Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Gabriel J.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; David Easterwood,
Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
and Ryan Shea, Sheriff of Freeborn
County,
Respondents.
No. 26-cv-00865 (SRN/LIB)
ORDER
Taylor R. Stemler, Merchant & Gould, P.C., 150 S. 5th St., Ste. 2200, Minneapolis, MN
55402, for Petitioner
Ana Voss,1 U.S. Attorney’s Office, 300 S. 4th St., Minneapolis, MN 55415, for Federal
Respondents
David John Walker, Freeborn County Attorney’s Office, Freeborn County Government
Center, 411 S. Broadway Ave., Albert Lea, MN 56007, for Ryan Shea, Sheriff of
Freeborn County
1 The Respondents’ response in this matter was signed by Matthew Ishihara on behalf of
the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Mr. Ishihara has not filed a notice of appearance in this case.
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SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
Before the Court is the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) [Doc. No.
1] filed by Petitioner Gabriel J. 	Petitioner seeks immediate release from detention, or a
prompt bond hearing in Immigration Court. 	Respondents oppose the Petition. (Resp’ts’
Opp’n [Doc. No. 5].)
The Court has taken the Petition under advisement on the papers. For the reasons
set 	forth 	below, 	the 	Petition 	is 	granted 	and 	Respondents 	shall 	release 	Petitioner
immediately.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a resident of St. Paul, Minnesota, and a citizen of Venezuela, who has
lived in the United States since November 2024. 	(Pet. ¶ 13.) 	He has a pending asylum
application and is not subject to a final order of removal. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Respondents arrested Petitioner without a warrant on December 12, 2025, while he
was in a vehicle, about to leave a restaurant. (Id. ¶ 16.) He alleges that agents approached
him and asked if he was “documented.” (Id.) He refused to speak with them and asked for
a lawyer. 	(Id.) 	Petitioner further alleges that agents aggressively pulled him from the
vehicle and handcuffed him. 	(Id.) 	Respondents are detaining him in ICE custody at the
Freeborn County Jail in Albert Lea, Minnesota. 	See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S.
Immigration 	& 	Customs 	Enforcement, 	Online 	Detainee 	Locator 	Sys.,
https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (last accessed Feb. 2, 2026).
Petitioner filed the instant Petition on January 30, 2026, asserting that he is entitled
to immediate release, or, in the alternative, a bond hearing. (Pet. ¶ 1.)
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In the Court’s January 30, 2026 Order to Show Cause, the Court enjoined
Respondents from moving Petitioner out of Minnesota until further order of the court, and,
to the extent he was released, likewise required Petition to remain in Minnesota while his
Petition is pending. (OSC [Doc. No. 4] ¶ 4.) The Court also ordered Respondents to show
cause for the “true cause and proper duration of Petitioner’s confinement,” and directed
Respondents to address “[w]hether the absence of a warrant preceding Petitioner’s arrest
necessitates Petitioner’s immediate release.” 	(Id. ¶¶ 1, 2(e).) 	Additionally, the Court
required Respondents to distinguish the instant Petition from the Court’s prior rulings in
Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Minn. 2025), and E.M. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025). (Id. ¶ 2(d).)
Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and is therefore not entitled to release. 	Their position is consistent
with new interim guidance from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)/ICE, and
a recent decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding that all persons
who enter the United States without inspection, including those who have been residing
here for some time, are “applicants for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), subject to
mandatory detention, rather than discretionary detention under § 1226(a). Maldonado, 795
F. Supp. 3d at 1150 (noting interim guidance); Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.
216 (BIA 2025). Respondents invoke their prior arguments, as set forth in Mayamu K. v.
Bondi, No. 25-cv-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819, at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025),
and Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF) (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025)—two
decisions that were not issued by the undersigned judge. 	(Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 2–3.) 	It is
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Respondents’ position that as a matter of statutory interpretation, Petitioner falls under the
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225, not § 1226, and therefore, is not entitled to release. 	(Id.)
They concede that the instant Petition raises legal and factual issues similar to those in prior
habeas petitions in Mayamu K. and Eliseo A.A.2 (Id. at 3.)
In further support of their position, Respondents argue that as an asylum seeker,
Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” under § 1225—an issue they contend this Court
has not previously addressed. (Id. at 7–9.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Section 1226 Applies
While the parties dispute whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) applies to a noncitizen who is already residing
in the United States, there is no dispute that Petitioner was arrested while already residing
in the United States.
