisdiction to reach the merits of the dispute”).
13 	Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are unlikely to establish standing, the
Court need not reach the other issues relating to the likelihood-of-success factor, including
whether Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits as to whether the 2025 Guidance is a
final agency action subject to judicial review under the APA, see ECF No. 68 at 36–29, and
if so, whether it is arbitrary and capricious, see ECF No. 27 at 26–30.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in this matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Stay Under 5 U.S.C. § 705 or,
in the Alternative, a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 32) is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: May 6, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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