This Court has previously found, along with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals—
the only circuit court to have addressed the issue—and the vast majority of district courts
2 	Respondents 	do 	not 	challenge 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	or 	administrative
exhaustion. Nevertheless, the Court briefly addresses these issues. As to jurisdiction, the
Court finds that none of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 apply to
the question of whether mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) or discretionary detention
under § 1226(a) applies. See Maldonado, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1144–47.
As to exhaustion, requiring administrative 	exhaustion would be futile in light of
Hurtado. See Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-CV-960-LJV, 2025 WL
3085032, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4. 2025) (finding exhaustion of remedies would be futile,
even if petitioner had not exhausted his remedies). Immigration judges would be obliged
to follow Hurtado’s ruling on the scope of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
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throughout the country, that the applicable detention scheme for noncitizens already
residing in the country is under § 1226(a), absent any exceptions under § 1226(c).
Maldonado, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1150–52, E.M., 2025 WL 3157839, at *4–8; Castañon-
Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060–62 (7th Cir. 2025); see also
Demirel v. Fed. Detention Ctr., No. 25-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18,
2025) (collecting cases); Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at
*6–7 (E. D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2024) (collecting cases); Yulexi T. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-68
(ECT/DTS), 2026 WL 77022, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2026); Kelvin N. v. Bondi, No. 26-
CV-32 (JMB/JFD), 2026 WL 63423, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2026); Iishaar-Abdi v.
Klang, No. 25-CV-4686 (JRT/DTS), 2025 WL 3764853, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 2025);
Awaale v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4551 (MJD/JFD), 2025 WL 3754012, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec.
29, 2025); Hugo v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4593 (LMP/DTS), 2025 WL 3688074, at *2–3 (D.
Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); Lionel V.F. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4474 (PJS/LIB), 2025 WL 3485600,
at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2025). By contrast, § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens at or near
the border. 	Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-CV-960-LJV, 2025 WL
3085032, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4. 2025). 	Respondents do not assert that any of the
exceptions under § 1226(c) apply. 	The Court remains unpersuaded by Respondents’
statutory interpretation of §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), but notes that Respondents’ arguments are
preserved for appeal.
Respondents also argue that this habeas petition is different from prior petitions
the Court has decided because “Petitioner is ‘seeking admission’ through his stated intent
to pursue asylum.” 	(Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 8.) 	Respondents equate “pursuing asylum” with
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“seeking admission.” 	(Id.) 	To support this argument, Respondents rely on Chen v.
Almodovar, No. 1:25-CV-8350-MKV, 2025 WL 3484855, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025).
The court in Chen reasoned that “seeking asylum” is the same as “seeking admission”
within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2) because “‘admission’ is defined in terms of ‘lawful’
status, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A), not physical presence on U.S. soil.” 	Chen, 2025 WL
3484855, at *6.
The Court declines to follow Chen, finding it not persuasive on grounds adeptly
expressed by other courts in the same district. First, treating a noncitizen with a pending
application for asylum as an individual “seeking admission” under § 1225—no matter how
long he has been present in the United States—would be incongruent with the ordinary
meaning of “seeking admission,” which is “entering or attempting to enter the country.”
Yao v. Almodovar, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-CV-9982 (PAE), 2025 WL 3653433, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025). This Court has previously determined that the phrase “seeking
admission” signifies a present and active effort; it is not a status. E.M., 2025 WL 3157839,
at *4. In the immigration context, the word “enter” means to cross a territorial limit into
the country. 	Goorakani v. Lyons, No. 25-CV-9456 (DEH), 2025 WL 3632896, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2025) (quotation omitted). Petitioner entered the United States more
than a year ago. 	“To the extent that asylum applicants already within the United States
continue to ‘seek’ something, it is not ‘entry’ to the country; they are already here. Rather,
these applicants seek a lawful means to remain in the United States.” Id. (citation omitted).
Second, Chen’s equation of “seeking asylum” to “seeking admission” is at odds
with Congress’s pointed distinction between a noncitizen’s admission and the grant of
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asylum to a noncitizen. Yao, 2025 WL 3653433, at *9. “Admission” is defined in the INA
as a “lawful entry . . . after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 	8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Whether to grant asylum is not decided at that point, however;
nor is the asylum decision made by the immigration officer. 	Yao, 2025 WL 3653433, at
*9. Further, “a later decision to grant asylum does not retroactively make the noncitizen’s
earlier entry ‘lawful,’ or constitute ‘inspection and authorization’ in connection with that
entry.” Id. Rather, a grant of asylum protects a noncitizen from removal, even if his entry
was illegal. Id. “Congress expressly decoupled the concepts of removability and asylum”
in the INA. 	Id. 	As these examples show, Chen “blurred two distinct legal concepts” in
equating “seeking asylum” with “seeking admission.” Id.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s ongoing pursuit of asylum does not equate to
his “seeking admission” to the United States and thus does not mandate detention under
§ 1225(b)(2). 	This conclusion is consistent with other judicial decisions in this District.
E.g., Misael T. v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-263 (ECT/EMB), 2026 WL 146510, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 20, 2026); Mahamed C.A. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-4551 (MJD/JFD), 2025 WL 3771299,
at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Awaale,
2025 WL 3754012, at *1; Mayamu K., 2025 WL 3641819, at *4. This conclusion is also
consistent with Maldonado, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1139, 1151–52, in which this Court
determined that a noncitizen with a pending asylum application was already present in the
United States, not seeking admission into the country, and thus not subject to § 1225(b)(2).
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B. Appropriate Remedy
Having determined that § 1225(b) is 	inapplicable to 	Petitioner, 	who would
otherwise fall under § 1226(a), the Court turns to the appropriate remedy. Section 1226(a)
provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). The statute requires the issuance of a warrant as a
precursor to detention under § 1226(a). Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4711 (ECT/SGE),
2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (citing Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, --- F. Supp.
3d ---, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025), appeal filed (Nov. 6, 2025);
J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2025)). “[I]t follows that absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be arrested
and detained under section 1226(a).” Chogllo Chafla, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (emphasis
in original).
Petitioner alleges that upon information and belief, he was arrested and detained
without a warrant. (Pet. ¶¶ 29, 52.) Although the Court’s Order to Show Cause required
Respondents to address “[w]hether the absence of a warrant preceding Petitioner’s arrest
necessitates Petitioner’s immediate release,” (OSC ¶ 2(e)), as Petitioner notes in his Reply,
Respondents have not produced a warrant, nor any other documentation supporting
Petitioner’s detention. 	(Reply [Doc. No. 6] ¶¶ 6–7.) Section 1226(a) requires, in the first
instance, that Petitioner’s arrest and detention are authorized by the issuance of a warrant.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); Vedat C. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19,
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2025). Again, Respondents have failed to produce, much less address, § 1226(a)’s warrant
requirement here. Petitioner’s arrest and detention are therefore unauthorized.
As other judges in this District have found, the appropriate remedy for detention
that lacks a proper statutory basis under § 1226(a) is release. Ahmed M., 2026 WL 25627,
at *3 (finding release the appropriate remedy where Respondents did not produce a
warrant); Juan S.R. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-0005 (PJS/LIB) (D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2026) [Doc.
No. 8 at 3–4] (following the reasoning of Ahmed M. and ordering immediate release where
Respondents failed to present evidence of a warrant); Vedat C. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4642
(JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025) [Doc. No. 9] at 6] (“[A] bond hearing presupposes
lawful detention authority under § 1226. 	Where that authority has not been invoked or
established, ordering a bond hearing would treat the absence of statutory power as a mere
procedural irregularity rather than a substantive defect.”). “Habeas relief . . . addresses the
lawfulness of custody itself,” and “[f]or detention that lacks a lawful predicate, release is
an available and appropriate remedy.” Vedat C., No. 25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn.
Dec. 19, 2025) [Doc. No. 9] at 6]. Accordingly, Respondents shall release Petitioner from
custody.
Accordingly, the Court grants Petitioner’s request for release, as set forth below.
III. 	ORDER
Based on the submissions and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that
1. 	Petitioner Gabriel J.’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] is
GRANTED, as follows:
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2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody immediately, but no later than
within 48 hours.
3. 	Prior to Petitioner’s release, Respondents must first notify Petitioner’s legal
counsel within two hours of his impending release, and include the location of
his release and approximate release time, so that Petitioner’s counsel may make
transportation 	arrangements 	and 	Petitioner’s 	counsel 	may 	notify 	family
members.
4. 	Upon release, Respondents shall return to Petitioner all of his identifying
documents, immigration documents, paperwork of any kind, his cell phone, and
any other personal belongings, including clothing and jewelry.
5. 	Respondents may not administratively recharacterize the release granted by this
Order as grounds to impose conditions or re-impose existing conditions in
conjunction 	with 	release 	(including 	release 	on 	recognizance 	or 	similar
instruments), without prior notice to and authorization from the Court, or absent
a new and independently lawful custody decision properly executed under the
law.
6. 	Respondents shall confirm Petitioner’s release within 48 hours from the date of
this Order.
7. 	Respondents may not re-detain Petitioner under a statutory theory this Court has
rejected in this proceeding absent materially changed circumstances.
Dated: February 4, 2026 	s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge
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